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Abstract
Every political system has a shared language of symbols, narratives and priorities 
through which legitimation is sought. This language is basic and schematic, yet it 
generates 'legitimate' priorities and objectives. My interest is two-fold: firstly, how is 
this language reproduced, disseminated and upheld? Secondly, how is it used, 
interpreted and adapted to legitimise a wide array of actions, policies or ideas? I seek 
to answer these questions in light of Turkey's EU ambitions.
I sketch the prescriptions of what I call the normative core of Turkish politics, as 
expressed through national socialisation, the Constitution and the raison d'etre of key 
institutions. I show how institutions such as the military, judiciary and Presidency 
legitimise their actions through appeals to this normative core, thus reproducing it 
with little variation, while simultaneously reproducing a shared language of politics. I 
also highlight the wide dissemination this language enjoys through education and 
early learning as well as its symbolic reproduction through spatial narratives such as 
national sites, museums and monuments.
Having demonstrated how this language is institutionally entrenched, widely 
disseminated and extensively used for the legitimation of public activities, I turn to 
the question of whether its constraints also create opportunities. I argue that Turkey's 
EU ambitions have actually led to the proliferation of such opportunities by 
introducing an alternative value benchmark in the pursuit of political legitimacy. 
Although the language is not abandoned, it is being actively enriched.
After decades of tension and reform, the notions of 'secularism' and 'westernisation', 
cornerstones of the normative core of Turkish politics, are now open to debate. This 
could lead to a process of radical re-negotiation of political values. Alternatively, the 
constraints that the language imposes might actually outweigh the opportunities. For 
now, a delicate but fascinating process of negotiation is unfolding in the heart of the 
Turkish political system. My PhD seeks to explain and analyse it.
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Introduction
The Republic of Turkey is Mustafa Kemal's (later Atatiirk) creation. This thesis sets 
out to examine the place Atatiirk's legacy occupies in Turkey today and the role it still 
plays in Turkish politics. I intend to show that Kemalism, an idiosyncratic blend of 
legacies, ideas and prescriptions, constitutes Turkey's language for legitimate politics, 
moulding political debate and processes. I propose that Kemalism is neither redundant 
nor a hegemonic ideology, as much of the literature suggests. Rather, after eight 
decades of being appealed to, institutionalised and celebrated, Kemalism has become 
a language used by law, educators, politicians and journalists, regardless of whether 
they understand Ataturk's legacy the same way or, indeed, embrace it entirely. This 
way of analysing Kemalism has not, to my knowledge, been documented and 
explored before. Yet it is vital to do so as Kemalism's ability to articulate Turkey's 
future is being revisited as Kemalism, as a language, is being renegotiated.
Because many embrace Kemalism as an ideology or creed and reject the very notion 
of re-interpretation and negotiation, using Kemalism as a language and, even more 
controversially, negotiating its specifics are sensitive issues in Turkey. Certain groups 
oppose this flexibility and seek to reverse it. The ensuing battle of wills between 
opposing groups is fought in Kemalist terms. Claims are made and opposed, 
effectively, in the same language. This does not mean that Kemalism is the only 
language for politics in Turkey; others do exist. Some, for instance, Islamic political 
idioms, antagonise Kemalist assumptions. Others, such as languages premised on 
Western universality and democratic popularity, represent alternatives without 
rejecting Kemalism, for Europe as an abstraction and universal values as a measure of 
civilisation are Kemalist legacies, as is the Republic within which a popular mandate 
can be claimed. Kemalism frames political debate in Turkey.
Research for this thesis started practically as Turkey's current government came to 
power. My initial purpose was to understand Turkey's erratic relationship with the 
EU, explain why EU membership is simultaneously feared and coveted and why 
domestic political actors simultaneously accuse each other of wanting EU 
membership too much and not wanting it enough. What I found is that Ataturk's 
legacy on the issue of westernisation is mixed and that a fierce negotiation on what it 
actually entailed and whether joining the EU will realise Ataturk's dream or
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undermine his legacy is currently under way. This negotiation is effectively debating 
both Turkey's path towards the future and the nature of this future.
Chapter 1 will discuss the nature of Atattirk's legacy and its function and seek to 
explain 'Kemalism' by looking at Atattirk's statements and speeches, analyses and 
opinions offered by partisan intellectuals, politicians and journalists as well as 
academic accounts. Looking at Atattirk's perception of his bequest, I will assess the 
form its preservation takes: is it an ideology? A tradition? A movement? This will 
help me analyse both this legacy's corresponding role within Turkish politics and the 
nature of its influence. Here I will propose that, although Atattirkism is an ideology 
for some and is understood as a movement by many, it has also become - through 
time, institutionalisation and extensive use - a language. Kemalism, I argue, is a 
language for the construction and negotiation of legitimacy in Turkey.
Kemalism as a language is useful because it is universally intelligible. In Chapters 2 
and 3,1 will show how every Turk is socialised into recognising Kemalist narratives, 
themes and priorities. Chapter 2 will look at schoolbooks, language books and leisure 
reading materials for children, while Chapter 3 will look at republican monuments, 
museums and national sites. I will show how a nexus of meaning is introduced at a 
young age and then constantly elaborated on and reproduced through a saturation of 
public space with Kemalist symbols and narratives.
Chapter 4 will show that this language is used not only to articulate national identity, 
but is actually the language of the law; its priorities are also the priorities of Turkey's 
legal system. Here I will demonstrate that the constitution derives its legitimacy from 
Atattirk and, in turn, bases all its provisions on Atattirk's principles. This means that 
the legal system remains anchored on certain principles, reforms notwithstanding.
As I will show in Chapter 5, this means that, despite recent reform, the law is 
interpreted in ways that uphold Kemalist principles as the judiciary understand them. 
This effectively means that Turkey's EU ambitions may be frustrated at home because 
of an intense debate over the essence of Kemalism and the goals of Turkish politics. 
Here I will show how self-professed Kemalists (the Turkish Armed Forces, TAP, or 
the President of the Republic) reproduce this language while simultaneously seeking 
to protect it from being used independently of what they perceive as its true content.
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This is what some Kemalists believe the current government seeks to do: use 
Kemalist language and priorities, namely westernisation, in order to renegotiate 
Kemalist practices, institutions and principles. Chapters 6 and 7 will highlight how 
this renegotiation possible in the first place and how it is being attempted.
Chapter 6 will demonstrate that Kemalist secularist legacies are mixed and 
contradictory. For early Kemalists, secularism was both a stepping-stone for 
modernisation and its proof. Hence, secular policies until the 1990s should be seen in 
the light of specific conditions and in conjunction with the general direction of the 
modernising project at any one time. During the 1990s, secularism was elevated to a 
value in itself. In this context, the AKP 1 seeks to redefine the meaning of secularism 
and alter the way secularism is understood and approached in Turkey. Erdogan seeks 
to transform Ataturk's freedom from religion to European-style religious freedom. In 
the context of Turkey's EU aspirations, Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan seeks to use 
Kemalist westernisation to challenge Kemalist secularism. This debate, I will show, 
simultaneously revisits the nature of modernity and the best path for its achievement.
Chapter 7 deals with westernisation. Although, on the surface, Ataturk's westernising 
drive is clear, his legacy towards the West is mixed. Kemalist modernising urges are 
closely linked to a defensive nationalism that makes Turks extremely sensitive to 
perceived slights, insults and what is often seen as unwarranted meddling from 
European quarters. As Turkey is battling against European doubts regarding its 
Europeanness, a domestic debate about whether EU membership should be pursued at 
all cost is gaining momentum. Many Kemalists accept an update of the system, but 
see no reason to replace the existing legitimising paradigm. Others, including such 
disparate groups as the government and much of the independent intelligentsia, 
support reform and believe that democracy should permit diverging perceptions of the 
'good life'. This debate is influenced and often hijacked by domestic and international 
developments and corresponding fears and anxieties. As incidents threatening to 
derail Turkey's EU bid are carefully negotiated at home, the question that needs 
answering is whether accession can occur without the Kemalist republic ceding its
1 Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, the Justice and Development Party. The acronym AK means white, pure, 
unblemished - in keeping with the AKP's self-professed integrity.
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place to a second republic. Is such a transition desirable? And will Kemalism's 
defenders permit the articulation of this option in the first place?
Studying events as they unfold a priori guarantees originality for one's project. This 
thesis occupies a vantage point that has not been explored adequately elsewhere and 
draws on material that - although analysed by others - has not been simultaneously 
studied in the same volume before. Moreover, this thesis benefits from the analysis of 
varied textual material and extensive personal observation.
I spent several months in Turkey, collecting books and documents as well as engaging 
in participant observation, informal interviews and visiting all the museums, 
monuments and national sites discussed in Chapter 3. All observations and 
descriptions not referenced to others are derived from my own research and all 
photographic material in the appendix is my own. A considerable amount of my 
original material was available online, hence legal and official documents, speeches, 
interviews, newspapers and certain scholarly articles were accessed electronically 
unless otherwise stated. References from electronic sources do not contain page 
numbers. All electronic references were valid and 'live' at the time of submission. 
When quoting ministers, state officials and military officers, I cite their title at the 
time the statement was made.
Newspapers are listed in the bibliography alongside a set of initials. In the text, 
newspaper articles are referenced citing these initials and publication date. Finally, 
schoolbooks and early childhood books are often penned by many authors or do not 
offer the author's name. In the text they are referred to by their title, for coherence and 
clarity. Full bibliographical details are offered in the bibliography.
Quotes, especially from speeches and documents available in English, often have 
mistakes in them that I have not corrected. For word-count purposes I refrained from 
adding (sic) next to them. All translations from Turkish, French, Greek and Italian 
sources are my own unless otherwise stated. In the bibliography, all documents are 
cited in the original with translations provided only for Greek titles.
As I only started learning Turkish when I started my PhD, I am aware of the 
limitations this places on my ability to use the language for some of my research. For
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instance, I was unable to read the Constitution in Turkish. As all such documents are 
available in English, however, this was not a handicap. I read the Turkish press daily 
and my language skills were adequate to tackle all the original material needed for 
Chapter 2 and elsewhere. Where secondary sources are concerned - and noting that 
Turkish scholars invariably seek to publish in English - I made a conscious decision 
to use only English-language secondary sources in the name of speed. I, nevertheless, 
used numerous Turkish sources in English and French and believe the coverage of 




Although it is easy to identify specific ideas and priorities as part of Atatiirk's legacy, 
charting this legacy and defining its form and functions is complex. In this chapter, I 
will outline Atatiirk's bequest, his political priorities and other legacies. I will 
demonstrate the difficulties involved in seeking to define Kemalism as an ideology, a 
political movement or a historical phenomenon and argue that, although Kemalism is 
an ideology many espouse, above all it is a language everyone uses.
/. Atatiirk's Legacy
During his lifetime, Atattirk actively encouraged his people's admiration of his 
achievements as war hero and republican father. Moreover, he always stressed the 
fusion of his personal trajectory with the national one, claiming that the nation is both 
an extension and a reflection of his person. The people should not only admire him 
but, in order to be true to themselves, remain loyal to him. Atatiirk claimed complete 
ownership over the people he liberated. He was their natural leader and they were his 
people, his children, forged in his image. This is his bequest, left to the Turks in the 
form ofNutuk1 , the famous 36-and-a-half-hour speech.
In this speech, Atattirk presents his leadership as essential to independence and 
freedom. He presents himself as the sole author of national salvation - not even the 
nation shares his glory - but also its only possible author. Without him, the Turks 
would simply not exist and, Atattirk stresses, he was the only person who could have 
achieved this. There were no alternatives as his comrades-in-arms and republican 
companions were inadequate, self-serving, power-hungry hypocrites and liars 
(Atattirk, 2003:16, 25, 409, 422, 443, 522, 581, 588, 592, 740). He on the other hand, 
Atattirk claims, only cared for the good of his people, who responded by giving him 




cannot be imitated or repeated: therefore, the nation needs to remain loyal to this 
legacy and vigilant against threats and reversals.
Given the magnitude of his achievements and the natural bond he enjoys with his 
people, opposition to Atatiirk's legacy would be not only foolish, but actually a 
character flaw (p.l 1) amounting to national betrayal. Such treason, he notes in Nutuk, 
took many forms during the national struggle. Some even sought to restore the 
imperial state even though the nation's manifest desires had made it impossible to 
continue serving the Ottoman cabinet (p. 165). Only Atatiirk responded to these 
desires because, he notes, he alone possessed the vision for saving his people (p.8). 
'In this situation there was only one resolution to be taken, that of creating a new 
Turkish state, based on national sovereignty... [so] that the Turkish nation could lead 
an existence of dignity and glory' (p.9).
Having saved the nation, to ensure that its restored dignity and new-found glory 
would not lapse, Atatiirk launched a modernisation campaign. Turkey was to achieve 
the standards of contemporary civilisation and join the civilised nations of the world 
(p.303, 523, 598). Thus Atatiirk offered his people military triumph, national 
deliverance, happiness and 'the avoidance of misery' (p.318), as well as a promise to 
work for the 'health of this patria and nation' (p.348). What he did not promise was 
democracy. Atatiirk proclaims: '[sovereignty belongs without reserve or condition to 
the nation. The administrative system rests on the principle that the people rule 
effectively and personally its destiny' (p.492). Nevertheless, he also notes: 'What I 
expect from the entire people, without exceptions, is complete submission to the 
orders of the government' (p. 134); but not just any government. While Atatiirk was 
alive, the Turkish Republic was his domain. Ataturk notes: 'The entire nation 
accepted the principles / published and it was clear that those who opposed the 
principles or even my person had no chance of being elected deputies by the nation' 
(p.624 - emphasis added). And thus, he believes, it should remain after his death.
Evidently, Atatiirk's legacy is one of nationalism and modernisation, not one of 
democracy and individualism. This legacy rested on three pillars: collectivism, 
essentialism and teleology. Nutuk closes with the famous Address to Youth, through 
which Ataturk entrusts the Republic to the hands of unborn Turks:
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'Your first duty is to safeguard and eternally defend national independence, 
the Turkish Republic. It is the only foundation of your existence and future... 
In the future, there will be those wishing the country harm, both inside and 
outside it, who will want to grab this treasure away from you... By force or 
ruse, all citadels and arsenals of the patria may have been taken; all of its 
armies may have been dispersed and the country entirely occupied. 
Envisage an even more sinister eventuality, suppose that those who hold 
power within the country have fallen into error, ignorance or even treason and 
confuse their personal interests with the invaders' political ambitions. The 
nation itself may have fallen into adversity, ruin and exhaustion. 
Even in those conditions, Turkish child of centuries to come, your duty is to 
save Turkish independence and the Republic. The strength necessary for this 
exists, in full potential, in the noble blood that flows in your veins' (Ataturk, 
2003:746-7 or 2002:279-280)2 .
Ataturk blends the primordial appeal to blood with the civic tie of republican 
citizenship, thus turning citizenship into an essential bond. Atatiirk claims both the 
Turks and the Republic as his creations and then presents the two as naturally linked. 
The Turks' blood dictates protection of the Republic because 'the blood shed' (p.487) 
for Anatolia's deliverance ensured the Republic's creation and should not go to waste. 
Blood binds unborn Turks to the republican patria. It is natural, Ataturk implies, that 
individual Turks should seek to protect what their ancestors died establishing. If one 
does not feel allegiance to the Republican Fatherland, then one is not really a Turk.
Through the Address to Youth - carved on the walls of public buildings, universities 
and Amtkabir (Atatiirk's mausoleum) and memorised by all schoolchildren - Atatiirk 
binds national consciousness with the Republic's protection. National consciousness 
entails vigilance against external and internal enemies. Although guarded, this 
national consciousness 'is not selfish and arrogant' (1920 speech, see Ataturk, 1920- 
1937); rather, it is good both for Turkey and the world. Speaking in 1921 (ibid), he 
stressed that 'Anatolia... is not only fulfilling a survival duty for itself, but... erecting 
a barrier against all attacks directed to the East'. For, although Ataturk (ibid) stressed
1 For alternative translations, see bibliography.
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in 1937 that '[a] 11 nations have become... members of one family', dangers to 
national independence persisted. Consequently, the nation must remain vigilant.
Actually, for Atattirk, this is the main task of national education, as vigilance holds 
the key to both national survival and greatness. Addressing a group of teachers in 
1922, Atattirk (1920-1937) noted: 'A military victory is insufficient for true 
liberation'. Lasting national survival and progress rest on the cultivation of national 
consciousness through education. 'It is only education, science and teachers that can 
save the nation' (1925 speech, ibid).
Liberation was only the first step in Atattirk's plan, the realisation of which relied on 
retaining national consciousness. Speaking in 1923 (ibid), and reflecting popular 
concerns of the time, Atattirk noted: 'No matter how great may be the victories won 
by a nation at the battlefield, those victories may only yield lasting results through the 
efforts of an army of educators'. Such statements undoubtedly offered teachers, 
working under hard conditions, a sense of purpose. Simultaneously, however, they 
reveal Atattirk's conviction that the national struggle did not end with independence. 
National deliverance led to the Republic, which, in turn, opened the road for 
modernisation. Modernisation was liberation's final aim.
National pride was an invaluable resource on this path, so Atattirk sought to cultivate 
a strong sense of pride in national belonging. Speaking on the tenth anniversary of the 
Republic's foundation, Atattirk identified himself as a member of the great Turkish 
nation, alongside 'his' citizens and the nation's 'valuable army' with great pride 
because, he noted, '[t]he Turkish nation is of excellent character... intelligent... 
capable of overcoming difficulties of national unity, and because it holds the torch of 
positive sciences' (Atattirk, 1933). Turkishness is associated with intelligence, 
progress and bravery. Simultaneously, unity - vital during the tumultuous war years - 
is deemed vital in peacetime as well, ensuring progress and greatness. Conversely, 
disunity is presented as an affliction and a sign of stupidity.
The speech concludes with the words 'ne mutlu Turkum diyene\ 'How happy he who 
says I'm a Turk', presenting happiness as a concomitant of Turkishness. This phrase 
is now an ever-present national mantra. Although this repetition could be interpreted 
as a sign of national insecurity, rather it seems to indicate the success of Atattirk's
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narratives in forging national pride and inspiring a sense of ownership over the 
republican, national, westernising project, as described in Nutuk.
Yet, there is one conspicuous omission from Ataturk's account in Nutuk: there is little 
mention of secularism. Does 'contemporary civilisation' ipso facto suggest 
secularism? For Andrew Mango, Turkey's most famous western student and one of 
Ataturk's most fervent admirers, it does. Speaking in 2000, Mango argued that 
'secularism followed naturally from Ataturk's rationalist philosophy'. Atatiirk did not 
need to stress the importance of secularism; in fact, secularism only becomes a 
contentious issue when modernisation proceeds without the corresponding 
secularisation. Yet this does not fully explain the omission.
Nutuk is hardly the place for secularist bravado. The speech was delivered soon after 
the end of the Independence War, during which the Kemalists had made extensive 
appeals to religion and the Caliph in order to gain the support of pious soldiers. 
Memories were fresh. Although Atatiirk dismisses the Caliphate as 'nothing but an 
object of derision in the eyes of the civilised and cultivated world' (p. 10), he still 
appeals to God frequently (e.g. p.371, 373) and does not advocate uncompromising 
secularism. He does, however, stress that the Turks' greatness predated their 
conversion to Islam (p.598) and urges them to purify sentiments and knowledge 
'through the light of true science' (p.608), thus preventing tradition, history and the 
fanciful notions of Islamic unity from jeopardising national survival.
Atatiirk praises enlightened religion whereby 'humanity shall abandon Christianity, 
Islamism, Buddhism [and] there shall exist a religion pure and devoid of tarnish, 
simplified and comprehensible for all and having a universal character' (p.612). This, 
he notes, is in line with a higher level of civilisation and universal standards. 
Secularism thus emerges as a means for showing the world that Turkey is not a 
primitive nation sunk in prejudice and superstition (p.745). Hence, Atatiirk opposes 
the Caliphate, not because of its religious identity, but because of its desire to block 
progress in order to hold onto an order of things made redundant by the passage of 
time. The Caliphate is guilty of seeking to 'sacrifice the Turkish people in the name of 
a simple caprice, a fantasy, a mirage' (p.610).
17
Chapter 1
A nation has to move with the times or perish. The Republic, celebrated by Ataturk as 
the Turks' 'natural' political habitat, is the vehicle for progress. Hence, Ataturk 
identifies republicanism and a thirst for progress as natural concomitants of 
Turkishness. Secularism is in turn depicted as a natural republican trait and, hence, 
necessary for both national survival and progress: 'Our greatest strength, our prestige 
in the eyes of the world rests in the new form, the new character of our regime' 
(p.602). The regime that Ataturk has bound with national identity is Turkey's ticket 
for acceptance by the world, or the part of it that matters: the civilised West.
2. The Six Arrows
Atatiirk's legacy is emotionally potent, albeit often muddled in terms of its derivation 
and internal logic. Kemalism's prescriptions are simple and stark, yet no concrete 
instructions are offered for the pursuit of its goals. Kemalism offers vision, but not 
method. That was the case even before Atatiirk's passing, even though he died in 
office. In the 1930s, rather than actively formulating policy, he busied himself with 
grand research projects in Turkish history and language. Nevertheless, he retained 
control over the direction, boundaries and priorities of political activity through the 
introduction of a simple set of principles known as the 'Six Arrows' (Alti Ok) initially 
presented as the manifesto of Ataturk's Cumhurriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican 
People's Party). With the exception of two short-lived experiments at controlled 
opposition that proved unexpectedly popular and thus came to an abrupt end, the CHP 
was, until the mid-1940s, Turkey's only political party. This effectively gave the Six 
Arrows universal validity, enhanced by their incorporation into the constitution 
(Weiker, 1981:222), where they have remained, despite constitutional reform3 .
The Arrows (nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism, statism and 
reformism) offer neither socio-political insight on a grand analytical scale nor short- 
term party-specific goals. Rather, they propose avenues and methods for ensuring that 
the Turkish nation leads a life of dignity, security and glory. Their ultimate aim is 
modernisation, which, for Ataturk, held the key to survival and progress. The Arrows
'In 1937, 1961 1983 and 2001.
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were pragmatic context-specific recommendations. Economic statism, for instance, 
was necessary for survival given the post-war, crisis-ridden international economy 
and was eventually abandoned. The remaining Arrows, however, survive and are still 
continuously appealed to, with some having become values in themselves.
As Ataturk was the leader of a state-seeking nationalist liberation movement, it is 
hardly surprising that nationalism remains strong in Turkey. In fact, nationalism is a 
powerful tool for any state, partly because, Herb (1999:9) notes, state power is 
territorially defined and partly because national identity itself is partially spatial. 
States, therefore, invariably seek to control, define and use territory in order to 
engender support or loyalty, claim legitimacy or foster a desirable collective identity. 
This is exactly what Ataturk's nationalism achieved, welding ethnic and civic appeals 
into a coherent narrative anchored on Anatolia. This account, essentialising both the 
Turks' homeland and their relationship to it, was subsequently embraced and widely 
disseminated by the Turkish state (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Fusing nationality and republicanism, Ataturk legitimised the polity by presenting it 
as a product of Anatolian soil and the Turks' natural political habitat. Yet this did not 
constitute a declaration of democratic intent. As the Ottoman Empire became 
associated with defeat and humiliation, Ottoman/Islamic identity became a symbol of 
vulnerability and potential degradation. The secular Republic was thus hailed as the 
institutional expression of a collectivist and decidedly anti-Ottoman Turkish 
nationalism and a guarantee of security and dignity. Having identified backwardness 
as the reason for Ottoman vulnerability, Ataturk saw the Republic as both the first 
stepping-stone towards modernisation and the best vehicle for its achievement. 
Consequently, he was more concerned with modernisation than democratic structures, 
while national sovereignty referred to a collective sense of destiny rather than civic 
empowerment. In this context, populism proved a useful tool.
Ataturk saw the nation as his creation and himself as the natural representative of 
national volition. As the purpose of politics was given (modernisation) and as the 
people lacked the political maturity to make (correct) decisions, Atatiirk's populism 
was, for Mango (1999a:6), a salutary sign of reason and realism. Effectively, 
however, what Ataturk described as politics for the people, if not by the people, was 
pure paternalism and gave rise to the devlet-baba (father-state) that is only now being
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challenged through reform and the electorate's increasing sophistication and 
cynicism. Still the paternal(istic) rhetoric persists.
The vaguest yet possibly most influential 'Arrow' is 'reformism' or 'revolutionism', 
referring to the continuation of the Inkildp, the non-violent revolution that was the 
political and social transformation Turkey experienced in early republican years. The 
secular republic was established as part of Ataturk's modernisation drive. Reformism 
expresses his intention to persevere until modernisation is complete. Reformism also 
proves that Kemalism is not reducible to the Six Arrows; its vision goes beyond the 
methods employed at any one time, hence negotiation on how best to achieve 
Ataturk's vision is possible, if not necessary.
Ataturk wanted Turkey to be modern as much as he wanted to be the leader of a 
modern country: personal ambition supported political intent. In Ataturk's mind, 
secularism, a republican nation-state and economic growth were the essence of 
modernity. Although his grasp of economic processes lacked sophistication, Ataturk 
visualised 'modernity' and tried to make Turkey look the part, hence his 
republicanism, secularism and nationalism were often exaggerated in form and 
possibly lacking in essence: they were means to an end.
Ataturk's (1933) legacy is clear: '[w]e shall raise our country to the level of the most 
prosperous and civilised nations of the world... We shall raise our national culture 
above the contemporary level of civilisation'. Turkey was a project and the nation was 
the vehicle for its achievement; national need was what Ataturk deemed it to be and 
the nation's destiny what Ataturk commanded. In time, Ataturk and his people would 
come to be seen as essentially linked as he becomes the executor of national volition, 
accepted by national mythology and academic commentators alike. When political 
scientist Henry Alien (1968:69) claims that, via Ataturk, Turkey exhibited national 
volition - 'deciding' to make herself a nation - he effectively embraces the 
essentialism of national rhetoric conferring a priori popular legitimacy on all 
Ataturk's acts, including the creation of the secular Republic. Some identify this 
mystical bond as Ataturk's most precious gift; others celebrate the Arrows as an 
ideological bequest, while others still perceive the movement towards progress, rather 
than its methods, as Ataturk's true legacy.
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3. From Atatiirk's Legacies to Kemalism
3. a. Kemalist Mysticism
The mystical bond between Atatiirk, the nation and the Republic is accepted and 
reproduced not only by Turkish schoolbooks (see Chapter 2), but also by academic 
apologists inside and outside Turkey. Jevakhoff (1989:442) calls Turkey the most 
beautiful homage to Atatiirk, turning the nation into a monument in the father's 
honour. This is a recurring theme. Most discussions on republican Turkey are 
premised on the belief that, although without Atatiirk a Turkish national state would 
probably still have been created, it would have been smaller and state-building would 
not have been as peaceful (Mango, 1999a:4). Atatiirk, having shown Turkey 'the way 
out of an oriental ghetto' (ibid, p.8), is venerated as the man without whom Turkey 
would not exist; he 'brought new life and hope to the Turkish people, restored their 
energies and self-respect, and set them firmly on the road not only to independence, 
but to that rarer and more precious thing that is freedom' (Lewis, 2002:293). 
Journalists and academics, both Turkish and foreign, revere Atatiirk and accept 
Turkey as his handiwork. The legitimacy with which this vests his legacy cannot be 
underestimated. Stressing that Atatiirk brought light and hope (Camcigil4, ND), 
'salvaging] his country from being reduced to... a client-state of British imperialism' 
(DT, 22 November 2005) makes gratitude a quasi-compulsory feeling.
Baki llkin, Deputy undersecretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, in a 2003 address, 
noted that 'the Turkish nation founds its national identity with Atatiirk' on 19 May 
1919, when Atatiirk landed in Samsun and the War of Independence begun. On that 
date, 'the birth date of Turkish democracy' (ibid), the Republic, the patria and the 
nation were born simultaneously. Although, llkin claims, the nation had 'high values', 
Atatiirk vested it with his own traits, thus catalysing the Turks' destiny through an 
inversion of historical and political agency. Although the Republic is based on 
national sovereignty, the nation is derivative. llkin even states that '[t]he Turkish 
nation did not leave [Atatiirk] alone in this quest for democracy and modernisation. 
With total conviction they adopted his reforms and embraced democracy'. Atatiirk is 
the actual repository of national agency: the nation follows.
' President of the Atatiirk Society of America.
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Initially, however, the nation did not follow all that readily. As 'the masses for the 
most part were oblivious to the fact that they needed to be saved', notes apologist 
Suna Kili (1969:53), Ataturk 'had to be ruthless in order to modernize a backward 
nation at a time when its illiterate people considered any reform the work of the 
infidel' (Kaylan5 , 2005:64). Thus, in Kemalist narratives, the Turks retain no agency 
over their liberation and later republicanism. Yet Kemalist priorities remain 'natural' 
to nationhood as they appear expedient in light of a narrative of historical 
determinism. Hence, these narratives can claim simultaneously that Ataturk forged a 
nation out of disparate and unwilling elements and that the nation is natural, its 
character and aspirations directly inherited from Ataturk. 'The Turkish nation will 
keep marching along the path of civilization that Ataturk laid before it. Because the 
legacy left by Ataturk is still cherished by the Turkish people as the strongest 
guarantee for its survival and progress' (ilkin, 2003).
For Kili (1969:82), 'one's Turkishness [is] not necessarily determined by one's race 
or religion, but by the degree a person associated himself with the ideas, ideals, and 
goals of the Turkish nation and by determination to protect all that had been won as a 
result of great hardships; and also by commitment to Turkish modernization'. As 
Ataturk forged the Republic and its citizens simultaneously and concurrently, loving 
Ataturk and cherishing the Republic is not a matter of choice. Essentialising the bond 
Ataturk shares with his people effectively 'naturalises' the entire republican project 
and 'locks' the Turks into following the path that Ataturk laid down for them because 
to stray from it would violate nature, providence and common sense.
Although this infusion of national narratives with ideological subtexts? is hardly 
limited to Turkey, its effects go beyond simply unifying the population. This 
essentialist narrative replaces Ataturk's undeniable charisma with a quasi-mystical 
aura (see Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1984:344-345). Ataturk comes to 'personif[y] the 
Turkish Revolution' making it impossible to 'be for the Turkish Revolution and 
against Ataturk' (Aksin, 1999:14-15). This goes beyond acknowledging an 
ideological debt to Ataturk and a sense of gratitude for the modern, secular Republic. 
Ataturk becomes the anthropomorphic instantiation of both state and idealised nation, 
Turkey's patron saint, the source and guarantor of national pride and safety.
' Journalist and self-professed Kemalist, see below.
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This is particularly evident during the commemoration of his death. On 10 November 
each year, schoolchildren write him letters asking for peace, health and prosperity. 
Some even register complaints about other children at school (H, 10 November 2005). 
The letters resemble prayers. On 10 November 2005, Hwriyet carried a text-box 
reading Yol aym yol, ruh aym ruh: the road is the same road, the spirit is the same 
spirit. The vision is alive and at 9:05 am, the time of Atatiirk's death, the fatherland 
stands still and silent to the sound of sirens and the national anthem.
10 November is a national day of mourning with ceremonies reminiscent of the 
country's monarchical past. In Istanbul, top military and municipal officers visit the 
room Atatiirk died in, before it opens to the public, hi Ankara, the President leads a 
ceremony at Anitkabir, attended by Turkey's political and military leadership before 
this site is also opened to mourners.
Honouring Atatiirk entails a transcendence of his mortality. The rituals claim his 
continued presence among his people. The appeals are not to his ideological legacy, 
but to the mystical bond, the guiding hand that, as President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
wrote in the Anitkabir visitors' book on 10 November 2005, led 'our country out of 
the darkness with your enlightenment' (S, 10 November 2005). The Dolmabah9e 
visitors' book is filled with similar entries, evoking Ataturk's presence: a beloved and 
saintly father watching over his people. The Independence War and reforms era are 
mentioned as if still in living memory. Atatiirk's immortal spirit is celebrated as the 
guarantor of republicanism and the essence of Turkish national pride. For Parla and 
Davison (2004:165, 167), this quasi-religious way of remembering Atatiirk supplants 
choice and reflection with a public discourse of love and kinship. Regardless of 
whether love is felt by all, this public narrative frames public discussions on Atatiirk 
and underlies appeals to and discussions of his legacy. It is in this context that the 
question of whether Atatiirk bequeathed an ideology should be raised. Many embrace 
Kemalism as an ideology while others malign it as one, resenting its symbolic 
prevalence. Yet 'ideology' does not fully describe Kemalism.
23
Chapter 1
3.b. What is Kemalism?
Kemalism is often referred to in the press as well as in academic and political 
literature as an ideology. In a study by Giannakopoulos and Maras (2005:13) on 
European Parliamentary groups' attitudes towards Turkey, all respondents speak of 
Kemalism as a doctrine. Although they disagree on Kemalism's specifics (p.7, 16-7, 
22), both the respondents and the authors treat Kemalism as Turkey's state ideology. 
Undeniably, Kemalism occupies a privileged discursive position within Turkish 
politics (see Chapters 4 and 5) and although Ataturk claimed that Kemalism was not 
an ideology but a guide to action, some embrace it as a value-system, while others 
oppose it as a hegemonic and repressive ideology.
For Parla and Davison (2004:35), Kemalism represents 'the sole, most determinative, 
all-encompassing public philosophy, embedded and enforced in the governing and 
socializing institutions of the Turkish Republic'. Kemalism is heavily institutionalised 
in Turkey, but Parla and Davison assume a degree of coherence and determination 
that may be exhibited by self-professed Kemalist actors, but is not actually offered by 
Kemal's legacy. Moreover, although Kemalism enjoys a predominant discursive 
position, Bozdogan (2001:12) finds that Turkey enjoys an intense, if polarised debate 
between the defenders and critics of Kemalism's republican modernism. If anything, 
in the five years since Bozdogan's publication, debate has intensified and points of 
view have proliferated and fragmented. Turkey's public domain is polyphonic; 
Kemalism is prominent, but open to contestation and appropriation by political agents 
from the far Left to the extreme Right (e.g. TP, 14 December 2004).
For Parla and Davison (2004:36-7), this in itself is proof of hegemony as Kemalism's 
presence in non-state institutional spaces both ensures and proves the marginalisation 
or elimination of alternative beliefs. To them, Kemalism is hegemonic, monopolistic 
and exclusionary, 'securing] and reserving] public space solely for itself by rejecting 
prima facie the legitimacy of existing alternative ideologies'. It seems, nevertheless, 
that Parla and Davison's (2004:48-50) quarrel is with Ataturk, not Atatiirkism. They 
do not seek to analyse what they dismissively call the 'congratulatory politics of 
national enthusiasm' (ibid, 2004:73). They do not seek to prove Kemalism is a 
hegemonic ideology; that is their starting point. They choose to speak of hegemony as 
Kemalism is neither coercive nor totalitarian yet, they believe, it still vanquishes
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alternatives. Kemalism is undeniably discursively dominant yet describing it as 
hegemonic clouds over the intensity of public debate in Turkey. This debate leads to 
alternatives to Kemalism prevailing on occasion and it often leads to the negotiation 
of what exactly a Kemalist point of view ought to be in the first place. Such 
flexibility, or even uncertainty, does not bode well for hegemony.
Although attempts to systematise Kemalism into an ideology have been made, they 
never succeeded. Some, such as Camcigil (ND), believe that '[t]here ought to be an 
Ataturk chair and Ataturk library in every Turkish University, and Ataturk courses in 
all middle and high schools. The public has to meet, embrace, and learn Ataturk 
anew' and they should do so in a standardised and monitored fashion. Yet 
standardisation would need to make a series of unsubstantiated assumptions and 
manufacture a conceptual rigidity that Kemalism otherwise lacks (Sahinler, 1995:239- 
240). '[D]efming Kemalism as an ideology is a problematic issue. There is little 
agreement among Kemalists themselves about what Kemalism exactly means as a 
contemporary political project... Kemalism has become a secularist and nationalist 
reflex, rather than a coherent ideology' (Ta§pinar, 2005:87-88).
Kemalism is prevalent, but it is appealed to by different agencies within and outside 
the state apparatus. The Association to Promote Contemporary Life (Qagda§ Ya§ami 
Destekleme Dernegi) for instance - a women's group founded in the 1990s to counter 
the perceived rise of Islamism - is not forced to include Ataturk in its charter. It does 
so because Kemalism is successful and hence appealing and because Atatiirk's name 
carries immense emotional resonance. This is possibly his strongest legacy and, 
contrary to Parla and Davison's claims, those who embrace Atatiirk's ideas mostly 
maintain that his bequest is not an ideology, but a course of action.
Kemalism lacks both internal coherence and a real theoretical basis for the analysis of 
society, politics or history. It started life not as an ideology, but as an action-focused 
movement created by generals and politicians - not theoreticians - in the heart of 
battle. Kemalism was thus defined in terms of its goals, since its strategies were 
strictly context-specific, moulded according to particular exigencies and conditions. 
Although named after its undeniable leader, the Kemalist movement was historically 
characterised by both conflict and disagreement. For Sahinler (1995:242), Kemalism
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constitutes a movement of permanent revolution. Evolution and change is inherent in 
such a movement, as is criticism, even if Atattirk often resented its existence.
Ataturk himself always stressed the non-ideological nature of his legacy and his 
followers claim to remain true to his goals and values while following no ideological 
guidance. This legacy, they believe, is essentially democratic and humanistic (see 
Sezer, 1992:3; Aksin, 1999:16, 19; Kaylan, 2005:67-8). Although Ataturk may not 
have always observed the letter of democracy in his lifetime, he 'left behind him the 
structure of a democracy, not of a dictatorship' (Mango, 1999b:534, 536). This 
structure is a vital part of his legacy, as is the purpose with which it was vested. 
'Kemalism means a continual effort towards modernism and progress' (Giritli6, 
1984:252-3); Kemalism 'means continuous pursuit of progress for catching up with, 
keeping up with and even surpassing the advanced level of civilization, not falling 
behind, not being humiliated or dominated' (Camcigil, ND).
Kemalism, for its adherents, is a movement towards progress, modernisation and the 
preservation of national dignity. The secular Republic is a Kemalist achievement, in 
line with modernisation. Nationalism is a Kemalist instinct, in line with preserving 
national dignity and freedom. But the essence of Kemalism is a constant movement 
towards progress, helped along the way by democracy and scientific rationality. The 
fact that Kemalism is not an ideology, note his supporters, ensures its continued 
survival. 'As Kemalism is based on rationalism, it will continue to be contemporary 
and progressive' (Giritli, 1984:252-3).
Analytically, approaching Kemalism as a movement rather than an ideology is helpful 
and illuminating. However, Kemalism as a movement still does not convey the 
complete story about Kemalism's function in Turkish political life. Although not 
actually hegemonic, Kemalism remains semiotically prevalent, seeking to establish a 
monopoly over certain discursive terrains and the definition of certain terms. Hence, I 
believe, it is better to approach Kemalism as a universally intelligible language 
through which political legitimacy is negotiated and legitimation sought.
' Dean, School of Journalism, Marmara University.
26
Chapter 1
4. Kemalism as a Language of Legitimation
4. a. Legitimacy and Legitimation
It is a well-known truism that if a term can mean anything, eventually it does. 
'Legitimacy' is one such term. It has been used to express a trait governments have, a 
blessing people convey or a process of political negotiation. It has been equated to 
authority, legality, democracy, efficiency and stability.
For Rothschild (1977:488, 498), legitimacy is a trait possessed, amplified or 
squandered by political organisations or states. It is linked to authority, procedural 
legality, good governance and efficiency. Although Rothschild does not equate 
legitimacy with public acceptance, he concedes that it may exist to varying degrees 
vis-a-vis different groups within society as legitimacy partly relies on a 'show' of 
good governance, sustained in the face of various relevant publics.
For Lipset (1983:64), legitimacy is the measure of this show's success. 'Legitimacy 
involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.' 
Legitimacy, therefore, can exist in every society, regardless of its political 
organisation or social structures, provided the system of government can maintain the 
dominant social groups' confidence in its 'appropriateness'. But how is 
appropriateness measured? Is it effective governance, as Rothschild suggests, a 
normative fit with society's values or neither?
For Schaar (1984:111, 127), in order to be legitimate, power needs to be situated in 
something outside itself, be it God or a transcendental ideology. Schaar rightly notes 
that, although belief is a manifestation of legitimacy, legitimacy cannot be reduced to 
belief. His demand for a transcendental justification for power, however, leads him to 
the conclusion that the modern, bureaucratic, non-transcendental state exists in a 
perpetual state of legitimacy crisis. This may indeed be the case, but the lack of divine 
justification of power is hardly the reason.
Schaar accurately notes that legitimacy needs to be negotiated in terms of a set of 
values or principles. These principles, however, do not need to be external to the 
political system. In fact, most political systems generate their own narratives of
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political legitimacy as they set rules according to their own principles. Currently in 
the West, political narratives locate sovereignty firmly with 'the people' and 
legitimacy is negotiated in terms of a popular mandate. Although legitimacy can be, 
and often has been, negotiated in terms of a transcendental ideology, e.g. Communism 
(see Di Palma, 1991), most frequently it is sought in terms of non-transcendental 
values, such as democracy. Consequently, democratic governments are often 
considered ipso facto legitimate, thus reducing legitimacy to a trait conveyed through 
democratic election.
This fit means that even authors who vehemently deny equating democracy with 
legitimacy make democratic endorsement a prerequisite for legitimacy. Beetham 
(1991) is a case in point: he accepts that power is legitimate when justified in terms of 
principles that satisfy a politically relevant audience; rational defensibility may 
convince intellectuals, while priests may be swayed by appeals to God. Yet legitimacy 
should not be equated to the act of believing. For Beetham, legitimacy is not simply a 
public relations feat, rather it indicates the degree of congruence between the system 
of power and the values providing its justification. This means that legitimacy is 
historically specific and changeable as values change and governments lose their 
legitimacy when this congruence lapses or weakens. This definition could be 
universally applicable were it not for the tripod analogy.
Legitimacy, Beetham notes, relies on rule-derived validity and moral congruence with 
society's beliefs and values, regardless of their content or derivation, as well as 
expressed consent; what he calls the declaratory power of confirmation. Beetham 
introduces expressed consent in order to avoid the murky waters of inaction and 
passivity being mistaken for acceptance. As a result, however, systems that do not 
offer institutionalised avenues for the meaningful expression of consent (which for 
Beetham entails the provision of real choice and the absence of coercion) cannot ever 
be legitimate, although Beetham denies this is the case.
As Beetham, like Rothschild before him, notes that ineffective governance, rising 
inflation or corruption can de-legitimise a government, he effectively reduces 
legitimacy to shorthand for democratic electability. Moreover, Beetham (1991:216) 
seems to conflate the legitimacy and stability of a regime and its incumbent 
government when he notes that '[d]e-legitimisation is the dramatic loss of prestige
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incurred by a regime when large numbers of its subjects refuse to do as they are told 
in a public and collective way'. By making civil disobedience the measure of a 
legitimacy crisis, Beetham fails to distinguish between the various on-going 
legitimation negotiations within a political system, fails to register the subtler signs of 
legitimacy deficits and fails to achieve what he actually set out to do, namely improve 
on Weber's understanding of legitimacy.
For Weber (1978:226), legitimacy is claimed and believed in. It is not a trait that 
governments possess, but a process of negotiation within a specific reference 
framework. Legitimacy describes the degree of congruence between a policy, system, 
action or institution and the values or principles that underpin activity in a relevant 
political context, be it dominant social values, religion or democracy. Weber 
(1978:266-7) concedes that 'it is readily possible that, instead of recognition being 
treated as a consequence of legitimacy, it is treated as the basis of legitimacy; 
democratic legitimacy'. But this is one of many kinds.
This distinction is vital in the context of modern Turkey. Here legitimacy is claimed 
within a republican setting, where national sovereignty and representative democracy 
allow for popular legitimacy to be conferred through elections. Simultaneously, 
however, legitimacy is also claimed in terms of Ataturk's legacy, including 
republicanism, but not derived from it. Pursuing congruence with Kemalist values 
generates boundaries and obligations, benchmarks and expectations that political 
actors comply with in order to remain legitimate in the eyes of other politicians, 
judges, the Press, the army and the citizenry. The image is not static. Kemalism, after 
its extensive use in the public domain, its institutional entrenchment and reproduction, 
now represents both the set of values through which legitimacy is claimed and the 
language through which this is being done. As a result, Kemalism is the medium 
through which political actors negotiate the boundaries of acceptable political activity. 
Kemalism frames political debate, but does not determine courses of action, so 
different and divergent policies seek to legitimise themselves in terms of Kemalism's 
core themes and priorities.
In subsequent chapters, I will demonstrate that Kemalism is not only part of the public 
culture, but also the normative bedrock of the Republic's legal and institutional 
superstructure, generating a frame of reference, explanations and expectations for
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citizens and officers of the state alike. I propose that Kemalism, far from being a 
hegemonic ideology, actually is a language, dominant and widely used, yet separate 
and distinct from Ataturk's specific political intentions. This language generates 
constraints and opportunities (see Barker, 1990:139) as the process of legitimation 
involves the creative re-appropriation of legitimacy's sources.
'[I]t is a notable feature of power relations that they are themselves capable of 
generating the evidence needed for their own legitimation' (Beetham, 1991:60). 
Rothschild (1977:491) agrees: 'Discussions of legitimacy and legitimation risk 
irrelevancy if they overlook this crucial dimension of a ruling elite's sense of its 
legitimacy' and its public appeals to that effect. These appeals constitute the activity 
of legitimation. Legitimation is the active pursuit of congruence with the political 
system's core normative values and the public claiming of said congruence. This 
constitutes, for Barker (2001:2), a generic trait of government. Elected, appointed and 
hereditary power-holders always actively claim to be legitimate, be it through the 
fabrication of sumptuous palaces, the observance of religious rituals or declared 
allegiance to social values and constitutional principles - themselves possibly 
moulded by the ruler in question.
Legitimation can be carried out in a variety of ways: verbal, visual or ritualistic. 
Although Barker's (2001:20, 24) connections between legitimation and legitimacy do 
not directly map onto what I described above, the stress he places on legitimation is 
vital for this analysis. As a political process, legitimation has specific aims that do not 
necessarily comply with society's normative core of political legitimacy. Legitimation 
is the process through which politicians seek to cover or explain potential disparities. 
In this process, the political system's normative core is appealed to, re-appropriated, 
negotiated and redefined with reference to emerging domestic or international 
realities, social change and each politicians' specific agenda. Motives and intentions 
are unknown and irrelevant to the analysis of legitimation, enabling us to assess the 
government's conduct vis-a-vis citizens and state agencies (Barker, 1990:2).
Regardless of whether 'acceptance' is part of legitimacy, governments seek 
acceptance, particularly in a republic such as Turkey. As Barker (1990:98) notes, if 
legitimacy is a relationship between the rulers and the ruled, between normative 
assumptions and practical politics, then legitimation is the (public) effort to ensure
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that this relationship continues to exist. As legitimacy is not constant throughout a 
political system, legitimation attempts enjoy varying degrees of success at different 
times, in different contexts and in the eyes of different audiences. Hence the 
legitimation process is never-ending and legitimacy never a foregone conclusion.
4. b. Kemalism as Language
Kemalism as a language is taught in schools, reproduced through media and spatial 
narratives and extensively used by politicians, academics and members of the TAP 
and the judiciary. The language has been in continuous use for decades and thus 
enjoys a position of undeniable discursive dominance. While for Parla and Davison 
this constitutes hegemony, for Volkan and Itzkowitz (1984:354) it represents a civic 
cult resulting from Ataturk's immortalisation. Constant appeals to Atatiirk 
undoubtedly forge a ritualistic legitimation avenue for Turkish politics. Yet, his 
legacy is most effective in the form it acquired, possibly despite Kemalist intentions: 
namely as a language all Turks speak.
Kemalism constitutes the unquestionable normative framework for the negotiation of 
political legitimacy in Turkey. Kemalism is the republican project's lynchpin; a 
national fact rather than a matter of individual political choice, as appeals to Atatiirk 
and his legacy are constant. In fact, the sheer volume of celebratory material and 
reverential references is telling in itself. This is not hollow politicking. Ataturk's plan 
worked and the narrative of national awakening and liberation, as we will see, has an 
element of defying fate in it. Appeals to Ataturk and his legacy, therefore, represent 
appeals for hope, resolve and pride in what the Turks are capable of. Appeals to 
Atatiirk effectively constitute claims to be doing the right thing.
Mehrnet Diilger, Chairman of the Turkish Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission, 
(2005:24) opens an article by quoting Ataturk's 'peace at home, peace in the world' 
motto. He stresses that Turkish foreign policy is genuinely committed to Ataturk's 
agenda, namely modernisation and the preservation of territorial integrity and unity 
(p.29). Similarly, OECD7 Manager Mehmet Ogiitcii (2005:96) argues in favour of
7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Turkey's ability to deliver the quick and radical transformation the EU demands in 
terms of Ataturk's legacy. 'One should recall that the founding father of modern 
Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, had accomplished the bulk of his revolutionary modernizing 
vision for the country only in a period of 15 years... between the two destructive 
world wars and in great deprivation. Consider what more can be achieved over the 
next two decades in the era of rapid globalisation.' Ataturk is proof of what Turkey is 
capable of; he is Prince Charming in Turkey's Cinderella story.
Yet the prince comes with heavy baggage. The founding of the secular republic was 
both a crowning achievement for Atatiirk's vision and an avenue for its continued 
pursuit. Kemalist modernisation went beyond politics and economics, encompassing 
individual relations and lifestyles. Social change, that elsewhere would be the side- 
effect of modernisation, here was part of a sustained campaign, (Eisenstadt, 1984:3). 
Ataturk taught Turkish peasants to use beds, chairs and lavatories; he coached men 
and women to embrace Western, mixed-gender entertainment. This was as important 
to Ataturk as acquiring a thriving industrial infrastructure, as he would thus achieve 'a 
shift in the bases of political legitimation and the symbols of the political community, 
together with a redefinition of the boundaries of the collectivity' (ibid, p.9).
This redefinition was total and extremely potent as the Kemalist conceptualisation of 
modernity established a long-term discursive monopoly. 'Modernity' meant what 
Ataturk wanted it to. Such radical change was possible in the first place because of the 
volatile post-First World War situation. Social and geographic dislocation, successive 
defeats and exhaustion left the population disillusioned and receptive to radical social 
transformation (McCarthy, 2001:92, 94). War broke social habits; the predictability of 
social life and individual experience vanished. Successive defeats destabilised and 
discredited administrative structures, facilitating political reform. Alien (1968:40), 
seeking to vest even secularism with popular legitimacy, notes that disillusionment 
with the Ottomans translated into widespread popular dissatisfaction with Islam. 
Religion was not actually discredited, yet dissatisfaction with the imperial order was 
widespread even among Ottoman elites (McCarthy, 1983:139-140).
Short-term expediency and Atatiirk's de facto legitimacy as liberator and war hero 
enabled him to introduce a series of radical modernising reforms without, at first, 
disclosing the specifics and eventual extent of his wider project. Moreover, as Ataturk
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started constructing a national legitimation narrative as early as 1920, with the first 
National Assemblies (see Sezer, 1992:2), the radical transition to republicanism 
appeared gradual. Once the Republic was a foregone conclusion, it became the avenue 
for the introduction of a new politics of modernisation, conducted in the nation's 
name. This new politics - its goals, assumptions and language - now constitute 
Turkey's political reality. Although the new politics used the discourses of democracy 
and national sovereignty extensively, they were actually welded into the 
amalgamation of ideas that is Turkish republicanism, meaning more and yet at the 
same tune less than they would elsewhere. After all, the republic's raison d'etre was 
to achieve modernisation, not popular democracy.
Although the new political vocabulary marked a radical shift in Turkish politics, 
Kemalism was more concerned with modernisation than with republicanism. The 
Republic was a modernising tool. Its purpose, Karpat (2004:201) notes, was not to 
allow the articulation of 'society's basic culture, philosophy, and aspirations', but to 
enable a revolution from above. As a result, national sovereignty referred to an 
abstract and idealised nation, not Turkey's actual citizens, and Kemalism, for Karpat 
(2004:221), became a mechanism for the perpetuation of political control. Control 
was necessary for securing a monopoly over the definition of progress and modernity 
and ensuring the country did not stray from the path of its achievement.
Undoubtedly, a tendency for the establishment of ideological hegemony is evident, as 
are the means for its potential achievement. Nationalism, republicanism and 
secularism became the essence of progress, making Kemalist prescriptions absolute 
conditions for modernisation, while also making 'the attainment of modern European 
civilization a new faith' (Karpat, 2004:228-229). Nevertheless, this faith, although 
discursively dominant, did not become hegemonic as, with the advent of multi-party 
democracy, the rigidity of the Kemalist agenda was compromised. Although lifestyle 
choices were heavily limited under both Atatiirk and his successor, ismet inonii, the 
advent of multi-party politics made it evident that much of Kemalist legislation had 
not penetrated Turkish society beyond the surface.
'The political struggle which began in Turkey after 1945 as a struggle for democracy 
was in fact the struggle for cultural and spiritual freedom as people understood them' 
(Karpat, 2004:231). This struggle lasted for several bloody decades and, for Karpat,
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represented an attempt to widen available lifestyle and belief options limited under 
strict Kemalist modernisation that not only decreed that the pursuit of progress was 
the purpose of politics, but also limited the ways in which that was to be understood 
and achieved. Atatiirk's vision of modernity was absolute. Legislation sought to 
ensure that Turkey would comply with his vision, from the development of industrial 
infrastructure to regulating his citizens' private lives. As secularism was deemed 
necessary for modernity, spiritual freedom became a political issue. As modernity 
came with specific cultural manifestations, individual tastes and leisure were 
measured against state-endorsed modernity benchmarks. For Ataturk, appearances 
mattered.
The 1925 Hat Law is a case in point. The fez disappeared from Turkish streets, yet the 
law did not have the corresponding effect on mentalities that the reformers expected. 
Similarly, banning arabesque music from the airwaves actually had mixed results as 
the genre became, briefly, strangely subversive. The state's relentless modernisation 
drive turned appeals to tradition into potent political statements. Because Kemalists 
perceived tradition as the opposite of modernity, tradition in all its manifestations, 
including arabesque, became a language for the expression of political 
dissatisfactions. This gave arabesque music subversive connotations by default, 
permitting politicians, such as Turgut Ozal, who played this genre during his pre- 
election rallies, access to pockets of electoral support outside the CHP's reach 
(Ozbek, 1997:219-220).
This politicisation lasted until the 1990s. The advent of private broadcasting brought 
arabesque back into the mainstream, as the market incentive was strong. Now it is 
neither contentious nor, for that matter, particularly popular. Yet the incident captures 
in miniature Kemalist attitudes towards folkloric, traditional or 'backward' images, 
practices and sounds. Interestingly, once the elimination campaign was suspended, the 
music lost its edge. The Kemalists' willingness, however, to simply eliminate 
practices deemed undesirable from the public domain explains why Kemalism has 
been described as authoritarian, despite the open and vocal debate over its specifics.
Kemalism can be questioned and disputed. Nevertheless, it enjoys unrivalled 
institutional and legal protection and access to socialisation channels. It can easily 
maintain a conceptual quasi-monopoly over certain analytical categories such as
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modernity, secularism and republicanism. Nevertheless, although authoritarianism has 
often donned a Kemalist cloak, Kemalism is too incoherent to be authoritarian per se.
'Ideologies seek both to make sense out of the world and to offer a rationale for living 
and acting in it. As such, they offer visions of legitimate thought and practice in the 
public world... All ideologies offer, in this sense, some prescription for legitimate and 
illegitimate action' (Parla and Davison, 2004:23-24). In Turkey, these prescriptions 
have forged a language through which legitimation is sought. Even those departing 
from Kemalism negotiate their position in its terms. This is possible because 
'Kemalist terms' (from modernisation to popular sovereignty) are flexible since 
Ataturk furnished no concrete definitions. Consequently, alternative and, often, 
competing definitions are sustainable, as Kemalism is in the strange position of 
having repressed several ideas almost in their own name. Freedom of religious 
expression was stifled in pursuit of secularism; democracy often suffered in the 
Republic's name; freedom of expression was limited in the name of a modernising 
drive that today brings Turkey on the EU's doorstep; and Turks are still prosecuted 
for insulting 'being a Turk and the Republic of Turkey' (Article 301/1, Turkish Penal 
Code).
Undoubtedly, Kemalist agencies retain considerable power yet Kemalism is not their 
exclusive property. As political agents use and re-appropriate Kemalist language, an 
intense debate is occurring in Turkey. Although attempts are often made to stem the 
creative uses of Kemalist language, alternative interpretations of terms (such as 
secularism) and priorities abound. This, for many, is a deplorable event. 'Gone [is] the 
enlightenment programme of the Revolution... The Kemalist movement [is] frozen. 
To conceal this fact, great emphasis [is] placed on "ceremonial Kemalism"' (Ak§in, 
1999:26). Jevakhoff (1989:457, 467-8) agrees: '[T]he mention of Ataturk often 
becomes a simple rite or caution used with the same ease by those on the Right and 
Left.'
The ambiguity of Ataturk's legacy and the creative interpretation entailed in its 
application to the 21 st century make this debate possible. For Kemalist purists, 
however, the debate is an aberration. To them, Ataturk created a nation in his image 
and, unless true to that image, people are laying false claims on national belonging. 
For them (e.g. Kaylan, 2005:441; Mango's 2000 speech) there is more to 'Kemalism'
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than ritualistic references to Ataturk and modernisation. Yet, looking at Turkey's 
political exchanges, it seems that Kemalism is most relevant as a set of ritual 
practices; as a language for talking about republicanism, secularism and 
modernisation; and a language for talking about Turkey's past, present and future. 
Kemalism is an ideology to some - hated or espoused - but a language for all.
This was partly achieved through conscious institutionalisation and partly by default. 
Although republican institutions reflect Ataturk's agenda, as they are his handiwork, 
attempts to turn Ataturk's project of thorough societal transformation (e.g. see 
Bozdogan, 2001:172, 174) into a coherent set of prescriptions fit for the 21 st century 
were frustrated. Particularly, since the advent of multi-party democracy, attempts to 
standardise and safeguard Kemalism have been more successful in opening Kemalism 
up for re-interpretation and negotiation than in protecting its purity.
'[I]nserting [Ataturk's] principles in the Constitution subsequently also made it 
possible for anyone adhering to the principles, often rather loosely interpreted, to 
qualify as loyal to the revolution' (Weiker, 1981:5). Kemalism, Weiker (1981:7) 
continues, 'established general principles which provided the outer limits of 
permissible dissent, but many of the principles were also flexible enough in their 
operational interpretation so that they could be legitimately debated'. It thus became a 
language for the negotiation of politics. Kemalism delineates the boundaries of the 
political arena and seeks to tame dissent, but does not set the political agenda. 
Kemalist principles are schematic and offer guidance for political activity rather than 
strict prescriptions, thus they frame political debate without actually determining it.
Hence, although the desirability of modernisation is not debated, its shape and the 
best route for its achievement are. Ataturk's legacies are revisited and redefined in a 
changing world, while competing political positions seek to justify themselves in 
Ataturkist terms. This is hardly surprising. Ataturk is Turkey's civic patron saint. His 
plan worked and his ideas have been incorporated into law and institutional practice, 
hence legitimation appeals phrased in Kemalist terms carry immense weight. What 
may be surprising is the flexibility and adaptability of which Kemalism is capable. As 
I will demonstrate in this thesis, the AKP is currently using Kemalist language and the 
Kemalist westernisation drive to renegotiate political priorities and bring about reform 
that would be hard to legitimise if it were not for the EU mantle. The AKP embodies a
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challenge to Kemalism, in the form of its Islamist credentials, yet it simultaneously 
represents the promise of Kemalism's vindication, as the AKP became the champion 
of EU accession.
The ensuing process of contestation and negotiation entails the reinterpretation of 
terms and notions, which, in turn, creates tensions. There is, for instance, the potential 
for intense conflict between Kemalists and the champions of a different kind of 
democracy, using Kemalist language in a way that challenges Kemalist authority. 
This conflict could either express itself as a confrontation between 'Kemalism' - 
defended by jurists, academics and soldiers - and the 'people'. Alternatively it could 
take the form of an internal semantic breakdown. Simultaneously, however, this 
tension is creating opportunities not yet fully explored. Although momentous change 
may be afoot, legitimacy remains a Kemalist domain. The AKP still seeks to 
legitimise its leader through references to Ataturk, noting that Turkey is living proof 
'that having a just and visionary leader is key to achieving quick and effective results' 
(Diilger, 2005:30). By appealing to constitutionally enshrined principles (such as 
territorial integrity and national unity) and national mantras, the AKP is widening the 
scope of political debate without challenging its terms and Kemalism's basic 
premises.
It has been argued that Kemalism is an irrelevant term - having changed too much to 
be analytically useful (Millas, 2001:30). It has been argued that Kemalism is a knee- 
jerk reaction attributable to socialisation and political culture. Yet current political 
tensions and negotiations prove that Kemalism has changed enough to represent a 
language everyone in Turkey can use creatively. Rather than stifling debate, this 
Kemalist language seems to be furnishing the terms for the revision of Kemalist 
principles, assumptions and institutions. This flexibility is currently being tested. 
Post-9/11, EU membership-seeking Turkey is facing domestic and international 
challenges that require drastic action. The fluidity surrounding many of Kemalism's 
guiding principles makes taking the action needed difficult, as rival interpretations 
clash in the public domain. Some wish Kemalism were more prescriptive, offering 
firm guidance in a changing world. But it is not. And the debate over the true meaning 
of secularism and westernisation is raging.
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Chapter 2, 'Learning' Kemalism
State-sponsored national-identity narratives in Turkey are conceptualised and 
articulated in Kemalist terms. National identity, notes Gillis (1994:5), is a useful tool 
to think with and a handy communication medium. As such, it is, by definition, shared 
and standardised in order to ensure intelligibility among users. The school is pivotal in 
the process of standardising and disseminating this cognitive tool, but not alone, as 
any communication medium is reaffirmed and reproduced through everyday usage.
Turks learn Kemalism from a young age, inside and outside the classroom. 
Standardisation and centralisation in national education means that core textbooks - 
with the exception of language books and supplementary materials - are not selected 
by individual schools. Former Minister for National Education, Metin Bostancioglu 
(2001), prided himself on the textbooks his ministry produced, commissioned and 
disseminated to all Turkish children. National education, stressed Bostancioglu (2000 
& 2001), is the bedrock of national growth, progress and development. Inevitably, 
centrally-produced textbooks and a centrally-managed single-textbook national 
curriculum promote a Ministry-sponsored vision of the past and future thus forging 
and sustaining 'vocabulary and syntax of national identity' (Heathorn, 2000:viii). 
Hence every Turkish student receives the same presentation of Kemalist narratives, 
concerns, priorities and vision at school as centralisation ensures coherence. 
Moreover, a high degree of convergence also exists between state-produced books 
and commercially produced titles. This creates a tight nexus of meaning, permitting 
Kemalist 'vocabulary and syntax' to pervade a child's work and leisure time.
The very existence of commercial 'patriotic' titles testifies to the publishers' and 
purchasers' active role in the cultivation and reproduction of a Kemalist arsenal of 
intelligible and accessible signifiers. Kemalism, sanctioned and cultivated by the 
school, is also actively promoted by the writers', publishers' and illustrators' 
willingness to produce patriotic literature, only a fraction of which is surveyed here, 
indicating an acceptance of the significance and emotional resonance of their subject 
matter. This literature may not be consciously cultivating a language of legitimate 
politics, but it is reproducing a nexus of national reference. The wide dissemination of
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this nexus makes legitimation appeals in its terms both immediately understandable - 
as all Turkish children grow up 'speaking' this symbolic language - and potentially 
very successful, given its emotional resonance. 'Fluency' may not ipso facto 
guarantee endorsement of Kemalism's standardised interpretations or acceptance of 
Kemalist priorities, but it does guarantee intelligibility.
The role national education plays in this process is not unique to Turkey. Every 
nation-state carries out or supervises national socialisation. Through 'national' 
education, the nation-state manufactures what Gellner (1983:38) calls 'viable and 
usable human being[s]'. A 'viable' individual is capable of decoding the complex 
symbols underwriting social life in a modern nation-state. This ability, in turn, makes 
the individual 'usable' in the context of the nation-state. Yet no code is value-free. A 
'viable' individual recognises both symbols and the narratives of justice and greatness 
associated with them. Ideally this recognition, Gellner notes, inspires desirable 
emotions and courses of action, and national education seeks to forge both recognition 
of relevant symbols and familiarity with the appropriate emotional responses to them. 
The school cannot engender pride. It can, however, teach the connection between 
certain symbols or events and a narrative of pride.
Heroism is inspiring and success stories are easy to tell. Ranging from early readers to 
poetry anthologies, privately produced volumes dealing with Ataturk abound. Artists 
deem the subject worthy of their time. More significantly, however, the sheer bulk of 
such material - only a fraction of which is discussed here - commissioned and 
produced by commercial publishers indicates huge market demand. The sheer number 
of such titles, on top of a considerable body of state-produced literature, obviously 
suggests that parents or children purchase these books, finding them interesting, 
appropriate or instructive. As a result, children 'learn' Kemalism through both state 
and private channels. Thus Kemalism becomes a natural component of everyday life.
Yet it remains inaccurate to describe Kemalism as a hegemonic language. Kemalism 
is propagated by the state, but alternatives are not silenced. Stories that have nothing 
to do with Atatiirk, written by Turkish or foreign authors, are plentiful, as are 
religiously inclined storybooks. Yet even religious stories do not denounce modernity, 
nationality and secularism (Saktanber, 1991:174-5), rather they often seek to construct
39
Chapter 2
a specific kind of morality, not incompatible with Kemalism in its specifics (ibid, 
p. 180), but which attempts to balance religion with the dictates of modernity.
Although literature providing different readings of nationality exists for adult 
audiences, for children it does not. Alternatives to patriotic literature constitute a 
separate genre, but do not challenge Kemalist national narratives. Whether the state 
would block attempts to provide an iconoclastic reading of national history aimed at 
young readers is a rhetorical question. Yet it is important to stress that the 
predominance of Kemalist narratives is ensured by agencies outside the state acting 
on the basis of market incentive and not state pressure. Books analysed here, although 
produced by various authors and publishers, share a coherent narrative structure. In 
introducing Kemalism as a language, the books also introduce Turkish history from a 
Kemalist vantage point, which effectively legitimises Kemalism in Kemalist terms.
This legitimation narrative consists of three layers. Firstly, Turkishness - nationality, 
national history and the national homeland - is presented as natural and essential. 
Secondly, republicanism is presented as natural to Turkishness. Although civic on the 
surface, republicanism is presented as a quasi-ethnic trait; an 'organic' component of 
a 'natural' identity. According to national narratives, the Turkish nation is both the 
force behind and the natural outcome of Ataturk's republican reforms, thus the two 
become essentially linked. What starts as a civic narrative becomes an essentialist 
discourse. Finally, a quasi-metaphysical appeal accompanies the account, celebrating 
Ataturk as the nation's natural leader and its timeless instantiation.
This narrative is linear and progressive, structured around Ataturk's career, 
achievements and aims. Modernisation and the preservation of national independence 
and dignity are presented as the ultimate goals of national history and national 
greatness is measured in their terms. Consequently, Ataturk's republican/secular 
legacy is celebrated as the sole medium for the achievement of the desired future. In 
doing so, national narratives give Ataturk's legacy a talismanic quality, while he 
emerges as, simultaneously, accessibly human and super-human.
This storyline is powerful. But is it effective? Unlike spatial narratives (see Chapter 
3), books can be ignored. Yet they remain significant for three reasons. Firstly, the 
books analysed here are designed for young readers. The accounts are schematic,
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unsophisticated and, thus, accessible across cultural-capital-induced barriers acquired 
with age. Although scientific treatises on Kemalism abound, familiarisation with the 
Republic's early history is not allowed to become the exclusive domain of the 
'educated'. In fact, it starts before the child can actually read. By definition, it 
accesses a much wider audience than any specialised volume could.
Secondly, the proliferation of styles in which Atattirk and other national(ist) stories 
are available further expands potential readership, as different tastes are catered for 
without varying the message. Thirdly, repetition ensures 'naturalisation', as narratives 
introduced by early childhood books constantly reappear in novels, comics and 
poems. Moreover, this narrative features in schoolbooks. Given their de facto 
institutional legitimacy, schoolbooks are invariably treated as objective and true. 
Hence the concert between schoolbooks and leisure books enhances the authority of 
their common message. The fact that pre-school books, leisure reading material and 
textbooks sustain the same narrative allows for its cumulative and gradual enrichment 
with one goal in mind: the education of republican citizens responsive to Atattirk's 
reforms, who also relish a sense of ownership of said reforms.
Kazamias (1966:220-221) notes that, in the 1960s, educators equated 'Turkishness' 
with allegiance to Atattirk, the TAP and secular Republic and a sense of ownership of 
Kemalist reform principles. In this chapter I will demonstrate that this largely remains 
the case and analyse the corresponding narratives in three bodies of literature: 
textbooks (state-commissioned or endorsed as part of a single-textbook national 
curriculum); language-learning books; and state-sponsored and privately published 
leisure books.
/. Kemalist Essentials: Claiming Anatolia 
l.a. The TTT
Anatolia plays a central part in Kemalist national narratives (see also Chapter 3), as it 
is vested with the power to naturalise and unify its inhabitants. So, although the Turks 
originated in Central Asia, the narrative claims Anatolia as their natural homeland
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and its history as their history. This melange of conjecture and elective affinities for a 
while constituted a powerful political and academic current, supported by Ataturk 
himself, in the form of the Turkish History Thesis (Turk Tanh Tesi, TTT), the appeal 
of which, although diminished in scholarly circles, has not altogether lapsed.
Millas (2001:77) believes that the Balkan national uprisings in Ottoman times taught 
the Turks the usefulness of propagating the myth of an ancient and superior people 
with a 'timeless' claim on the national land. The TTT forges this myth for the Turks, 
presenting the people as 'native' and national geography as 'natural'. The TTT, 
intended for both domestic and international consumption, represented an 
extraordinary attempt to prove that Turkish history is not reducible to the Ottoman 
period. Actually, while claiming that Turkish history predates and outshines Ottoman 
history, the TTT ended claiming most world civilisations as Turkish1 .
Through what Millas (2001:62) calls 'expressed anti-orientalism', the TTT sought to 
reaffirm the Turks' worth vis-a-vis the West by claiming both the origins of Western 
civilisation and the West's genetic ancestry as Turkish. As Ataturk (2003:388) put it: 
'It is a truth known by all that... long before the advent of Islamism, the Turks had 
penetrated to the heart of Europe'. Historical appropriation and reductionism enabled 
the Thesis to claim that, as Turkish people were the Europeans' ancestors and 
Anatolia, the Turks' home, was the cradle of all Western civilisations, Turkey was, by 
extension, European. Hence Atatiirk's westernisation drive would enable Turkey to 
'return' to an assumed original position, alongside the West. Presenting a bid at 
momentous transformation as a homecoming naturalised the process, thus both 
legitimising it and fostering public confidence in its success.
Atatiirk's policies, advocating the return of Turkey to the Western fold and of 
Western civilisation to its birthplace, presupposed that the Turks' ownership of 
Anatolia was 'natural' and total. The nature and significance of this ownership 
represent the TTT's most lasting influence on Turkish national narratives. Anatolia 
remains shrouded in a mystical aura, perceived as both conveying and expressing
1 Vryonis (1991:37, 70-2, 74) quotes Turk Tanh Tetkik Cemiyeti Secretary-General Resit Gahp 




national character. This makes its protection from violation and the maintenance of 
sole Turkish ownership a Turk's foremost national duty. Anatolia's territorial 
fragmentation would also maim national character; this is the message that the books 
surveyed here convey.
This is hardly surprising. Internal inconsistencies aside, the TTT provided an 
overview of world history that enabled Anatolians to be, for the first time, proud of 
their Turkishness. Although with time, and through Republican commemoration, 
sources of national pride proliferated, the appeal to an Anatolian identity was initially 
necessary and has since remained strong. Even the Independence War, now 
commemorated as a Turkish national war, was at the time, fought by Anatolians, for 
Anatolia. Anatolia thus became the conceptual bridge, thanks to the TTT's 
retrospective articulation, that took the people from their Ottoman/Islamic past to a 
Turkish future. The Independence War thus represented both the Turks' glorious 
national awakening and the deliverance of Anatolia's holy land. Similarly, the 
Republic was inserted into this essentialist discourse by being claimed as the natural 
offspring of Anatolia's historical development, the structural manifestation of 
Anatolian character and the institutional expression of nationality. This fusion offered 
a powerful legitimising discourse for the Republic's early years.
Millas's overview of early Republican schoolbooks, history books and novels shows 
that, as the Kemalists gained confidence, outlandish TTT appeals ceased. The thesis 
faded into the background, surviving in fragments, nuances and assumptions that, 
according to Parla and Davison (2004:221), lead to 'praise for anything Turkish' and 
the assumption that 'anything praiseworthy is Turkish'. Although naive patriotism 
hardly needs recourse to a pseudo-scientific basis, TTT influences survive. In the 
literature surveyed here, they are most evident in the presentation of Turkey's 
'rightful place in the world' and the glorification of Anatolia.
l.b. Republican Anatolia
Anatolia features heavily in the material surveyed here. Early and pre-school readers 
celebrate the fatherland through the national flag and map. Turkey's shape becomes a
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powerful Republican symbol. Children memorise its borders and visualise their home 
as an international entity. The history they learn (national awakening, Independence 
War, modernisation and current events) takes place in and around Anatolia and is 
mostly concerned with Anatolia's protection, defence and advancement.
Early childhood books such as Ataturk ve Cumhuriyet abound. The mere existence of 
' Ataturk and the Republic' in a pre-school series including titles on animals, family 
life and traffic awareness is telling in itself. The book starts with counting exercises: 
one apple, two pears, three Turkish flags (p.8-9). The existence of national(ist) 
symbols at this level naturalises them, while repetition makes them familiar and 
almost personal without, however, allowing them to become banal and mundane. The 
seemingly omnipresent flag is always presented in a respectful setting. It gradually 
becomes a potent symbol. National narratives will later assist in turning it into a 
sacred object. For now, the book teaches children how to draw a Turkish flag (p. 25). 
Interestingly, this exercise follows a section on growing potatoes. The even and 
random mix of ordinary information (such as naming the seasons) and nationalistic 
narratives 'neutralises' them, making both sets of information appear factual.
On the book's back cover, a picture of Ataturk is superimposed onto a map of Turkey 
drawn to resemble the flag: red with a white crescent and star. Underneath this, on a 
heart-shaped wreath held up by children we read 'ne mutlu Turkum diyene\ National 
references become a natural part of everyday discourses and encounters. It is a small 
step towards accepting, or even expecting, nationalism to form the backbone of public 
political discourses later in life.
A rival publisher offers a similar book entitled Ataturk. National symbols are, again, 
introduced in a seemingly innocuous yet potent fashion: a Turkish flag at the end of a 
maze (p. 15); exercises in drawing the flag, singing the national anthem or counting 
Turkish soldiers. Repetition is vital because it engenders familiarity. Introducing very 
young children to this pervasive national discourse naturalises it, as the omnipresence 
of national symbols in diverse settings becomes habitual and, by extension, 'normal'. 
This is vital as this omnipresence persists beyond childhood (see Chapter 3).
The familiarity of such symbols facilitates the presentation of Anatolia in the desired 
(Republican) light, which is what a famous children's series under the general title
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Ktiftik Gezgin does. This 'Little Traveller' series boasts over 100 titles seeking to 
familiarise young Turks with their country, integrating different cities and regions into 
official Republican history. Unity is of the essence. The series, aimed at 
schoolchildren, uses photographs and drawings; the text is dense and the colours dark. 
In Kutahya'da, the series' hero, Omer, expresses the desire to travel and get to know 
his country. This is a commendable desire, readers are told. Reading books about his 
destination on the train, little Omer offers his readers a short history of KUtahya (p.4), 
complete with visual aids and pictures of republican statues and monuments (p.2).
This city, and Anatolia in general, is the home of great civilisations, we are told. 
Omer speaks of Kutahya's Hittite, Frygian, Roman, Byzantine, Sel9uk and Ottoman 
heritage (p.9) gradually progressing to the Independence War and Kutahya's part in it. 
Although information about architecture and local cuisine is offered, the book is 
actually an ode to Anatolian republicanism. The patriotic narrative is accompanied by 
pictures: the Dumplupmar monument (p. 12), statues of Ataturk flanked by Fevzi 
Cakmak and Ismet Inonu and of Mehmetqik2 (p.l 1). The book praises Turkish soldiers 
for inspiring trust in their friends and fear in their enemies. Omer speaks of national 
heroes as martyrs, recounting the events of 1922 as the Greek offensive started to 
crumble. His narrative is illustrated in eerie black, white and green drawings of 
battles, graves and an outstretched arm holding a flag, emerging from a marble slab.
Children are highly unlikely to read the entire KUquk Gezgin series. Yet exposure to 
one title suffices to learn that Anatolian cities, with their specific culture and history, 
contributed in a unique and vital way to the Independence War, confirming and 
celebrating the unity of Anatolian domains. The cities' differences are played down 
and their shared Republican legacy stressed. Although the series fulfils a Sunday- 
school role, promoting a wholesome, patriotic, articulate and exceedingly polite little 
Omer, its main message is the celebration of Anatolian unity. The Independence War 
and Republic are celebrated as means that ensured and continue to protect this unity.
National unity and unity between the nation and the land across space and time are 
also the themes of Yesilyurt's Qanakkale Benim Adim (p.8). Most books of this kind




celebrate Anatolia as the cradle of civilisation, home of the Turks and birthplace of 
the Republic. Waxing lyrical about Anatolia's natural beauty is either entirely absent 
or used as an introductory gimmick before delving into its political history. Yesilyurt, 
true to the TTT, starts his account with Troy, skips the Eastern Roman Empire and 
Byzantium, reaching the battle of Canakkale (p. 17) in a few pages. According to the 
title, this battle should be central to the book, yet its discussion is brief. The account 
swiftly moves on to the Independence War and the Republic (p.24). For Yesilyurt, the 
country's glorious past makes its defence an ever-pressing duty. His historical 
analysis is peppered with poems and warnings about how close Turkey came to not 
existing (p.56-60) and stresses that, given the circumstances, the Turks' success and 
survival is little short of a miracle. The Republic is part of that miracle (p.65ff).
Although Anatolia was delivered by divine or superhuman fiat, its protection is now 
everyone's duty. Anatolia - the Turks' national home and the Republic's birthplace - 
is celebrated in this dual role in novels and schoolbooks alike. The preservation of 
national geography is vital. Anatolia needs to remain whole, hence vigilance against 
invasion or secession is important. But Anatolia must also remain the Turks' 
undisputed home, hence internal contenders for 'indigenous status' are as dangerous 
as invaders. Consequently, Anatolia's ancient peoples are 'claimed' as Turks and their 
history appropriated (see Chapter 3) through the land, believed to carry its own 
history. Thus Anatolia itself ensures the desirable time-space continuity. Sole 
ownership of Anatolia meant that the Turks' national existence and chosen 
civilisational identity were secure. Turkey's map under the national flag came to 
symbolise all this.
Such historical revisionism is hardly unique. National identities the world over rely on 
the constant revision of collective memories (Gillis, 1994:3). Nation-building is 
primarily a process of revision aimed at ensuring a fit between collective memories 
and certain prescriptions, that, in Turkey's case, entail allegiance to the nation, the 
Republic and Ataturk's modernisation. Hence, celebrating the Turks as Anatolia's 
sole legitimate heirs assisted both nation-building and modernisation - by elevating 
the Turks' collective self-image vis-a-vis the West.
There was only one problem: other Anatolians. Although war, displacement and 
population exchanges altered Anatolia's demographic make-up in the Turks' favour,
46
Chapter 2
nation-building required replacing the memory of coexistence with a narrative 
claiming the Ottoman Empire as a Turkish state. Turkish schoolbooks thus integrate 
the Ottoman period into a Turkish-history narrative starting with the 1071 battle of 
Manzikert (Malazgiri), after which, it is claimed, Anatolia became Turkish. All states 
that existed in Anatolia since then are integrated into a geo-politically continuous 
narrative (Koullapis, 2002:280-281). By presenting Anatolia's history as Turkish, the 
Turks emerge as indigenous; Anatolia's rightful owners. As other communities are 
rarely mentioned, textbooks sustain the impression that Anatolia was scarcely 
inhabited before the Turks' arrival in the 11 th century. Moreover, if the Turks are 
native, non-Turkish populations resident in Anatolia are, by extension, non-native. 
Thus the Turks manage to be 'from elsewhere' and indigenous to their new homeland.
This narrative is complicated but necessary for nation-building, hence national 
education was harnessed early on to disseminate it. In fact, a Ministry of Education 
was created before Turkey was, so to speak - it was established in 1920, while the 
Independence War was still raging. This, Winter (1984:185) rightly notes, indicates 
both the importance of education for Kemalist modernisation and the republican 
elite's readiness to use it as a nation-building tool. A year after the Republic's 
proclamation, this determination to control national socialisation led to the unification 
of education, bringing all secular and religious institutions under direct state control.
Although the Turkish nationalist elite was following foreign models, this initial 
establishment of the national schooling system in the midst of war had a lasting effect 
on education. The martial tone persisted, viewing teachers as an 'army of educators' 
and education as a campaign for national survival. Undoubtedly, given the deprivation 
and widespread illiteracy of early republican years, this militaristic approach bolstered 
teacher morale. Yet the maxim her Turk asker dogar, every Turk is born a soldier, 
seems to have affected education long after the end of the war.
Kazamias (1966:143), in his now-classic study, found that the education system's 
stated aim was to inspire a sense of national duty and pride in 'being the son of a great 
nation with an honourable history'. The TAP, he notes, was a useful model, 
representing an idealised version of the republican Turk, forever vigilant against 
threats. As the Republic and patria are fused in Turkish national discourses and as 
Turkey's historical claims on Anatolia are an indispensable part of national identity,
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patriotism is effectively synonymous with a duty to protect both the nation and the 
land against incursions, divisions and threats. Anatolia's integrity, national unity and 
the survival of the Republic thus become indistinguishable.
The high school history book Inkildp Tarihi ve Ataturkfuluk (ITA, ND), celebrates the 
TAP as the purest representative of the nation's spirit and strength. The TAP, it notes, 
ensured Anatolia's deliverance in 1923 and its continued protection since (p.75). 
Soldiering is celebrated as the Turkish nation's highest profession and art (also see T, 
13 January 2002). Discipline, strength and order suit the Turkish character, 
consequently the TAP is one of the world's oldest and most prestigious3 military 
establishments (ITA, ND:238). The bilingual reader Ozgtirltik Ugruna/To Set Them 
Free4 also calls soldiering 'a man's route' (p.6/7), celebrating 'a soldier's qualities' 
(p.62/63) and stressing every Turk's duty to protect Turkey as Atatiirk did 
(p. 186/187).
It could be argued that, as a conquering people, the Turks inevitably resort to a 
militaristic identity alongside the appropriated histories of the peoples they 
conquered. Yet the TAP is also a useful conceptual bridge in a narrative seeking to 
distance the Republic from its Ottoman past yet retain continuity in Anatolia's 
history. The TAP, celebrated as the only segment of the Ottoman apparatus that did 
not betray the people and embraced the national cause, republicanism and modernity, 
offer the Turks a sense of continuity. The TAP, ITA claims, inherited a tradition of 
valour and forward thinking which now represents the Turkish nation's distilled spirit. 
In Atatiirk's words (ITA, ND:239), the army represents and protects national unity, 
freedom and strength. Thus it remains organically linked to the people and land - an 
argument often appealed to by the TAP - and responsible for their protection.
The subsequent glorification of the land is found in both books. ITA hails Anatolia as 
the Turks' cradle and their grave, soaked in ancestral blood and, for that reason, 
Turkish in a most elemental way (anonymous quote, p.80). Sacrifice binds the people
3 Koklii, literally 'with roots'.
4 The book is used as an English language-learning tool in Turkey, Turkish language-learning tool in 
America and, the authors proudly note, as part of Kemalist education.
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to their land. Citizenship, the administrative manifestation of this essential bond 
between the Turks and their homeland, is derivative and secondary.
Unity within and with the national domain is a natural state of being. 'The nation 
inside the boundaries of the fatherland is one whole' (p.84). Hence, both the Allies' 
desire to share the Empire's lands during the First World War and the Ottoman 
government's failure to resist betray both morality and nature (p. 115). The Allies 
pursued narrow self-interest - using the Empire's Greek and Armenian populations as 
pawns for their designs (p.l 15, 126) - with a disregard for justice. Using a David-and- 
Goliath narrative, ITA notes that the Allied forces were stronger, richer and more 
numerous than the TAP. Yet Turkey had nature and justice on its side so it won the 
Independence War and established the Republic. National deliverance and the 
Republic's establishment are presented as indistinguishable.
Thus, believes Altmay, emerged the myth of the 'military nation'. Studying the 
teaching of National Security Knowledge in Turkish schools, Altmay claims that 
socialisation into the 'military nation' is surprisingly successful. Unless personal 
experience directly contradicts what they learn, students internalise national security 
wisdom imparted at school. Although critics exist, Altmay found that the course 
helped sustain a reverential attitude towards the TAP. National Security Knowledge 
(compulsory for boys and girls in all high schools and usually taught by a serving or 
retired officer) is openly aimed at raising citizens committed to Ataturk, his reforms 
and principles; conscious of the privilege of being a Turk; and willing to sacrifice 
personal interest for the common good (Altmay, 2004:120-1). The course accepts 
most TTT assumptions about national history, depicts nationalism as a natural 
instinct, not an ideology, and celebrates the TAP as the nation's embodiment (p. 125).
Altmay offers a minute and superbly annotated analysis of National Security 
Knowledge textbooks (hence I shall not focus on them here). The course's 
preoccupation with the unity of nation, territory and language, and glorification of the 
TAP and national service, Altmay notes, works. Students generally accepted military
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service as 'the most sacred service to the homeland' 5 (p.131), while teachers equated 
a good education with inculcation in Ataturk's principles (p. 135).
Altmay found that teachers often implicitly referred to the proverb Turkiin Tiirkten 
ba§ka dostu yoktur6, heightening the perceived need to protect and preserve the 
motherland from numerous enemies. Students were told that no country or 
organisation - and certainly not the EU - wants Turkey to be strong and independent, 
as Atatiirk warned in Nutuk. The course takes it as read that Greeks, Syrians and 
Armenians have expansionist designs on Anatolia, while Iran wishes to turn Turkey 
into a theocracy (Altmay, 2004:136-7) and its proposed solutions are invariably 
military. Altmay found students mostly agreed with their books.
As noted above, all textbooks celebrate the TAP as the nation's purest representative 
and best guarantor of national greatness, freedom and safety. Here the military's de 
facto authority when discussing national security - they are, after all, experts - 
enhances the gravity of the message. Classroom experiences reproduce the discourse 
of threat and protection. It is extremely significant that none of Altmay's interviewees 
questioned this course's existence (p. 143) or the military's unlimited access to all 
high school students in the country (p. 139) and actually commented7 that officers 
were the best people to teach the course (p. 147). As a result of this arrangement, all 
Turkish students are told, by a figure of authority, that Turkey is surrounded by 
enemies, hence the military needs to stay strong; a 'fact', Altmay (2004:145) found, 
accepted even by those who questioned the course's specifics. As the sacrality of 
protecting the motherland's unity and integrity is stressed, a powerful national 
narrative emerges, lending legitimacy to all actions justified in its terms. Repetition 
ensures familiarity, as this national mantra appears in history, geography and 
language books.
National Service is compulsory for all Turkish males. Exemptions do occur on medical grounds or for 
the highly educated - for a fee. Although conscientious objectors exist (see 
http://www.savaskarsitlari.ora;,') their numbers are small as evading military service creates a myriad of 
day-to-day problems.
6 A Turk's only friend is a Turk.
7 Students in Southeastern Turkey, having had direct experience of conflict, had different views of the 
TAP (e.g. see p. 152, 163).
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Modernisation is justified in terms of protecting the motherland from ever suffering 
indignity and fear again. In order to navigate around republican nationalism's biggest 
caveat - namely how, after fighting the Europeans, Turkey could be persuaded to 
emulate them - national narratives separate European civilisation from the Europeans.
The Allies are the undisputed villains of early Republican history. The West is 
depicted as evil - for fighting against the Turks and refusing to acknowledge their 
superior nature - and inferior: hypocritical, self-interested and of dubious moral fibre 
(Millas, 2001:75, 79, 84, 98, 133). The Allies' baseness, combined with their strength 
and wealth, makes them a constant source of worry. For Kemalists, Turkey had to put 
itself in a position where the Allies could threaten it no more. Hence, although 
defeated after the Independence War, the Europeans were not 'neutralised'. The only 
way for Turkey to be truly safe was to become as powerful as its enemies.
This initial conceptualisation of survival soon became a civilisational aim in its own 
right and modernisation became the lynchpin of Republican nationalism. 'Every 
single aspect of reform was justified on nationalistic grounds and as a concerted effort 
to indicate that the Turks were, or had the potential to be, as cultured as any other 
nation of the world' (Kazamias, 1966:187). This appeal entailed a precarious balance 
between embracing Western civilisation and not forgiving the Westerners. 
Kazamias's survey of early Republican textbooks shows that Western civilisation is 
promoted with heavy provisos, cautioning against the equation of Civilisation with 
Western European countries. The fact that modernity happened to flourish in Western 
Europe does not make it Western European. The Turkish modernisation drive was 
thus reconciled with an intense pride for all things Turkish.
ITA celebrates this balance. Speaking of injustice, brutality, sacrifice and disaster, the 
book accuses Europe and America of causing destruction and bloodshed in Anatolia 
(p.80-1) while betraying their own principles (p.86-7)8 . Turkey, conversely, remained 
true to its principles even after military victory, never maximising her demands during 
negotiations at Lausanne (p. 174). Retaining the moral high ground is important to the 
narrative. Turkey's struggle for Anatolia becomes a pursuit of justice and fairness that 
the Allies seek to violate in their pursuit of selfish gain (p. 174-5). This rhetoric is now
8 Wilson's Fourteen Points.
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often used against the EU by those who find that reform demands compromise 
Ataturk's legacy: Turkey should westernise without the West.
This theme is stressed in the Education Ministry-produced comic Imparatoluga Veda. 
The enemies are depicted as numerous and treacherous (p. 13). Their only desire was 
to carve up and share out Ottoman lands (p.42) and turn the Sultan into a puppet 
(p.53), so that what little was left to the Empire would also fall under their control. 
Moreover, the Allies' ethnic or religious connections to minorities residing within the 
Empire meant that Allied victories led to violence and intimidation against 'the 
people' (p.47, 51). The comic's exclusion of Christians from the Ottoman demos 
gives (anachronistic) legitimacy to nationalist narratives. 'The people' are Turkish 
and Anatolia is their rightful home. Although Turkey as a country may not yet exist, 
the Allies are the people's enemies as they violate their country's integrity.
This theme is taken up by many a war novel or memoir, such as Seyfettin's9 (2004:4- 
46) Primo, Turk Qocuk, following the spiritual journey of a westernised Turk who, 
having rejected his nationality in the name of Western civilisation, discovered that 
Westerners were not that civilised after all. Through an agonising night of self- 
criticism, the hero exposes Western hypocrisy, cultural arrogance, imperial aggression 
and insatiable greed. Young readers recognise these themes; national concerns are 
confirmed. Seyfettin's hero re-embraces his nationality and finds freedom, truth and 
happiness in an identity he had previously rejected. This identity, the hero exclaims, is 
a source of happiness because it is culturally authentic while offering a purer and 
more honest approach to Western civilisation than found among many westerners. As 
Atatiirk debunks the myth that Turkishness is a backward identity, he enables his 
compatriots to feel proud to be Turkish and, through that identity, embrace modernity.
2. Atatiirk: From Essentlalism to Metaphysics 
2.a. Delivering and Protecting Anatolia
9 This particular story is not taken from a schoolbook but during the course of my fieldwork I asked a 




The fusion of national independence, republicanism and, later, modernisation allows 
national narratives to celebrate the Independence War as the founding moment of all 
three. Atatiirk was the founding father of all three, hence presenting his career as the 
unfolding of a preconceived plan towards national liberation, a seamless narrative of 
military achievement and political accomplishment, is ipso facto celebrating the 
republic that will soon emerge. Given the symbolic nature of the moment and the 
genuine appeal of a heroic story with a happy ending, a vast body of literature exists 
focusing exclusively on Ataturk's defence of Anatolia. This material confirms and 
reproduces narratives discussed above, forming part of a self-perpetuating narrative 
chain. Familiarity is part of its socialising function and, possibly, part of its appeal, for 
this genre is particularly popular. Although circulation statistics are hard to locate, 
staff in several Ankara bookshops confirmed that 'anything with "Atattirk" in the 
title' sells. Everyone I asked during the course of my fieldwork whether they had, in 
their childhood, read Ataturk-related stories, poems and comics answered 
affirmatively. Reading about Atattirk is a national pastime and the habit starts at a 
young age. In Dost, possibly Turkey's largest bookstore chain, Atattirk and the 
Independence War warrant a separate section, distinct from Turkish history and 
politics and larger than both. Nutuk is invariably in the bestsellers' corner and the 
sheer volume of secondary titles suggests one thing: publishers stand to gain from 
printing them and do so with great flare and imagination.
Neverland Qocuk Kitabevi, a tiny children's bookstore behind Ankara's Kocatepe 
mosque, offered 16 different Ataturk-related poetry anthologies for very young 
readers. Similar poetry anthologies for teenagers crammed several shelves, while 
assorted biographies covered entire walls. Copies of Nutuk, in various abridged 
editions, books on Kemalism, the history of the Independence War and/or the reforms 
and books of Ataturk's quotations took up most of the youth section. Non Ataturk- 
related novels took up less than a third of the shelf space.
Ataturk's story is explored from many different angles. Some authors focus on his 
childhood and youth (e.g. Araz, 1999; Savci, ND; or Ataturk's classmate Ali Fuat 
Cebesoy, ND), while others relate Atattirk's story through parables and anecdotes. For 
instance, Hengirmen's (2004:8-9) Atattirk Qftlikte and Yavash's (2004:23) Ben 
Mustafa Kemal discuss vigilance against the enemy in terms of the famous 'crow
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incident'. Little Mustafa, the story goes, living on a farm in Rapla, is asked to drive 
marauding crows from the fields. The crows, readers are told, represent the enemies 
and the field the motherland, 'little Mustafa would one future day scare the enemies 
out of the country as he succeeded in scaring the crows off the plain' (Hengirmen, 
ibid).
Other books, such as Palazoglu's (2004) history of the Independence War for young 
readers, prefer a didactic tone, reflecting a belief that Ataturk's war feats represent 
vital knowledge in themselves. This belief is often taken to extremes. Arikan (2003), 
for instance, offers a day-to-day calendar of the critical period 1918-1923, while 
Koklugiller (2000) offers an effective inventory of key events and reforms. Ataturk's 
principles are catalogued (p.59ff), as are his thoughts on issues ranging from law to 
flowers (p.65-66) and from sport (p.81) to patriotism (p.83). One chapter offers 
segments of famous speeches (p.86ff), while another is devoted to poems inspired by 
Ataturk's life (p. 11 Iff). The last chapter consists of a meticulous list of foreign 
dignitaries' statements on Atatiirk, alphabetised by country name (p.!47ff).
As the story offers pitched battles, political intrigue, treason, heroism and a happy 
ending, it most commonly appears in the form of emotional patriotic novels and 
comics. The Ministry of Education publishes an entire series on Ataturk's career often 
focusing on periods shorter accounts ignore: for instance, Imparatoluga Veda 
(Volume 9 of this series) deals with pre-1919 events. Still, this account stresses that 
Ataturk already had a specific plan for national salvation. In the fullness of time, 
Ataturk's level-headed brilliance enabled him to single-handedly deliver the nation to 
freedom.
Ataturk is presented as perceptive, resourceful, brave and capable of always making 
the correct decision (p.22, 24, 36-7). Although not actually wielding power, Ataturk 
shows great leadership and serves the Empire commendably (p.6, 12), thus earning 
the respect and admiration of both his men and superiors, including the Sultan and the 
German Kaiser (p.16-17, 20, 33-34, 48). Although Ataturk's rank and age make the 
lavishing of such praise unlikely, hindsight makes admiring Ataturk seem natural.
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Atatiirk's brilliance, the story claims, enabled him to remain untainted by the 
Empire's failures and abstain from Enver's activities, realising the CUP 10 was bad for 
the country (p. 11). Only Ataturk managed to lead his army to victory even in the 
grimmest of times (p.38). He alone maintained his resolve when the Ottoman 
government resigned itself to humiliation and nationalist commanders despaired 
(p.43, 53). The war was not over, he said, the Turks' war was about to start (p.44); the 
occupying forces would not stay long: 'As they came, they shall go' (p.46).
In order to achieve this, Ataturk travelled to Anatolia to organise resistance (p.54). 
Interestingly, although the Sultan is aware of Atatiirk's nationalism (p.27) and his 
active involvement in and leadership of nationalist groups (p.53-55, 60), he still 
dispatches Ataturk to Anatolia (p.58) with the mission of 'rescuing the state' (p.61). 
Ataturk preferred to rescue the nation realising that, to remain true to his conscience, 
he had to oppose the Sultan (p.28). The volume ends as Ataturk departs for Samsun. 
His parting words are that the Allies 'cannot appreciate the love of freedom and a 
nation's determined struggle for it, the only thing they trust in is physical force' 
(p.62). Everyone knows what follows: Ataturk matches their force with his - and 
wins.
Knowing the outcome hardly compromises the thrill of reading about Atatiirk's 
successes, however, as the immense popularity of the Kuquk Gezgin series proves. 
The series' hero, Omer, visits famous battle sites, such as Sakarya, or places where 
important innovations were announced, such as Kastamonu: the series 'follows' 
Atatiirk's military and political career, although the books are not actually about him. 
Yet a book about Anatolia is essentially about Atatiirk as he is the land's champion 
and its redeemer. Anatolia is the coveted prize the Independence War secured. As 
Atatiirk's life and the nation's destiny are fused and he is the War's undeniable hero, 
as the Republic's raison d'etre is Anatolia's protection and Atatiirk is the Republican 
father, the national narrative further fuses Anatolia with Atatiirk, for without him 
Anatolia would have been ravaged.
In Ben Mustafa Kemal, Yavash drives this point home. Before Atatiirk, invaders were 
robbing the Turks of their freedom and the Sultan of his powers. But the Sultan only
10 Committee of Union and Progress.
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cared about his enjoyment (p. 34, 37, 78) and did nothing to prevent the Allies from 
grabbing 'our lands from our hands' (p.51, 94). Even 'the government takes the 
weapons from our hands' (p.88). '[O]ur country lacked a firm hand' (p.81). The 
Turkish people and the cause of freedom needed a champion.
'Our patria's independence, our nation's future is in danger' (p.89), Ataturk told the 
Erzurum Congress, but '[t]he sublime Turkish nation, will show its heroism once 
more, and will win the first national independence war in human history' (p.83). 
Atatiirk's success, notes Yavash, was vital for humanity, as the Turkish victory 
against all odds 'gave the whole world the first example of a national awakening' 
(p. 10). Historical inaccuracy hardly undermines the potency of this first-person 
narrative whereby Ataturk tells his young readers that 'the most important thing for 
humanity nowadays is freedom and independence' (p.45). Which was exactly what he 
gave the Turks. For '[wjithin two days [of the Erzurum speech] there were no 
enemies East of Sakarya' (p.99). 'By 18 September 1922 no enemy soldiers were left 
hi Western Anatolia' (p. 109). Ataturk had achieved the impossible (p. 127).
This is where the education system comes into its own. Ataturk is the symbol of 
Turkish patriotism, hence protecting his legacy and safeguarding Anatolia and the 
Republic - his gifts to his people - become, not simply national duties, but duties to 
Ataturk. He single-handedly delivered the land and its people; all he expects in return 
is that his gift be preserved. Thus the Address to Youth becomes a national prayer. It 
appears, superimposed on Ataturk's portrait, in the first-grade reader Birinci Kitap, 
Okuma-Yazma (1990), although it is beyond the students' reading abilities. It appears 
on the last page ofOzgiirluk Ugruna (1981:250/251), printed in the shape of Ataturk's 
profile, like an icon. In IT A, the high school history textbook, the Address is printed 
alongside the national anthem, the flag and a portrait of young, western-clad Ataturk.
As IT A addresses teenagers, the introduction (p. 15-16) explains why Atatiirk's 
reforms and thoughts are worth studying. The state, we are told, is naturally strong, 
rich and beautiful, but remains a work in progress. For that work to be completed, the 
Turks need to face and resolve contemporary problems and, to achieve this, 
understanding Atatiirk's principles is essential. Although, the nation is freedom- 
loving by nature, it was Ataturk who established its freedom. Studying Atatiirk's 
reforms, the book notes, is necessary for future happiness. ITA claims to teach the
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history of Turkey's critical years in order to offer students a reference point and 
benchmark for the future. As Atatiirk's reforms constitute an essential part of 
citizenship, learning about his activities - and by extension his life - becomes an 
essential avenue for moulding future citizens.
Hayat Bilgisi, an elementary schoolbook blending basic physics (unit 8) with civic 
education (an introduction to electoral politics), fanning (unit 7), giving directions 
(p.73-4), shopping (p.33) and recycling (p.43), also offers lengthy patriotic interludes.
The book opens with the words of the national anthem, the flag - a visualisation of 
nationality - and the words ne mutlu Turktim diyene. Repeating this mantra 
constitutes a national ritual, all the more potent for being familiar. Then comes a 
simplified version of the already well-known history of the Independence War and 
early republican reforms. The account is focused on Atatiirk's life and actions, 
ensuring accessibility for its young readers, while also retaining narrative structure. 
The choice to anchor the entire story on Ataturk, however, is both practical and 
tactical as it perpetuates and reproduces the myth that Anatolia's deliverance was the 
work of one man.
'Before the Republic, our state used to be called Ottoman', the book relates, 
upholding the 'Turkification' of the Ottoman state discussed above. That state lost a 
war and, as a result, part of the country was occupied. The occupiers disarmed the 
soldiers (p.49), but Ataturk went to Anatolia to fight nonetheless. The tone is set. 
Ataturk is the key historical agent: he started the Independence War (p. 50) - 
seemingly, single-handedly and proclaimed the Republic. The book presents the War 
and the Republic's proclamation as stages of the same event. Discussion of the 
Erzurum and Sivas Congresses facilitates this, stressing the existence of republican 
practice even in the midst of war.
Interestingly, although the war is discussed, the enemies are barely mentioned. 
Germany, the Ottomans' ally, is not mentioned either. Other nations are mere extras 
in this discourse of inevitability leading from national liberation to political 
republicanism. Nowhere is this equation more evident than in IT A. The truth after the 
Great War was simple, we are told; the Turks' motherland was to be occupied and 
shared out among the enemies. The Sultan did not resist, but the nation would. As the
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army was being demobilised, patriotic officers joined the nationalist forces that 
spontaneously formed (p.74). Building on the established understanding of the 
Ottoman state as a Turkish state, the book speaks of the nation and patriotic national 
officers anachronistically, but convincingly. The sections on the Balkan and First 
World Wars open with Ataturk quotes - creating a false sense of continuity - and a 
'growing sense of national consciousness among the people' is stressed (p.75).
The people rallied around the national cause (p.78-81). The book quotes from rousing 
speeches and offers maps marking the changing political and military situation11 . For 
students long-exposed to a rhetoric of unity and indivisibility, taught to identify 
Turkey's map with independence and freedom, the lines criss-crossing the motherland 
carry a potent emotional message. So the book proceeds, noting that 'we will not 
endure any nation becoming... our master in our own homeland' (p.79). Ataturk 
ensured such a fate would not befall the Turkish people. Emerging as a deus ex 
machina, Ataturk is praised for his superior political understanding and ability to give 
the people what they needed. He brought them hope by going to Anatolia with the 
specific aim of establishing a new state based on national sovereignty (p.75). His plan 
of action predated his posting; in fact, we are told, he only accepted the official 
commission to facilitate this work, for he recognised, in the military struggle against 
the Allies, a simultaneous struggle towards a new polity. Ataturk was the dawn after a 
long dark night (p.79), bringing justice to two million Turks who risked being 
sacrificed to two hundred thousand Greeks (p.80).
Ataturk delivers justice while also naturally representing the people - both through 
superior understanding and through the democratic legitimation conveyed by the 
Sivas and Erzurum Congresses. 'The patriotic people of Eastern Anatolia were firmly 
gathered and united around the Pasa' (p.84). The people wanted freedom and needed 
Ataturk in order to get it: his was a strong guiding hand to lead them towards the 
future of national independence they had autonomously envisaged. Popular legitimacy 
and procedural transparency is vital for Ataturk's own legitimation as a true national
11 E.g. Balkan Wars (p.25); First World War (p.33); Mudros Armistice - map marking location of 
occupying forces (p.41); Greek offensive and Independence War (p. 128); the Republic of Turkey 
(p.335); the 'Turkish World' - countries considered ethnic kin (p.336).
58
Chapter 2
leader and genuine republican father: he was popular; his agenda was popular; his 
power was acquired through proto-democratic structures.
This clarification is important as some small-minded, jealous people failed to see the 
magnitude of his achievements and felt Atatiirk was exceeding the limits of his 
authority for personal gain. But his contributions were selfless; a fact proved by his 
resignation from the Ottoman Army - his childhood dream and only ambition - in the 
national struggle's name (p.83 & Ozgurliik Ugruna p.212/3). Besides, ITA stresses, 
Ataturk's authority could not be measured against conventional benchmarks as new 
conditions forged a new legitimacy derived from the nationalist movement (p.85).
Presenting both Ataturk himself and his power as legitimate automatically legitimises 
subsequent political reforms. Claiming legitimation in terms of both democratic 
popularity and natural authority creates tensions, as procedural democratic legitimacy 
effectively qualifies claims to 'natural leadership'. Nevertheless, the books pursue 
both avenues in an attempt to pre-empt potential counter-narratives: Ataturk's power 
was procedurally legitimate, democratically and essentially representative and his 
goals were both popular and just. Although the discourse of republican nationality 
presents the transition to a republic as natural and inevitable, authors are aware that a 
republic needs to be popular with its citizens. Hence no legitimation appeal is left 
untapped in an attempt to present the Republic as both natural and popular, 
simultaneously giving the nation ownership of the republican reforms.
Moreover, Ataturk's legitimacy ipso facto proves the Sultan's illegitimacy as he 
opposes Ataturk's - aka the people's - desires. As Ataturk is the people's 
representative in both procedural and essential terms, the Sultan's slights against him 
represent a collective insult and violation of national volition. The Sultan forfeited his 
legitimacy, ITA continues, when he conceded to the country's break-up (p.89), thus 
failing the nation. This was the 'biggest blot in Ottoman history' (p.l 17), as it ignored 
national volition and was only erased by the treaty of Lausanne (p. 173).
Discussing national will as something that predated the Independence War lends both 
the nationalists and their state de facto legitimacy: on 'April 23, 1920 a new state was 
created in Anatolia based on unconditional national sovereignty' (p. 120).
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Republicanism was thus inserted into the national imaginary as a natural concomitant 
of independence. The connecting thread is Ataturk himself.
2.b. Ataturk: Real Man, Real Hero
Ataturk is war hero, statesman and national champion wrapped into one. His every 
endeavour seems to have been crowned with glory and everything Turkey is today 
emanates from his vision and willpower. Ataturk is the strapping young prince in 
Turkey's Cinderella story and, as such, he is a potent symbol in his own right. 
Arithmetic books, for instance, often sport Ataturk's picture, looking fondly at a child 
on his knee, encouraging learning with the promise of his affection. His omnipresence 
may represent a homage, a habit or an attempt to invest an endeavour with some of 
Ataturk's charisma. What it achieves is familiarisation with Ataturk's figure which, in 
turn, helps sustain national narratives, as he is both the symbol of national victory, 
republicanism and freedom and the connecting theme in all national narratives.
In these narratives, Ataturk often emerges as a super-human, mythical figure. 
Photographs help remind readers he was real. This 'reality' works on two levels. 
Pictures of his parents, the home he was born in or Amtkabir (ITA, p. 62; Hay at 
Bilgisi, p.59) serve as reminders of his humanity and mortality. Such pictures, and the 
anecdotes that accompany them, enable students to develop a sense of proximity to 
the leader. Simultaneously, however, Ataturk's pictures on the battlefield (e.g. IT A, 
p. 164) or a photograph of the Bandirma (ITA, p.77), the vessel that carried Ataturk to 
Samsun on May 19, 1919, thus enabling him to start the Independence War, remind 
the reader that Ataturk's heroic feats, mythical as they may appear, are actually true. 
Familiarity is not always trivialised. Hayat Bilgisi (p.60) seeks to cultivate respect, 
even awe, when noting that Ataturk devoted his life to the Turkish nation: defeating 
its enemies, ensuring its progress and, eventually, breaking his health for 'our sake'. 
Okuma-Yazma concurs, linking his death to hard work while Ozgurluk Ugruna (1981: 
248/249) identifies 'the burdens that a perpetually active life' as the cause for 
Ataturk's death. Cirrhosis of the liver is, unsurprisingly, not mentioned.
60
Chapter 2
The Ataturk mythology is assisted by the proliferation of audiovisual material often 
used in schools: documentaries, dramatisations - available on video and DVD - and 
CDs of narrative, poems and patriotic songs. One such CD 12 even claims to include 
Ataturk's favourite song. Meanwhile, at home children can do jigsaw puzzles 13 
commemorating key moments in Ataturk's career. Adults hang his portrait in their 
homes, shops and cars. The fusion of Ataturk's life trajectory with national salvation 
creates immense interest hi the man himself; his life, not just his career; his thoughts 
and desires, not just his actions. Interest gives rise to a fascination that commercial 
publishers are eager to feed and capitalise on with commemorative albums such as 
Renkli Fotograflarla: Ataturk, Ozel Album (ND).
Publisher Milliyet claims that this album was designed as a resource for students and 
schools. With that in mind, it opens with Ataturk's Address to Youth (p.5). The 
photographs, arranged in chronological order, are digitally coloured, offering the 
nation the opportunity to see 'Ataturk's blue eyes' (back cover). The captions offer 
quotes from politicians, public personae, academics and Ataturk himself. Nuggets of 
nationally salient information are also offered, including a summary of the Milli 
Misak (p. 10), Ataturkism's core principles (p.49) and the significance of national 
unity in ensuring freedom and territorial integrity (e.g. p. 13, 26). Territorial integrity 
protects the Republic, which in turn protects freedom (p.32). As the Republic is 
Ataturk's gift, by extension, Ataturk offered Turks both freedom and progress. 
Pictures of children (e.g. p. 16-8, 20-1, 27, 29 and, p.44ff pictures of Ataturk's 
youngest adopted daughter, Ulkii), Western-clad crowds (p.32-3, 39 etc) and quotes 
on women's liberation (p.22, 34) enhance the message of republican well-being.
The album supports the one-man-struggle narrative with all the reverential admiration 
such a feat deserves. In most pictures Ataturk stands alone - even if that has, at times, 
required some airbrushing 14 . Simultaneously, this narrative is supported by a series of 
pictures in which Ataturk is not alone. Certain comrades-in-arms, particularly ismet -
12 'Mustafa Kemal Devrimicinin Giincesi: Soz, Muzik, Sozliik'. Text and Narration: Fikret Kizilok 
(Kalan Muzik Yapim ltd Sti).
13 Heidi offers 20 different puzzles. Other brands abound.
14 For instance, Refet (Bele) has been removed from p. 14. See Mango (1999, fig.21, p.298-299) for a 
copy of the original.
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having survived both early Republican 'purges' and digital retouchage - respectfully 
accompany Ataturk, stressing the subtext of great leadership among great men. 
Similarly, quotes of admiration penned by famous individuals and the respectful 
presence of military personnel (p.33, 40, 52) and foreign dignitaries (p.30, 67, 88) 
underline Atatiirk's personal authority. This recognition confirms Atatiirk's glory in a 
public and ceremonial fashion. Yet the image of the statesman does not outweigh that 
of the caring national father. Ataturk is shown touring the country, eager to stay close 
to his people (although his biographers mention no such interest), as a father should. 
One picture shows Ataturk listening intently to a soldier, the proverbial mehmetgik 
(p.60).
Such albums do not simply glorify Atatiirk, they also provide 'proof of the 
republican fairytale's reality. A story of such achievement can easily slip into the 
realm of myth. People need reminding that it is true. Pictures of Atatiirk delivering 
Nutuk (p.69, 79) and other images associated with specific reforms accompanied with 
explanatory captions (p.62, 84 the Hat Law, p.87 on script) provide hard proof. The 
album does not need to relate stories, it simply hints at them. Everybody recognises 
Sabiha Gokfen, Atatiirk's adopted daughter and Turkey's first, and for a long time 
only, female military pilot. Her picture is a story in its own right (p.72, 89). Similarly, 
pictures prove Atatiirk actually existed and one day in Kastamomu he did shock his 
audience by introducing the Western brimmed hat. Simultaneously, recognition of key 
moments forges a narrative for the reader, regardless of whether one is provided.
Readers will have read an abridged version of Nutuk at school (Ataturk, 2002), hence 
a picture of Ataturk delivering the speech, the finale of which (Address to Youth) 
everyone knows by heart, triggers immediate recognition. Readers are aware of 
Atatiirk's modernisation drive, but while their lives are shaped by eight decades of 
republican modernisation, beholding snapshots of the reform effort as it unfolded 
enhances the story's reality and resonance: the first Turkish universities (p.48, 50); 
ceremonies celebrating Republican anniversaries (p.55, 57, 65); new factories (p.66). 
The pictures extol progress, education, industrialisation. Atatiirk's presence in every 
frame stresses that it was all achieved under his guidance. The album finishes with a 
picture of Amtkabir: Atatiirk is dead, but his legacy lives on.
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Nothing about this album is unique. 'From the moment persons are born into Turkish 
society, they are taught to view Mustafa Kemal as the unparalleled chief and savior of 
the Turkish nation and to devote themselves to preserving his accomplishments and 
legacy' (Parla and Davison, 2004:41).
Pre-school 'Ataturk packs' are common. Ataturk Cok Seviyorum (ND) offers four 
books of stories, pictures and exercises. Single volumes on Ataturk and the Republic 
also exist. Publishers seem to consider such titles necessary for early socialisation as 
they always include them in 'educational series' such as the Benim Biricik Dergim 
books, which are aimed at children aged 5-7. Here, Ataturk ve Cumhuriyet (ND) 
introduces basic facts about Atariirk's life and career and offers pictures of Ataturk's 
Salonica house and Amtkabir (pages 4-5). As the book is an example of 'learning 
through doing', national symbols are integrated into games and exercises. For 
instance, joining the dots 'gives' the Bandirma (p.7), while mazes lead to the little 
pink house and Ataturk's mausoleum (p. 12). Similarly, in Ataturk (ND) - a similar 
volume by a rival publisher - joining the dots also gives the Bandirma (p.8) and 
Amtkabir (p.36), which is also the final destination of a maze (p.37). Repeated 
exposure to these images in childhood enhances familiarity while also ensuring that a 
visit to relevant national sites, later in life, will feel like a return.
These books do not limit themselves to promoting national imagery. They also offer a 
basic yet powerful republican narrative, always hinged on Ataturk. Ataturk ve 
Cumhuriyet (p. 14-5) suggests that Ataturk brought fairness, peace and prosperity to 
his people through reforms, depicted through scales and a courthouse, a dove and 
olive branch as well as factories. A clock, some bottles and a calendar complying with 
the republican metric system link objects the child recognises to Ataturk. The 
message is clear and partly true: nothing would be as you know it without him. 
Ataturk thus emerges as the maker of the child's reality. Actually, Ataturk emerges as 
the maker of all good things surrounding the child, as his reforms are further 
associated with enlightenment, freedom and happiness. Drawings show old and 
stooping Ottoman Turks wearing veils and peasant garb in shades of grey and brown. 




Visual narratives are easily accepted as factual. Lists of major national holidays and 
their significance (p. 16-7) and the seasons (p. 18) enhance this aura of objectivity. 
Either the publishers believe in the factual nature of their narrative or they wish the 
children to do so. Either way, the presentation of nationally salient information as 
objective and real moulds the child's experience accordingly. In some cases, to ensure 
that children have committed these facts to memory, the books offer tests. In Ataturk 
(ND), a quiz asks the reader to name Ataturk's birthplace and his parents, as well as 
identify the Amtkabir and the Istikldl Mar^. Ataturk Qftlikte offers the names of 
Atatiirk's family members in a Turkey-shaped bubble and the child is asked to match 
them to their pictures. This information enhances familiarity and accessibility, which 
helps turn Ataturk into a manageable role-model. Like his reader, Ataturk had parents 
and went to school - and he was exceptionally hard-working, setting an example for 
all Turks (Ataturk, ND:6).
Rather than discussing Atatiirk's later accomplishments, these books discuss his 
tastes, his habits and what is known of his childhood. Ataturk asks the child to discuss 
novels, noting that Ataturk loved to read (p.21), or to discuss the sea, noting that 
Ataturk loved to swim (p.23). Rather than discussing the sources of Ataturk's 
greatness, the books forge familiarity and accessibility. Offering a photograph of 
Ataturk with his friend tnonii (p.30), the book urges the young reader to draw the 
picture of a friend; a picture of a smiling Ataturk (p.33) begs the question of what 
makes the reader smile. Ataturk is real, accessible, lovable. On the last page the child 
is told that this glorious man is dead and is asked to draw him some flowers (p.35).
Drawing parallels between a child's experiences and Ataturk's life seeks to forge a 
personal bond between young readers and the Republican father, stressing that every 
great man was once a child. Ataturk Qftlikte belongs to a 32-title series dealing with 
Ataturk's life, from cradle to grave. This series devotes several titles to Ataturk's 
boyhood, his antics and achievements, even his first love.
Enabling a child to feel close to Ataturk facilitates embracing the republican project 
and its faith in an accelerated and controlled modernisation. Hence the books stress 
traits that children may identify with. In Ataturk Qftlikte, Ataturk is a poor, orphaned
15 The Independence March, Turkey's national anthem.
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farmer, enabling millions of Turks to identify with him. Similarly, in Ben Mustafa 
Kemal, a first-person narrative rich in photographic material (p.48,64,66, 74, 84) and 
anecdotal information (p.23, 86-88) adding immediacy to the story, the author 
constructs a sense of proximity. Although Ataturk's leadership is celebrated (p.69, 
82), the book stresses his kind and caring nature (p.41, 49, 55), seeking to instil in 
young Turks the knowledge that Ataturk was one of them. But was he?
2.c. Ataturk: Beyond Humanity?
Ata'ya Armagan - available in bookshops and costing twice as much as most 
children's books - is a small polygonal contraption of folded cardboard that 
eventually unfolds into a flower made of pictures of Ataturk from different stages in 
his life. On the reverse side of each 'petal' one reads: I believed, I trusted, I worked, I 
captured success, I used the strength that was in the blood in my veins - a reference to 
the Address to Youth -1 am so happy, thanks to you. The belief that Ataturk brought 
his people success and happiness by enabling them to achieve both forms part of a 
parallel narrative that children encounter as they grow older. Ataturk may be a 
familiar figure, but, with time, he also becomes a superhuman hero.
The belief that heroes are the nation's true representatives and the best examples 
according to which 'moral men and women' should be moulded (Kazamias, 
1966:133) means that such imagery is extensively used in education. Hero-worship 
helped construct the new national narratives, as the Kemalist state sought to fuse 
disparate ethnic elements into a coherent national culture through education (ibid, 
p. 109-111). Although smaller heroes are celebrated, Ataturk represents the backbone 
of this narrative. In fact 'the War of Independence seems to be integrated into his life 
or to be just an episode of his life' (Koullapis, 2002:298).
Rather than fading, this phenomenon has intensified with time. The 1980s military 
government enhanced Atatiirk-worship and ensured Kemalist principles were taught 
in schools in a clear and comprehensive fashion. Although educational reform has 
occurred since, this Kemalist drive has not been abandoned and Atatttrk's 
omnipresence has actually increased. Since the 1990s, history books average one
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Atatiirk picture every fourth page. This both capitalises on and increases the 
emotional resonance of Atatiirk's story.
This story constitutes the topic of choice for many language-learning books because, 
according to a group of English Literature university students in Ankara, familiarity 
facilitates language-learning. Hence books such as Kirk's (ND) Kemal Atatiirk or 
Ardananci's (2004) Atatiirk: Leader of Turkish People - also available in German and 
French - abound. Their format is standard: the story opens with a picture of the little 
pink house (also in Ozgiirliik Ugruna, p. 10) and recounts Ataturk's childhood in light 
of his thirst for modern education. The double stress on modern education and 
Ataturk's exceptional intelligence, diligence and indefatigable inquisitiveness (see 
Atatiirk: Leader of Turkish People, p.6, 9, 13; Atatiirk Qftlikte, p.3, 5, 13; Ozgiirliik 
Ugruna, p.46, 56/57, 68/69, 154/5, 170/1, 174/5, 186/7; and Ben Mustafa Kemal, 
p. 19, 29, 33), simultaneously propagates the Kemalist modernising plan and 
encourages children to be hard-working at school.
These books present little Mustafa as a miniature of the man he later became, with all 
his convictions already in place and his plan formulated. In Atatiirk: Leader of 
Turkish People (p. 15, 17, 20), Atatiirk is depicted as patriotically aware by the age of 
seven, while Ozgiirliik Ugruna (p. 182/3, 184/5) suggests that Atatiirk was consciously 
educating himself for his future role, learning how to manage political change and 
bring freedom and democracy to his people. His leadership is presented as natural 
(p.14/15, 168/9, 190/1), both in terms of his personality and in his relationship with 
the nation. Atatiirk, it is claimed, was destined to lead his people to freedom and a 
plan to that effect predated the circumstances that enabled its realisation. By 1919, 
k [h]e is ready to serve his country. He will go to Anatolia and create a new country. 
He has the necessary talent to do it... So democracy [begins] in Turkey' (Atatiirk: 
Leader of Turkish People, p.27, 30).
In these simplified accounts, Ataturk is both accessible and out of reach. He is a 
normal boy, attending school as his readers do, facing his share of difficulties, yet 
unlike 'normal boys' he has a mission, an inner calling that common mortals do not 
share. The dissemination of this message, important in its own right, becomes more 
significant when inscribed in language-learning material, compounded by the 
awareness that the material will be automatically accessible to foreign audiences -
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and foreign audiences matter. Every book helping a Turkish child practice French also 
enables a French child to learn about Turkey and Ataturk or even learn Turkish. In 
this spirit, Ataturk comic books are available in a variety of languages. Children on 
buses and ferries often clutch the Turkish version; according to booksellers, the 
French, English and German versions are used for educational purposes, while Dutch 
or Swedish versions are mainly targeted at tourists. Whatever the root of their appeal, 
Turkish, French and English translations were sold out everywhere I searched. 
Finally, I procured a battered Italian copy from a dusty bookshop in Se^uk.
Once again, the narrative starts with the pink house in Salonica and ends with 
Amtkabir. This is a story of landmarks, symbols and emotional appeals. The aim is 
not the provision of facts, but their ordering. According to this sequence of events, 
Atatiirk's national leadership was a plan long in the making and his faith in his 
impending success unwavering (p. 19). The book stresses his genius and foresight 
(p.13-4, 17) and his intuitive ability to know his people's desires (p.43). This quasi- 
organic link with his people meant that Atatiirk's power was essentially 
representative, even if not always structurally so. It also meant that opposition to 
Atatiirk's actions ipso facto opposed the nation's wishes. Only deranged, self-serving 
individuals and reactionaries - such as Rauf (Bele), who advocated the Sultanate's 
return (p.33) - opposed Ataturk and the Republic. Ozgiirluk Ugruna (p.230/1, 236/7- 
238) concurs, stressing that Ataturk always enjoyed everyone's support. Those who 
opposed him were jealous or ignorant men. Yet, we are told, Ataturk actually 
favoured the existence of opposition for the sake of democracy. According to Ataturk: 
La Nascita di Una Nazione, he wanted political activity to become independent of 
him, yet deputies kept seeking his advice (p.35) and opposition leaders, feeling used 
by subversive elements, withdrew from the political arena.
All figures, apart from Ataturk, seem secondary and subservient to him. Even Kazim 
Karabekir, without whom there would have been no nationalist forces for Ataturk to 
command, is mentioned merely as one of Atatiirk's men. No other war comrade is 
mentioned by name and, although the narrative does not lapse into falsity, omissions 
create the impression of a superhuman leader taking Turkey by the hand, doing what 
was necessary for the good of the people (e.g. executing dissidents p.36, 39, 45),as it 
was 'too soon to realise a completely democratic regime'. In Ben Mustafa Kemal
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(p. 119) the same theme is stressed: Atatiirk wanted to give his people multi-party 
democracy, but they were not ready. So he did what he had to.
Undoubtedly, Ataturk was 'one of the most important statesmen of our century' 
(p.54), yet many authors approach him with reverence, vesting him with almost 
superhuman qualities. In Ozgurliik Ugruna, Ataturk is presented as beyond human 
constraints. This is a narrative of his childhood, for which sources are rare, but for the 
authors the biggest challenge was not research. ' Ataturk's achievements have made it 
seem almost unthinkable that he could ever have been a child at all; to imagine this 
great hero engaged in childlike activities seems almost an impertinence' (p.xiv/xv).
The book claims that Ataturk, a born leader, did not develop the desire to lead his 
people towards freedom and progress. Rather this desire was an integral part of his 
personality, evident since childhood. His nature, we are told, was noble, kind-hearted 
and caring: he cared for puppies and younger children (p.70-75) and once bought two 
goldfinches just to set them free (p.26/7). 'Someday he could lead the people of his 
country to freedom, the same way that in childhood he had set free those two 
goldfinches in the market at Salonica' (p. 180/1). National freedom, however, was not 
Ataturk's only gift to his people. He also brought them individual freedom by 
teaching them to embrace modernity the way he had always done. Even at the age of 
seven, Ataturk refused to kneel at school, choosing instead to sit. He rejected tradition 
and religion, preferring modern education, art and science (p.42/43, 60/61, 74/5). 
Undoubtedly such thoughts are uncommon among seven-year-olds, but this is no 
common seven-year-old.
Authors looking for the man in the boy have no trouble finding or constructing him. 
In Ben Mustafa Kemal, Ataturk is also depicted as a moderniser since early childhood, 
rejecting corporal punishments, rote-learning and uncritical memorising at the age of 
seven (p. 16-8, 25, 28). His opposition to traditional methods and endorsement of a 
new civilisational paradigm is not accidental. Ataturk knew, it is suggested, since 
childhood, that modernisation held the key to progress.
So Ataturk saved his people, freeing them from the Sultan's grasp and making them a 
'proud democratic nation' (Ozgurluk Ugruna, p. 188/189, 198/199). Everything he
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promised, he delivered. In fact, the words 'verdigi sozii tuttu' 16 (p.23, 119) constitute 
a common rejoinder in Ataturk stories and anecdotes. He kept his word, against the 
odds, making personal sacrifices as 'the interests of Turkey and its possibilities for 
survival lay with the Nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal... 
undefeated in pitched battle, a master of warfare and tactics' (p.218/219). Ataturk 
liberated his people becoming '[sjchoolteacher (ba§6gretmeri) of the whole nation', 
leading his people to progress through his reforms. Thus, he was named Ataturk:
'His was an appropriate name indeed, because as father, he had given the Turk 
reason to be proud of his home and his heritage, and made him ready to play a 
role in the twentieth-century... In truth, just as the child Mustafa had set those 
two goldfinches free, the man Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had set his own people 
free, free from the past, free from the dictates of other political powers, free to 
walk tall among the nations of the world, free to live under their own laws, 
free to sing their own songs' (p.244/245).
This leader, exceptional by any standards, has been further glorified since his death. 
For the authors, however, the divine aura surrounding Ataturk is not the product of a 
sustained glorification campaign. Rather, they believe that young Mustafa was on a 
mission and a divine hand protected him ensuring he survived to fulfil it. This 
narrative is not uncommon. In Ben Mustafa Kemal (p. 76), we hear of a pocket watch 
taking a bullet that would have pierced Atatiirk's heart and sparing his life. In 
Ozgurluk Ugruna we are told that a door fell off its hinges onto his cot (p.50/51) yet 
he was spared; a gun he was cleaning as a young boy fired by accident yet 'for a 
wonder, no harm had been done to anybody' (p.64/65) and Ataturk grew up having 
learnt not to clean a loaded gun. Even when his brothers died of diphtheria, he 
survived. 'How had Mustafa escaped the dreadful disease?' (p.20). The implication 
that he was spared in order to fulfil his mission is clear in this narrative. His mother, a 
republican Mary, knew her son was destined for greatness and although she deplored 
the burden he was to carry for his people, she accepted it as his mission (p. 126/127). 
Atatiirk himself also believed he had survived for a reason (p. 152/153 & Yavash, 
2004:24, 32).
16 'He kept his word'.
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Atatiirk's ascent to prominence appears linear; career frustrations are not mentioned 
and his plan for national salvation is given a timeless quality. As God or providence 
seemingly conspire for his success, it is no wonder that Ataturk often features in 
books as a quasi-divine figure. The bilingual reader Ataturk Olmak/Becoming Ataturk 
is a case in point. A child is wondering what to be when he grows up. As the book 
teaches basic vocabulary - family members and the professions - the child learns 
about 'how [Ataturk] had saved Ttirkiye from the invaders and established the 
Republic' at school (p. 10). Interestingly, in the English text the country retains its 
Turkish name while in the Turkish text it is simply referred to as 'our country'.
The child, fascinated, decides to become Ataturk when he grows up. His family, 
however, mock this decision: Ataturk was extraordinary, no one can resemble him; 
the very suggestion is a sin (p. 16). 'Not only did Ataturk lead a revolution that freed a 
(captive) nation, but he also paved Turkiye's future by introducing reforms' (p. 13). 
His brother laughs at him for wanting to be like Ataturk without his 'burning blue 
eyes and hair, which shone like the sun' (p. 14). Everything about Ataturk, from his 
physique to his abilities, is unique and immune to replication by mere mortals.
Nevertheless, the child is told, by understanding Atatiirk's thoughts and protecting his 
principles everyone can preserve a part of him in his heart (p. 18): 'If you understand 
Atatiirk, then he will always be within you' (p. 19). The child then 'knew that Atatiirk 
would live within his heart throughout his life and guide him. As he would, all the 
other children on the path to peace and brotherhood' (p20) like a patron saint or a 
guardian angel. Thus, the Address to Youth becomes not a political bequest, but the 
articulation of a moral duty for Turkish youth.
This is undeniably the stuff of poetry and, indeed, poetry it has inspired. Anthologies 
such as Atak's (ND) child and youth poems or Giines's (ND) Ataturk poetry 
anthology pay patriotic homage to Ataturk and the Independence War. Some, such as 
Ozyiirekli's (2002) Mustafa Kemal'in Suvarileri, complement dramatic verse with 
graphic battle drawings and photographic material from the Independence War. 
Cakmak9ioglu's (1997) best-selling Ataturk Destam - the Ataturk epic, placed 




Ataturk, the poem starts, was thinking of the people that had been forgotten for many 
years and were thirsting for freedom (p.8-9). No one else thought of them while the 
enemies were ravaging the country. But Ataturk came to the people in answer to their 
prayers. In the book, a picture shows trees in bloom and an angel hovering over a 
dancing crowd. Ataturk came to his people, with whom he belonged (p. 12), and took 
up their cause. With his arrival the first rose blossom tore through the darkness (p. 13). 
Ataturk's intervention restored his people's pride, progress and prosperity (p.24); his 
arrival enabled the water to flow, the trees to bear fruit and the sun to rise (p. 14, 27).
Figurative language emphatically stressing how 'Atattirk's light' changed his 
country's destiny is expected in a patriotic poem. Its effects, however, should not be 
underestimated. Ataturk is vested with the power to defeat fate and affect nature. Not 
only did he re-draw the motherland's map, he also made all his people - whom he had 
known for centuries - be 'of the same blood' (p. 15). Although the nation is claimed as 
having always existed, Ataturk awakened and united it. hi fact, it was through Ataturk 
that the nation acquired the unifying tie of shared blood. The poem dramatises 
national awakening: rolling drums follow Ataturk's wake-up call as villagers take up 
arms and join him (p. 17-18) to reclaim their land. During all this, Ataturk remains 
outside and above the nation which is symbolised by Mehmet, the soldier (p. 18).
After liberating the nation, Ataturk 'founded the Republic' (p. 19). Once again, 
establishing the Republic is presented as an integral part of the national Independence 
War. Once again, historical agency is vested in Ataturk. The nation followed: when he 
laughed, they laughed and when he called, they went (p.20). The nation accepted 
Ataturk's Republic and the youth accepted the duty of protecting it and defending 
national unity, knowing that the strength necessary flows in their noble blood (p.21).
The organic tie Ataturk and his people share is extended to include the Republic. 
Ankara is the nation's heart, where love beats and the Assembly works (p.22). As the 
Republic is organic, it is natural and essential. Ataturk's reforms, then, were 
necessary. Republicanism was not a choice, but a natural imperative as Ataturk was 
creating civilisation (p.23). And he succeeded. Everything the Turks enjoy today, 
from apples and waves to literacy and international respect is Ataturk's gift. So 
whenever problems occur, whenever there is confusion or uncertainty, the Turks turn
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to him for answers as he is the flag that never disappears from the skies (p.26): 
Atatiirk has not left his people and they have not left him.
Atatiirk Destam stresses that Turks still eagerly answer his call to arms (p.28) and 
shows drawings of schoolchildren - wholesome boys and uncovered girls - solemnly 
filing past an Atatiirk bust while mourners hold flags and copies of Nutuk and 
Atatiirk's head hovers above them (p.29). Atatiirk has not left his people, he still 
reaches down to wipe our tears, the poem continues, stroke our hair and say 'now that 
the Mustafa Kemals have grown, no one can make our fatherland disappear'. On the 
last page, the Address to Youth spells out the Turks' mission in their Father's words.
Can such a leader's bequest be ignored? Ataturk changed history, defeated enemies 
against all odds and modernised Turkey. His call on Turkey's youth to defend his 
legacy is hard to disregard; his assurance, that their blood vests them with the power 
to do so, is hard to disbelieve. As Atatiirk's people, the Turks inherit his deterministic 
momentum towards success, survival and glory, as long as they remain loyal to 
Atatiirk's legacy. The Republic thus emerges as both the repository of national 
essence and the only path towards success and progress.
3. Essential(ist) Civics
A republican narrative, hinged on Ataturk, accompanies the story of national 
liberation discussed above. In Atatiirk ve Cumhuriyet, pages 14-15 juxtapose everyday 
life before and after Atatiirk. The dichotomy of old/new is simultaneously one of 
good/bad: Arabic is written on a piece of grey scroll, Latin ABCs on a bright red 
book. The Ottoman student sits on the floor reading the Quran while the modern 
(blond) child is seated at a desk in a sunnier room, wearing colourful clothing. 'New' 
things - associated with Ataturk's reforms and, hence, the Republic - are brighter.
In Ben Mustafa Kemal the Republic is equated with modernity and 'contemporary' is 
equated with 'good' as early as page 10. By default, religion is equated with 
backwardness, which is inherently bad. The Republic, we are told, brought modern 
national schools, free from foreign oppression or religious superstition (p. 122-3), as
72
Chapter 2
well as modern clothes (p. 124) and surnames (p. 126), thus enabling the Turks to enter 
the contemporary world. Secularism, therefore, does not need to be discussed as 
policy. Religion is dismissed as the reactionaries' domain: men with no interest in 
national survival (p.61, 95). Yet national survival is the most important task and the 
Republic is discussed as a natural part of Ataturk's struggle for national salvation.
The Republic is depicted as born and subsequently named, as a child would be 
(p. 115). Interestingly, the schoolbook Hayat Bilgisi uses exactly the same imagery. 
Ataturk does not proclaim a republic in 1923, he simply names a structure that grew 
organically as national sovereignty and representation took root (p.51).
According to Ben Mustafa Kemal, secularism is an inherent part of the republican 
order, in fact, one cannot exist without the other. The issue of whether the country 
was ready for secularism does not arise. Secularism is a given for contemporary 
civilisation and when Ataturk offered the Turks freedom and independence, he did so 
through a secular republic. Today's Turks ought to defend the entire package as part 
of their national legacy. The book concludes with Ataturk's famous words, 'my 
mortal body will one day turn to dust, but Turkey's Republic will live forever', and 
the appeal 'remember me' (p. 132). The appeal is hardly necessary. For anyone 
educated in Turkey, Ataturk is impossible to forget.
Birinci Kitap, designed for use in schools both at home and among Turkish migrants 
abroad, starts with a patriotic poem dedicated 'to our heroic soldiers' guarding the 
homeland without ever sleeping. Although this poem is, undoubtedly, beyond the 
children's reading abilities, its presence is significant. Read out by the teacher in 
class, the poem is visually enhanced by a flag, map and Ataturk's portrait and 
reaffirmed by a civics section, planted in the middle of the ABCs, discussing the 
significance of Republican holidays through simple narrative and photographs.
Every year on 29 October, the book narrates, the nation pays its respects to Ataturk's 
mausoleum and Assembly buildings. Pictures of young scouts carrying flags give 
children an active role in Republic Day ceremonies, enhancing the desired sense of 
ownership of Ataturk's republican legacy. The sacred duty to protect this legacy is 
stressed in the discussion of the Ataturk Commemoration Ceremony, which takes 
place on the anniversary of his death, 10 November 1938. The picture of a clock,
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showing 9:05, teaches the child the exact time of Atatiirk's death. This is not simply 
patriotic trivia; students learn that the clock on Atatiirk's bedside stopped when he 
passed away. No mystical interpretation is offered, but none is needed.
Through this account, children learn to identify national landmarks, such as Amtkabir, 
and are introduced to the dual image of Ataturk as familiar father and divine leader. A 
picture of Ataturk in a garden with a child and the caption 'Atattirk loved children' 
seeks to establish accessibility, while a picture of Ataturk seated at his desk, under the 
caption 'Ataturk worked hard for our country', establishes reverential admiration. The 
knowledge that this extraordinary individual loved 'us' and dedicated his life to 'us', 
creates an overpowering sense of gratitude and makes the map of Turkey, at the end 
of the book, seem like Atatiirk's gift to its young readers.
Maps appear in every schoolbook, stressing the significance of Anatolia - delivered 
by Atatiirk's victorious Independence War and administered by his Republic - in the 
students' own lives. This visual representation of national geography and 
administrative sovereignty effectively celebrates Atatiirk's legacy and achievements, 
while also reminding young Turks of their duty to protect the motherland. The 
Address to Youth features both in the actual books and at the forefront of their 
authors' minds.
Hay at Bilgisfs readers are urged to be true, to work and to love their country and 
nation, paraphrasing the mantra Turk ogtin qah§ guven 17, often inscribed under 
Ataturk's busts. The opening pages hail the great Ataturk for giving Turkey worthy 
goals. The first chapter discusses the beginning of the school year, showing 
classrooms, schoolyards and assembly halls sporting Ataturk busts, banners and 
portraits. Students, who stood by Atatiirk's bust in their own schoolyard and sang the 
national anthem, thus learn that their experience is shared by all Turkish 
schoolchildren (p. 10), forging national awareness and a feeling of unity.
This feeling is part of the desired national consciousness and a wider Republican 
project. Part of this project is 'being modern', hence 'modern' traits are celebrated 
and promoted alongside patriotism in Hayat Bilgisi: fitness, cleanliness, personal
17 'Turk be proud, work and trust'.
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hygiene, a healthy diet and proper sleeping patterns (unit 6), as well as decency and 
good manners (p.20). Politics is discussed in terms of administering the beautiful 
homeland (p.82-4). Although the country's physical beauty is celebrated, with 
pictures and references to its numerous tourist attractions, it does not divert attention 
away from the true source of national pride: republicanism. Through references to 
school and national elections (p.23 & p.57 respectively), the book seeks to make 
civics relevant to students. Similarly, the discussion of the Republic's significance is 
framed in a narrative of rights and freedoms, which the students themselves enjoy 
within it (p.98-99). Such rights can only exist in a republic, the book notes. Hence the 
children ought to love the Republic, honour Atatiirk - whose gift it is - and the 
ancestors who died in its defence, and do their duty: vote, work and do military 
service (p. 107) in order to protect the Republic just as Atatiirk did.
Hayat Bilgisi dedicates an entire section to the national awakening that began with 
Ataturk's landing at Samsum (p.47ff). Although republican reforms are not discussed 
at length and their radical nature is underplayed, they are presented as an integral and 
necessary stage of the war effort. It is interesting that, although treaties and ceasefires 
are named and dated, the book focuses less on the war and more on its achievements, 
namely the national modernising republic presented here as inherently popular, a true 
national endeavour (see unit 9). Simultaneously, however, it is abundantly clear that 
family law, gender equality and modernity itself are Ataturk's gifts. Every Turk owes 
Atatiirk a debt of gratitude for having 'loved the homeland and the nation very much' 
and for having 'worked for the homeland and the nation all his life long' (p.64). The 
emotional appeal is compounded by patriotic poems (e.g. p.67).
Turkishness is premised on republicanism, which is Ataturk's gift. Yet this civic 
narrative is not free from purely ethnic references. Ozgurluk Ugruna claims that 
Turkey was Ataturk's creation, but the nation was not. Atatiirk awoke a nation that 
existed since time immemorial. This national awakening was not separable from the 
Republic's birth, as Atattirk identified republicanism as the only way to save the 
country (p.208/209). His people would learn to accept democracy so they could 
eventually be ruled by representatives and not one person, 'no matter how talented' 
(p.232/233). The Republic is thus incorporated into nationhood as, without it, the 
nation would have slept on or perished. Protecting the Republic is now a national
75
Chapter 2
duty. The ability to do so, as the famous Address goes, is in the Turks' blood. 
Republicanism thus, peculiarly, becomes an ethnic trait.
ITA promotes a similarly essentialised civics account. The book celebrates the 
Amasya Declaration as the turning point in Turkish history, after which territorial 
unity and national independence became the core principles of politics. Nevertheless, 
ITA suggests, the voice speaking through the declaration is Atatiirk's (p.82). Although 
ITA celebrates popular sovereignty, this does not translate to a discussion of national 
agency. In ITA the sole historical agent is Atatiirk. Independence and freedom are 
Atatiirk's gift. This inherently contradictory postulation is viable because the nation is 
fashioned in Atatiirk's image, hence his will encompasses national volition. The 
nation does not exist independently from Atatiirk. Hence, his statement that 
' [fjreedom and independence are of my character. The most important legacy for my 
nation ... is that I am a man full of love for independence' (p.73) ipso facto makes 
freedom and independence traits of a Turkish national character.
Yet the Turk, by this definition, craves national, not individual freedom. Hence when 
Atatiirk states that '[t]he Republic is the most appropriate type of government given 
the creation and character of the Turkish nation' (p. 181) he is referring to a vehicle for 
the expression of a collectivist nationalism and his own modernising plan, not to a 
political arrangement that would bind and limit him in his endeavours. Moreover, this 
statement renders alternative political arrangements 'inappropriate'. Consequently, 
the Sultanate had to be banned, especially as it defied national volition by bowing to 
foreign interests. Besides, the Turkish nation needed progress and a return to past 
systems or practices was not going to help. Rather, the nation selected a new president 
to redeem past deficiencies (p. 183). Atatiirk was elected unanimously on 29 October 
1923, as the Republic was proclaimed. That day the regime, already essentially a 
Republic, was given its true name (p. 184).
Reform is presented as the restoration of Turkish politics back to a natural state of 
affairs. The Caliphate is discussed in terms of an issue needing resolution (p. 185). Its 
abolition was Atatiirk's answer to a problem. A technical discussion of the 
Caliphate's origins presents it as a political institution. The tensions that accompanied 
decisions and reforms are downplayed and the Caliphate's abolition is presented as 
natural (p. 185-6). Reform is once again depicted as less controversial than it actually
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was, thus dispensing with the need to discuss opposition to Ataturk's policies. If 
something is 'natural' then its alternatives are, by implication, not.
The Caliphate's abolition is depicted as structurally expedient and historically apt. As 
a symbol of the old regime, we are told, the Caliphate could become a dangerous 
focal point for regressive political elements. Now that the road for open-mindedness 
and enlightenment was open, should Turkey risk returning to an artificial order 
(p. 188)? The recalibration of power-politics resulting from this reform is not 
discussed. The book simply notes that it strengthened national sovereignty, allowing 
the Republic to move into a laik duzen (secular order), wherein the state had no 
religious foundations and used no religious symbols; religion was now the citizens' 
domain. Secularism is celebrated as an essential part of republicanism.
As the Republic is a natural political arrangement for the Turks, ITA does not 
elaborate on secularism's inherent value. Secularism is not relativised by being 
discussed as a reform. Rather, alongside nationalism, it is promoted as the foundation 
of both reforms and, by extension, the Republic. Secularism is presented as a 
paradigm-shift marking the transition to a new and distinct historical and civilisational 
period. With secularism, a new era of law and justice was inaugurated: 'Secularism, 
national sovereignty, democracy, freedom ... are the contemporary order of life' 
(p.290); they are natural so they are not debatable.
'National narratives are constructed out of romantic ideas about the past and desires, 
both conscious and unconscious, about what the present and the future should look 
like' (Heathorn, 2000:197). For Kemalists, the past held horrors and frustrated 
opportunities. The only thing worth keeping about the Turks' past was the Turks 
themselves, now led into a glorious future by Ataturk. Turkey's national strength - 
economic, socio-cultural and military (ITA, p.253) - was to be harnessed in the name 
of this civilisational transition. The Turks had to focus on achievements natural to the 
era they lived in. Modernisation means 'conforming with what is necessary' (p. 181). 
This principle, we are told, is the basis of Turkish society's values and institutions as, 
for Ataturk, modernisation was a question of life and death for Turkey. All sacrifices 
were to be endured hi its name. That was Ataturk's decision, the nation followed suit.
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Growing up in this Kemalist-saturated context means that Turks become 'fluent' in 
the language that is Kemalism. They may choose not to speak it, but they understand 
it. It also means that, for some, the language evokes feelings of duty, gratitude and 
determination, while it neatly corresponds with categories of value for everyone 
educated into this system. The propagation of this language and its corresponding 
priorities and value-system continues through spatial narratives.
78
Chapter 3
Chapter 3, Continuing 'National Education': Spatial Narratives
A language needs to be constantly used in order to survive and not be superseded. 
Kemalism, used so extensively in children's patriotic literature and schoolbooks, 
remains present in everyday adult experiences, its symbols pervading daily life. 
Ataturk's face can be seen on coins and notes - including the AKP-introduced New 
Turkish Lira - above store counters, in schoolyards, courtrooms, police stations, 
squares and on street corners, accompanied by engravings and banners of his sayings. 
No other hero or statesman is honoured thus. Spatial narratives endorse national 
history's message: Ataturk is celebrated as an extraordinary hero, achieving Turkey's 
'awakening' and liberation alone; all other leaders were his assistants and apprentices.
Ataturk emerges as a symbol of dangers overcome and greatness achieved. 
Monuments and statues celebrate his super-human, quasi-divine attributes, thus 
lending his legacy added weight. Simultaneously, and confirming narratives 
encountered in childhood, museums cultivate a secondary narrative reminding Turks 
that Ataturk was real. He slept, ate, wrote letters, had baths and needed socks. This 
trivialisation helps bring a quasi-mythical figure within reach and permits 
identification; Ataturk was, after all, a Turk, the nation's finest specimen. Turks are 
invited to revel in pride for his achievements, but never to believe that they can be 
emulated or repeated. The proliferation of Ataturk's images also warns the people 
against straying from his modernising republican path. In order to achieve this, spatial 
narratives build on the fusion of republican, national and secular symbols and utilise 
Ataturk's face as a symbol of the specific Kemalist identity, already discussed. Thus, 
imagery and assumptions learnt at a young age are constantly re-affirmed and re- 
launched, turning national socialisation into a lifelong process and nation-building an 
ongoing state activity.
Spatial narratives, constituting the most effective method of continuous national 
education, are hinged on four core themes: the nation's founding moment - constantly 
rekindling gratitude towards Ataturk; national and territorial unity and the need for its 
protection; a glorification of the nation's 'true' representatives: soldiers, teachers and 
peasants; and a celebration of modernisation, through symbols associated with
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progress and the West 1 . Although living in this symbolic universe does not 
necessarily make one a Kemalist, it perpetuates national socialisation in adulthood. 
Categories of meaning are reproduced and associations, such as the link between 
republicanism and secularism, or patriotism and loyalty to Ataturk, are sustained. 
Again, as was the case in Chapter 2, this reproduction is partly state-sponsored and 
partly the outcome of individual and group initiatives sustaining a common currency 
of symbols and narratives through which political legitimation is articulated.
With that in mind, in this chapter I will look at public monuments - inescapably part 
of everyday life - and museums, as they are well-attended and their message enjoys a 
large audience. As such national sites are entirely state-managed, their reproduction of 
Kemalist language, priorities, symbols and narratives is 'unadulterated'. Moreover, 
their sheer number gives Kemalism an undeniable symbolic advantage over other 
'languages'. Simultaneously, the propagation of Kemalist language through museums 
and galleries is equally important as curated sites carry the stamp of the expert and 
thus enjoy respect and acceptance as 'objective' and 'true'. This is particularly 
important as adults, notes Riegel (1996:89), tend to learn about history and 
ethnography through museums rather than books. Naturally, the potential effect of 
this 'education' relies wholly on attendance. While at school the national curriculum 
has a captive audience, here individuals need to choose to attend. And they do.
Although archaeological and ethnographic museums are the domain of tourists and 
schoolchildren (becoming, by default, part of early learning), commemorative spaces 
and exhibitions related to the Independence War and Atatiirk are filled with Turks, 
defying Fyfe and Ross's (1996:127) disclaimer that museum attendance is linked to 
class. During my numerous visits to all museums, monuments and sites discussed in 
this chapter (between 2002 and 2005) I was surrounded by people from diverse 
economic and socio-religious backgrounds. As the subject matter of national 
museums is familiar to all, those lacking extensive cultural capital are not intimidated. 
For museums openly dedicated to nation-building, such accessibility, notes Wittlin 
(1949:186, 202, 205), is a sign of success as their purpose is to help familiarise people 
with the requirements and traits of their collective identity and the demands of
1 Interestingly, modernisation was never celebrated through the glorification of bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs or scientific elites. This was a populist message.
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national citizenship. Hence the museum seeks to integrate the past with the present 
and the local with the international in the context of a specific national narrative.
Museums turn the past into an invaluable resource for a modernising state's pursuit of 
progress (Walsh, 1992:37-8). Unsurprisingly, the Kemalist state has used museums 
since its inception in order to propagate a specific national narrative and the 
corresponding modernising project. Museums have been used to forge a link between 
nationhood and allegiance to the secular Republic and to promote the assumption that 
westernisation does not constitute policy, but a historical necessity.
When choosing to use museums as part of their modernising project, the Kemalists 
drew inspiration from a century's worth of experimentation in the guided production 
of knowledge. Museums had been used for the political socialisation of citizens since 
the French revolution when '[t]he museum was a crucial instrument that enabled the 
construction of a new set of values that at once discredited the ancien regime and 
celebrated the Republic' (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992:190). This is what Kemalists 
sought to achieve. They were not alone. In Nigeria museums helped people visualise 
national unity (Kaplan, 1994:75-77). In Greece the founding of the new national state 
practically coincided with the founding of the first national museum (Avgouli, 
1994:261), while in Mexico, between 1825 and 1925, the National Museum was not 
only dedicated to discovering Mexico's 'patriotic identity', but also an accepted 
symbol of that identity (Morales-Moreno, 1994:183-4).
This open dedication to national socialisation is particularly significant. Museums 
are, by definition, the habitat of the expert. Some people consciously visit museums in 
order to learn, true to the schoolbook's enthusiastic endorsement of museums as the 
perfect place to learn about the nation's glorious past (Hayat Bilgisi, p.200). 
Invariably, museum visitors accept that exhibitions offer 'facts' and knowledge rather 
than artefacts and opinions. Objects in a museum are deemed valuable and important 
and museum narratives automatically true. As Macdonald (1998:2) notes: 
'Exhibitions tend to be presented to the public rather as do scientific facts: as 
unequivocal statements rather than as the outcome of particular processes and 
contexts.' In a Foucauldian Power/Knowledge nexus, Bennett (1995:59, 63) finds, the 
museum possesses knowledge and the visitor does not. Although the visitors are 
empowered through the opportunity to learn what the institution of power already
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knows, the 'truth' they are given access to is tainted and specific as the museum offers 
what Hooper-Greenhill (1992:193) calls 'society['s] "general politics" of "truth".'
Nevertheless, the belief that the museum bestows objective knowledge is what makes 
it useful as a political socialisation tool. The actual message, as Hooper-Greenhill 
(1992:195) succinctly puts it, is in the narrative, not the object displayed. The curator 
turns maps, medals and fragments of objects into a story, leaving alternative stories 
untold. Can the visitors see through the narrative? Some can, most choose not to. 
Firstly, the museum's de facto 'objectivity' makes it unlikely for credibility questions 
to be raised. Secondly, narrative is what makes museums 'good to think with' (Fyfe 
and Ross, 1996:148). Without narrative, the museums' appeal is heavily diluted if not 
altogether lost. Bennett (1995:131) agrees: the display context within which artefacts 
are placed makes them relevant, evoking memories and creating expectations. 
Museums thus come to not simply represent, but embody the national past. If nations 
are 'never-ending stories' (Bennett, 1995:148), museums represent the state's attempt 
to stitch together what is known of these stories into a coherent national narrative.
In Turkey, this narrative is simultaneously physically inscribed onto urban spaces. 
Although architecture is not part of my analysis, it is important to stress that 'the 
planning of the capital city of Ankara is an unsurpassed example of the monumental 
narrative of modern Turkey' (Nalbantoglu, 1997:193). Architecture 'assumed a 
larger-than-life mission in Turkish nation-building' (Bozdogan, 2001:6, 298), as 
modernity lacked both a material base and a coherent social agent. Thus, the state 
took charge, manipulating public space in order to give Turkey a modern aspect. 
Reinforced concrete became a symbol of modernity, itself a constitutive part of 
Turkish nationalism. Having changed the script and replaced the calendar, and in 
order to achieve a visual representation of national imperatives and state ideology, 
Ataturk decreed the construction of buildings a la Corbusier and Soviet-style statues 
celebrating progress (Akman, 2004:103-111) and symbolising the modernisation 




Ahmad (2003:87) notes that Atattirk felt confident enough to have his statue unveiled 
in Istanbul as early as 1926. This was a bold move. The Republic was still young, and, 
traditionally, Islam frowns upon the representation of living form. Since then, 
however, statues and busts have proliferated to the extent that '[t]here is not one city 
in Turkey that does not have at least one square with Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk's statue 
at its centre' (Cmar, 2005:99-100). Atatiirk's likeness expresses allegiance to the 
nation and its principles, even abstract ones such as secularism, hi fact, Atatiirk's face 
has become a signifier of republican legitimacy, national greatness and progress.
In Istanbul's noisy Taksim Square, near Beyoglu's crowded cafes and bookstores, 
stands the Republic Monument (fig.l). Here Atatiirk is simultaneously honoured as a 
soldier and statesman, on one side depicted in full military regalia and on the other 
wearing a Western-style suit, celebrating both military prowess and modernisation. 
This monument is a rare specimen, depicting Atatiirk in the company of others - 
historical personalities, war heroes and deputies. Nevertheless, he remains prominent, 
in a pose of quiet determination, undoubtedly leading those around him. Part of this 
group consists of flag-wielding Mehmetfik figures. The national flag, a quasi-totemic 
object, in the hands of a figure celebrated as the nation's most authentic representative 
enhances the message of national urgency and pride with Atatiirk emerging as the link 
between national liberation and the Republic, and a symbol for both.
The Republic Monument is a reminder of the gratitude owed to all soldiers, whatever 
their rank, for their role in establishing and protecting national independence and the 
Republic. Naturally, gratitude is, above all, owed to Atatiirk, who delivered the 
homeland and established the Republic. Here, the celebration of his reforms is subtle 
- implied in his Western clothes but, above all, the choice of location for the 
monument. Taksim stresses Istanbul's modem, secular aspect with its bustling 
nightlife and European pedigree. In fact, Taksim was specifically chosen as the site 
for this monument in 1928 exactly because it lacked a mosque. As the foreigners' 
quarter in Ottoman times, Beyoglu is full of churches and synagogues, but the 
Ottoman-Islamist heritage is weaker. With no minarets in sight, Taksim became a 
symbol of republican Istanbul. Arguably the Islamist municipality had this symbolic 
narrative hi mind when, in 1994, it contemplated building a mosque off Taksim.
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Although the project was justified in terms of the area's need for a mosque in light of 
other faiths' over-representation, Islamists are aware of Beyoglu's Republican 
character and its symbolic significance for the nation-state. Trying to build a mosque 
in Taksim was a heavily charged move that, if successful, would have broken the 
Kemalist symbolic monopoly. For some, this constituted a provocative attempt to 
undermine what this monument and whole area stand for: national unity within the 
secular republic. £mar (2005:116-7), however, believes that the Islamists' choice of 
Taksim over a more traditional area, such as Sultanahmet, for their mosque project is 
not subversive. Rather it shows that the Islamists do not wish to create an alternative 
centre, but embrace the nation-state and desire a voice within it. Kemalism, implies 
£inar, has won. Either way, this controversy - stressing the extent to which the 
negotiation of public space in Turkey occurs in Kemalist terms - highlights the state's 
commitment to the preservation of Kemalist space. It is significant that the state 
blocked the building of the Taksim mosque when hundreds of mosques are being built 
all over Turkey every year. It is as significant, however, that Islamist politicians seek 
to share Kemalist space without affecting a breach by moving to an alternative centre. 
Regardless of whether they ultimately desire to coexist with Kemalism or defeat it, 
the struggle for symbolic supremacy is taking place on Kemalist terrain.
Not that non-Kemalist terrain really exists in Turkey. Things have changed since 
1928. Now Istanbul's every corner bears Kemalism's mark: from fashionable Bebek 
to dusty Fatih, Istanbul is dotted with Ataturk's statues and busts. Some Turks enjoy 
being reminded of Ataturk's exploits. Others resent the perceived personality cult, 
even though they appreciate Ataturk's legacy. And there are those who resent both the 
man and the statues so much that they are willing to pour green paint - Islam's colour 
- over them. Such incidents are rare but not unheard of.
When Ataturk's statue in Sincan's Lale Meydani was vandalised, the city's 
Kaymakam, Ertan Yuksel spoke of 'desecration' and called the attack 'disgusting and 
provocative... an attempt to sully Sincan's honour' (9-10 July 2005 TNA). The local 
CHP head, Kemal Bastimur, accused the perpetrators of seeking to remind everyone 
of Sincan's 'dark past' 2 , while crowds denounced the vandal in their midst.
: Sincan was the site of intense religious tension on the eve of the 1997 soft coup, see Chapter 5.
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This struggle for symbolic control is unequal. Vandals, armed with tins of green paint, 
have an endless task ahead given the sheer number of secular republican symbols. 
Moreover, this is not simply a struggle against the state, police and judiciary; many, if 
not most, citizens espouse Kemalism and resent such acts. Throwing paint over 
Atatiirk does not merely constitute antisocial behaviour, it mocks the Republic, the 
nation and the Turkish state's modernising secular identity. Punishments reflect that. 
Murat Vural, found guilty of five separate instances of vandalism including the 
Sincan incident, was sentenced to 22 years in prison - four-and-a-half years per 
vandalised statue. Although penalties are usually softer, the court explained, Vural 
was a repeat offender who showed no remorse. He therefore had to be made an 
example of as the desecration of Atatiirk's statues was an open challenge to the 
secular order (H, 3 November 2005; E, 4 November 2005).
The connection between respecting Atatiirk's statues and respecting the Republic can 
be taken to extremes as Veysel Dalci, AKP leader for Fatsa, discovered. Dalci was 
arrested following accusations of 'disrespectfully chewing gum during an April 23 
ceremony' while laying a wreath in front of Atatiirk's statue (H, 27 April 2006). Dalci 
is lodging an official complaint with the TAP General Staff, yet the incident is telling 
of the diligence with which secular Republican symbols are protected against 
potential disrespect by suspected anti-secular actors, such as the AKP.
The symbolic representation of secularism is important for Turkey's national project. 
Although Atatiirk's face encapsulates secularism, alternative symbols are also used, 
such as women who have dispensed of the veil and are embracing modernity. 
Variations on this theme abound. Outside Istanbul University, Atatiirk's statue is 
accompanied by two stern, athletic youths: a man in a loincloth shouldering a flag and 
a woman holding a torch, steadied by the Father's hand on her back (fig.2). The 
complex represents virility, strength, progress and freedom. Such statues, Bozdogan 
(2001:75) notes, expose a Kemalist fascination with youth and health comparable to 
that of Fascist Italy, only here the immortal leader is guiding the nation to a better 
future through education, not martial virtue. The torch of knowledge burns bright, 
symbolically held by a woman, whom Ataturk liberated from the veil.
This basic semiotic recipe of torches, books, doves and flags is used frequently. In 
Ce§me's central square, Ataturk stands taller than adoring, flag-bearing youths. On
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Ku§adasi's seaside promenade, Ataturk - again taller than other figures - holds hands 
with two athletes: a man bearing a torch and a woman holding a dove. The structure, 
surrounded by Turkish flags, stands on a plaque reading yurtta sulh cihanda sulh3 . On 
the outskirts of Fo9a a composite sculpture of Atatiirk and two small children, a boy 
and a girl, holding a book stands next to an engraving urging young Turks to aim high 
in the Republic's name.
This national narrative is glorious in its simplicity, representing peace and progress 
through easy-to-decode symbols and depicting the nation through young and 
wholesome, yet 'nameless' figures, eagerly following Atatiirk. The nation - men and 
women, side by side - is young, strong and healthy, eager to strive for education and 
progress under Ataturk's watchful gaze. Education holds the key; hence the image of 
a young teacher or student, holding a book - modern script clearly visible on the 
cover - becomes an important modernisation symbol. Atatiirk remains the nation's 
mentor and guardian, the biiyiik ogretmen (great teacher) leading his people to 
progress. Outside Izmir's Dokuz Eyltil Universitesi, Ataturk is seated in a huge 
armchair next to a lengthy quote urging students to embrace modern art and science 
and labour towards national greatness and security. Such quotes, seemingly engraved 
on every available surface and the numerous statues adorning every Turkish town, 
create a tight nexus of meaning, consisting of images, admonitions and a general 
feeling that Ataturk's teachings can help ordinary Turks navigate through the 
challenges of everyday life.
Ataturk's face thus becomes an icon, a promise of 'protection'. In the quiet park 
behind Istanbul's Topkapi palace (fig.3) or on an imposing pedestal (fig.4), Ataturk is 
forever watching over his land and people. Near Izmir's NATO headquarters, a 
majestic statue gives this protection an edge: Mustafa Kemal, uniformed and on 
horseback, is pointing towards where the Greeks came from and retreated back to, 
forever guarding Anatolia's coast and reminding his people of how close Turkey 
came to not existing. On the marble pedestal, a Delacroix-esque battle scene - 
complete with flag-carrying woman - dramatises the sense of danger.
3 'Peace at home, peace in the world', a famous AtatOrk quote, also the motto of the Foreign Ministry 
and the daily Milliyet.
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Ataturk saved Turkey from imminent danger and his legacy will protect it from future 
perils. Hence his face becomes a lucky charm on crests and logos, while roads, 
buildings, schools and airports are named after him regardless of any link to his life or 
person. The Kredi ve Yurtlar Kurumu4 logo, outside a girls' hall of residence in 
downtown Istanbul, consists of two girls' faces superimposed onto Atatiirk's. In 
Istanbul's Kustepe neighbourhood, a primary school sports a reproduction of one of 
the leader's most famous wartime photographs on its outside wall. In Sihhiye, a run- 
down Ankara neighbourhood, a school founded in 1886, when Ataturk was a baby5 , is 
called Atatiirk Lisesi. The school was neither attended nor founded by Ataturk, it was 
simply (re)named after him, as if Atatiirk's name was itself a talisman.
The omnipresence of Atatiirk's name and face serves as a constant reminder of his 
achievements and legacy. Ataturk is among his people, guiding them, but also 
assessing their progress down the path he chose for them. The proliferation of such 
symbols in schools is particularly apt for reminding students - especially girls - that 
modern education is a gift that they have a duty to protect. Through education, 
Ataturk gives his children the opportunity to remain free, become strong and work 
towards actualising his modernising project. This message is inscribed in every 
schoolyard next to Atatiirk's bust (fig.5), yet is not limited to schools.
Ataturk's ubiquity both bolsters his legacy and serves to turn every activity into a 
patriotic endeavour of utmost national significance, from the quote in Izmir's tiny 
ethnographic museum extolling culture and civilisation (fig.6) to the signs in Cesme's 
small but busy harbour admonishing the locals: 'vafara/oy: her turist buyukelgidir *. 
Banners, Atatiirk's profile in one corner, warn against littering or parking illegally. 
Creating a modern, civilised country is everyone's duty and public spaces are dotted 
with 'reminders' of what is expected of people. Thus, notes Herb (1999:23), a 
national landscape - cleansed of all visible traces of previous occupancy through 
expulsion, annihilation or symbolic effacing - can be claimed. For Herb, Atatiirk's 
face, carved on wood and erected on a mountainside outside Urla, marks the symbolic 
appropriation of space and its inundation with appropriate (Kemalist) symbols.
4 Credit and Dormitory Foundation.
5 Atatiirk was bom in the winter of 1880-1.
6 'Patriot, every tourist is an ambassador'.
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This process becomes particularly significant moving East. Oktem (2004:569) notes 
that in Kurdish-populated regions, hills are often inscribed with the crescent and star 
and slogans such as ba§ ogretmen Ataturk or m mutlu Tiirkum diyene. Such 
inscriptions, Oktem finds, proliferated during the height of the PKK's insurgency in 
the late 1980s. This 'Kemalisation' of space, notes Oktem (2004:564), followed the 
elimination of the area's alternative heritage, through neglect, migration or systematic 
destruction. As, until recently, part of the Southeast was under martial law, the 
process of cultural 'neutralisation' and re-appropriation was greatly facilitated - even 
though, simultaneously, the boundaries of the region under martial law 'traced a 
Kurdish map and put it before the international public' 7 .
The Southeast is a riddle for Turkey. Politically complicated and morally charged, the 
'Southeastern issue' is the subject of intense and bitter debate, coloured by different 
perceptions of justice and personal loss on all sides. For McDowall (2000:210), 
'Turkey had unmistakably intended genocide of the Kurdish people, hi practice its 
intentions were defeated by the sheer size of the task'. But intentions are hard to 
ascertain. What is known is that Kurds joined Mustafa Kemal in his rejection of the 
treaty of Sevres, even though it offered them national independence. Through the co- 
optation of urban notables and tribal chiefs and by playing the religious card, Ataturk
o
then claimed the Kurds as the Turks' ethnic kin . Yet the Turkish embrace was vice- 
like. As early as 1922 the Kemalists spoke of 'bringing the Kurds to a higher level of 
civilization through the building of schools, roads and (more ominously) gendarmerie 
posts and military service [...] explicit within only a few months was the idea of 
turning Kurds into good Turks' (McDowall, 2000:191). This fits in well with the 
Kemalist penchant for state-sponsored social reform, as well as the association of 
tribalism and peasantry with backwardness. But modernisation in the Kurdish areas 
required a more intense symbolic campaign than elsewhere.
The Kemalisation of space was meticulous. References to Kurdistan disappeared from 
official materials, Kurdish provinces were renamed and their boundaries redrawn. 
Hence, Le Ray (2005:4) relates, Dersim became Tunceli, failing to include much of
7 Former chief of parliamentary commission of unresolved political murders, Sadik Avundukluoglu (Z,
19 August 2005).
8 Although, McDowall (2000:189-190) notes, the Kurds are of Iranian not Turanic origin.
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historic Dersim. Turkish became the only acceptable language. Attempts at reaction 
and revolt led to brutal reprisals and, according to McDowall (2000:199), often 
unrelated arrests, executions and large-scale deportations. In Ataturk's lifetime, war 
was raging and Turkification was far from subtle. The state's unitary national vision 
and the goal of westernisation meant that the Kurds, referred to as 'mountain Turks', 
were a national hurdle to be overcome. Their resistance to the Republic was regarded 
as reaction against progress that had to be crushed for their own good.
Today, Turkification campaigns differ. There is a flag-raising ceremony in Tunceli's 
central square twice a week (Le Ray, 2005:7), while inscriptions on surrounding 
mountainsides read ne mutlu Turktim diyene and once vatan9 . The removal of Kurdish 
symbols from urban landscapes, notes Le Ray (2005:7), went as far as replacing all 
green bulbs in traffic lights with blue ones to prevent the Kurdish colours (red-yellow- 
green) from flashing up on a daily basis.
The campaign has had mixed results. Among the Southeast's Alevi population 10, the 
state has abandoned its confrontational attitude in favour of co-optation. The 1980s 
synthesis-inspired mosque-building spree ceded its place to toleration, if not support, 
for the construction of cem evleri, the Alevi place of worship. With the Kurds, 
however, the situation is more volatile. The existence of the PKK, whose history of 
violence clouds the fact that it does not have a clear position on the issue of 
separatism, complicates matters. Simultaneously, certain public figures, such as 
Diyarbakir Mayor Osman Baydemir, stress their commitment to the unitary state, 
noting that Kurds and Turks 'founded the Republic together and will keep it alive by 
being supportive of one another' (TDN, 12 August 2005).
Nevertheless, achieving an atmosphere of cooperation is difficult because of the 
Kemalist state's Jacobin approach to citizenship, effectively proclaiming 'to the Kurd 
as individual, everything; to the (politically conscious and culturally assertive) Kurd, 
nothing'. Many, including PKK sympathisers, resent having to choose. Yet for others, 
including many Kurds hi Tunceli, the distinction presents no problem as people pride 
themselves on the purity of their Turkish and their attachment to Atatiirk.
9 'First of all, the motherland'.
10 The Sunni-Alevi divide cuts across the Turkish-Kurdish divide.
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This attachment, as noted before, is so closely linked to national identity and political 
 epublicanism that land inhabited by people loyal to Atatiirk is ipso facto considered 
'safe'. As Kemalist nationalism is premised on citizenship and territoriality on the one 
hand, and blood and ethnicity on the other, loyalty to Atattirk as an external 
manifestation of national belonging means that the populations in question 'fit' the 
nation and deserve the land they live on. This 'desert' is vital as Anatolia, as 
discussed above, bestows metaphysical continuity and belonging to the people that 
inhabit it, effectively merging civic and ethnic national narratives. For this reason, it is 
vital that no non-Turk be allowed to claim Anatolia as his natural home.
The request to reopen Ayasofya as a mosque in the 1950s to mark the 500th 
anniversary of the 1453 fall of Constantinople is a manifestation of this need to 
celebrate Anatolia's ownership. Similarly, the reaction against the commemoration of 
Istanbul's Greek history by the Orthodox Patriarchate and the reluctance to return 
'minority' properties (e.g. see E, 6 & 7 September, 11 November 2005) is premised 
on this elemental need to claim Anatolia as Turkish: administratively, historically and 
organically. As Anatolia is a constitutive part of Turkishness, it needs to always have 
been Turkish, hence its history is edited, rearranged and re-written accordingly.
This ownership is celebrated by inscribing public spaces with Atatiirk's face, 
symbolising both the nation and its struggle for Anatolia as the instigator and hero of 
the Independence War. Atatiirk's face expresses a very rich, albeit narrow, national 
cosmos, enjoying immense emotional resonance as the hand-made banner fluttering 
outside a petrol station near the coastal city of Seferhisar proves. On the banner 
Atatiirk's face is accompanied by the words seni seviyoruz 1 .
In the outskirts of Ankara many houses sport hand-carved crescent and stars on their 
walls and portraits of Atatiirk inserted in the tile work 12 : Atatiirk symbolises the 
nation, the Republic, national freedom and progress. His face symbolises everything 
that is good about the past, present and future. Thus a self-sustaining cult emerges 
around Atatiirk wherein two narrative strands are pursued concurrently. Atatiirk is
11 'We love you'.
12 In the 30s, notes Bozdogan (2001:87), it was common to inscribe dwellings, not only public 
buildings, with AtatUrk's sayings.
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simultaneously celebrated as the example every Turk should follow and a divine 
figure people should simply bow to. Preserving fragments of Atatiirk's mortal life 
stresses his humanity and accessibility, presenting him as the father everyone can 
love. Simultaneously, appeals to the metaphysical, especially through stories and sites 
related to his death, elevate him above humanity, a force to be obeyed and followed. 
Republican mythology had to compete with the supernatural and metaphysical folk 
traditions of a people neither prepared for nor, initially, convinced as to the benefits of 
secularism and modernisation. So it created a rich and wonderful mythology of its 
own, complete with a saintly figure and holy relics.
1.a. Atatiirk's Personal objects
Objects associated with Atatiirk are preserved and carefully displayed in national 
museums. This, on occasion, goes to extremes. In Istanbul's naval museum, a silver 
toothpick is displayed alongside other paraphernalia from his yacht, the Savarona. 
Yet the trend feeds on and enhances the general tendency for national symbols to 
constitute popular currency in Turkey, independent of specific political meaning.
The exhibition of Atatiirk's personal objects further enhances their significance as the 
act of display vests any item with value (Crane, 2000:2). As the objects in question 
are mundane, such as combs and teacups, this institutional acknowledgment is 
bestowed, not on the object, but on its former user. The individual whose personal 
effects are deemed worthy of public display has to be objectively great, or the 
museum - by definition the locus of unbiased truth - would not be displaying their 
nightshirt. In Atatiirk's case, already famous before his personal artefacts went on 
display, the museum becomes part of a multi-faceted commemoration machine, 
constantly augmenting the mythology surrounding him. The museum both creates 
familiarity and increases awe. By proving that the great Atatiirk was real, drank coffee 
and wore slippers, the museum makes his achievements seem even more admirable 
for, although an ordinary man, his deeds were extraordinary.
Objects become stage props in the reconstruction of Atatiirk's extraordinary story. 
This is necessary, as the past, Fowler (2003:81) notes, 'does not just exist. What we
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see of its presence, and the uses that we make of our ideas about it, are to a 
considerable extent contrived'. Thus information about the past needs to be 'staged' 
with the help of banal, everyday objects, in order to be accessible. In Atatiirk's story, 
such objects abound. On the top floor of the house he was born in, on a busy street in 
Greece's second largest city, Thessaloniki (Salonica) there is a small display of 
Ataturk's clothes: undergarments, collars, slippers, shoes, worry beads and a dinner 
jacket. Ataturk's report cards from the Manastir and Harbiye military schools are 
displayed, offering objective proof that he was as intelligent and studious as legend 
suggests. The museum also displays Ataturk's Ottoman and Republican identity 
cards. This is not only irrefutable evidence that Atatiirk was real, but also a visually 
powerful way of introducing the script reform through contrasting the two documents. 
Visual aids are invaluable in summarising complex policy.
Objects associated with Atattirk also allow a museum to 'claim' him. hi Istanbul's 
§isli district, in a house where Atatiirk spent a brief 18 months as a little-known 
Ottoman officer, a small display of his personal effects, including clothes and 
underwear, marks the space's authenticity. Similarly, down the road, the military 
museum boasts a wide collection of Ataturk's personal objects, mostly donated by his 
youngest adopted daughter Ulkii. Clothes, undergarments, pyjamas, towels, cutlery 
and cups used by Atatiirk, together with headed notepaper - some sheets signed in his 
own hand - pens and ink bottles from his office, all serve a triple function: they add 
objectivity to the narrative, they perpetuate the Atatiirk cult by rendering the subject 
both accessible and magical and, finally - given the significance of this 'cult' - they 
lend significance to the museum itself. A museum that has access to Ataturk's 
personal paraphernalia is a true Republican institution, a badge of honour the military 
would not pass by. Hence the military-managed museum attached to Anitkabir 
'claims' Atatiirk as 'one of ours' and the TAP as 'his'.
Here too, objects associated with Ataturk's public life (swords, guns and gifts 
presented by foreign dignitaries 13) are presented alongside slippers, socks, shoes, 
shaving kits, canes and walking sticks (displayed alongside pictures of Atatiirk using 
them). The collection even includes a stuffed animal (according to a plaque, Ataturk's 
dog) and the rowing machine he used to keep fit.
13 Cigarette holders, teacups and glasses, luxury toiletry sets and ornate cigar boxes among other things.
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Do people care to see underwear, towels and spoons? Judging from the crowds in 
front of the cabinets, they do. The museum shop attached to Anitkabir does a roaring 
trade selling just this kind of everyday object. Apart from guidebooks and postcards, 
this shop stocks academic works on Ataturk, CDs and DVDs with music, text and 
dramatic re-enactments of the Independence War and the widest selection of Ataturk 
paraphernalia I have seen in one place. Although the streets of Ankara or Istanbul are 
filled with peddlers selling Ataturk lapel pins and framed pictures, here one can obtain 
medallions, wallets, ties, tie-clips, clocks, pocket mirrors, lighters, cigarette cases, pill 
boxes, sewing kits, key-rings, spoons, pen-holders, fridge-magnets and earrings with 
Ataturk on them. Each item is available with Ataturk in various poses.
Visitors can purchase engravings of famous speeches, jigsaws of famous battle scenes 
and Ataturk engravings on stone or small metal plaques bearing an uncanny 
resemblance to Christian icons. Portraits are also on sale: pictures and paintings, 
including a popular frame fitted with slanted panels. Looking at the frame from the 
left, front or right, one sees Ataturk in youth, maturity and old age. This portrait can 
be purchased in the back-street stalls of conservative Ulus and in the exclusive Karum 
shopping centre in Ankara's most modern neighbourhood. Shops selling Ataturk 
portraits abound as the goods are in demand. From barbers in run-down Sihhiye to 
banks in upper-class Kavaklidere, from the ticket office on Btiytik Ada's jetty, in the 
Bosphorus, to grocery stores in the coastal village of Ala9ati, Ataturk's portraits 
watch the Turks as they go about their daily business. The Ataturk cult, for lack of a 
better word, enjoys a genuine popular following and, although Ataturk's image means 
different things to different people, the act of hanging his portrait constitutes a 
patriotic ritual performed independently from the state that effectively unites Turks.
l.b. Atatiirk's Houses
Given Atatiirk's centrality in Turkish national narratives and the narratives' centrality 
in daily life, it is hardly surprising that Atatiirk's houses are now well-frequented 
museums. Houses recreate a sense of space, which, Walsh (1992:160) finds, 
facilitates learning about the past, as visual narratives are more accessible to people of 
all ages and educational backgrounds. Recreating a room forges the feeling of 'having
93
Chapter 3
been there', stressing objectivity. Although what visitors see is not 'what it was like', 
but the product of a highly selective process of interpretation and recreation, the 
experience nevertheless feels authentic, especially if the sites in question are as well- 
known as the 'little pink house' in Salonica (fig.7). Constant exposure to pictures (see 
Chapter 2) or scale models (such as the ones displayed in Istanbul's military museum 
and Anitkabir) of this house means that visitors recognise it and appreciate its 
significance as the place where Turkey's national awakening began.
The house, now a museum in the garden of the Turkish Consulate in Salonica, offers a 
photograph collection and small reference library 14 on the ground floor, re-creating 
the 'house' on the top two floors. The curator accepts the fusion of Ataturk and 
Turkey. The Independence War and the Republic's proclamation are depicted as facts 
in his life while his pictures alongside European leaders are proof of Turkey's 
international prestige. Keeping with established narratives, Ataturk stands alone in 
photographs. There are no pictures of his war comrades; there is only one picture of 
Ataturk with his, later divorced, wife Latife and one with Olkti. There is one group 
photograph taken outside the Assembly building and not a single picture of his sister, 
Makbule. Solitude enhances Atatiirk's myth while also giving the Republic a 
monarch-style figurehead.
The museum mixes well-known pictures, objects and symbols with new ones. 
Familiarity with the narrative structure enhances the potency of its message. The 
house, immediately classed as 'typical' of its time - with assorted kilims, divans and a 
traditional bathroom - is actually unlike any other as, on the first landing, in an 
ordinary room (marked with a commemorative plaque) Ataturk was born. Next door, 
in Atatiirk's mother's room, a copy of the Quran reminds visitors of well-known 
stories regarding Ztibeyde's piety. Ataturk's mother, the story goes, wanted him to 
become a hoca, but he defied her wishes -just as the country broke with its Ottoman 
past - and opted for a secular, modem education and military career.
14 The books offered are exclusively about Ataturk. Being 'written about' makes an act, by definition, 
important. As this is not a lending library and there is no reading room, it is doubtful that it may be 
consulted often, yet its presence puts a scientific stamp on national narratives.
94
Chapter 3
This fusion between Ataturk's story and national awakening is also sustained in the 
museum booklet. Entitled Atattirk's House: The place where the future of a Nation 
was born, it offers a short biography and photographs (Ataturk's parents, Ataturk as a 
child, a coffee cup he once used). The booklet's main message, however, is that, 
Ataturk's mortality notwithstanding, his legacy is immortal. On the opening page, a 
1923 Time magazine cover is reproduced. It shows Ataturk - itself a tribute and 
international acknowledgment - and the famous words 'my mortal body will turn to 
soil some day; however, the Turkish Republic will last forever'. The Republic, 
Ataturk's brainchild, the booklet suggests, has not simply outlived its founder, but 
survived as his spiritual legacy, educating young Turks to follow in Ataturk's 
footsteps and inspiring the desire to visit the site where it all began.
Although a Turkish-run museum, the little pink house is in a foreign country and thus 
difficult for Turks to visit. Therefore, an exact replica (fig. 8) was constructed on 
Ataturk's model farm, in Ankara's Gazi neighbourhood to mark the centenary of his 
birth. Although visitors know this is a replica, they also know it is a very good one as 
the house is a familiar sight. Thus the sense of 'having been there' is forged even 
though the visitors know they actually have not. Besides, a visit to such a site is rarely 
inspired by scientific curiosity, rather it represents a national pilgrimage.
The pilgrim need only travel across town to visit, on the rare occasions that it is open 
to the public, Ataturk's residence inside the £ankaya presidential complex - also, 
peculiarly, pink. In this house, the Presidency's website notes, momentous decisions 
were made and defining moments for the country's destiny were lived through. Hence 
'today, it is preserved with utmost care as part of Ataturk's indelible memory' 15 . Once 
again, the country and its leader are fused. The authenticity of this space - where 
'[t]he bedroom... is furnished humbly, yet with an appropriate taste. Ataturk's own 
cushion and quilt together with the original coverlet have been kept on the bed' 16 - 
legitimises the Turkish Presidency. Inside the Presidential palace, untouched by 
subsequent presidents, is Ataturk's home, thus placing him, not only symbolically, but 





Similarly, preserving Atatiirk's other homes has the effect of situating him among his 
people. This omnipresence is achieved by turning even houses he spent little time in 
into museums. The pink house in Si§li is a case in point. Practically unfurnished, the 
house offers a small photographic collection and some interesting posters from the 
Independence War. References are made to the well-known national narrative with no 
real attempt to recreate it. Although the means for recreating a sense of space are 
lacking, the curator knows that the visitor is familiar with the narrative and satisfied 
with the authenticity of the space that once housed Atatiirk. The curator also knows 
that visitors are only interested in seeing one exhibit: a wine-stained tablecloth on 
which Atatiirk scribbled the new Turkish alphabet during a picnic. The reality and 
immediacy of this fragment of the script reform is incredibly potent.
In fact, the very existence of this tablecloth, unwashed and treasured, betrays the fact 
that soon after the Independence War, the Atatiirk cult was gathering momentum and 
objects were being preserved for later display. The house Atattirk stayed in briefly 
while in Izmir is a perfect example of this. When he was here, Atattirk already was a 
celebrated national hero. So, after his departure, everything was preserved as it was at 
that moment - down to the coffee cups he used. Photographs, personal effects and 
clothes clutter the displays, while Atatiirk's famous frock coat, immortalised in 
countless pictures, is exhibited on a mannequin. Furniture stands exactly as it did 
when he conducted state affairs from these rooms.
The claim of having preserved everything as it was when he was there is also made of 
the place where Atatiirk died. Although the Dolmabah?e Palace is normally filled 
with foreign tourists, numerous Turks also join the mandatory guided-tour, starting 
with the Red Audience Room where, the guide claims, the Ottoman Sultan summoned 
Atatiirk and charged him with starting the Independence War - a popular urban 
legend making the civil strife that followed the war easier to forget 17 .
Either way, Atattirk set off for Samsun from this palace and also ended his days here, 
in a section painted, by curious coincidence, vivid pink. The room Atattirk died in,
17 This is not an irrelevant debate for Turkey. Historical research and intense public deliberation 
surround the question of whether Sultan Vahdettin was more interested in saving the country or his 
throne hi 1919, e.g. see Z, 19 July 2005.
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approached through bathrooms, medical chambers and sitting rooms, is plain. Above 
the bed hangs a huge tapestry, depicting Ataturk during the war fought, ironically, 
partly against what the palace, in which it hangs, stood for. The bed he died in is 
covered with an enormous Turkish flag. On the bedside table, the legendary clock 
shows five minutes past nine. Visitors have read about this clock at school and have 
heard the sirens at 9:05 on the morning of 10 November. They have heard that, when 
Atatiirk died, time stood still and so do his people every year, to commemorate a man 
who defied mortal constraints. Actually seeing the clock lends credibility to such 
metaphysical and often outlandish claims.
I.e. Atatiirk's Resting Place
Atatiirk is dead, but 'death [does] not release a man from national service' (Gillis, 
2004:11), especially when he is a nation's foremost hero. Atatiirk remains the focal 
point of national narratives and his majestic mausoleum - now Ankara's most famous 
landmark - is the locus of patriotic pilgrimages. This, however, was not Atatiirk's first 
resting place, as he died in 1938 and Amtkabir was only completed in 1953. For 15 
years Ataturk was interred in Ankara's Ethnographic Museum (fig.9).
The museum's few rooms embrace the burial chamber in a loop, so one's visit starts 
and ends in front of Atatiirk's cenotaph: white marble adorned with bronze palm 
leaves under a gilded Ottoman-style dome. The marble hall is cool, silent and church- 
like. On a vertical slab, Atatiirk's face, cast in bronze, is mounted next to the famous 
phrase: even if he turns to dust, the Republic will live on 18 . The hall is lined with 
photographs from the funerary procession showing old, young, male, female, 
traditional and modern mourners laying wreaths. Pictures show people lining the 
streets or perched on top of mosques' domes and roofs in order to catch a glimpse of 
the funeral procession as Atatiirk's body travelled by boat, train, armoured car 
(preserved in Amtkabir) and on soldiers' shoulders. On the wall, the Anadolu Ajansi 
announcement of his death is sombrely framed.




This feeling of collective loss is reversed in Amtkabir where Atatiirk's immortal spirit 
is celebrated and his omnipresence reasserted. Bozdogan (2001:282) describes 
Amtkabir as the 'holiest' site in modern Turkey, expressly designed as a national(ist) 
temple. According to the 1942 architectural competition brief, Amtkabir should be 
where Ataturk would be celebrated as a symbol of the Turkish nation and where the 
people could pay their respects. The intention, Bozdogan continues, was to 
commemorate Ataturk as a soldier, president, statesman, scientist, intellectual and 
great creative genius. The building was meant to evoke feelings of respect, dignity 
and immortality (Bozdogan, 2001:186). The result - achieved by architects Emin 
Onat and Orhan Arda and sculptor Hiiseyin Ozkan - is, for Bozdogan, the secular 
substitute for a space of religious ritual and prayer. And pray is what many visitors do 
in front of Ataturk's cenotaph. His body is buried directly underneath the chamber 
open to the public, held under lock and key by the Chief of General Staff, who rarely 
grants permission to visit.
That does not discourage visitors, however. Amtkabir is a quintessentially 'national' 
space constructed around a national narrative rather than the tomb itself. Even the 
location, now known as Arut Tepe, is charged with national significance. This hill 
marks the spot where the city's two axes - the heroic 'old' Ankara of the 
Independence War and the modern city - meet, (Bozdogan, 2001:289). The site was 
meant to represent the fusion of old and new while dominating the skyline, as 
Amtkabir 'was part of the effort of Turkish nationalists to define, and thereby control, 
the symbolism of public life' (Meeker, 1997:169). Amtkabir, wrought with intricate 
symbolism, was to become one more national symbol.
Ironically a mosque challenged this dominance. The Kocatepe mosque 19 (fig. 10) 
boasts Turkey's tallest minarets which, given Ankara's hilly terrain, make it visible 
from almost anywhere, including from Amtkabir. Although only a short distance 
apart, Amtkabir is not visible from the mosque's esplanade or, indeed, from many 
other elevated spots. Ankara's skyline has risen since Amtkabir's construction and
19 Although the building of the Kocatepe mosque was agreed in the mid-1930s, construction only 
started in 1967 and lasted 20 years. The complex boasts a huge mosque, conference halls, Western- 




pollution hinders visibility. Still, for Meeker (1997:177,182-3), Amtkabir has not lost 
its battle for symbolic supremacy. Kocatepe, he claims, is respectful of Amtkabir and 
proudly advertises itself as a national place of worship. Nevertheless, Meeker 
concedes, competition over dominating the skyline does exist. However nationalised, 
a minaret was the last thing Ataturk would have wanted defining Ankara, the modern 
Republican capital. And yet, minarets are the city's new municipal symbol (fig. 11). 
Given the mounting tensions between secular and (perceived or real) religious 
agencies (see Chapter 6), this contest for symbolic supremacy is as intense as ever.
Meeker believes the contest is over: Kocatepe may be more visible, but Anitkabir has 
won, as its concerns and priorities have re-shaped the way religion is approached. 
However, after eight decades of secularism, this may hardly be enough. Although 
many individuals 'worship' at both sites, Anitkabir was meant to fulfil the need for 
Kocatepe. Anitkabir is a place of worship, commemorating Atatiirk's life and rule as 
well as his intellectual remains, manifest through republicanism and national unity 
(Vale, 1992:102). As Atatiirk's legacy is Turkey, Anitkabir is the shrine where society 
worships itself. Meanwhile, the Head Teacher delivers his last lesson.
The entire site, notes Wilson (2004:1) represents a conscious bypassing of Ottoman 
legacies and the deliberate claiming of an alternative historical evolution for the 
Turks: central Asian, Hittite and Greco-Roman. The promenade leading to the 
mausoleum is flanked by 24 Hittite lions 'representing the strength and power of the 
Turkish nation' (plaque inside the Independence Tower at the foot of the promenade). 
The Hittite theme is hardly surprising. Wilson (2004:3) notes that early Republican 
elites 'actively supported and funded archaeological excavations, the establishment of 
"ancient civilisation" museums, and printing of publications in support of this 
imaginary pre-Islamic or pre-Ottoman ancestry of the Turks'. Motifs thus discovered 
(deer, lions, double-headed eagles or the Hittite sun) were integrated into Turkish 
architecture and are also celebrated here, in Ankara's national 'temple'.
On the main plateau, however, Hittite references vanish. The main building and the 
colonnades surrounding the esplanade have a distinct Greco-Roman feel to them 
(fig. 12). Patriotically named20 towers mark the site's every corner. These towers'
20 National Pact, Republic, Defence of Rights, Independence, Freedom, Mehmetifik and Victory.
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roofs resemble traditional nomadic tents21 , a reference to the Turks' central Asian 
past. Similarly, the ceilings of the colonnaded corridors flanking the esplanade are 
decorated in abstract carpet motifs, seeking to assert national unity across time.
Amtkabir also asserts the spatial unity of national domains. The mausoleum is 
constructed with materials brought from all over the country (Meeker, 1997:170). 
Moreover, soldiers constantly patrol the site in complex step formations. As they 
frequently stop to identify themselves and their names and home provinces echo 
around the ceremonial plateau, it is clear that Amtkabir was meant to unite, represent 
and express the entire nation. Hence the nation's 'authentic representatives' stand 
guard by the mouth of the promenade: a soldier, a peasant and a teacher/student faced 
by three women (fig. 13). These are the people the nation needs for its material, 
spiritual and emotional sustenance. The rest, Ataturk has taken care of.
Half-way up the 26 risers leading to the mausoleum, symbolising 26 August 1922, 
when the nationalists achieved full control of the country (Wilson, 2004:6), a sign 
reads: hakimiyet kayitsiz, $artsiz milletindir22, Ataturk's Republican legacy.
Inside the cool, dark hall, speeches by Ataturk and Inonii are engraved on opposite 
walls - just as Inonii's modest grave faces Ataturk's across the ceremonial plateau. 
Inside Ataturk's burial chamber there is no flag, statue or bust. This is the only public 
room in Turkey not to bear Ataturk's image. There is no need. His presence is 
intensely felt. The room is Spartan but for a gilded, elaborate carpet motif above the 
black granite sarcophagus. Before it, people stand to attention, pray or leave flowers. 
Some kiss the steps. A tearful old man wrote in the visitors' book 'great father, thank 
you'. Leafing through the entries, one finds the ledger is full of messages of love and 
gratitude. As people of all ages, 'covered' and agik2*, file solemnly past the tomb, it is 
impossible to link the 'Ataturk cult' to one socio-economic or cultural group. 
Ataturk's message - engraved on his mausoleum's outside wall in the form of the 
Address to Youth and his speech on the Republic's 10th anniversary - was intended for 
all Turks and people from all backgrounds have responded to it.
21 'Yurt\ the nomadic tent, also means 'homeland'.




The TAP, however, pride themselves on being Ataturk's first and truest disciples and, 
as Amtkabir is the military's domain24, this connection is evident in the site's well- 
curated museum. Pictures celebrate Amtkabir as the capital's foremost ceremonial 
site, while also firmly establishing the TAF's position - represented by Chief of the 
General Staff, General Hilmi Ozkok - among the country's elites as military leaders, 
foreign dignitaries, the Premier and President pay their respects to Atatiirk. Moreover, 
the museum attempts a detailed reconstruction of the Independence War and 
republican reforms and a celebration of the TAF's role in them.
This starts with a re-enactment of the battle of Canakkale, complete with cannon 
sounds and eerie music. A map of Turkey is juxtaposed with a map of what would 
have been Turkey had the treaty of Sevres not been reversed - a reminder that the 
country would not exist had it not been for Atatiirk and the TAP.
Although other military leaders are present in this narrative and their portraits 
displayed, Atatiirk remains prominent. Paintings depict Atatiirk alone or surrounded 
by the 'salt of the earth' - peasants, whose selfless contribution to the war and 
Ataturk's direct, unmediated relationship with them are central to national narratives. 
Focusing on the anonymous heroic masses makes national greatness the outcome of a 
collective national endeavour of which all Turks can be proud, while simultaneously 
reserving the hero's pedestal for Atatiirk alone. The presence of women in such 
paintings is particularly significant as a potent reminder of his policies towards gender 
equality. Images of massacres, bayonet-bearing Greeks and cross-wielding priests 
('clerics played a provoking role' in such massacres, the caption reads) remind 
visitors of the horrors endured to ensure freedom, while preaching vigilance against 
both foreign invasion and religious fanaticism. Down the hall, the battle of Sakarya is 
reproduced. The music is triumphant and the claim that national independence has 
one sole author is symbolically upheld by Atatiirk's omnipresence on the battlefield as 
all famous wartime pictures are reproduced on the tableau.
The next cavernous hall is dedicated to republican reforms: a bronze engraving of a 
fierce, uniformed Atatiirk, surrounded by people holding riffles, flags and pitchforks 




beginning. Successive alcoves present republican reforms in great detail. The TAP 
seem more interested in hard proof than easily digestible narrative offering 3,000 
photographs and 600 pages of information (museum leaflet): everything from the 
script reform to Turkey's electrification is minutely documented.
The TAP are making a powerful claim regarding how Republican history should be 
read. Controversial or contentious issues are not avoided; rather they are treated as 
opportunities to offer clarifications. For instance, under the rubric 'multi-party 
polities' the TAP stress that Ataturk 'saved the country'. 'He gained the confidence of 
the nation as a hero' and used it to establish a functioning republic, even if that meant 
occasionally interrupting multi-party politics. Besides, the caption continues, 
interruptions were objectively necessary. The Progressive Republican Party was 
disbanded in the wake of the murderous 1925 §eyk Sait Rebellion while the Free 
Republican Party actually dissolved itself. Needless to say, suggesting that Ataturk 
would tolerate no opposition is hardly the stuff of nationalist museum exhibits.
Besides, this presentation of republican reforms suggests the project matters more 
than the process. The Republic as a timeless abstraction matters more than republican 
procedure, especially if the latter endangers a perceived republican 'essence'. 
Although seemingly contradictory, this thesis defines the Republic as what Ataturk 
established. Its purpose was his project and the method through which that was to be 
fulfilled was secondary to its aims. 'Republicanism' hence becomes an idiosyncratic 
term as, no matter what Ataturk does, it is, by definition, republican.
The TAP are this Republic's appointed guardians. Atatiirk's 'Last Message to the 
Army' - exhibited in the Milli Ouvenlik (national security) alcove - delivered on 29 
October 1938, makes this abundantly clear:
'If you saved your country from oppression, tragedy and enemy invasion in 
the most critical and hard times, I have no doubt that in the fruitful era of the 
Republic... you will conduct your duty with the same loyalty... As I express 
the feelings of gratefulness today, I am also the voice of the feelings and pride 
of our great nation... Our great nation and I believe and fully trust that you are 
always prepared and ready to carry out your duty of defending the Turkish
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land and the honour of the Turkish people against any internal or external 
threats.'
Framed for all to see, are the military's clear instructions.
2. Inscribing 'Republican Nationality' onto National Space
In the summer of 2004, Turkey was full of Republican paraphernalia. Some 75-year 
anniversary banners remained alongside 80-year anniversary streamers, while 85-year 
commemorative signs and hangings were already appearing. By Dolmabah9e Palace, 
letters mounted on an archway over a busy road read 'we love democracy and the 
Republic' (fig. 14). Eight decades after the Republic's proclamation, loyalty to it is 
still actively and publicly celebrated, while its protection remains an urgent matter. 
Such commemorations afford the opportunity to assert national dignity and celebrate 
national sovereignty and Ataturk's project. Moreover, they allow national narratives 
to renew the urgency of their message. This urgency is central to the message, as 
Ankara's War of Independence Museum proves.
The museum, initially a school and home of Turkey's first Assembly, preserves the 
classroom that served as the assembly hall, thus wordlessly stressing the 
precariousness of the nationalist struggle when it started and, by extension, the 
magnitude of its success. In the hall, Ataturk's bust on the podium is forever 
addressing the nation (fig. 15). Adjoining rooms display the flag raised above the 
building on 23 April 1920 alongside the weapons, phones and pigeonholes used by 
nationalist deputies.
The walls are lined with patriotic paintings representative of the populist/nationalist 
art which republican elites used in order to forge a new collective identity (Altan, 
2004:6, 11). Paintings depict Ataturk as a statesman, not a soldier, featuring 
landscapes of Ankara, the new republican city, and book covers in the new script. 
Thus paintings exalt Ataturk and his reforms, merging the Independence War and the 
Republic's declaration and presenting them as a genuinely popular insurgence against 
darkness and anachronism, a la French revolution (Bozdogan, 2001:57). This imagery
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is central to Atatiirk's self-legitimation, premised on the claim that he changed his 
people's reality, just like his French revolutionary counterparts.
The museum presents the script reform by exhibiting documents in Arabic and the 
calendar reform through double-dating in explanatory plaques -e.g. 1335 (1919) - 
thus stressing how Ataturk moulded the visitors' reality. The reform effort is 
celebrated as momentous and necessary, almost inevitable. Decisions are discussed in 
the passive voice, as if no agency was needed, and the curator constantly stresses the 
revolution's popularity. Finally, the display of the rebellious MPs' identity cards and 
personal belongings adds immediacy to the narrative. These men - whose faces 
visitors inspect - were involved in a historic event and, as the caption notes, they 
showed extraordinary heroism and determination, following Ataturk and working 
against all odds until 'our country was saved from the enemies'.
Although the MPs are named, none is singled out and their ordinariness is repeatedly 
stressed. The plaque quotes contemporaries' testimonials: the MPs' selfless patriotism 
and self-sacrifice is a fact. Despite poverty and hard conditions, the valiant Turkish 
deputies managed to create the Republic under Atatiirk's leadership. Again, the 
Republic is celebrated as Atatiirk's work, accomplished with the assistance of 
anonymous yet worthy Turks. The First Assembly, notes the plaque, was an 'example 
of the determination the deputies... showed in realising their common aims towards 
the salvation of the country' and an example for subsequent generations.
This message is captured by a 1994 TRT-produced 'mockumentary' DVD, on sale in 
the museum shop. According to the production leaflet, the reconstruction Kurtulu$ - 
Push to Freedom, involving 5,000 participants, sought to capture the feeling of self- 
sacrifice that inspired men and women during the war. This production combines 
grand epic scale with intimate narrative, extolling Atatiirk's virtues (refusing to 
desecrate a Greek flag after his resounding victory over the Greeks) and the love and 
devotion he inspired in his people (bringing veterans and deserters back to the front 
merely by making his wish known). Ataturk, we are told, was capable of fighting the 
battle for progress alongside the Independence War. Even before the armistice at 
Mudanya, Ataturk is addressing a group of teachers, the narrative goes, stressing that 
the true victory is theirs to win as the nation's true enemy is backwardness and 
teachers are the Republic's peacetime soldiers.
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Nevertheless soldiers are never forgotten. Mehmet?ik, the peasant-soldier, the son of 
the soil - a universally familiar picture - represents the common Turk who ploughs 
the land and guards the borders. Sometimes the soldier has a name. Near Izmir's 
famous clock tower is the statue of Kubilay, famous for his unfortunate involvement 
in the 1930 Menemen incidents. Kubilay is a model Kemalist officer: young, secular - 
literally to the death - dedicated to Ataturk and, when not serving his country, a 
teacher. Kubilay's image reminds everyone that the TAF's willingness to defend the 
modernising, secular Republic is matched by the common Turk's.
This is a recurring theme. Two soldiers and a peasant woman carrying ammunition 
accompany Atatiirk's equestrian statue in Ankara's Ulus Square (fig. 16). Mehmet9ik 
and the Turkish mother are potent symbols in this narrative. Although Turkish 
feminist scholarship has long-deplored women's auxiliary role in national semiotics, 
it is nevertheless important that women are present in such monuments given female 
exclusion from the public domain in pre-republican times. It is true, however, that few 
women are commemorated as individuals25 and those who are, are closely linked to 
Atatiirk. Such sculptures are rare and, usually, tucked away. Zubeyde Harum's busts, 
for instance, found in one of Izmir's quiet pedestrian streets or near Istanbul's 
Yedikule, are dedicated to en biiyiik Turk annesi26 . A Republican Mary, Zubeyde is 
commemorated for having given birth to the national messiah.
The only other female figure present in this spatial narrative has mixed credentials. 
Halide Edip (Adivar) was Atatiirk's friend and collaborator, but fell from grace, 
although this is often conveniently forgotten. Now she is a national symbol and her 
bust, 'with the love of the Turkish woman', adorns Sultanahmet square, where she 
gave her most fiery speech, in 1919, mobilising Istanbul's women against the Greek 
occupation of Izmir. Abstractions such as 'the Turkish mother' or 'the Turkish 
woman' are part of a highly pervasive national narrative reminiscing about the glories 
of old and simultaneously pursuing a very specific, albeit idiosyncratically conceived, 
future. Symbols of past achievement sustain well-known national imperatives.
25 Tributes to individual women are, largely, context-specific: the statue of a famous soprano is outside 
the National Opera House in Ankara and Sabiha G6k9en's outside the Aviation Society.
26 The greatest Turkish mother.
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Kemalism is progress-driven and forward-looking. These spatial narratives act as 
reminders that each Turk is personally responsible for the country's future.
Each Turk's duty is to realise Atariirk's plan by remaining secular and republican and 
by working hard towards modernisation. True to the motto Turk ogiin, qah§, guven, 
the structure in Ankara's Giiven Parki - the aptly named 'pride' park (fig. 17) - 
depicts peasants, soldiers and artisans. The image of craftsmen at work is often used 
to symbolise progress. Together with soldiers and peasants, artisans are vital in 
achieving and sustaining the nation's progress. Repetition is vital in maintaining this 
narrative's momentum. Further up Ataturk Bulvan, a similar structure (fig. 18) 
emphasises the nation's need for craftsmen. A Delacroix-esque representation of 
civilian figures brandishing flags and holding books accompanies an engraving 
extolling the nation's need for artisans, scientists and craftsmen. Praise for leadership 
qualities is conspicuously absent from this narrative: the nation needs workers. No 
leaders are needed - Turkey has an immortal leader: all Turks need to follow him.
Reminders to that effect abound. Every Turkish city boasts an Ataturk Bulvan, 
usually the main commercial road. Ankara has both a Gazi Mustafa Kemal Avenue 
and an Ataturk Avenue. Excessive? Possibly. But Ankara is a special case and 
Kemalists want that remembered. Bozdogan (2001:68) calls Ankara a 'utopian city', 
the republican dream emerging out of barren land. The Kemalists, she notes, saw it as 
a tabula rasa for the implementation of their vision, from which mosques were 
expressly absent, although they have mushroomed since.
Ataturk's statues symbolise this modernising republican identity. He represents the 
nation, the state and even abstract notions such as progress and justice (fig. 19). His 
presence inscribes nationhood and is thus employed to 'caution' traditional 
neighbourhoods or 'expunge' alternative national memories, as in the case of the 
Izmir Kiiltur Parki. Built specifically for the 1936 international fair, the park is an ode 
to modernisation. But it is not set on 'neutral' ground; the park mostly occupies what 
used to be the Greek quarter, ravaged by the 1922 fire, and now inscribes nationhood 
on a previously non-national space. The park obliterates the memory of a past now 
made irrelevant and a disaster that scarred the city offering instead an assertively 
modern Turkish space. The park is dotted with Atattirk's statues and plaques inscribed 
with his aphorisms. Here, there is even a statue of Atatilrk with Ismet; but, Inonu is
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not a challenger for parity in the pantheon of national heroes and does not undermine 
the glory of Atatttrk's one-man-show.
Near this statue is the Izmir Sanat (Art) Gallerisi that, in the summer of 2003, hosted 
an exhibition marking the Lausanne Treaty's 80th anniversary. Pictures, documents 
and caricatures were on display. In one, Ismet and Venizelos27 are depicted as boxing 
contestants - Ismet sitting bolt upright in one corner while Venizelos is being revived 
in another. The match ended in victory for Ismet and this park is his trophy.
Commemorating nationhood hi parks is common in Turkey, as parks represent 
Western refinement while also symbolising health and youth. Moreover, parks are 
popular and accessible to all, hence permitting national narratives to extend their 
symbolic eminence by penetrating leisure spaces. Examples abound. In Ankara's 
Genclik Parki, there is a likeness of Ataturk constructed of white metal and what 
looks like spent light bulbs. In Doga Parki inside Ankara's Ataturk Orman Ciftligi 
nationality is literally inscribed on the soil in the form of a flag carved in the middle 
of the grass-covered picnic area (fig.20). Such symbols constantly remind Turks to 
enjoy their surroundings as Turkish space, liberated by Ataturk.
Inscribing nationality in public spaces is not a state monopoly. In Kavakildere's 
Kugulu Parki, a small free-standing arch covered with clay handiwork made by local 
children commemorates 23 April, Republic and Children's Day. The children have 
used clay to make Turkish flags and models of Amtkabir and the Bandirma (fig.21). 
Neither the children's familiarity with these symbols nor their readiness to focus on 
the Republican rather than 'children's' aspect of the holiday is surprising. Students 
instinctively gravitate towards activities that beg rewards within any education system 
and children often are invariably susceptible to hero-worship. Nevertheless, this small 
shrine is not simply the children's work. Teachers and local councillors were 
involved, thus directly participating in the symbolic appropriation of national space.
'National space', as a bounded and protected entity, is a popular and emotionally 
resonant image and fear of division or fragmentation is widespread - as Turk
27 Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos - largely responsible for the Asia Minor Campaign and 
subsequent population exchange, although not for the events in-between.
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Telekom's anti-privatisation campaign proves (fig.22). The most common antidote 
against the spectre of a divided or preyed-upon country is Mehmet9ik.
3. Defending the Land
The TAP are dedicated to the country's protection out of both duty and profound 
patriotism, as a streamer outside the Florya army barracks advertises: Turkiyemi ve 
bayragimi seviyorum2*. This duty to protect, however, is heavily tinted by the TAF's 
perception of what the country needs protecting from. As, for the TAP, republicanism 
is a Turkish national trait not a political or administrative choice and Turkey is, by 
definition, a Republican space, their protection of national geography spills into 
upholding and defending specific national signifiers and political structures.
The TAP are committed to Atattirk's Republic. This Republic welcomes public 
acceptance, but is neither reducible nor dependent on it. For the TAP, the Republic is 
measured in terms of its modernising aims and character. To retain those, it may need 
to be protected even from the people. Although this creates the potential for immense 
tension between narratives seeking to legitimise Kemalist reforms in terms of their 
popularity and those seeking to do so in terms of their inevitability and inherent value, 
it also offers an insight into the TAF's esprit de corps, as their idiosyncratic 
republicanism is reflected in all military-controlled public spaces (see Jones, 
1996:152). The TAP seek to advertise their role in the Independence War and reform 
effort, as well as their 'ownership' of Atatiirk.
Istanbul's military museum achieves both. Occupying the elegant 19th-century 
building that once housed the Harbiye military academy, the museum boasts a rich 
collection of weapons, uniforms, paintings and artefacts from several wars. Here, 
three inter-related narratives are pursued: national greatness is evoked; the 
precariousness of national safety is stressed; and Turkey's rightful position alongside 
the West is advertised. Throughout these narratives the TAP are celebrated as the 
nation's most authentic representatives. Moreover, as Ataturk is reclaimed as a 
soldier, the TAP emerge as the key agent of national history. The museum's booklet
28
'I love my Turkey and my flag'.
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stresses (p.32) that Atatiirk, 'the founder of the Turkish Republic and major 
statesman', was educated in this very building. His Harbiye classroom is 'preserved' 
in the middle of the museum's collection of Ottoman and Islamic artefacts. This 
'interruption' provides a subtle, but symbolically potent link between the museum's 
Ottoman and Republican wings. The transition from empire to republic entailed a 
momentous breach for most of the nation, but for the TAP it was smooth as, through 
claiming Ataturk, they claim authorship of the change. His classroom proves that 
Atatiirk' was 'one of ours'.
Moreover, true to the maxim 'every Turk is born a soldier', this 'ownership' is 
extended to every Turk - brave Mehmetfik - whose valour is celebrated hi the 
museum's numerous paintings from the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the 
Independence War. Paintings show a soldier who keeps fighting even though his arms 
are bandaged and bleeding; soldiers helping each other out of harm's way; women 
carrying ammunition. The museum dedicates its 'Martyrs' Gallery' 'to all those, 
throughout history, who have lost their lives in action in the cause of liberty'. The 
TAP are not a war machine, the message goes. As Atatiirk's 'peace at home, peace in 
the world' motto is inscribed on the wall in several languages, the museum stresses 
that the TAP fight for just causes only and, consequently, always bring progress and 
assist growth. The TAP are not an agent of destruction. In the Enver Salonu, 
bequeathed to the museum by former Chief of Staff Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980 
coup and subsequently President of Turkey, a Turkish flag that was taken to the moon 
is displayed, stressing the TAF's progress-oriented culture.
Although the Army's main task is to fight or prevent wars, the curator is anxious to 
claim that Turkey has never fought an expansionistic or aggressive war: the TAP have 
always fought for freedom or survival and will do so again, whenever required. But in 
order to avoid that eventuality, the TAP believe it is their duty to ensure the Turkish 
nation does not grow complacent. Hence, the curator stresses all the dangers that the 
country has faced in the past and may yet face, giving the Greeks pride of place, as 
theirs was the only invasion that republican Turkey has suffered and it kick-started the 
Independence War. In fact, although not the only enemy, it was the Greek defeat that 
marked the Nationalists' final victory. Hence, paintings of massacre abound, in which 
the urgency of guarding the fatherland is underlined.
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There is no hall dedicated to the First World War. For perspective's sake, it should be 
mentioned that the Korean War is commemorated in a huge hall, while the First 
World War is glossed over in a small room marking the Ottoman victory at Gallipoli, 
exhibiting petty 'booty': Allied equipment, soldiers' personal objects, even parts of a 
human skull. The Ottoman alliance with Germany is never mentioned.
This lack of information is concealed, albeit not compensated for, by presenting the 
Independence War as having started in 1918. The well-known images of greedy 
Allies and bloodthirsty Greeks (in 18th-century costume) are re-used, while those who 
died in the name of the Republic and national independence are celebrated as martyrs 
of God and their artefacts displayed for dramatic effect, from the car Resid Pasa was 
assassinated in, complete with bullet holes, to Mehmet9ik's bloody clothes. Nothing 
makes danger seem more imminent than the sight of blood.
Although grievances against the Allies are subsumed by a desire for Western 
integration, there is still unfinished business with the Greeks. The rooms dedicated to 
Cyprus are dramatic and poignant as paintings cede their place to photographic 
evidence, hard proof of the atrocities committed against the island's Turkish 
population. The exhibition fuses Greek Cyprus with Greece and presents the Cyprus 
events as a continuation or rekindling of the 1920s. The message is caution for the 
Turks and a plea to the 'West' as, 30 years on, the island of Cyprus remains divided 
and the Turkish presence in the North remains condemned by the international 
community. Here is where the TAF state their case, claiming theirs was a peace 
operation, rescuing civilians who were being slaughtered. A photograph of Lieutenant 
General Nurettin Errin embracing Rauf Denktas in 1974 stresses the TAF's 
continuing commitment to Cyprus. Next to the picture lies a blood-red pouch filled 
with Cyprus soil. The dramatic representation of land and blood is complete.
Although concert between public moods and official narratives is hard to ascertain, 
there is considerable popular sympathy for this narrative. On the eve of the 2004 
Cyprus referendum, all political parties, with the notable exception of the AKP, filled 
Istanbul with banners reminding people of the conflict. A CHP poster read dayan 
Denkta§ yamndayiz29, whereas the ultra-nationalist MHP30 - whose leader, Devlet
29 'We stand by Denktas in his resistance'.
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Bah9eli never misses an opportunity to declare his support for KKTC - raised 
banners sporting the grey wolf, the Turkish flag and the words: Istanbul Kahraman 
Denktap karphyor32 . The TAF's support for such declarations was tacit. Yet what 
they perceived as 'national betrayal' actually helped Turkey, for the first time since 
the Cyprus saga began, to occupy the moral high ground in Western eyes.
Western acknowledgment of Turkey's 'worth' is vital for the TAP as it would 
constitute proof that Ataturk's westernisation is, finally, successful. Hence the 
Museum devotes a surprisingly large section to displaying ceremonial gifts presented 
to Turkish military and civilian'officers by their foreign counterparts. Although this 
preoccupation can be read as a sign of national or institutional insecurity, for the TAP, 
these gifts represent a ritual recognition of Turkey as an equal in the international 
arena. Hence they carry immense weight in Turkey's struggle to secure its 'rightful 
place in the world', alongside Europe. In fact, stressing that Turkey has always been 
part of Europe even if it failed to start off there is a constant theme in these 
exhibitions. Ottoman protective armour is discussed as the fusion of Islamic and 
European influences. Similarly, when displaying uniforms, attention is drawn to 
Selim III and the Tanzimat reforms that 'Europeanised' outfits. In the accompanying 
leaflet, all 16 pictures show European-style liveries.
Stressing Turkey's European credentials often relies on downplaying the significance 
of its Ottoman pedigree, usually by reducing Ottoman history to a period in Turkish 
history. Hence, the Military Museum and Cultural Centre booklet speaks of Turkish 
bows and arrows of Ottoman times (p. 8), 19th-century Turkish cavalry (p. 10) and the 
^-century Turkish Sultan Selim I (p. 14). Under the rubric of 'Islamic cutting 
weapons', the leaflet mentions Turkish swords'. Once again republican 
historiography claims that the Turks predated and outlived the Ottoman Empire. 
Although they originated in Central Asia, the Turks are so entwined with the history 
of Anatolia that its history becomes theirs. Anatolia has not always been Muslim, nor 
indeed Ottoman; neither have the Turks. 'Islamic' and 'European' practices and
30 Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party
31 E.g. see Z, 4 August 2005 or www.mhp.org.tr/genelbsk/gbskkonusma/2005/02/02005.php
32 'Istanbul welcomes the hero Denktas/.
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civilisations may remain distinct analytical categories, but the Turks do not belong to 
one at the expense of the other.
4. Constructing Continuity in Space and Time
The Turkish Presidential insignia is a Turkish flag bearing, in its top left corner, a 
golden Hittite-style sun, representing the Republic, surrounded by 16 stars, 
representing the 16 Turkish states that have existed throughout the nation's history33 . 
True to the TTT, the insignia claims continuity between the history of different Turkic 
tribes across time. The Turks, originally from the steppes of central Asia, migrated to 
a land rich in history and converted to Islam. The Turks today, claims the TTT, 
represent the fusion of a pre-Islamic past, Islamic traditions and the culture of all 
Anatolian civilisations. Association is more important than proof in this narrative34. 
The Hittites were Anatolian, so are the Turks, ergo the land's Hittite past is now the 
Turks'. The use of Hittite symbols seals the Turks' long and glorious history (fig.23).
Anatolia's Hittites or Greeks are not claimed as Turks. They are Anatolians. So are 
the Turks. Hence they share an Anatolian legacy as the land nurtures civilisations and 
passes legacies on (Ozal, 1991:21-22, 26). Thus Ozal (1991:346-7) claims Homer and 
Paul of Tarsus as 'our countrymen'. Similarly, as philosophy, geometry and the 
world's religions flourished in Anatolia, the land must have had something to do with 
it. This land is now the Turks', hence they own both the birthplace of European 
civilisation and the setting within which it grew. This narrative grounded the nation in 
a remote and mythical past rooted in Anatolia enabling it to 'claim' an antiquity 
comparable to the Europeans'. Unsurprisingly, Bozdogan (2001:118) notes, it was 
extremely popular with modernising elites, who named banks and industries after the 
mythical past that Turkey claimed as its own (e.g. Sumerbank and Etibank). Surely a 
nation with such a glorious past could not fail to succeed in its future endeavours?
33 http://www.cankaya.gov.tr/eng_flash/gunes.htm
34 For instance, the Hittites were the first civilisation to have archives; the Turks are fond of archives 
ergo there is a connection (Ozal, 1991:6).
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This insecurity is now less pronounced, yet TTT influences remain strong in Turkey's 
ethnographic museums. Ankara's Museum of Anatolian Civilisations, for instance, 
offers the story of Anatolia's Turkish people and discusses Ottoman, Memluk and 
Selguk periods. 'The Turkish art of embroidery is unquestionably as old as the history 
of the Turks themselves', it notes, which stretches back for millennia. Similarly, 
Izmir's Ethnographic Museum embraces a narrative accepting the Turks as Anatolia's 
only indigenous people. Although Levantine populations are mentioned, the very 
word implies that Anatolia's non-Turkish populations were imported and transient.
The absence of any mention of, or artefact related to Izmir's Jewish and Christian 
(Armenian, Greek and Syriac) communities is staggering, but unsurprising. A 2003 
picture exhibition on Izmir's seaside promenade, marking 80 years since the Lausanne 
Treaty, included no picture taken before 1928. This is a part of Anatolian history that 
the TTT is not eager to appropriate, as it would entail accepting shared ownership of 
the land which Turkish national narratives have bestowed with so much meaning. 
Accepting that the Turks are not Anatolia's sole owners could have potentially 
explosive results in the Southeast and would throw the entire national identity 
narrative off balance.
As it stands now, the TTT-inspired identity does not claim substantive linguistic, 
religious or indeed racial links with Anatolia's populations. The TTT claims a 
continuum, not continuity. As Anatolia remains constant, its owners benefit from the 
land and bestow it with their civilisation. Thus the Turks have inherited Anatolia's 
history and, through it, became essentially Anatolian. The Sel9uks, for instance, came 
from Central Asia but were Anatolian anyway, according to Izmir's Ethnographic 
Museum, as if it were an elective rather than descriptive term. Perplexing captions 
help: 'the Anatolians brought Central Asiatic carpet-weaving patterns to Anatolia'. 
Dating is non-sequential and Muslim and Christian dating is used interchangeably, 
causing confusion as to what the Turkic tribes did before emigrating to Anatolia and 
what had been done in Anatolia before the Turks arrived. Although we are told that 
the Sel9uks came from central Asia, it seems that there never had been a time when 
they were not Anatolian. For instance, next to a set of carpets, one caption claims that 
these motifs were brought to Anatolia in the 13th century, while another notes that
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they were first found in Anatolia in the 3 rd century. Confusion must be the desired 
effect. And yet this narrative is neither uncommon nor limited to Turkish nationalists.
Stierlin (2002), in his popular coffee-table book on Selcuk and Ottoman architecture, 
speaks of Sel9uk and Ottoman periods rather than tribes. Stierlin (2002:15) describes 
the 'Ottoman period' as the time when 'Turkish power had given rise to one of the 
greatest empires in history' and stresses Anatolia's influence on its inhabitants. Before 
settling in Anatolia, the Turks had only the most rudimentary notions of architecture 
and art, but once there, they produced true masterpieces, which for Stierlin (2002:9, 
100, 132-3) is the result of a direct creative dialogue with the civilisations that 
flourished in Anatolia before the Turks arrived. For Stierlin (2002:23) there is no 
conundrum: '[t]he Turks settled permanently in Anatolia [in the 11 th century] and 
since then it has been Turkish.' For the TTT, however, this is not enough. Anatolia 
needs to have always been Turkish, hence it is reclaimed through, for instance, 
translating place names. The Mikroyalos shrine in the coastal city of Fo?a, becomes 
Kiiciik Deniz, an exact translation. Even when the information plaque at the site of the 
shrine quotes Herodotus, Kuftik Deniz replaces all references to Mikroyalos. The 
nationalising effect is as imperceptible as it is potent.
No attempt is made to conceal the linguistic or cultural diversity of Anatolian 
civilisations. Museum curators simply stress that Anatolia was central in enabling 
diverse civilisations to flourish: this is where the Romans were at their greatest and 
Greek city-states truly thrived. This narrative, supported by the Istanbul, Selcuk and 
Ankara Archaeological Museums, enables national narratives to embrace Anatolia's 
history without denying unity of space. Simply by translating place names, the feeling 
of distance is overcome and an intense sense of pride is instilled in people even 
though they do not claim direct ownership of those civilisations, simply of the land 
that inspired them. A schoolteacher, guiding a group of first-graders around Istanbul's 
archaeological museum in the spring of 2004, told them they should be proud that 
their country had been the home of many glorious civilisations. How glorious must a 
land be, she asked, if so many glorious people choose it as their home?
This message, although instilling national pride, is also directed at European 
audiences, as many of these sites are packed with tourists. The Kemalist project was 
one of westernisation and, as national identity was moulded to assist this project,
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simultaneous narratives were generated claiming that the Turks - because of droughts 
in prehistoric times (Bozdogan, 2001:243) - migrated to India, China, Mesopotamia, 
Anatolia and Europe, carrying and disseminating their civilisation. So although the 
Hittites - or, indeed, the Europeans - are not the Turks' ancestors, they might actually 
be their offspring. Stierlin (2002:23) also identifies the Fins and Hungarians as 
descendants of migrant Turkish tribes.
'The republican need for self-affirmation through Western eyes appears... central to 
the cultural and political consciousness' of this elite (Bozdogan, 2001:67) and 
explains many of the theories they generated that otherwise seem untenable. As 
Republican elites needed to simultaneously facilitate relations with the West and 
legitimise westernisation as a return, a series of theories was generated that now 
potentially seems naive. It succeeded, however, in claiming that there was no shame 
in Turkey seeking to learn from Europe, for Europe had once learnt from Turkey. 
Moreover, by separating the civilisation Europe stood for from the conduct of 
individual European countries, Turkey managed to retain a sense of pride, while being 
able to challenge the Europeans at their own game. As Ozal (1991:304 & 356), among 
others, claims, to accept Turkey, Europe has to rise above ethnocentrism, become 
truly secular and, in short, be true to its own civilisation.
The pursuit of this civilisation has bequeathed Turkey with a confused and confusing 
relationship with the West. As I will show in Chapter 7, this westernisation drive both 
stems from Kemalism and undermines it, as Kemalism has given rise to specific 
institutional arrangements, legal practices and codes of conduct that are often 
incompatible with westernisation in the form of EU accession. Yet Kemalism has 
also, as I have shown, given Turks a language and rich symbolic arsenal for thinking 
about the future and carving their path towards progress, modernity and national 
dignity. This language, reproduced through education and spatial narratives, is also 
the language of the law, protected and reproduced through the constitution and 
judicial activity. This effectively means that making some use of the Kemalist 
language in Turkey's public life is hardly a matter of choice.
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Chapter 4, Kemalism as the Language of the Law
Having demonstrated that Kemalism pervades the Turks' everyday life, from 
childhood to adulthood, in this chapter I will demonstrate that Kemalism also 
represents the normative basis of the Republic's legal system.
1. The Constitution
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1 is a heavily amended version of the 
document that came into effect in 1983 under military tutelage. Although substantially 
revised in line with EU stipulations, the current constitution remains true to most of 
the original version's concerns. Articles quoted here (unless otherwise stated) were 
untouched by constitutional reform. This is particularly significant as the 1983 
constitution was, after all, the work of a military government, which ensured that, 
under considerable pressure, the document was endorsed by more than 90 percent of 
the population in a referendum. This constitution made former coup leader Kenan 
Evren the most powerful president in Turkish history, while offering all coup leaders 
immunity from criminal indictment or judicial review (Provisional Article 15). This is 
considered Turkey's most restrictive constitution. It promotes a unitary, collectivist 
national vision and, in its original form, enhanced the power of the Presidency and the 
National Security Council (NSC) at the expense of Parliament.
This imbalance has been partly restored, the NSC's power has been diluted and its 
composition altered2, much to the dismay of those fearing the AKP's 'hidden agenda' 
(E, 30 November 2003). They had good reason to fear. The AKP was the first party 
under the current constitution to have a parliamentary majority enabling it to pass
1 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm. see bibliography for details.
2 According to (amended) Article 118, the NSC now meets under the chairmanship of the President of 
the Republic and consists of the Prime Minister; Chief of General Staff; Deputy Prime Minister; 
Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs; the Commanders of the 
Army, Navy, Air Force and the Gendarmerie.
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constitutional reform without the collaboration of another party3 . Given the AKP's 
mixed credentials, this was potentially worrying. Reform, however, has remained 
sedate, satisfying but not exceeding EU demands. Hence, although clauses identified 
by the EU as problematic were changed, reform did not touch the clauses setting out 
the state's character and mission. In fact, there is little proof that the AKP wished to 
replace them in the first place. This, however, means that, despite the reforms, the 
Turkish Republic's core normative concerns and the state's identity and mission as 
reflected in the Constitution, remain true to the 1983 military government's 
intentions.
Preamble paragraphs 1 & 2 read:
'In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles 
introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk, the immortal 
leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal 
existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the 
Turkish state, embodies;
The determination to safeguard the everlasting existence, prosperity and 
material and spiritual well-being of the Republic of Turkey, and to attain the 
standards of contemporary civilization as an honourable member with equal 
rights in the family of world nations;'
The Republic's legal cornerstone explicitly draws legitimacy from Ataturk: the 
constitution is legitimate because it is in line with Ataturk's reforms. That established, 
the constitution then declares allegiance to (primordialist) nationalism and the 
indivisibility of the state, identified as a republic, and its domains. Then it stresses its 
commitment to the Republic's protection and the pursuit of progress and alignment
3 According to Article 175, Section 7 (amended 17/05/1987), constitutional amendments have to be 
proposed in writing by at least one-third of MPs. Proposals then ought to be debated twice in Plenary 
Session. The adoption of a proposal requires a three-fifths majority in the Assembly. The consideration 
and adoptions of such proposals should take place in line with the law. The President may refer laws 
related to constitutional amendment back to Parliament for further consideration or, if the Assembly 
adopts a draft law by a two-thirds majority, the President can submit it to referendum. A referendum 
can also be resorted to if the required majority is not met in the Assembly.
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with the universal standards of contemporary civilisation. Before outlining the 
Turkish state's organisational and functional traits, the constitution specifies that the 
preservation and furthering of Atatilrk's plan represents the core objective towards 
which political power ought to be used (see Glyptis, 2005a:411). The constitution 
demands that Turkey should both espouse the standards of contemporary civilisation, 
and strive for the acknowledgment of its status by nations deemed to possess the 
requisite civilisational standards.
Also before delving into technicalities (preamble paragraph 5), the constitution further 
stresses the 'principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and 
territory, Turkish historical and moral values of the nationalism, principles, reforms 
and modernism of Atatiirk (sic)' and secularism. Again, Turkey's constitution draws 
legitimacy from Atatiirk. Modernism, nationalism and the indivisibility of state and 
territory are reiterated as not only the state's organisational principles, but part of its 
mission and purpose. This mission, however, is not the state's alone. Preamble 
paragraph 6 stresses that 'all Turkish citizens are united in national honour and pride, 
in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties regarding national existence, in 
blessings and in burdens, and in every manifestation of national life'. The indivisible 
unity of the state and land also includes the people, thus completing the trident of 
state-territory-nation. National identity is both celebrated as the source of individual 
joy and pride, setting the document's collectivist tone, and established as the basis on 
which citizenship-related rights and duties are hinged.
This collectivism, expressed through the conceptualisation of a shared national 
destiny, translates into an elaborate set of state responsibilities. The state is bound to 
the people almost organically, as the existence of common national interests and a 
shared destiny translates easily into the assumption that the 'common good' also 
exists and it is the state's job to pursue it. In Turkey, the state is responsible for the 
cultivation of national pride and accomplishment - for instance, promoting successful 
athletes - and for protecting the families of those who sacrificed their lives for the 
nation's freedom and glory (Articles 59 & 61). Moreover, the state is responsible for 
ensuring that the economy - from land cultivation (Article 44) to private enterprise 
(Article 48) - serves 'national economic requirements and social objectives'. 
Upholding national interest is a key state responsibility as the constitutional document
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'recognises' national unity. It does not demand or legislate it, it simply states its 
natural and unmediated existence. This legitimises related legislation that, premised 
on the assumption that national unity and solidarity exist, seeks to protect them from 
perceived challenges, such as ethnic or linguistic plurality.
Article 2 defines the Turkish state as a democratic, secular and social republic, 
premised on national solidarity and loyalty to Atatiirk's nationalism. Article 3, 
paragraph 1 reiterates that '[t]he Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an 
indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish'. Identifying Turkish as the language of this 
'indivisible entity', the lawmaker indicates that this language is derived from and 
belongs to the unit that is the nation. As such, no other language can belong to or 
express this unit. Linguistic unity thus becomes both a practical manifestation and an 
inherent part of national unity. This is extremely significant as many EU-stipulated 
reforms were targeted at reversing the exclusion of other languages, namely Kurdish.
In line with EU demands, Article 26 on freedom of expression and the dissemination 
of thought, that in 1983 read '[n]o language prohibited by law shall be used in the 
expression and dissemination of thought' has been scrapped. However, Article 42, 
paragraph 9 still proclaims that '[n]o language other than Turkish shall be taught as a 
mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education'. The 
article permits the teaching of foreign languages and, in fact, Turkey sports a number 
of established foreign-language schools and universities. The issue here is the 
potential status of a language other than Turkish as a mother tongue for Turkish 
citizens, an acknowledgment that would heavily compromise national unity. Now, 
although the direct ban on Kurdish has been lifted and it enjoys (limited) access to 
education and broadcasting (AFP, 17 March 2006), Turkish remains the 
constitutionally protected language of the indivisible entity that is the nation.
This indivisible entity has to be at the forefront of the judges' minds when interpreting 
the law (see also Chapter 5). Article 5 is unequivocal:
'The fundamental aims and duties of the state are: to safeguard the 
independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the 
country, the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and 
happiness of the individual and society; to strive for the removal of political,
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social and economic obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of 
justice and of the social state governed by the rule of law; and to provide the 
conditions required for the development of the individual's material and 
spiritual existence.'
In line with EU concerns, the constitution stresses its commitment to the individual. 
Nevertheless, it also commits itself to the active promotion of society's happiness. 
Moreover, the document upholds the integrity and indivisibility of the nation and its 
republic as the state's first and foremost duty. Although since 2001 the constitution's 
tone is 'softer' than it was in 1983 when exalting the state and society's supremacy 
over the individual, such provisions remain similar in content. This gives the question 
of interpretation and implementation added urgency, especially as the list of duties 
includes potentially incompatible fundamental aims without according any one of 
them priority. Although this confirms the (bounded) conceptual flexibility of the 
Kemalist language, it also leaves immense power in the hands of those interpreting 
the law and the perambulatory clauses discussed above become, in this light, 
important pointers. These clauses' priorities and concerns are reiterated as part of 
every political actor's duties. Article 68, paragraph 4 states:
'The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall 
not... conflict [with] the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity 
with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule 
of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular 
republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship 
or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.'
Banning parties whose programme undermines the constitution seems perfectly 
reasonable. However, a closer reading reveals that a wide array of political 
programmes constitute, under this clause, threats to national indivisibility, integrity 
and secularism. As the preservation of these principles emerges as a key political duty 
in Turkey, a framework for the legal suspension of rights and freedoms survives, even 
after extensive EU-championed reform. Interpretation is of the essence. For instance, 
Article 17, paragraph 2 permits the use of violence in quelling riots or insurrections. 
As International Women's Day 2005 events proved, however, defining 'riot' is not a
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straightforward matter4 . Provisos on rights and freedoms exist in all legal systems, the 
difference lies in the manner and frequency with which they are appealed to and the 
mechanisms for checking the authorities that wield the power to limit said freedoms.
Article 27, paragraph 2, for instance, bans using art, broadly defined, to challenge 
Articles 1-3 of the constitution; in other words art cannot challenge the Republic, 
nationalism or the indivisible unity of state-territory-nation and its language. Freedom 
of artistic expression is secondary to the protection of state integrity and national 
unity. Regardless of how often Article 27 is appealed to, the unconditional supremacy 
of national integrity cannot be lost on the judges, especially as it is not simply art that 
should respect national integrity. Article 28, paragraph 4 prevents the publication or 
printing of news or articles that threaten the state's internal or external security, the 
indivisible integrity of state-territory-nation, or that may incite offence, riot or 
insurrection. For Rebecca Tinsley5 (2005), such legal provisions enable the state to 
limit individual freedom of expression in the name of an abstract collective national 
good - in whose name, secularism is also upheld.
Secularism is part of Republican character and the Republic is part of the indivisible 
trident of state-territory-nation that the Constitution protects and upholds. The 
protection of secularism takes many forms. Article 24, paragraph 3 bans proselytising; 
Article 24, paragraph 4 brings all education and instruction in religion and ethics 
under state supervision and control, while Article 24, paragraph 5 states:
'No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or 
things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of 
personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, 
social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets.'
4 During the Q&A session following a speech (see GUI, 2005e), Abdullah Gul was challenged by 
audience member Ayse Gul on why the police used violence against what she claimed was a peaceful 
demonstration on Women's Day. The minister noted the matter was under investigation, but stressed 
that implementation of Turkey's new legal framework needed work still.
5 Director, Waging Peace.
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Religion is firmly excluded from the public domain. Yet the line separating the public 
expression of religious beliefs from their exploitation for political purposes is blurred. 
The distinction is left up to the courts, whose secularism is unyielding (see Chapter 5).
Having established the core principles that should underpin law and political activity, 
the constitution seeks to ensure their protection and perpetuation, declaring that all 
educational institutions have a duty to protect Atatiirk's principles and the 
constitution. Nationalism, secular republicanism and westernisation are to be 
communicated through education:
'Training and education shall be conducted along the lines of the principles 
and reforms of Atatiirk, on the basis of contemporary science and educational 
methods, under the supervision and control of the state. Institutions of training 
and education contravening these provisions shall not be established. The 
freedom of training and education does not relieve the individual from loyalty 
to the Constitution.' (Article 42, paragraphs 3 & 4)
'The state shall take measures to ensure the training and development of youth 
into whose keeping our state, independence, and our Republic are entrusted, in 
the light of contemporary science, in line with the principles and reforms of 
Atatiirk, and in opposition to ideas aiming at the destruction of the indivisible 
integrity of the state with its territory and nation'. (Article 58, paragraph 1)
The constitution's command, that it is the future generations' duty 'to safeguard and 
eternally defend national independence', effectively reproduces Atattirk's Address to 
Youth. Although the famous rejoinder celebrating the Turks' blood is not reiterated 
here, the constitution embraces primordial nationalism elsewhere and the law remains 
true to Kemalism. The problem is that Kemalism is, as mentioned before, internally 
incoherent. Hence a court would have to untangle the constitution's potentially 
incompatible principles before upholding them (see Chapter 5).
Still, having entrusted its protection to the nation, the constitution also binds key 
political figures to the same set of principles by oath.
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'I swear upon my honour and integrity, before the great Turkish Nation, to 
safeguard the existence and independence of the state, the indivisible integrity 
of the Country and the Nation, and the absolute sovereignty of the Nation; to 
remain loyal to the supremacy of law, to the democratic and secular Republic, 
and to Ataturk's principles and reforms; not to deviate from the ideal 
according to which everyone is entitled to enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms under peace and prosperity in society, national 
solidarity and justice, and loyalty to the Constitution.' (Article 81, MPs oath).
'In my capacity as President of the Republic I swear upon my honour and 
integrity before the Turkish Grand National Assembly and before history to 
safeguard the existence and independence of the state, the indivisible integrity 
of the Country and the Nation and the absolute sovereignty of the Nation, to 
abide by the Constitution, the rule of law, democracy, the principles of the 
secular Republic, not to deviate from the ideal according to which everyone is 
entitled to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms under conditions of 
national peace and prosperity and in a spirit of national solidarity and justice, 
and to do my utmost to preserve and exalt the glory and honour of the 
Republic of Turkey and perform without bias the functions that I have 
assumed.' (Article 103).
The Republic's elected officials are, under oath, responsible for the protection of the 
state and nation's indivisible unity and integrity. Although only the President is 
specifically responsible for the protection of secularism, everyone is responsible for 
protecting the Republic, which is secular in nature.
Finally, Article 174 seals the constitution's Atatiirkist nature:
'No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as 
rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws6 ... which aim to raise Turkish 
society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to safeguard the 
secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on the date of the 
adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey.'
' Atattirk's fundamental republican reforms.
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The constitution itself draws legitimacy from the Reform Laws, passed under Atatiirk. 
As the constitution, and by extension the Republic, is premised on Ataturk's vision 
and reforms, the laws in question need to remain unchangeable. Thus Ataturk's legacy 
is 'essentialised' by constitutional fiat, placing it outside political debate.
2. The Penal Code
The Turkish Penal Code is a good example of how - almost despite the provisions of 
individual articles - the law is both premised on Ataturk's principles and dependent on 
the judiciary to implement it on said principles' terms. In 2005, the Penal Code was 
amended in line with EU demands. The new code protects women's rights and aligns 
Turkish family law and inheritance provisions with EU legislation; it establishes a 
Court of Appeals and enhances freedom of thought. Prison sentences for members of 
the Press are abolished in favour of fines, and Article 216 replaced Article 312, so that 
now 'opinion statements which do not exceed the limits of providing news and which 
are made to provide criticisms, cannot be considered crimes' (Z, 27 May 2005).
Although the EU commended Turkey's accession efforts, the government denied that 
reform took place with the EU in mind. The Directorate General of Press and 
Information of the Prime Minister's Office7 describes this reform as a 'silent civil 
revolution', responding to public desires, not external pressure. The AKP seeks to 
create a sense of ownership for the reform effort among the Turkish people while also 
trying to advertise the party's popular mandate. AKP politicians know only too well 
that their popularity is their hardest currency (see Glyptis, 2005c).
The directorate, however, further seeks to legitimise the new code in Kemalist terms, 
describing it as 'new and modern', seeking to capitalise on the positive connotations 
the words carry. A modern penal code, surely, takes Turkey a step closer to achieving 
the desired standards of contemporary civilisation. The amendments to Ataturk's 
1926 Code, the Directorate explains in a most reverential fashion, should not be 
perceived as a rejection. The 1926 Code, we are told, was aimed at 'bringing Turkey
7 hup. \\\\\\ b>egm uov tr see bibliography for details.
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into line with the standards of modern civilization. Taking into account the era of its 
origins, the Code must certainly be considered a revolutionary step forward'.
Yet reform was necessary as Turkey was struggling to establish a 'fully legal system'. 
Atatiirk's code did not fail, continues the semi-apologetic document, but external 
obstacles hindered implementation. '[L]aws are fated to always fall behind the times; 
they must be periodically amended and renewed' if only to facilitate implementation. 
Aware that a rejection of Atatiirk's handiwork would cause public outrage and could 
be deemed unconstitutional, the AKP claims continuity with Kemalism, presenting 
reform as 'updating' Atatiirk's legacy. Yet an 'update' is hardly what the EU had in 
mind and organisations such as Women for Women's Human Rights8 and Amnesty 
International9 expressed concern about some of the new code's restrictive articles. 
Amnesty International, as well as the Turkish Journalists' Union noted that provisions 
for freedom of expression were inadequate, while Union President Nazmi Bilgin 
called said provisions superficial and the year-long effort to amend the old code an 
abject failure (TDN, 2 June 2005).
Despite amendments, journalists can still be fined and even jailed for what they write. 
The code does not secure the journalists' right to report on public-interest issues; 
restrictions remain on access and disclosure of information, while defamation and 
insult remain criminal rather than civil offences (TDN, 8 July 2005). Combined with 
the New Press Law, passed a year previously, the code undoubtedly improves the 
Turkish journalists' lot, but limitations persist. Reports violating the needs of a 
democratic society; the rights or freedoms of others; moral values; national security, 
stability, public security; and the nation's territorial integrity can still be banned. Bans 
can also be used to protect national secrets, prevent crimes or ensure the authority and 
independence of the judiciary (TDN, 11 June 2004). Although under the new code 
journalists in violation of the law face a fine rather than a prison sentence, it has not 
brought the qualitative change in preoccupations and priorities that many had hoped 
for.




But how could the new penal code not reflect concerns with unity, integrity and the 
protection of national interest when these concerns represent the constitution's core 
principles and, as such, inform all legislation? These principles automatically shape 
both laws and their interpretation. In fact, Tinsley (2005) notes, a cursory look at 
freedom of expression court cases in Turkey shows that, although the state prosecutor 
is highly erratic in bringing cases to justice, their treatment is standard. Trespasses, 
she notes, may lead to a trial in one case but not another, while a piece of writing may 
land its author in court a decade after its publication. The prosecutor's willingness to 
prosecute, Tinsley found, depended on a variety of factors that were not always 
directly related to the case, but were invariably linked to the values being upheld. 
Consequently, when the prosecutor did act, the approach to authors accused of 
undermining the nation, state or their indivisible unity, was coherent and predictable.
In 1986, notes Vryonis (1991:120), publisher Hulya Potuoglu was brought to court 
under the old penal code because of a footnote in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica's 
Turkish Edition mentioning a 12th-century Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia. Potuoglu 
was charged with trying to undermine Turkish National Identity. Almost 20 years 
later, under the new penal code, publisher Fatih Tas was sentenced to six months in 
prison for printing the translation of an American book detailing the activities of 
Turkish paramilitary forces during the struggle against the PKK, and an academic 
conference debating the 'Armenian Question' was, briefly, banned by the courts (TE, 
11 November 2004). Although the saga of the twice-cancelled Armenian Conference 
ended in victory for those who saw it as a litmus test for Turkey's democracy and 
human rights (TDN, 26 & 27 September 2005), the story itself is telling.
The conference was cancelled when it transpired that genocide allegations might be 
openly discussed. Justice Minister Cemil Cicek, speaking in May, described holding 
the conference as 'stabbing Turkey in the back'. The minister called the organising 
universities 'irresponsible' and deplored his inability to single-handedly take them to 
court. Although Ci9ek eventually retracted these statements and supported the 
conference, the Press were not going to let him forget them in a hurry (e.g. TNA, 23 
August 2005; TDN, 27 September 2005), especially as five prominent Istanbul 
journalists were indicted for having criticised the courts' initial decision. This, notes 
Kinikhoglu, proves that EU-stipulated reform has hardly touched the judiciary (EAN,
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17 December 2005). For Etyen Mahcupyan, domestic policy director of the Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation, the explanation is even more sinister, as he 
believes the judiciary belongs to a conservative camp seeking to sabotage the AKP's 
EU vocation (ibid). Although Kimklioglu agrees with Mahcupyan about the necessity 
of reform, his interpretation of the Armenian conference saga is actually triumphant. 
It was vital for Turkey's reform effort, he notes, for the conference to take place 
despite the reactions surrounding it (TDN, 27 September 2005), even though, in the 
end, most speakers expressly avoided discussing the question of whether the 
Armenian question constitutes genocide, potentially respecting 'public sensibilities' 
and possibly intimidated by the controversy that predated the conference and the 
clamouring crowds outside the venue on its opening day (TDN, 26 September 2005).
Everybody was a winner. Kemalist values had not been compromised, academic 
freedom had scored a minor victory without injuring national pride and EU 
spokesmen congratulated Turkey on successfully passing this 'litmus test'. Yet before 
long, another such test emerged. Once more, a public contradiction of official national 
narratives before an international audience - relativising national orthodoxy, giving 
voice to alternatives and simultaneously harming Turkey's image abroad - triggered 
the new penal code's provisions on freedom of expression into action. This time the 
case was even more controversial, concerning Europe's favourite Turkish writer.
Orhan Pamuk, during an interview in Switzerland, claimed he is the only person who 
dares mention the deaths of a million Armenians and thousands of Kurds. The 
statement was not particularly provocative and, as far as his solitary campaign for 
justice goes, exaggerated. Yet the prosecutor, ironically the same man who, four years 
previously, investigated Erdogan for 'insulting the state' (NYT, 25 September 2005), 
found that Pamuk's statements had violated Article 301 of the new penal code. 
Articles 299-301 deal with 'crimes against symbols of state sovereignty and the 
honour of its organs'. Pamuk's public contradiction of official Republican history 
narratives was interpreted as an insult to Turkishness and therefore qualified as a 
violation of Article 301. If found guilty, Pamuk would have faced a longer prison 
sentence for having made the statements abroad and having, thus, compromised 
Turkey's international image 10. Punishing Pamuk would damage Turkey's EU
10 See Writer's Association http://www.internationalpen.org.uk/
127
Chapter 4
chances more than his statements ever could. Nevertheless this trial upheld the legal 
system's priorities and concerns.
'Legalists say the problem with [Article 301] is not the law itself but its 
implementation' (Z, 19 December 2005). European journalists claimed the Pamuk 
trial was a sign of Turkey's failure to face up to 'this blood-sodden chapter of its 
history' (FT, 5 September 2005). The European Parliament's co-chairman, noting that 
the prosecutor was misusing Article 301, warned that, unless the trial was suspended, 
the EU would consider interrupting membership negotiations with Turkey (Z, 18 
December 2005). EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn also demanded the 
amendment of Article 301 in a tense meeting with Turkey's chief EU negotiator Ali 
Babacan. Babacan's answer failed to satisfy the commissioner, yet it illuminates the 
controversy perfectly. He simply said that Turkish courts are independent (H, 24 
November 2005). This is what they chose to do with their independence.
Erdogan, when asked to comment on the case, echoed Babacan. 'Correct or incorrect', 
he stated, 'the case is under [the] judiciary's authority' (Z, 18 December 2005) and 
that authority, his government would not meddle with. Meddle, however, is exactly 
what his government was asked to do, as the case stumbled on a technicality: was 
Pamuk to be tried according to the old or new penal code? The decision was referred 
to the Justice Ministry and the AKP was thus faced with a stark choice between siding 
with the prosecutor and upholding the national project or facilitating the EU-oriented 
modernising project by dismissing the case. Eventually, the Ministry chose the path of 
least resistance while effectively siding with Europe: it refused to issue a ruling (BBC, 
23 January 2006). The Europeans 'described the case as a litmus test of Turkey's 
eligibility to join, warning that it is Ankara - rather than Mr Pamuk - that is going on 
trial' (BBC, 16 December 2005). As a result, they were delighted by this development, 
but stressed the urgent need to revise Article 301 in order to prevent similar incidents 
from recurring. Prevention is hardly the issue, however, with more than 60 writers and 
publishers currently facing similar charges. Which raises the question of why the 
Ministry chose to allow this case to fall without actually articulating opposition to it.
The Ministry, on this occasion, protected Turkey's EU ambitions by removing the 
obstacle that such a well-publicised case would represent without actually touching 
the law or prosecution mechanisms that created this obstacle in the first place. The EU
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was placated, but the Turkish court system remains unchanged. Unless extensive 
retraining for judges and prosecutors goes hand in hand with a revision of articles 
such as 301, it is not likely to change soon. Meanwhile, ironically, Pamuk offered the 
best explanation of this controversy (NY, 19 December 2005). Although lamenting his 
books' public burnings and calls that he should be 'silenced for good', Pamuk is calm. 
'I do not think I will end up in jail', he writes. 'This makes it somewhat embarrassing 
to see my trial over-dramatized.' Yet he understands:
'The hardest thing was to explain why a country officially committed to entry 
in the European Union would wish to imprison an author whose books were 
well known in Europe, and why it felt compelled to play out this drama ... 
"under Western eyes"... [T]he Westernizing elites in my own country, feel 
compelled to follow two separate and seemingly incompatible lines of action.'
Both modernisation and nationalism are lines of action contained within Kemalism, 
protected by law and celebrated through national narratives. Yet, as I mentioned 
before and as Pamuk's case proves, they are potentially contradictory. Although 
Pamuk's article ends on a semi-accusatory note, telling the Europeans that neither 
they nor their legal systems are as perfect as they often think, his assessment of his 
native country is insightful. Turkey's reasons for pursuing EU accession are often 
muted. For many, the desirability of EU membership stems from Ataturk's 
westernising imperative (see Chapter 7). If, however, membership is approached as a 
Kemalist goal then it is, automatically, secondary to Kemalism itself. Hence achieving 
this goal should not be allowed to compromise Kemalist values or imperatives. Thus, 
for many, protecting the nation's indivisible unity and the supremacy of established 
national narratives - the significance of which has already been discussed - is actually 
as important as maintaining EU accession momentum.
Moreover, in Kemalist terms, projecting 'the right' image is vital. As I have already 
shown, the republican project entailed the creation and dissemination of desirable 
historical narratives for European consumption. Controlling Turkey's image abroad 
has always been an important state function and a significant component of the 
attempt to attain the universal standards of contemporary civilisation. Speaking of 
massacres, as Pamuk did, does not enhance Turkey's 'Western' image and thus 
contradicts said narratives. On this occasion, the attempt to punish him for tarnishing
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Turkey's desired image may in fact damage the image more than Pamuk's statements, 
yet it demonstrates the state mechanisms' basic impetus to prosecute those who 
endanger the Kemalist project.
While trying to negotiate a difficult public relations situation, Justice Minister Ci9ek 
stated that '[s]ome people make statements that push the limits of freedom of speech 
to the extreme' (TNA, 7 November 2005). For European commentators, used to 
individualistic legal traditions, the statement was yet another blunder. And yet Ci9ek 
was being insightful for, as we have seen, in Turkey the individual is not the non- 
negotiable core of legal thought. The state, Atatttrk's project and the national 
collectivity vie for protection on an equal footing with the individual. The statist 
component of Turkish nationalism should not be underestimated. As Atatiirk's chosen 
medium of revolutionary reform, the state is often perceived as constituting the 
institutional expression of national volition and, as such, deserving both obedience 
and protection. Atatiirk (2003:314) was unequivocal: 'What I expect from the entire 
people, without exceptions, is complete submission to the orders of the government'.
Although freedom of expression is respected in Turkey, albeit in a qualified fashion, 
as is the case everywhere, collectivism often overrides individualism and the nation- 
state emerges as an agency with interests and priorities beyond merely protecting its 
citizens. This is of vital significance. Basic freedoms are observed in Turkey, contrary 
to European accusations. For instance, because of the new code's controversial 
provisions, the Press Council has set up a special assistance service for journalists 
facing jail sentences, offering an information hotline as well as free access to a lawyer 
(TDN, 6 June 2005). Limitations to freedom of the Press are known and openly 
discussed. These limitations are not imposed by an authoritarian regime, but result 
from the collectivist premises of Turkish law and state model wherein the nation 
conies before the individual and the common good amounts to more than the sum of 
individual 'goods'. Hence limitations to individual freedoms differ from those 
accepted in European liberal democracies. This does not make Turkey essentially 
repressive, but it does make is substantially different from the Union it seeks to join.
For Cakmak (2003:71), Turkey's unitary nation-state model is a historical throwback, 
globally superseded by a plural, multi-layered type of polity. Rather than arguing, 
however, that this state model is premised on Kemalist collectivist nationalism,
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Cakmak (2003:70) presents it as derived from the need to 'eliminate the negative 
effects of [ethnic and religious] diversity' during early Republican years. £akmak 
(2003:71) links human rights violations directly to the PKK insurgency and, turning 
his initial argument on its head, notes that Turkey's unitary state model actually 
reflects the people's common identity. Although human rights violations intensified 
during the 1980s, £akmak's claim that the unitary state model was a response to 
specific terrorist threats is ahistorical and inaccurate. Atattirk claimed Anatolia for the 
Turks and the Turks only. The protection of national and territorial indivisibility is, as 
I have demonstrated, every citizen's duty. And citizens stand warned that threats 
assume many guises, from the PKK to a newscast undermining national cohesion.
Atariirk's (2003:487) legacy was clear: "
'The efforts exerted by the nation with the exclusive goal of safeguarding its 
sovereign rights; the blood [the nation] shed without counting; the resistance, 
the resolve it exhibited in all sorts of difficulties, internal or external, have 
created the new favorable situation in front of which we are found today.'
According to Kemalist lore, it is everyone's obligation to maintain this favorable 
situation by safeguarding national unity, territorial integrity and secularism. Kemalist 
agencies such as the courts, the TAP and the presidency never fail to do what they 




Political Actors: Using Kemalism, Protecting Kemalism
Kemalism is the language of political socialisation and the cornerstone of Turkey's 
legal system, despite its internal tensions. In this chapter, I demonstrate how this 
language, despite its contradictions, is upheld by core political agencies (the judiciary, 
TAF and presidency). For them, Kemalism is the language of choice when seeking to 
legitimise decisions or actions. These institutions are central to the conceptualisation 
and evolution of the Kemalist project and their recruitment processes, training and 
professional duties reflect that fact. For them, Kemalism is not simply a language. 
Rather the language is derived from and corresponds to a specific set of values and 
priorities that they wholeheartedly embrace. Here I will show how the presidency, 
judiciary and particularly the TAF seek to uphold Kemalist values as they understand 
them and prevent others from acting in ways that are incompatible with them.
Nevertheless, Kemalism's inherent flexibility and potentially contradictory 
prescriptions forces its defenders to use it selectively, upholding what they identify as 
its essence, while other agencies, increasingly, also capitalise on this flexibility. These 
agencies use the Kemalist language in order to attack the interpretative monopoly 
Kemalism's defenders reserve for themselves. Thus they seek to re-conceptualise 
Turkey's identity and future orientations. The problem is that for Kemalists, 
'Kemalism' is more than a language and it was never intended to become a loose 
framework within which politics was negotiated. Yet that is what it has become.
The Kemalist language is all-pervasive, its narratives and symbols, as shown 
previously, dominate public life. As these narratives and symbols are both reproduced 
by agencies vested with great authority (e.g. the school or courthouse) and inherently 
popular - as they are associated with the nation's founding moment and a story of 
great heroism and glory - Kemalism as a language is now used by various agencies. 
Public usage enhances the language's currency, it reproduces it and enhances its 
intelligibility. This intelligibility, cutting across status or educational divides, renders
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this legitimating language common property, not the elites' exclusive domain, and 
opens the debate over the country's future to all.
It is hardly surprising, then, that the AKP government is using this language 
extensively in its legitimating appeals. Capitalising on the language's inherent 
legitimacy, however, the AKP is gradually shifting its meaning and boundaries. The 
courts, the TAP and the President resist this effort, as to them the Kemalist language 
corresponds to specific values and priorities that are compromised by this new-found 
linguistic flexibility. Moreover, as I will further discuss in Chapter 6, AKP politicians 
are intensely mistrusted given their association with Islamist politics and frequent 
faux pas in the discussion of religion's place in public life. Hence the linguistic 
tension between the AKP and the Kemalists is symptomatic of a deeper conflict 
regarding unarticulated, competing visions for Turkey's future. This debate is the 
most public fashion in which these tensions are played out. Yet tensions have 
practical manifestations as the courts, president, generals and Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan clash.
/. The President
The President of the Republic of Turkey is elected for a single term of seven years by 
a two-thirds majority of the total number of MPs (Article 102 of Turkey's 
Constitution) in the Turkish Grand National Assembly from among its own members 
or from among Turkish citizens who fulfil the age and education requirements and are 
eligible to be deputies (Article 110). Nominating presidential candidates from outside 
parliament, such as the current president, former Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, requires a written proposal by at least one-fifth of MPs.
The President is the head of state and represents the Republic, hence the president- 
elect is committed to impartiality: he ought to sever any relations with a political party 
and his status as an MP should cease. Upon assumption of office, the President swears 
to protect national unity, national glory and secularism. The President can promulgate 
laws; summon the Assembly; return laws to the Assembly to be reconsidered; submit 
constitutional amendment proposals to referendum; and appeal to the Constitutional 
Court for the annulment of provisions or laws (Article 104). For instance, President
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Sezer sent parts of a new Anti-terror Bill to the Supreme Court for revision (Z, 18 July 
2006). The President has many duties in common with most heads of state (appointing 
the Prime Minister, calling elections, giving the Parliamentary opening address or 
ratifying international treaties). Yet he remains more powerful than most, especially 
in Parliamentary systems.
The President appoints the members of the Higher Education Council (Yuksekogretim 
Kurulu1 , YOK - previously appointed by the NSC) and the rectors of public 
universities. Article 130 of the constitution brings education under state control and 
gives the President (indirect but significant) power over it. The President appoints 
YOK's members who are, in turn, partly responsible for the appointment of rectors 
and faculty deans (Article 131). Technically, state universities provide a list of 
candidates, from which YOK chooses three names, irrespective of who got the most 
votes, and submits them to the President who then selects one. Foundation (private) 
universities do not conform to this rule. Although attempts were made to change this, 
a wave of protests resulted in the proposal being shelved. Boards of trustees choose 
foundation universities' rectors.
Nevertheless the President - and until recently, the TAP - enjoys immense power 
over state higher education, having the final word over rectors' appointments and 
having selected the selectors (i.e. YOK). Thus it is likely that rectors will fit a certain 
profile and it is common for academics, from both types of universities, to rally in 
Kemalism's defence. Although such guardianship pretensions may not be 
representative of Turkey's intellectual establishment, they remain part of its 
mainstream. This is even more significant given the respect and unrestricted access to 
public platforms that educators enjoy.
The President's power over university appointments is matched by his control over 
judicial appointments. He appoints the members of the Constitutional Court, Military 
High Court of Appeals, Supreme Military Administrative Court, Supreme Council of 
Judges and Public Prosecutors as well as a quarter of the members of the Council of 
State. Finally, he appoints the Chief Public Prosecutor and Deputy Chief Public 




senior judges and determines promotions (by controlling top appointments, including 
appointments to the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors that 
determines promotions to lower posts), thus effectively controlling the judiciary's 
demographic make-up. Thus the President's understanding of Kemalist priorities has 
a powerful and lasting effect on politics, as most of his appointments will outlast his 
tenure. The judiciary's Kemalist esprit de corps becomes almost self-sustaining.
The inter-connectedness of Kemalist institutions is completed with the bond that the 
President enjoys with the TAP. The President appoints the General Chief of Staff and 
presides over the NSC. As the TAF's Commander-in-Chief, the President commands 
military mobilisation and represents the TAF's Supreme Military Command on behalf 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. '[T]he Office of the Commander-in-Chief 
notes Article 117 of the constitution, essentialising the bond between the Army, 
presidency and the Republic, 'is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly'. The current General Chief of Staff concurs, 
noting that '[t]he office of the Commander in Chief is represented in the spiritual 
entity of Turkish Grand National Assembly' (Ozkok, 2004b).
It is hardly surprising that the judiciary, presidency and TAP share a political agenda, 
orientation and understanding of key Kemalist terms. For some, this concert is a sign 
of military manipulation. Giiney (2002:192) believes that the presidency often does 
'the military's work for them'. Although the President often shares the TAF's 
assumptions and priorities, especially as the occasional appointment of retired 
military officers to the presidency made such agreement a foregone conclusion, this is 
not forced. The TAP enjoy a considerable degree of influence over political 
proceedings, yet they actually have no direct control over or access to the President's 
appointment. Although the presidency's agenda and professional ethos coincides with 
the TAF's, this is hardly surprising given Turkey's constitutional framework.
President Sezer is independently as Kemalist as the TAP. Sezer (2000a) embraces 
republicanism, stressing that democracy is 'the single most important value to be 
upheld' and that the Turkish Republic is the outcome of 'my nation's struggle for 
progress and prosperity'. He embraces modernisation, noting that '[o]ur country, 
which cannot remain inward-looking, has to become integrated with the values of 
civilisation embraced by the European Union. Our success in the areas of the
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supremacy of the law and democracy will enhance our respectability in the 
community of modern nations' (Sezer, 2000b). He defends secularism and favours 
EU accession without ever losing sight of national dignity and security (see Chapters 
6 and 7). His interpretation of what national unity entails, as I will demonstrate below, 
invariably coincides with the TAF's and diverges from the AKP's. Yet, when Sezer 
acts in ways that meet the Army's approval thus potentially, eliminating the need for 
intervention, he is not compromising the independence of his office. Rather, such 
incidents prove that the TAF's agenda has a powerful, prestigious and vocal 
supporter. Currently this agenda converges on intense suspicion regarding the AKP's 
actions and intentions and a perceived need to protect national unity and the secular 
Republic.
2. The Courts
Having demonstrated the ways in which the letter of the law and its implementation 
incorporate, reproduce and uphold Kemalist priorities and concerns, here I will briefly 
demonstrate that Kemalism is the backbone of Turkey's judges' corporate identity
The Constitutional Court2, according to Article 148 of the constitution, examines the 
constitutionality, in form and substance, of laws, decrees having the force of law, the 
Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and constitutional 
amendments (only with regard to form). The court can be called upon by the President 
to verify the constitutionality of laws and decrees. The court also has the power to 
decree the closure of political parties. No action can be brought before the court 
alleging the unconstitutionality, either in form or substance, of laws or decrees having 
the force of law issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war. The 
constitution protects the TAP a priori.
According to Article 146 of the constitution, the Constitutional Court consists of 11 
regular and four substitute members appointed by the President, according to specific 
quotas, from the High Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Military High Court
2 The Constitutional Court also acts as the Supreme Court and the Republic's Chief Public Prosecutor 
acts as the Supreme Court's Prosecutor.
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of Appeals, the High Military Administrative Court and the Audit Court, after 
candidates for each vacant office are nominated by the Plenary Assemblies of each 
court from their respective members. One further member is selected from among 
senior administrative officers and lawyers and one from a list provided by YOK, 
whose make-up and likely commitment to Kemalism was discussed above.
Recently, Prime Minister Erdogan accused YOK of 'displaying an ideological 
attitude' (Z, 4 November 2005). Yet it seems that YOK's very purpose is to uphold 
certain values as, according to the constitution, Republican education as a whole 
should be in line with Kemalist principles. As the constitution establishes and 
undertakes to protect the Atatiirk High Institution of Culture, Language and History 
(Article 134), it would be surprising if YOK did not display an ideological attitude. 
YOK's make-up, structural position and esprit de corps point it towards a specific 
direction. Almost by definition, academics have, for most of Turkey's history, been at 
the heart of Kemalist modernisation, as they were both necessary for the 
enlightenment project and more likely to embrace the westernising rhetoric, secular 
outlook and Republican discourse. Although this tradition, while not rejected, was 
superseded with the advent of an era of subtler meanings and proliferating options, 
and the pool from which YOK selects its nominees is now varied, YOK's own 
composition and the continued existence of die-hard Kemalist elements in intellectual 
circles makes it easy to maintain a coherent pool of Kemalist candidates when 
selecting nominees for the Constitutional Court.
Moreover, although the President can exercise discretion, the TAP are necessarily 
represented in the country's highest court, further cementing its Kemalist outlook. 
Finally, choice is further limited by the judiciary's professional ethos that remains, by 
and large, secular, republican and in support of a unitary, Kemalist national 
awareness. Reproducing and maintaining this professional ethos is easy as judges' 
promotions are internally regulated. For instance, appointments to the High Court of 
Appeals are made by the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors from 
among first category judges and public prosecutors (Article 154). Thus Turkey's top 
judges can ensure their corporate identity is upheld and reproduced. This identity is, 
unsurprisingly, secular, republican and nationalist, which has led to accusations that 
the judiciary is the TAF's proxy. As the Constitutional Court is particularly active in
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rejecting legislation, its independence from the government of the day cannot be 
doubted. Yet, for Cizre & Cmar (2003:316), that does not make the court 
independent. They believe that during the 1997 'velvet coup' the TAP relied on the 
courts extensively in order to wrestle political power away from the Islamists, thus 
forcing their agenda onto the courts, ending judicial independence.
Shankland (1999:129-130) disagrees, noting that when the state prosecutor brings 
individuals or parties to court he is acting independently, upholding the letter and 
spirit of the constitution without consulting other civilian or military authorities. This 
proves both the judiciary's independence and the supremacy of Kemalist priorities 
and their corresponding language. Although the judiciary's agenda often coincides 
with the TAF's, this is the result of agreement, not coercion (Shankland, 1999:111). 
Besides, the TAP 'prefer to rely on the state prosecutor where they can' (ibid, p.85) 
because they are fond of upholding Republican procedure when it functions according 
to their understanding of Kemalist propriety. Simultaneously, this reliance is telling of 
the TAF's trust in the judiciary's Kemalist credentials, a well-founded trust, as a Vakit 
columnist insulting the generals discovered to his cost (TDN, 11 June 2004).
Against all evidence, the British journalist and sometime adviser to the Turkish 
government David Barchard denies that there is any concert between the judiciary's 
and the TAF's political agendas and believes that the judiciary is independent and 
opposed to the military. He claims that the TAF held onto the state security courts 
(SSCs) as long as they could exactly because the civilian judiciary does not share their 
preoccupation with territorial integrity and national unity. Now that the military is 
isolated, notes Barchard (2005:89, 98), the judiciary's true 'centre-Left leanings' 
become apparent. This, combined with the fact that 'Turkey's mainstream press [...] 
undoubtedly subscribes to the common values of the modern world' (ibid, p. 103) 
deals the TAF's defensive nationalism a coup de grace.
Barchard is striving to persuade his readers that Turkey is ready for EU membership 
but he seems to be conflating the undoubted independence of Turkey's judiciary - 
itself a 'Western' trait - with an idealised Western-style individualistic, liberal 
conception of the state and law. This equation does not stand up to close scrutiny. The 
Constitutional Court's task is to uphold constitutional principles. These coincide with 
the TAF's principles as the TAF forged the constitutional document in the first place.
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This concert does not mean judges are less independent. Rather, judges are an integral 
part of the country's nationalist, modernist, secular - aka Kemalist - establishment. 
Hence, when the Prosecutor's Office launched an investigation into DEHAP3 for 
having called former PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan 'esteemed' in a statement (Z, 19 
August 2005), the investigation sprung from 'Kemalist' concerns with national unity, 
but was unprompted by any bodies outside the judiciary.
This may, in fact, be the reason why the judiciary now seems to be under attack. 
Could Erdogan be using the EU-prompted judicial overhaul (H, 30 November 2004) 
as a veil under which he seeks to compromise judicial independence and thus weaken 
an established Kemalist bastion? The AKP's defence is unequivocal: 'The 
Government, led by a Prime Minister who has been hurt several times due to a 
politicised judiciary, is struggling to prevent the politicisation of the judiciary' (TNA, 
9-10 July 2005). Yet many remain unconvinced, noting that 'Erdogan's disdain for 
the independent judiciary has become the rule rather than the exception' (NRO, 12 
December 2005), as his government has reportedly ignored several Supreme Court 
rulings declaring their seizure and sale of political opponents' assets illegal.
This confrontation with the courts goes beyond disrespect, as it is feared that, before 
long, Erdogan will have 'influenced' the appointment of up to 4,000 judges and 
prosecutors in lower courts, thus seriously compromising the judiciary's 
independence (ibid). Those who suspect the AKP of harbouring a hidden agenda 
speak of a concerted effort to undermine the judiciary's Kemalist credentials, while 
former Constitutional Court Chief Judge Mustafa Bumin publicly accused the AKP of 
violating judicial independence. Parliament Speaker Biilent Arm? dismissed Bumin's 
concerns, speaking, rather, of unwarranted political meddling by 'unaccountable 
bodies' (TDN, 8 July 2005) and threatening the Constitutional Court with closure if it 
continues 'hampering' AKP legislation (AEI & NRO, 2 August 2005). EU observers 
worry. Meanwhile Erdogan's opponents speak of a personal vendetta against the 
judiciary and a perceived impatience with the compromises inherent in democracy.
3 Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP, Democratic People's Party), (Kurdish) party founded in 1997 as 
an alternative to HADEP.
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Yet democracy is the AKP's bulwark as their reform initiative is carefully packaged 
as EU-stipulated judicial restructuring. The need for change in Turkey's court system 
is impossible to deny: 112,000 lower court decisions were overturned by the Court of 
Appeals in one year only, while a staggering 43 percent of criminal cases were found 
judged in a manner that contravened the law (Z, 19 May 2005). The EU average is 
one in 10 such cases. Reform is necessary, but since its instigators are mistrusted, 
reform itself is feared. The opening of the judicial year in September 2005 was 
greeted with demonstrations: thousands of attorneys attended rallies in Ankara, some 
marching to Amtkabir, protesting a perceived undermining of judicial independence 
through political meddling (TNA, 6 September 2005). The symbolic significance of 
taking a complaint directly to Ataturk is immense. Although visiting Amtkabir is 
customary at the beginning of the legislative and judicial year, as well as upon 
assumption of office, the act of carrying a protest to the Father lends the issue at hand 
great national urgency. Attempts to compromise the courts' independence amount to 
an affront to Ataturk's legacy. The lawyers are effectively accusing the government of 
thwarting Ataturk's plan. The implication is that the courts' duty to protect national 
unity and territorial integrity is now more urgent than ever, especially since the 
abolition of SSCs (see TDN, 11 June 2004).
The SSCs, established with Article 143 of the 1983 Constitution, dealt with offences 
against the state's indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, the Republic or 
any of its core elements. They were abolished in accordance with EU demands. Such 
demands are effecting piecemeal change to Turkey's legal system - eliminating 
'moral reductions' for 'honour' killings4 or countering the General Chief of Staffs 
control over RTUK (Radyo ve Televizyon Ust Kurulu, the broadcasting regulatory 
authority) and YOK appointments. The judiciary, largely Western-oriented, extends 
its collaboration on certain matters. For instance, the Supreme Court of Appeals ruled 
against the closure of Egitim-Sen (the Education Personnel Labour Union), 
overturning a lower court's decision demanding closure on the basis of Egitim-Sen's 
support for education in local dialects (Z, 26 May 2005).
EU pressure even succeeded in overturning one of the SSCs' most famous rulings, 
achieving the release of Leyla Zana, Orhan Dogan, Hatip Dicle and Selim Sadak (M,
4 The EU condemned the lenient treatment of honour killings by Turkish courts as tacit compliance.
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9 March 2004). Zana and her fellow former-DEP parliamentarians had been in 
custody for 11 years. While still in existence, the SSCs resisted demands for their 
release. Although her supporters claim her only crime was speaking Kurdish inside 
the Parliament building (TP, 2 April 2004), in April 2004, during her 13th trial (having 
served 10 years of a 15-year sentence), Zana was yet again convicted of staging 
separatist activities. Then, a few months later she was released (TDN, 11 June 2004).
The EU had succeeded. As Zana's release coincided with the first Kurdish language 
broadcasts, those worried about Turkey's human rights record breathed a sigh of 
relief. But what about the small print? Zana's conviction was never overturned and 
the deputies' release is pending ongoing investigations. Although the SSCs' critics 
greet her release as conclusive proof that banning these courts was a momentous step 
for Turkey, Zana is not yet acquitted. Her release proves that the system is flexible 
and amenable to change. Nevertheless, perceptions of what constitutes a threat to 
territorial and national integrity have not yet changed. Zana's release does not 
represent a retraction of the courts' commitment to the protection of national integrity. 
In fact, it may have been a tactical move to appease the EU, although Court of 
Appeals Chief Judge Erarslan Ozkaya denied this. For CHP leader Deniz Baykal, 
long-term Sevres Syndrome sufferer, her release was a concession to inappropriate 
external pressures and EU meddling (TDN, 11 June 2004).
Zana's case magnifies fears regarding national survival, unity and territorial integrity, 
which are heightened by a perceived Kurdish threat. The very existence of a Kurdish 
identity poses a symbolic challenge to Turkish national narratives, undermining the 
Turks' sole ownership of Anatolia. Claims to cultural distinctiveness within Turkey's 
borders are experienced as subversive and threatening even if they are not 
accompanied by demands for political independence, because cultural distinctiveness 
could inspire political nationalism. Cultural pluralism within Anatolia constitutes 
symbolic transgression. As Zana's release coincided with a spate of renewed attacks 
on soldiers and gendarmes (Barchard, 2005:93), her repeated calls for a ceasefire (Z, 
19 August 2005) failed to dispel public mistrust. When Zana publicly kissed Abdullah 




The EU's support for Zana is interpreted in the light of memories of European 
intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs and a traditional mistrust of the meddling 
West: seemingly protecting, yet again, the interests of potentially hostile minorities 
within, thus undermining national unity and jeopardising territorial integrity. This 
narrative is often resorted to by the Press, while a more sophisticated version appears 
to have shaped the courts' rationale when dealing with Zana, disproving Barchard's 
claim that concerns with unity and integrity are the TAF's monopoly. Such concerns 
remain at the heart of the judicial process regardless of EU-stipulated reforms (see 
Chapter 7). SSCs no longer exist; Zana is free; the EU is partially satisfied, but the 
judiciary's agenda is not radically changed.
Until the AKP's attempt to remodel the judiciary succeeds - if they are truly trying - 
Turkey's courts will remain independent and genuinely committed to the 
constitution's Kemalist principles. Consequently, the courts use the Kemalist 
language to articulate their priorities and perceptions of what national interest 
constitutes, while simultaneously seeking to prevent the violation of said perceptions. 
Increasingly, the courts are faced with agencies, such as the AKP, who use this 
language without embracing all Kemalist values, an eventuality they were not 
necessarily prepared for. This enables the AKP to utilise the language to broaden the 
political debate and explore new avenues towards the future. Certain agencies, 
including the judiciary, are resisting, but the confrontation is not over. Meanwhile, 
individual legal reforms often fail to affect all relevant pieces of legislation. As 
implementation invariably depends on interpretation, and taking the judges' 
professional ethos into account, reform often merely dents the surface of judicial 
practice. For Former Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Justice Sami Sel9uk, freedom 
of expression and true democracy now depend on a radical change of mentality hi 
Turkey's judiciary (TDN, 14 June 2006).
This is not necessarily forthcoming. The anti-terror law, for instance, was reformed in 
line with EU demands. The clause making propaganda against the indivisible unity of 
the state a terror crime was scrapped and the length and severity of resulting 
punishments were decreased (Z, 12 August 2005). Territorial unity, however, remains 
an overriding concern in both the constitution and other bodies of law and, as a result, 
a core concern for the judges. Kemalist concerns coincide with core constitutional
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principles; the judges' professional ethos and their professional 'bible', Turkey's 
Constitution, point in the same direction. Protecting national interest and the 
indivisibility of the state-nation-territory nexus is their primary concern, even if that 
entails limiting some individual freedoms. The TAP agree.
3. The TAP
Ataturk's (2003:314, 571) legacy is clear: '[T]he affairs of the nation and the state do 
not work by supplications or recourse to equity and pity; neither do we ensure dignity 
and independence by... begging for equality'; rather, they are won and maintained 
'by the force of our bayonets'. Hence the TAF's mission is to protect the country from 
internal and external enemies; maintain peace at home, peace in the world and 
stability in the region; and preserve the Republic's independence and integrity5 .
The military are oath-bound to the Turk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) and the 
Republican regime, according to article 277 of the Armed Forces Internal Service 
Law, which for Turfan (2000:438) is not, strictly speaking, a military task. Birand 
(1987:2-3) agrees, drawing attention to Article 35 of the Armed Forces Statutes 
stating that '[t]he duty of the Armed Forces is to safeguard (kollamaK) and defend 
(korumak) Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the 
constitution'. This is neither unique nor surprising, as most armies are oath-bound to a 
regime. What is potentially different here is that the TAF's understanding of 
republicanism is rigid and they are willing to intervene when they feel it is being 
compromised.
Moreover, for the TAP, republicanism is fused with nationhood, hence preserving the 
Republic becomes the essence of national interest. This means that Ataturk's 
(2003:37) aphorism, '[i]t is the national volition that is sovereign in the conduct of the 
state's and nation's destiny. The army is the docile servant of this national volition', 
makes the TAP the servant of an absent master. How is national volition determined 
or the country's destiny ascertained? The TAP are unequivocal: Ataturk's legacy 
holds both answers. As the nation was created in Ataturk's image, the TAP interpret
5 The TAF's website, www.tsk.mil.tr
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national volition in terms of Ataturk's plan, before humbly serving it. Thus the TAP 
construct a national narrative similar to that studied in Chapters 2 and 3. The nation, 
awakened by Ataturk, fought for independence and the Republic. Turkishness is fused 
with republicanism and the nation emerges as part of Ataturk's plan; a rhetorical 
abstraction, rather than a demographic reality: an ideal type towards which the 
Turkish people should strive, with the military as their guide.
Simultaneously, the TAP establish themselves as the nation's most authentic symbolic 
and institutional expression (Parla and Davison, 2004:236, 240) as 'the Turks are an 
Army nation' and '[t]he God-given military mission... was accepted by the Turks as 
an ideal for all times' 6 . National history is seen as a succession of military victories, 
elevating Gallipoli to a victorious campaign and depicting the end of the First World 
War as a unilateral decision taken by the Allies at the Ottomans' expense. Yet the 
defeat and demise of the Ottoman Empire is not to be deplored:
"The demise of this deep-rooted empire gave way to the rise of a new sun, 
laying the foundations of the Turkish Republic that would last forever. 
Breaking through the dark clouds, this sun was Mustafa Kemal ATATURK, 
the great soldier and statesman of the 20th century' 7.
Ataturk is the TAF's starting point. Their sole concern is protecting his legacy: the 
Republic and the nation's integrity, freedom and dignity (H, 24 November 2005). 
According to Military Academy Commander General Aydogan Babaoglu, '[t]he 
reason for our existence is to wholly serve the Turkish nation'. In serving the nation, 
Babaoglu notes, the TAP serve Ataturk as '[o]ur never-ending enthusiasm for our jobs 
and patriotism... is directed by his principles and ideals' (TNA, 4 October 2005).
The TAF's patriotism makes the protection of Anatolia, the Turks' essential 
homeland, a vital task. In a 30-year-old polemic published jointly by the Chief of 
General Staff and the Tourism Ministry8 in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 
Cyprus crisis, the TAF stress Anatolia's significance for the Turkish nation. 
Discussing the blood-ritual entailed in the Independence War, the pamphlet stresses
6 www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/genel Jtonular/tarihcejj.htm
7 Ibid.
8 Ttlrk-Yunan ili§kileri ve Megalo Idea? see bibliography.
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that threats to Republican territorial integrity actually represent threats to the national 
essence (p. 10, 22, 60, 62, 64) as Anatolia is saturated with the blood Turks shed in its 
defence. Vigilance is essential. The Ottoman Empire suffered at the hands of both 
treacherous minorities within (p.44, 46, 51, 54) and greedy external enemies (p.41, 
49, 57, 68, 70). Turkey has learnt its lesson and the TAP are determined to protect its 
unity and integrity at all cost. The nation is inconceivable without its territory, which 
cannot be divided or shared without compromising the national essence.
So the TAP oversee the nation and its politics without actively partaking in it, as 
Ataturk decreed that no serving officer should hold political office. This, notes Turfan 
(2000:xviii), was aimed at protecting the military from factionalism, not politics from 
the military. The TAP feel they are above, rather than outside politics. Institutional 
channels, such as the NSC that enable the TAF to oversee the republican process 
mean that politics is not so much shielded from the military as shielded by it. 
'[AJlthough Kemal rejected direct rule by generals during his time, he made such rule 
possible by entrusting to the army the high duty of guarding the state from all 
"internal and external" threats' (Parla and Davison, 2004: 231). Consequently, the 
TAF see it as their right and duty to publicly comment on Republican affairs. Such 
public commentary is hardly aimed at influencing policy. Military top brass is well 
represented in the NSC and the Chief of Staff is so highly placed in the state hierarchy 
- appointed by the President and answering directly to the Prime Minister in 
peacetime - that institutionalised channels for communicating TAF feelings to the 
government abound. The TAF feel duty-bound to respond 'to the view of our people 
that [the] TAF should always assume a definite attitude towards every important 
issue' (Ozkok, 2004a). Hence, officers hold press conferences and issue statements on 
civilian political issues - cashing in on their reputation as a trustworthy and solidly 
republican institution. The TAF claim they are not meddling, rather they are yet 
another pressure group in a functioning democracy, provided democracy functions to 
their satisfaction.
Through their public platform, the TAF seek to promote Kemalist orthodoxy and, 
concurrently, a legitimising narrative upholding the TAF's self-image. This platform 
becomes particularly significant when the TAF's conduct is called into question. 
When the 2005 explosions in the Southeastern town of §emdinli were followed by
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speculation that rogue military elements were involved, Gereral Yasar Buyukamt was 
indignant: 'The Turkish Armed Forces overall, and specifically the Land Forces 
within them, act within the law. Those who say differently have their own aims' (//, 
24 November 2005). The TAF's code of conduct rests on respecting the law as long 
as the law respects Ataturk's legacy and they want the nation to know that and never 
doubt that the TAF's behaviour could be motivated by anything other than selfless 
patriotism and a genuine commitment to the Republic.
This commitment should not be interpreted as declared allegiance to democracy, 
however. For the TAP, Ataturk's project matters more than democratic process. In the 
name of the Republic's protection and sustenance - conceived as separate and distinct 
from the democratic process - the army has, several times since Ataturk's death, 
suspended democratic politics in order, they claimed, to protect the Republic, public 
order and Ataturk's legacy9, always restoring civilian rule at the earliest opportunity.
The first military intervention came on 27 May 1961, toppling Adnan Menderes' 
government. Menderes introduced a new political formula in the 1950s still employed 
by Turkish politicians today (Shankland, 1999:39), fusing Right-wing economics with 
overt sympathy for Islam within the republican/secular framework. Within a decade of 
his election and the advent of multi-party politics, however, Menderes' economic 
programme was failing. As his popularity waned, he resorted to repression. An 
attempt to close down the CHP together with Menderes' suspected involvement in a 
failed attempt on ismet Inonii's life, also fuelled speculation that Menderes was 
flirting with a return to one-party rule (Hale, 1994:106).
Moreover, Menderes built on the relaxation of secularism initiated under inonu, 
'regress[ing] from the reforms and principles of Atattirk' (Kili, 1969:180). Under 
Menderes religious education became virtually compulsory (parents now had to ask 
for exemption) and certain compromises were made. Although these were more 
symbolic than real, and substantive legislation was not actually relaxed, the message 
was potent both for the pious masses and the secular elites. Ahmad (1977:365) 
dismisses theories suggesting that Menderes harboured an anti-secular agenda,




stressing that the decision to switch the ezan (the call to prayer) back to Arabic was 
taken over cocktails. The new religious discourse was epidermic and symptomatic of 
the frustrations of 27 years of one-party rule. Religion had become a symbolic playing 
field exactly because it mattered so much to the Kemalists. It was not, or not yet, a 
force in itself. Interestingly, Menderes' defence at the time was that the nation, which 
had voted for him, was Kemalism's true guardian, hence his decisions were 
compatible with Atattirkism (Ahmad, 1977:366, 376). Evidently, Kemalism was a 
legitimising language as early as the late 1950s and Menderes made extensive use of 
it, passing legislation upholding Ataturk's reforms (1951 Atatiirk Bill), alongside 
religious reform.
Menderes was not staging a revolution, rather he was trying to carve a niche for his 
party in a political system designed and dominated by Ataturk and his disciples. For 
Ahmad (1977:370-1), religion simply represented an easy way of diverting attention 
away from the financial crises plaguing Turkey in the late 1950s. These crises and the 
resulting repression, threatening unity and order, inspired the coup of 27 May 1961. 
The TAP assumed power with no real plan for 28 May. Despite the confusion, 
abortive counter-coups and the ensuing purges of the military and academic 
establishments, the TAP remained confident that intervention was both necessary for 
the Republic and popular with the people. Although popular support is not essential, 
the fact that the 'majority of educated opinion', including academic jurists, embraced 
the 1961 intervention (Mango, 2005:20) offered the TAP popular legitimation. 
Support from the country's urban population and students, AtatUrk's proverbial 
Turkish Youth (Kili, 1969:181), offered the TAP supplementary sources of (Kemalist) 
legitimation. For Kili (1969:111, 181), this support legitimised both the intervention 
and the agenda in the name of which the TAP intervened, proving Ataturk's reliance 
on 'the Turkish military and Youth to protect his reforms and principles' right.
Although the military relished this sense of mission, their legitimation appeals also 
included an appeal to legality. Menderes was accused of both straying from Ataturk's 
path and defying the rule of law. 400 Democrat Party (DP) members were tried, on 
charges of misgovernment and violating the constitution. These trials were vital in 
sustaining the TAF's desired legitimation narrative, although Hale (1994:144-5)
147
Chapter 5
believes they eventually backfired. Several DP members were imprisoned and 15 
were sentenced to death, although only three (including Menderes) were executed.
Then, the TAP embarked on constitutional reform in order to eliminate the possibility 
of similar power abuses from occurring again, creating the most liberal constitution 
Turkey has ever had, enabling associational life and offering religion institutionalised 
breathing space. Rustow (1994:362) calls the 1961 coup the price Turkey had to pay 
for its first democratic regime having been the work and gift of a dictator. Similarly, 
Turkey's most liberal constitution was the work and gift of a military administration 
and, as such, it came at a price. The NSC was created, institutionalising military 
involvement in civilian affairs. It was hoped that the NSC would enable the military 
to safeguard the Republic, as Ataturk intended, without needing to intervene again.
This was not to be. By 1968-9 disorder had returned and bloody clashes were a daily 
occurrence. In 1971 the Army intervened with a pronunciamento forcing Premier 
Suleyman Demirel to resign, hoping to pre-empt the need for a more radical 
intervention. Order was restored through martial law, sweeping arrests, the execution 
of three student leaders and closures of newspapers and organisations. When the TAP 
sought to return the Republic to the 'right' path, a government of technocrats and 
representatives of various parties was put in place under the Army's watchful gaze. In 
the name of national interest, this government affected constitutional reform 
strengthening collectivism at the expense of individual freedoms. Once reforms were 
in place, the TAP withdrew from politics. Nevertheless, neither stability nor order 
returned as militancy, violence and Right-Left polarisation intensified while the 
government remained weak and ineffectual 10 . According to Pope and Pope 
(1997:127), political 'street fighting' between 1973 and 1980 claimed 5,240 lives. 
Meanwhile, the economy suffered from rampant inflation, growing foreign debt, 
intense labour disputes and a slumping GNP. In 1979 power cuts and basic goods 
shortages added to what became known as the 'winter of discontent'.
By mid-1979, the breakdown of order was complete. Street violence was 
indiscriminate, causing an average of 20 deaths each day, even though the TAF had
J0 Between 1973 and 1980 there were two general elections, but several weak coalition governments - 
10 according to Hale (1994:215) and 13 according to Pope & Pope (1997:127).
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partially imposed martial law and had set up military tribunals. Politicians seemed 
chiefly interested in keeping each other out of power, thus confirming the TAF's low 
opinion of them, and the police were incapacitated by political fragmentation, 
gradually also threatening the TAF's lower ranks (Birand, 1987:80-1, 228). The 
spectre of full-scale civil war was real, yet military intervention was delayed.
Legitimation was of the essence. The TAP have never intervened with the intention of 
holding onto power. Interventions are perceived as corrective and withdrawal is 
always part of the plan. This role is ongoing, hence appearing legitimate - firstly to 
themselves, secondarily to other state agencies and the people - is vital for the TAP. 
Although interventions may be legitimate in Kemalist terms, popularity offers a 
separate source of legitimacy, hence the TAP waited. When they intervened, on 12 
September 1980, Birand (1987:195, 232), Shankland (1999:43) and Mango (2005:22) 
believe, the people heaved a sigh of relief.
Before that day, a concise and public explanatory narrative had been sustained, 
stressing the civilian authorities' inability to control the situation. Coup leader 
General Kenan Evren launched this narrative well before the coup, flagging up 
civilian failures vis-a-vis both the preservation of order and Atatiirk's project. Evren 
established a legitimising paper-trail, writing letters to politicians and repeatedly 
stressing to President Koruttirk the need to find solutions 'within an Ataturkist 
national perspective and within the current parliamentary democratic regime' (quoted 
in Birand, 1987:100). These warnings were even broadcast on the radio on 2 January 
1980. When the Army finally stepped in to salvage Atatiirk's Republic, proceeding 
with sweeping arrests and summary justice, Evren sought to retain the legitimation 
momentum initially forged by despair:
'Exalted Turkish Nation... the Republic of Turkey which was entrusted to us 
by the Great Atatiirk, and which is an indivisible entity with its state and 
territory, is the target of traitorous assaults - both physical and intellectual - 
on its very existence, regime and independence, prompted by enemies within 
and without' (quoted in Birand, 1987:186).
'The TAP intervened on 12 September 1980 ...in accordance with its Internal 
Service Act which assigns to [it] the responsibility of "safeguarding and
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protecting the Turkish Republic". Whenever the TAP have been faced with 
[this] necessity... they have undertaken this task unhesitatingly and for the 
sole purpose of preserving the... integrity of the country' (quoted in Turfan, 
2000:439 - emphasis added).
Evren claims continuity with Ataturk, stressing that the coup was aimed at upholding 
unity and integrity. Extra-institutional, military intervention is defended in terms of its 
intention to protect the constitution. The TAF's guardianship role means that, when 
all other avenues fail, it is their role to protect the Republic. Evren thus claims that the 
coup was in accordance with constitutional principles and that the intervention was 
actually prescribed by legal provisions setting out the Army's duties. As the TAP, he 
claims, is morally and legally responsible for the Republic's protection, the coup is 
morally and legally legitimate, especially as it protected Atattirk's legacy by 
safeguarding national unity and integrity and ensuring the peace necessary for 
progress. This legitimation campaign worked. Some only accepted Evren because he 
stopped bloodshed and violence, while others actually compared him with Ataturk. 
More than two decades after the return to civilian rule, Evren's memory remains 
untarnished, his pictures hanging alongside those of other statesmen in Arntkabir, 
while the Istanbul Military Museum sports an Evren Salonu.
During his leadership of the junta administration, Evren sought to stay true to 
Kemalist principles in a vocal fashion. Revoking the freedoms of the 1960s 
constitution was justified in terms of Kemalist collectivism as '[w]e have to sacrifice 
some personal rights for the security of the Community' (Evren quoted in Pope & 
Pope, 1997:148). Under Evren, individual rights were qualified by the government's 
power to override them in the name of national security, while national unity and 
territorial integrity were paramount policy objectives. Order was restored, fostering 
economic stability. Yet staying true to Atariirk's principles meant restoring civilian 
rule. Especially as, although the US did not mind Turkey's military regime - as, after 
the Iranian revolution, supporting Turkey became a default position - Europe did. As 
the TAP wanted Atattirk's westernisation to resume in the form of rapprochement 
with Europe (see Chapter 7), a return to civilian rule was necessary.
In the name of Kemalist westernisation, civilian rule was restored in 1983 under 
Evren's presidency. The coup bequeathed the Republic a new constitution and
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restrictive legal provisions, partly still in effect (Z, 27 August 2005), seeking to 
bolster collectivism and national solidarity in the face of a perceived Communist 
threat. Forging this solidarity entailed appeals to religion as a constitutive element of 
identity (see Chapter 6) that eventually, albeit unwittingly, opened the road for a new 
phenomenon and, ultimately, a new challenge: political Islam. In the next military 
intervention, the TAP were pitted against an enemy partly of their own making.
Before the 1997 velvet coup, the TAP, once again, engaged in a series of public 
appeals - verbal and ritualistic - stressing the government's failures. Although, this 
time the people's backing was neither unqualified nor unanimous, public support was 
not actually necessary, it was, however, desirable and useful in ensuring popularity 
and respect for the TAP. In 1997, the TAF's concerns resonated with certain groups 
who both sided with the Army and assisted in the ritual dissemination of the 
legitimation appeals that were, to a very large extent, addressed to the TAP 
themselves. In the run-up to the 1997 coup, the TAP were not waiting, as Giiney 
(2002:168-9) believes, for civil society to make the decision to resist political Islam 
on its own, rather they wished to establish then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's 
failures vis-a-vis Kemalist secularism in a public manner before intervening on 28 
February 1997.
'A major characteristic of the 1997 coup was that judges and journalists rather than 
bullets and tanks, supported and implemented it' (Yavuz, 2003:244). The people's 
reluctance to support the TAP was interpreted as divergence from Kemalism, thus 
making the need for intervention seem more urgent as the people, erring away from 
Kemalism, had to be guided back to the right path 11 . This interpretation was not 
limited to the TAP. Journalists, such as Kaylan (2005:382), sympathised with this 
sense of urgency, noting that l [t]he Turkey I had known [had] disappeared; some of 
the reforms I had gone through as a boy [had] vanished. The secularity of the state 
[was] constantly under aggression... The legacy of Kemal Ataturk has been so 
dogmatised and is such a victim of neglect that millions are no longer touched by it'.
11 Similar justifications were employed in Eastern Europe by leaders equating lack of support with 
ignorance and error (see Di Palma, 1991).
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The TAF, for Kaylan, are the last remaining bulwark. 'The Turkish army is a 
beloved... institution. Most people, fed up with extremism and governments diseased 
with corruption, look up to the armed forces and see a guardian institution for their 
security' (Kaylan, 2005:346-7). Politicians betrayed Atatttrk's legacy in their pursuit 
of selfish ends in the past and may do so again (ibid, p.24-5), hence the TAF should 
remain involved in politics as a counter-weight to civilian ineffectiveness and greed. 
A 2003 opinion poll suggests that the people share this pessimism, as 83.3 percent of 
respondents agreed that 'democracy is not fully functioning in Turkey' (TDN, 16 
November 2003). Although these figures may have changed during the AKP era, this 
lack of faith in the democratic process means that people are more likely to tolerate 
the military's guardianship role even though they hardly welcome it, as 53.3 percent 
of respondents wished to see TAF's involvement in politics curbed.
Although the TAF have not staged a full-scale intervention since 1980, interference in 
the form of memorandums persists. Hale (1994:295) attributes this partly to a 
realisation that coups are no longer internationally acceptable and would damage 
Turkey's modern aspect and westernising aspirations and partly to politicians treading 
more carefully, having learnt their lesson. Besides, the TAF abandoned intervention in 
the name of interference, not passivity, as Erdogan's government discovered through 
tensions, public relation face-offs and 'leaks' to the Press (e.g. M, 8 January 2004). 
The TAF can antagonise the government. The repository of their loyalty is the 
Republican regime: not procedural democracy nor the state. Commitment to the 
country and people is derived from commitment to Atatilrk's Republic.
Cadets are trained to see themselves as the heirs and protectors of Ataturk's legacy: 
'Your flag will be the great Ataturk. Your ideology will be his principles; your aim 
will be the direction he showed us. You will follow unswervingly in Atatiirk's 
footsteps' (officer quoted in Birand, 1991:3). Training discourages a critical 
engagement with Atatiirk's legacy and ideas as, for all junior officers, faith is an 
invaluable resource on the battlefield. Besides, the TAF's faith is genuine; drawn 
from the knowledge that Ataturk saved his country, setting it on the path of progress. 
Cadets are taught that Ataturk's plan worked and his principles now constitute a tried 
and tested benchmark. In time, Birand (1991:22-23, 52-53) finds, Kemalism gets 
'under their skin'. During Birand's interviews, cadets claimed democracy was the best
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form of government, but understood democracy to be coterminous with Atatiirk's 
Republic. Therefore, they were prepared to stage 'rescue operations' as and when 
necessary, suspending democratic process in democracy's (aka the Republic's) name. 
This involvement was emphatically distinguished from 'doing polities'.
The TAF's esprit de corps requires that they remain outside and above politics, non- 
aligned and untarnished by association with any political party, group or class 
(Giiney, 2002:164). Politically 'meddlesome' armies elsewhere often provide a 
reflection of political realities on the ground. The TAP do not. The TAP also escape 
the factionalism and corruption often afflicting political armies. As the TAF's role is 
corrective, it is vital for their legitimation not to hold onto power longer than 
necessary. These factors enable the TAP to claim - for internal and popular 
consumption - that they are apolitical and their interventions are always based on 
genuine Republican patriotism rather than power-hunger and self-interest.
The perceived need for the continued existence of a Republican guardian is justified 
in terms of a conviction that Kemalism holds all the answers that Turkey will ever 
need. This denial of relativism, combined with a deep-seated mistrust of politicians 
and a dismissive paternalism vis-a-vis the people - both inherited directly from 
Atatiirk - makes it unlikely that the TAP will voluntarily admit that, after eight 
decades, the Republic has come of age and no longer needs a custodian. Such an 
admission would be incompatible with the TAF's corporate identity that enables the 
Army to feel it represents society while also being a quasi-sacrosanct institution that, 
for all its meddling, should not be meddled with (Turfan, 2000:136-7) as they believe 
they hold a true recipe for progress and embody national interest.
Thus they are ideally suited to protect the Republic. That may, on occasion, mean that 
'democracy should be suspended only to restore and revitalise the democratic regime' 
(Karaosmanoglu, 1993:28). Democracy is not allowed to run its course and overcome 
a crisis. As the TAF approach republicanism in terms of a Kemalist blueprint, not in 
terms of democratic process, they do not perceive experimentation, negotiation and 
recalibration as salutary signs. Secondly, the TAF believe that Turkey is constantly in 
grave peril, therefore, allowing democracy to run its course would leave the country at 
the mercy of Islamists, terrorists and (ethnic) separatists who, according to General
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Buytikamt (2005), constantly prey on Turkey's 'inseparable integrity' and its 
Republic.
Yet these enemies should never forget that Turkey's dynamic Armed Forces are 
sworn to protect the Republic to the last, true to their mission (ibid). The TAF's 
ownership of the Republic is central to their sense of mission. Not only are they 
Atatttrk's appointed Republican guardians but, actually, the TAP claim authorship of 
the Republic, alongside Ataturk, simultaneously ritually claiming him as 'one of us'. 
On the anniversary of Atatiirk's enrolment in the Military Academy (13 March 1899), 
the roll call includes his name. As the cadets sound 'present' in unison, they are 
effectively celebrating the TAF's role in the achievement of national independence as 
Ataturk - and many other Republican leaders, including Inonu - were soldiers, 
moulded by the Army before they were in a position to reorganise it, as Atatiirk did 12 . 
Before he was a national hero, Ataturk was a soldier and the TAP remain the only 
Republican institution that may bear Ataturk's mark but was not created by him. The 
TAP is proud to be both a means for the achievement of independence and its symbol.
Ottoman leaders were rejected: the Sultans were corrupt and the ulema manipulative, 
but the Turkish people were told that 'their soldiers had always been brave and had 
upheld the noble ideals of their nation' (Hale, 1994:2). Since independence, the TAF 
perceived themselves as a school for national and revolutionary principles (Hale, 
1994:81), largely responsible for ensuring that Ataturk's sixth Arrow, Revolutionism, 
was not forgotten and the Republic was preserved as Ataturk bequeathed it. Today, 
public confidence in the TAF's impeccable national credentials and unwavering 
commitment to the national good persists, partly flowing from the TAF's commitment 
to the funding of development projects in Southeastern Anatolia, even when the 
government turns a blind eye (TNA, 9-10 July 2005).
Although the age of full-scale interventions is behind us, the Army retains influence 
over the political process and a willingness to use it. Gtiney (2002:170-1) accepts the 
TAF's claim that they now simply constitute a pressure group. Yet the TAF's 
institutional representation - not least in the NSC, described by Kili (2003:405) as 'an 
institution having constitutional authority, in support of Ataturk, Atatttrkism and
12 Ataturk reorganised the TAF into territorial units to 'break' resistance clusters (Hale, 1994:71)
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modernity' - their influence and kudos combined with access to weapons means that 
they wield much more power than any pressure group. The TAP hardly need to 
intervene, given the channels for political involvement at their disposal.
This remains true even after the EU-championed reform of the NSC. Although the 
Council now includes more civilians, what is reduced is the TAF's voting leverage, 
not their influence. As their agenda resonates with constitutional prescriptions and 
concerns, it is unlikely this NSC reform will alter decision-making dramatically. 
Nevertheless, the reform is significant as a sign of military willingness to cooperate 
on the road to EU accession. The TAP are willing to change. The extent and speed of 
that change remains, for now, a moot point but, realistically, the TAF's corporate 
identity and constitutionally prescribed mission begs the question of whether 
abandoning their guardianship role in the name of EU-sponsored democratisation is, 
in fact, possible.
Erdogan's administration is probing this question. Although the NSC acquiesced to 
reform, tensions between the AKP and the generals remain unresolved. Following a 
barrage of accusations over a security breach, some wonder whether the AKP has 
launched a covert but sustained campaign to discredit the NSC and, through it, the 
TAP. When a document outlining primary security issues was leaked to the Press, the 
AKP chose to emphatically blame the NSC's administrative personnel rather than its 
officers (TDN, 3 November 2005). Yet Erdogan hardly seeks to hide his impatience 
with the TAF's self-appointed guardianship role, frequently stressing that '[t]he 
nation does not need custodians or supervisors' (TDN, 3 November 2004). The 
Turkish people are capable of making their own decisions through the democratic 
process. Erdogan knows the TAP mistrust him, doubt his genuine democratic 
commitment and suspect him of harbouring an Islamist agenda, so he stresses that 
'[n]o power that legitimises itself by the support it received from the people can limit 
democracy' (ibid). Is Erdogan right? Has the Turkish nation outgrown its guardians? 
And will Erdogan be allowed to demonstrate that this is the case?
Having sought to remove him from politics twice before, the TAP are now biding 
their time. Erdogan is resilient and, mostly, careful. Past performance undermines the 
TAF's faith in Erdogan's professed democratic and secular credentials, but while he 
pays lip service to Kemalism and respects the secular westernising republic, the
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generals know that an intervention would incur accusations of self-interested 
manipulation, thinly veiled under the defence of a frayed ideology.
4. The AKP Government
AKP spokesmen frequently embrace Ataturk's republican legacy, advertising their 
national(ist) credentials and dedication. They are aware of the powerful legitimising 
effect of referring decisions and policies to Ataturk, and make full use of that fact. For 
instance, Foreign Minister Abdullah Giil (2005b), speaking on the anniversary of his 
Ministry's foundation, noted:
'[O]ur ministry has not only secured and exalted the founding principles of the 
Republic's foreign policy, but also performed successfully hi adapting to the 
rapidly changing circumstances of our age... The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has always played a pioneering and effective role in the modernisation process 
for Turkey in terms of both ideas and approaches... my Ministry will continue 
to function with a high level of patriotism'.
Giil advertises his ministry's loyalty to Ataturk's legacy and interprets its successes in 
terms of this legacy. Praising Ataturk's principles, his pragmatic outlook, 
modernisation and patriotism, GUI speaks of political orientations and duties, almost 
repeating Ataturk's (2003:9) words: 'The essential thing is that the Turkish nation 
could lead an existence of dignity and glory.' Giil notes that his ministry is committed 
to pursuing modernisation and contemporary civilisational standards in order to 
ensure this glory. As for dignity, Giil shares the preoccupation with upholding 
desirable national narratives in the international public domain that led to Pamuk's 
abortive trial and reactions to the Armenian conference. Hence, when a civic-minded 
Turk informed the minister of an Australian museum exhibit showing an Allied 
soldier trampling the Turkish flag underfoot, GUI sprung to action. In a bitter letter, 
Giil denounced this terrible insult and false representation of the battle of Canakkale, 
demanding the restoration of historic truth (M, 23 August 2005).
AKP politicians may share the self-professed Kemalists' concerns with national unity, 
dignity and pride. In fact, the AKP makes extensive use of the Kemalist language and
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embrace its priorities, yet it does so in a slightly subversive fashion. For instance, 
Erdogan and Gill speak of democracy where Kemalists would extol republicanism. 
Without ever denying the significance of Atattirk's republican legacy, their discourse 
shifts. Rather than seeking legitimacy in the Kemalist origins of republicanism, 
nationalism or secularism, Erdogan and Gill build on the de facto legitimacy of 
Kemalist concerns using terms in a more general and open fashion, thus expressing 
ideas (potentially) outside Kemalist ideology through the Kemalist language.
Every language is a system of signs. Abiding by the system's conventions is the only 
guarantee against unintelligibility. A signifier, the linguistic vessel, corresponds to a 
signified. Linearity ensures that language is an effective medium of communication. 
Kemalism, as a language, has a basic vocabulary built around notions of 
westernisation, republicanism, secularism and nationalism. Erdogan is using this 
vocabulary, yet shifting the terms' exact meanings, capitalising on the realisation that 
Kemalism is both the language of legitimacy and the main normative reference point 
of all legitimation narratives in Turkish politics. This exercise, however, is 
complicated by the fact that Kemalism also corresponds to values and ideas that 
certain well-placed agencies and individuals seek to protect. In effect, the TAF's or 
the President's defence of Kemalism is a simultaneous defence of ideas associated 
with it and an attempt to resist its utilisation as a language independently from the 
ideas that inspired it. The ensuing debate over terms' boundaries and meaning is 
actually one over fundamental differences about Turkey's desired future.
Erdogan's usage of the Kemalist language and symbolic arsenal allows increased 
flexibility to the terms through which legitimacy is negotiated. The process is delicate 
but simple. Democracy is legitimised in terms of Kemalist modernist republicanism. 
Democracy, in Kemalist terms, is a concomitant of modernisation and part of the 
republican system, although secondary to it. The Republic is not legitimised in terms 
of a democratic essence, but rather it uses democracy as a means of political 
organisation. This means that, in accordance with the TAF's narratives, the Republic 
was alive even when democracy was suspended. Erdogan's conflation of 
republicanism with democracy builds on the Kemalist habit of using the terms 
interchangeably to denote republicanism. Erdogan uses them both to mean 
democracy. For example, Erdogan (2004b) describes his party's politics as a
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'Conservative Democracy': the marriage of conservative social values, democracy 
and market-oriented economics. The AKP's commitment to democracy is in line with 
EU demands; it does not contradict republicanism, if anything it reinforces the 
Republic by confirming faith in both its structures and procedures. The AKP borrows 
from traditional Kemalism in its rejection of 'interest' politics and claims to be 
representing the whole nation. Nevertheless, it does not indulge in a Kemalist 
veneration of the Republic. In AKP discourses, the republic is spelt in lower case as 
the focus shifts from AtatUrk's legacy to democratic process.
Simultaneously, the AKP keeps appealing to Kemalist progress and civilisation. Gul 
(2004c), for instance, calls democracy a necessary ingredient for progress. While 
Kemalist republicanism is a collectivist project honouring the group before its 
individual members, however, Gul celebrates 'democracy [as] a way of thinking' 
going beyond free and fair elections: 'it is about freedom of thought and expression 
[and the] ability to freely associate for the common good'. Gul's definition of 
democracy retains the Kemalist preoccupation with the common good and yet it 
introduces the individual as an equally significant parameter. Rights and freedoms are 
thus inserted into the discussion of democracy on an equal footing with the common 
good. The AKP widens the debate without, at any point, abandoning Kemalist appeals 
or denying Kemalist definitions. Gul (2004c, 2005a) is careful to stress that the 
democracy he speaks of is republican in form and universal in nature, celebrating 
AtatUrk's legacy and his commitment to universal civilisational standards. In line with 
this legacy, Gul celebrates Turkey's acceptance of universal values. In this vein, Gill 
(2004c) stresses that Turkey's history, culture and religion do not obstruct its 
progress. Although the preoccupation with modernity is maintained, Gill's emphasis 
on Islam diverges sharply from AtatUrk's vision.
Having anchored their revised understanding of democracy in Kemalist 
modernisation, Erdogan (2004a) and GUI (2004c, 2005a) link democracy to individual 
rights and freedoms, good governance and accountability. Abandoning Kemalist 
collectivism, the AKP does not depict democracy as the vehicle for the achievement 
of national greatness and progress, but as the individual's domain. This radical shift is 
possible because it is necessary in order to placate EU observers.
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This new focus, however, offers the AKP an unexpected platform from which to tell 
many Kemalist agencies to mind their own business. Constantly appealing to its 
popular mandate, the AKP reminds President Sezer - elected by Parliament - that the 
party has more democratic clout than him. AKP parliamentary group deputy leader 
Sadullah Ergin told Sezer that it is not his place to offer more than recommendations 
and warnings regarding political issues (TDN, 14 June 2005). Cemil Ci9ek stressed 
that the presidency lacks the direct popular legitimation that the AKP enjoys (H, 30 
November 2004). Parliament Speaker Ann?, always at the heart of controversy, 
accused 'people with no political responsibilities' (aka Sezer) of trying to undermine 
parliamentary decision-making without themselves being accountable (TNA, 8 July
2005) and warned the TAP not to 'imagine themselves above parliament' (Z, 24 April
2006). Even Erdogan joined in, telling all 'unaccountable bodies' lacking a mandate 
to remain silent. 'If you are the one who will give account, no one has the right to 
make decisions but you.' (Z, 5 June 2005). These bodies, it was recently made clear, 
include the TAP which were reminded that they, too, are unaccountable (E, 22 May 
2006). Erdogan was unequivocal: 'the Army answers to me' (E, 24 May 2006).
Such bold statements, indicative of the AKP's antagonistic relationship with core 
Kemalist institutions, combined with the AKP's idiosyncratic Kemalist legitimation 
and the suspicion this causes in Kemalist circles, mean that the AKP cannot rely on its 
Kemalist legitimation: other lines of legitimation have to be pursued simultaneously. 
Constant appeals to its popularity provide a straightforward legitimation appeal in a 
Republic: the people want us. If this argument worked for the TAP, it is bound to 
work for a democratically elected government.
Having premised its discourse of democracy and individualism on Kemalist 
republicanism and progress, the AKP blends familiar and new references. This blend 
is subsequently used to legitimise the AKP as both the people's choice and the vehicle 
through which the final stages of republican Westernisation are achieved. Retaining 
popular legitimacy is vital for the AKP, hence the President is reminded he lacks it, 
even though he has not exceeded his role's constitutionally prescribed boundaries. 
Moreover, appeals to popular democratic legitimacy assert democratic process as a 
parameter of republicanism, continuing the linguistic negotiation.
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Alongside this, or possibly as part of it, the controversial issue of religion's public 
role (see Chapter 6) is debated while Erdogan is introducing sweeping political 
reforms in the name of EU accession (see Chapter 7) and raising questions about the 
sustainability of Turkey's unitary nationalism. Erdogan (2005a) was the first Turkish 
premier to openly speak of the Kurdish issue without resorting to euphemisms (such 
as speaking of 'mountain Turks'), without describing Turkey's Kurdish population as 
either backward or a 'fifth column' and without equating identity with terrorism. 
Erdogan (2005a) actually uttered the words 'Kurdish problem' and 'citizens of 
Kurdish origin'. Responses were mixed. Zana found the AKP's gesture courageous, 
while opposition leader Deniz Baykal called it naive politicking (M & TDN, 12 
August 2005). Unsurprisingly, the break with tradition incurred the NSC's wrath 
(TNA, 23 August 2005), yet at a Siirt rally, the Premier still spoke of 'Kurdish 
citizens' having problems just as everyone else (Z, 9 October 2005). Nevertheless, 
even though breaking with tradition, Erdogan's (2005a) speech was anchored in de 
facto legitimate notions: democracy and Kemalist pragmatism.
Atatiirk prided himself on his pragmatism and ability to adapt to real situations in 
order to achieve his goals. Erdogan, similarly, claims that it is impossible for him to 
ignore realities and obvious problems. 'Ignoring the political and administrational 
mistakes made against our citizens of Kurdish [origin]... is as inappropriate as 
resorting [to] violence or creating "an atmosphere of terrorism".' Although Erdogan 
soon returned to familiar territory - reiterating the AKP's zero tolerance approach to 
terrorism - he did not dismiss all Kurds along with the PKK, thus automatically 
closing the matter of Kurdish rights, as was often done before him. Rather, he stated 
that 'terrorist organisation^] can in no way be accepted as the representative for any 
group of citizens'. Republican national unity was upheld, yet redefined:
'Whether you name it social demands of our citizens of Kurdish origin, the 
southeast issue or the Kurdish issue, those who try to relate this issue to 
terrorism will be met by the opposition of Turkish citizens of every ethnicity, 
or in other words, the Turkish nation as a whole. When it comes to this, our 
nation is one and whole.' (Erdogan, 2005a)
Unity remains vital. Simultaneously, however, variable ethnicity emerges as an 
acceptable phenomenon within the Turkish nation, much to the generals' and
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President's horror. Erdogan's determination to widen the scope for debate, broaden 
terms and shift the boundaries of political activity is inspiring intense suspicion and 
speculation regarding his ulterior motives.
Undoubtedly, Erdogan wishes to mollify EU observers. Actually, his gestures towards 
the Kurds may mean more to European than Kurdish audiences. DEHAP's Osman 
Baydemir, commenting on Erdogan's (2005a) speech, finds that the AKP remains out 
of touch with Kurdish realities (M, 22 March 2004). Baydemir notes that 
modernisation has damaged the Southeast and dismisses Erdogan's 'reformist' agenda 
as thinly veiled electioneering. Experience in dealing with the state makes it hard for 
Kurds to believe that traditional definitions of 'unity' and 'integrity' have been 
abandoned. This could be residual bitterness. Or the AKP could be playing the 
European card while actually remaining closer to the Kemalist agenda than may at 
first appear to be the case. Undoubtedly, the AKP's understanding of national interest 
has often differed from the Kemalists', but its preoccupation with Kemalist concerns 
has never wavered. Whether this is an opportunistic legitimation avenue or a genuine 
policy concern is hard to ascertain. Yet there are reasons to suspect that the AKP's 
attachment to certain Kemalist principles, although heavily qualified, is genuine.
As Kurdish groups are quick to note, Erdogan's administration, rhetoric aside, rarely 
diverges from established paths. The ban on Hakkari Turkish Human Rights 
Association posters reading 'peace will prevail' in Kurdish is a case in point. 
Claiming that the posters were harmful to the constitution, the police confiscated and 
banned them (7ZW, 13 December 2003), proving to many that the AKP differs little 
from previous governments. On the other hand, General Ozkok hinted that the TAP 
are under 'restricted authorisation' in deciding whether a state of emergency is needed 
in the Southeast (Z, 1 September 2005). The AKP evidently seeks to strike a balance, 
precarious as it may be, on the road towards EU accession. Simultaneously, however, 
a legitimation narrative at home has to be sustained. Patriotic and Kemalist appeals 
are emotionally resonant with the people while also establishing affinity with national 
discourses and the country's legal framework. It is unsurprising that the AKP indulges 
in such appeals. And it would be misleading to dismiss the AKP's 'Kemalism' as 
mere lip service. AKP members have occasionally had 'Kemalist' outbursts that 
undermined the parry's European orientation. These outbursts used the established
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Kemalist language, with no appeals to Erdogan's new-found individualism, as Ci9ek 
was doing when he described the infamous 'Armenian Conference' as a stab in the 
Turkish people's back (see Chapter 4).
5. Negotiating the Boundaries of Legitimate Political Activity: Concert and Conflict 
between the AKP and Kemalist Agencies
Kemalist unity (fusing the nation and state) is the common core of almost all public 
legitimation appeals. After a spate of PKK attacks, for example, Hakkari governor 
Erdogan Gurbuz declared that terrorists would not be allowed to undermine the state's 
unity and integrity, while Sirnak Governor, Osman Gunes stated: "What is important 
is the continuation of the state... This big state is a whole with its people and there is 
no power [which can] destroy this" (Z, 20 May 2005). Governors of towns and cities 
affected by the attacks did not promise their constituents protection for their families, 
but rather lectured them on the significance of safeguarding national unity. Similarly, 
CHP member Mesut Deger, speaking after the §emdinli attack, declared himself 
'willing to sacrifice his life for the preservation of Turkey's unitary integrity' and the 
fight against terrorism (Z, 9 January 2006). Even Interior Minister Abkulkadir Aksu 
described terrorism, not in terms of the terror it wreaks, but as 'seeds of discord... 
sown among our citizens that [are] strongly united" (Z, 18 September 2005). The 
threat to national unity seems greater than that to lives and livelihoods.
The TAP agree. Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff General tlker Basbug 
noted that the PKK is particularly dangerous because its aim is 'ethnic nationalism' 
(H, 19 July 2005). Although, Basbug admits, ethnic and cultural differences exist in 
every country, when domination is sought, ethnic nationalism appears in the form of 
terror organisations seeking to undermine national unity. In a series of simple 
connections, Basbug equates all challenges to Turkey's unitary nationalism with 
terrorism. Although the PKK does wreak terror, Basbug is not simply referring to 
PKK violence here. Rather he also links terrorism to symbolic challenges to the 
Turkish nation's sole ownership of Anatolia's historic land. 'Turkey's unitary 
structure is not open to debate', he noted on a different occasion, 'questioning it could 
lead to disintegration... The TAP cannot accept a debate over the unitary structure of 
the Turkish state, an untouchable provision of the Constitution' (TDN, 3 November
162
Chapter 5
2004). Such a debate would sully Atatiirk's memory as well as the memory of those 
who fell in its defence, fighting against terrorism.
General Ozk6k (2005b) also stressed the huge number of TAP members and regular 
Turks who sacrificed themselves in order to shield the Republic and nation from PKK 
violence. Reminding his audience of AtatUrk's 'Peace at Home, Peace in the World' 
maxim, Ozkok equated peace with security and security with the preservation of 
Turkey's territorial integrity. Yet, as mentioned above, preserving integrity goes 
beyond avoiding territorial fragmentation, as it encompasses national unity and the 
unbreakable bond between the nation and its territory. Protecting this integrity, the 
TAF often consider symbolic threats to be as significant as physical ones. Unfaithful 
minorities were central to the Ottoman Empire's downfall and the TAF have learnt 
their lesson. So, when two Kurds burnt a Turkish flag in Izmir during the Nevruz 
celebration (marking the beginning of spring) Ozkok spoke of 'so-called citizens' 
(TP, 23 March 2005) since, to Ozkok, the ritual rejection of the state's flag was 
tantamount to renouncing Turkish citizenship.
Article 66 of the constitution states that '[ejveryone bound to the Turkish state 
through the bond of citizenship is a Turk'. Although this depicts 'Turkishness' as a 
civic identity, constant references to blood, destiny and collective needs mean that 
Turkishness actually carries heavy and complicated essentialist baggage. As Article 
66 declares that '[n]o Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he commits an act 
incompatible with loyalty to the motherland', it is clear that Ozkok believes the 
burning of the Turkish flag to constitute such an act. The general was not alone, as 
week-long countrywide demonstrations and the appearance of numerous flags on cars 
and buses, offices and homes proved (BBC, 28 March 2005). Even recently-released 
Zana and Dogan condemned the attack on 'our common flag of our common 
homeland' (TP, 23 March 2005). As the flag symbolises the indivisibility of state- 
territory-nation, an attack on it constitutes an open provocation to the state and nation, 
and an act of desecration (TDN, 9 August 2005). When this attack is perpetrated by 
members of a minority known for its erratic commitment to the nation, the sense of 
threat is immense. This is reflected in the Turkish General Staffs response:
'[The Army] has sworn to protect its country and flag at the cost of [its] 
blood... We recommend to those who attempted to question [our] loyalty to
163
Chapter 5
[our] country and flag, to look at the pages of history... The Turkish nation 
has experienced many betrayals besides its countless triumphs throughout its 
history. However, it has never seen such vileness [perpetrated] by its so-called 
citizens in its own territories. [The] Turkish nation is known [for] its respect 
even [for the] flag of its enemies in the battlefield. Such a desecration [of the] 
Turkish flag... is nothing, but treason' (TP, 22 March 2005).
The narrative of betrayal is familiar to Ozko'k's audience (see Chapter 2). An appeal 
to the blood of those who died in the country's defence enhances an already 
emotionally charged debate. The burning of a flag, a ritualistic attack that does not, 
actually, physically harm anyone, is grouped together with the violence experienced 
in the Southeast. By protecting the flag or mounting operations against Kurdish 
insurgents, the TAP feel they are performing one and the same duty: defending the 
country's integrity and unity. When performing this duty, General Buyukanit stresses, 
the TAP need no guidance or assistance: 'We don't need anyone's advice on how to 
fight terrorism. We are not going to the mountains on a picnic - we are going to 
defend the country's unity' and the unitary state (TDN, 10 July 2005).
General Ozkok (2005a) agrees:
'[T]here is a single country, single sovereignty and a single nation in the 
unitary state. The goal of the terror organization against which we struggled 
for so many years is to change the unitary nature of the Turkish Republic, 
which means the disintegration of the country (sic).'
Without unity, Turkey as a country is dealt a blow challenging its very existence. The 
nation, Ozk6k (2005a) continues, is a body of citizens bound together through 
common 'language, culture and ideal(s)' true to Atattirk's definition of the nation as 
'the people of Turkey, who founded the Turkish Republic'. Again the civic bond of 
citizenship is mixed in with the ethnic ties of language and culture. Yet essentialism 
goes further, defining the Turks as the people who founded and love Atattirk's 
Republic. Those who do not share this love do not, by extension, belong in or with the 
Turkish nation. Unity is not a matter of policy but a matter of fact, as rejecting 
republicanism ipso facto denies one's Turkishness in the TAF's eyes. For Ozkok, an 
attack on the 'singularity of the concept of the nation' is tantamount to an attack on
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the nation itself because the nation is a unit and it 'cannot be regarded as an entity 
consisting of parts' (ibid). Such analyses will only lead to the country's disintegration, 
as the nation's constituent parts will each seek to possess a segment of the country.
The Republic's unitary structure, continues Ozk6k (2005a), is set out in Article 3 of 
the Constitution. 'Opening this article to discussion has the potential of leading 
Turkey into conflict. Therefore... each mindful citizen should eagerly support the 
understanding of a unitary state structure and further strengthen this concept for the 
future of our country.' There can be no nation within the nation. Although, Ozkok 
stresses, Turkey's rival states have often tried to weaken or breach its unity, the TAP 
and 'mindful citizens' have and will continue to frustrate such plans. 'It is our main 
objective to maintain the territorial integrity and the values of our country [and] to 
preserve [its] unity and integrity in the forthcoming period according to the principles 
of our great leader Ataturk' (Ozkok, ibid). This was also Aegean Forces Commander 
General Hiirsit Tolon's message during his retirement speech:
'I am handing over an Army which condemns with hatred the attempts of a 
group and its supporters... to destroy the Unitary structure of the Turkish 
Republic... An Army who will not make any bargaining ever on the sacred 
trusts it protects, who is loyal to the oath it made and... identifies with its 
people in terms of will and determination of struggle' (Z, 22 August 2005).
President Sezer agrees. During his New Year's address, Sezer quoted Ataturk and 
spoke of the 'indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its Land and people'. 
Accepting diversity, but denying it affects national unity, he noted:
'The Turkish Constitution has adopted a unifying and integrating 
nationalism... everyone who is connected to the Republic through citizenship 
is a Turk... naming all citizens as member[s] of the Turkish Nation, no matter 
what their ethnic roots and religions are, is to establish equality among the 
citizens and to prevent the citizens from various ethnic roots from being 
"minorities" within society. The rule "sovereignty belongs to the Turkish 
Nation unconditionally" also shows [... that] "Turkish Identity" includes all... 
citizens [irrespective of] ethnic root... or religion' (Z, 1 January 2006).
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The President can hardly deny differences within the nation exist. Eighty years of 
republican rule have not quite eliminated residual Ottoman traits - religious, tribal, 
linguistic or regional - dividing Turkish citizens. Speaking of these differences a few 
months earlier, Erdogan (Z, 22 August 2005) had stated:
'The Kurdish citizen is my citizen. They are all sub-identities... under the 
main identity of the Turkish Republic. There are not only Kurds hi our 
country; we also have Laz, Bosnians, Albanians and Circassians. There are 
about 30 ethnic identities. Let's not confuse this with citizenship of the 
Turkish Republic... A single nation, a single flag and a single country.'
Sezer's address emphatically denounced this statement, because speaking of 
minorities ipso facto denies unity. The President stressed that the nation was defined 
by Atatiirk as the people who established the Republic; Atariirk, the nation and the 
Republic are, since then, thought of concurrently, through Turkey's 'singular state 
structure' (Z, ibid), hi order for that structure - and by extension the Republic - to be 
maintained, Sezer noted, 'national identity awareness' has to be settled and not 
disrupted by provocative statements like the Prime Minister's (77*, 3 January 2006).
Although Erdogan is careful to stress unity of symbols, citizenship and 
administration, and although he is careful not to list Turkishness as a sub-identity 
among many, he effectively demotes cultural Turkishness to a sub-category by 
stressing the republican (civic) identity that binds all Turks, regardless of culture. 
Erdogan accuses those who elevate sub-identities to political identities of promoting 
ethnic nationalism. Could the AKP's zero tolerance to ethnic nationalism also be 
directed at Sezer? The 'only primary link that connects us (is) Turkish Republican] 
citizenship' (TP, ibid), noted Erdogan, capitalising on the vulnerability of the 
Kemalist conception of Turkishness. By defining it as secular and republican, official 
national identity narratives render 'Turkishness' a civic identity, even though a 
(rhetorical) ethnic patina is often applied. Erdogan has identified an internal tension in 
Kemalist narratives and is exploring how far it can be used in order to widen political 
debate without actually abandoning or contradicting the Kemalist language.
For Sezer, Erdogan's claim contradicts a perceived Kemalist essence, according to 
which Turkishness goes beyond citizenship and identities established by law (ibid).
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The national bond is built on shared joys and sorrows, as well as on collective pride in 
being Turkish. For Sezer (ibid) this constitutes a primary identity. The President is 
unwilling to compromise on unity, a concern the TAP share.
Similar tensions emerged over the question of Northern Cyprus when, once again, the 
AKP defined national interest and modernisation differently to the TAP. Normally, 
Erdogan handles the Cyprus question with caution, aware that, if handled poorly, it 
could end Turkey's EU ambitions. For the TAF, things are more straightforward. 
Land Forces Commander General Ayta9 Yalman stressed that the TAF remain 
committed to defending Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and its people (TDN, 12 May 
2004). For General Tolon, Northern Cyprus is part of the fatherland and those (i.e. 
Erdogan) with no regard for its welfare are traitors (M, 21 January 2004).
Erdogan responded to General Tolon's statements with a question. During a time so 
critical for Turkey's development and the realisation of its westernising aspirations, 
what does love of the motherland dictate? Erdogan is adamant: the best proof of 
loving the country is to bestow the next generation with a stronger and more 
prosperous Turkey (//, 23 January 2004). As a line of legitimation, this is flawless. 
The problem is that, although Erdogan's stated goals are fully compatible with 
Kemalism, some of the etapes on the way to realising them seem to stretch the notions 
of secularism (see Chapter 6), national unity, integrity and pride (see Chapter 7) to the 
limit.
Journalist Taha Akyol, in an article extolling the military's duty to strengthen the 
country's unity (M, 21 January 2004), unwittingly demonstrates how flexible 
Kemalism is for those who seek answers in its. legacies. Stressing Ataturk's 
pragmatism, Akyol notes that the great leader knew when to fight 
(Alexandretta/Hatay) and when not to (Kirkuk). The Turks today, Akyol continues, 
should not refer back to an 'essential nation' or to what Atatiirk did all those decades 
ago: rather they should ask what Ataturk would have done in their place. This attitude, 
shared by many, opens the scope for debate even further. The AKP claims that 
Ataturk would approach secularism and westernisation differently in the 21 st century 
than he did in the 20th . Some Kemalists fear that such claims only intend to weaken 
Kemalism and allow religion to invade politics or Western interests to invade the
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Chapter 6, Negotiating Secularism
The Turkish Republic is a secular state. In this chapter I explore what this actually 
means to analysts trying to decipher eight decades' worth of secular policies and to 
actors seeking to protect, defend or redefine secularism. Such attempts, now 
championed by the AKP, create tensions and suspicions regarding the AKP's real 
intentions. These tensions are particularly evident when policies actually address the 
boundaries of secularism, such as the provision of religious education or, more 
controversially, the headscarf question. After stressing how Kemalists themselves 
unwittingly enabled the negotiation of secularism's boundaries and provisions, I will 
demonstrate how the AKP seeks to redefine it and how Kemalists seek to resist such 
efforts and uphold their understanding of secularism. I, finally, raise the question of 
whether this debate is actually one regarding the boundaries of modernity and the 
direction of modernisation, an essentially Kemalist concern.
1. Laiklik a la Turca: 'No-one was told not to pray' (Kaylan, 2005:69)
Kemalist secularism inevitably begs the question of feasibility: was what Atatiirk set 
out to do possible? 'Islam is something more than a religious belief system', notes 
Toprak (1981:20), hence 'secularisation also becomes something more than a formal 
separation'. Therefore, it does not suffice to look at Atattirk's policies and intentions. 
Rather, to understand his secularism, one has to think about the nature of Islam and its 
relation to politics. For Berkes (1998:3, 7-8, 507-8), secularism is a Christian remedy, 
unfit for the Ottoman context that it was made to fit, through radical reform, because 
the Kemalists deemed religion-free politics necessary for modernisation. Nevertheess, 
essentialising the link between Ottoman politics and Islam, elevating it to an Islamic 
trait rather than an Ottoman choice, confounds analysis by effectively claiming that 
Atatiirk carved the only possible path, given the socio-political realities on the ground.
Caha (2003:108, 114-5) disagrees, stressing that the Kuran does not specify desirable 
political arrangements and the community-focused, often authoritarian, political
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arrangements in many Muslim countries should be treated as social artefacts rather 
than religious inevitabilities. For Caha (2003:117-120), Islam is fully compatible with 
liberalism, rationalism and individualism and, by extension, secularism - intellectual 
misgivings linked to the Muslim experience under French colonial rule 
notwithstanding. Islam, in fact, always accepts the separation between religious and 
state law, thus facilitating the separation of state and religion (Caha, 2003:123). What 
Caha implies is that Islam cannot be blamed for Turkey's incomplete secularisation; 
rather one should look at the policy-makers' intentions.
For Ahmad (2003:84), Ataturk consciously chose laikhk (state-controlled Islam) over 
secularism (the separation of religion from politics), containing and using religion 
while limiting freedom of conscience in order to protect people from false 
consciousness. Kili (2003:356) agrees: through laiklik Kemalism sought to de- 
emphasise Islam, not abolish it. The result was, for Ozdemir & Frank (2000:195), 
'state Islam', not secularism, whereby Ataturk exerted lay control over religion. This 
was not a new idea. Abdulhamid had made a concerted effort to 'monopolise official 
sacrality' (Deringil, 1999:53), thus creating a precedent for state control over religion. 
What there was no precedent for was disestablishment. Through a combination of 
disestablishment, separation and control (Davison, 1998:181-2), Ataturk forged 
Turkish laikhk, a system that is neither fully 'secular' nor 'laic'.
The Caliphate was disestablished, but other institutions of religious authority inherited 
by the Republic were kept and extensively used as the state continued to administer 
religion (Davison, 1998:140). Religion became a vital resource for the mobilisation of 
peasant masses during both the Independence War and early republicanism, before 
institutions were consolidated and this strategy could be abandoned in favour of 
producing an educated westernised elite that would control the periphery without 
recourse to religion (Toprak, 1981:63, 66-67). Ataturk (e.g. 2003:371, 373) made 
frequent appeals to religion and even assumed a religious military title (Gazi 1 ). Yet he 
deemed religion an explosive weapon in the wrong hands, so control over it was 
retained, not least in order to ensure that no unauthorised agency could use religion to 
subvert the state's purposes. For Kemalism, secularism was part of Atatiirk's 
modernising plan. It was both a modernising etape in itself and a means for the
1 Warrior of the Faith.
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project's continuation, hence it was not pursued strictly for its own merits. Although 
secularism was always central in Kemalist thought, secularist policies were moulded 
with the wider project in mind. Thus they varied, responding to changing conditions 
on the ground and often using religion to assist other aspects of modernisation. Hence 
Laitdik equalled new religious policy, not no religious policy (Davison, 1998:153).
Still, the change, at least in theory, was immense, as the Ottoman state ostentatiously 
described itself as a theocracy, even though the actual application of Islamic law was 
often mitigated by political intrigue, raisons d'etat and realpolitik. The Ottoman 
regime had a clear sense of a statist sphere not subordinate to Islam: not all state 
business and arbitration paid lip service to religion and legislation produced by the 
Sultan did not claim divine provenance. Nevertheless, the Sultan was also the Caliph, 
claiming personal legitimacy in terms of this dual position and submitting himself 
only to Islamic Law - not man-made laws - thus giving religious dignitaries a high 
position within Ottoman hierarchies. The Republic put an end to religious mandarin 
traditions, replacing them with republican structures and legitimising narratives. 
Although processes and preoccupations changed little, political priorities had changed 
radically as modernisation had become the overriding political goal.
Secularisation should be analysed through Atatiirk's anxieties, peculiar to turn-of-the- 
century Ottoman officers. Through successive military defeats, real or perceived 
betrayals by allies and subjects and frustrated, ill-conceived or half-hearted reform 
experiments, the Ottoman Empire taught its officers a bitter lesson regarding 
protection. Ataturk was convinced that Turkey had to modernise and become as 
strong as any possible opponents in order to avoid future humiliations.
The Ottomans had sought to emulate Western technical accomplishments while 
remaining uninterested in the foundations of the civilisation that made such 
accomplishments possible (Berkes, 1998:29, 53). Although ideas, shreds of secular 
policy and radical experiments predated Ataturk, he was convinced that half-measures 
achieved nothing. Building on the frustrations of war and the increasing sophistication 
of Ottoman society (who, as individuals, travelled, read2 and traded more), Ataturk
2 Interestingly, for Deringil (1999:8) the Ottoman state's religious foundations and legitimacy were 
slowly being eroded since Sultan Mahmud permitted printing. Although repression was rife and
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embraced the rose that is Western civilisation with its thorns. Many disapproved of 
this. Yet reform was necessary as the selective and random application of reforms (the 
co-existence of the Muslim lunar calendar and Western solar calendar for trading 
purposes or the coexistence of commercial courts outside the jurisdiction of the 
^eyhulislam - Berkes, 1998:161-2) eroded the Empire's institutional coherence. 
Atatiirk's secularism eliminated the overlapping institutions, practices and authorities 
that created confusion and slowed down the administrative apparatus.
In 1920, however, Atatiirk's prevalence was no foregone conclusion as nationalist 
deputies remained pious and attached to the religious legitimacy of Ottoman politics. 
Although everyone agreed on the state's desperate need for reform in order to catch 
up with the West, there was no agreement on how to achieve that (Turan, 1991:33) 
and many retained the belief that Western technology could be effectively separated 
from Western 'civilisation'. In 1924, the Republican constitution actually mentioned 
Islam as the country's official religion.
The secularist movement was bolstered by default when it was discovered that 
religious dignitaries were lending support to anti-nationalist elements (Karpat, 
2004:214). Atatiirk prevailed and the new secular Republic was promoted as the 
perfect vehicle through which the Turks could dissociate themselves from Ottoman 
defeat and humiliation and turn a new page in their history. Still, legislative 
intervention was required in order to eliminate symbols and vested authority that 
could forge a rival legitimising discourse to republican modernisation. Islam was too 
closely associated with Ottoman authority and the pre-national past to be trusted.
Atattirk disposed of the dual system and eliminated confusion by embracing 
modernisation whole-heartedly and re-thinking the country's civilisational model. 
Secularism was part of the new civilisational paradigm and, for many, modernity's 
sharpest thorn. Its introduction was gradual but relentless. All mention of religion was 
removed from Turkey's Constitution in 1928 - in the midst of an uncompromising 
campaign eliminating symbols, structures and individuals associated with the fusion 
of religion and Ottoman politics. Thus Atatiirk protected his modernising project,
publishers avoided politics, the simple act of reading for pleasure was subversive in itself. Printing and 
reading profane, if not anti-religious, material allowed people to bypass religion without forsaking it.
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advertised his determination to see it through to its logical conclusion and, 
simultaneously, pursued a very specific power struggle. Following the abolition of the 
Caliphate in 1924, all members of the House of Osman were banished from Turkey 
(Lewis, 2002:264), thus removing individuals around whom conservative political 
sentiments could be rallied.
Symbols of the old order were methodically eliminated and an attempt was made to 
look modern. The fez was banned in 1925, and the veil was widely criticised - 
although an outright ban was left up to local authorities (Lewis, 2002:269 & 271; 
Cmar, 2005:59); international numerals and the Latin script were adopted in 1928, 
followed by a Turkish language purification campaign; women were given full 
electoral rights in 1934; Western-style surnames were introduced and Sunday adopted 
as the day of rest, replacing the Muslim Friday, in 1935. Thus Atatiirk ejected 
religious undercurrents from all non-religious activities. For Pamuk (2005:10), 
westernisation made little sense to the people: 'Although everyone knew it as freedom 
from the laws of Islam, no one was quite sure what else westernisation was good for'. 
Yet the secularisation drive had an undeniable nationalising effect.
Secularising policies were actually simultaneously westernising and nationalising as 
they distanced Turkey from 'Islamic' practice. This was particularly true of language 
reform. Although it rendered Ottoman literary and historical sources unintelligible in 
the space of one generation, the new alphabet marked Turkey's new orientation: due 
West. The new script expressly abandoned the universalism of Arabic, thus severing 
ties with the Arab Middle East, while also assisting literacy - itself necessary for 
modernisation and useful for nation-building - by offering the people an alphabet that 
was both easier to learn and better suited to the representation of Turkish phonetics. 
Such secularising measures equalised the population, creating a sense of national 
ownership of the new language and script.
Nationalism, secularism and modernisation were interlinked in Atattirk's mind and 
remain so in his supporters' hearts. Religion was harnessed, controlled and 
nationalised. The Kuran was translated into Turkish and, briefly, so was the ezan. 
This act of symbolic transgression confined the Prophet's language to the Mosque and 
ensured that religion would be mediated through the national language. Secularism 
embodied this shift from empire to republic, from tradition to modernity, from Ummet
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to nation. This new religion - subordinate, national and attuned to the Republic - 
came to represent the essence of Turkish secularism that, since 1937, is protected by 
the constitution. Pre-ambulatory clause 1, paragraph 5; Articles 2, 13, 14, 137, 174; 
provisional Article 2; and the MPs and the President's oaths all describe Turkey as a 
secular Republic and Article 68 permits the closure of political parties challenging or 
undermining secularism. The constitution makes it clear that containing religious 
influences and safeguarding secularism is an ongoing task.
The protection of secularism entails the continued pursuit of nationalised religion and 
pure Islam and continuous vigilance against the appearance and growth of political 
Islam. The latter is a core concern for Kemalist actors such as the President or the 
TAF. The former is taken care of by an organisation forged by Article 136 of the 
constitution, the Diyanet Isleri Bakanhgi (Directorate of Religious Affairs, DIB). The 
DIE, a true bureaucratic army with 80,000 employees (Ozdemir and Frank, 
2000:201), enjoys a monopoly over employing and training imams (prayer-leaders) 
and hatips (preachers). As the DIB remains tethered to the state, it is often described 
as an ideological state apparatus, although its Head, Professor Ali Bardakoglu 
(2004), defends its intellectual freedom. The DIB, he notes, is concerned with 
individual piety and seeks to promote a modern expression of Turkish culture and 
civilisation in a secular state with a (mostly) Muslim population. Religion has found 
its place within the Republic and 'secular and non-secular Muslims join hi the varied 
practices of Islam' (Ozdemir & Frank, 2000:63), under what Bardakoglu identifies as 
state protection. Bardakoglu praises the secular state for guaranteeing religious 
freedom while preventing religious demands from disrupting social order.
This, however, is not the whole picture. Although the state preached secularism, 
successive governments sought to compromise it for electoral gain. The advent of 
multi-party politics made religion an invaluable bargaining tool for politicians. 
Although what was offered by way of concessions was minimal, it constituted a 
powerful symbolic break with Atatiirk's relentless secularism. Even Inonu joined in 
the new mood, granting permission for Turks to take the pilgrimage to Mecca, 
introducing elective religion courses in primary schools3 and permitting the re-




opening of imam-hatip schools in 1949. More such schools opened as soon as 
Menderes swept into power. Banning the medreses had been one of Atatiirk's first 
acts in power. Was their reopening a betrayal of Atatiirk's secularism? Arguably not, 
as the transition from the Ottoman polity was, by then, complete and, if Islam was to 
be harnessed by the state, as discussed above, preachers and prayer-leaders had to be 
trained in a standardised and monitored fashion.
Many of the concessions, however, were not part of a concerted policy, but either 
populist vote-seeking moves or acts of symbolic 'restoration' - such as the return to 
the Arabic ezan or the allowing of Kuran readings on state radio (Toprak, 1981:80). 
Even the military used Islam. Following the 1961 intervention, the TAP did not 
restore militant secularism and even exhibited a desire to transform Islam into a 
'national instrument for the state' (Ahmad, 1977:374). Islam was not, at this stage, 
seen as a threat to democratic stability. And with good reason, as more imminent 
threats existed. With the 1971 intervention, some of the earlier legislation relaxing 
secular provisions was repealed. Still, religion was not Turkey's key problem at this 
time. With the start of the Cold War, the Communist threat from the north 
overshadowed the Islamic threat from the south. Harnessing all conservative forces 
against Communism became expedient and placating Muslims seemed a sensible way 
of combating the violent political polarisation tearing Turkey apart.
As a result, the next military intervention did not subdue Islam; it used it. In 1980, the 
generals seized power, determined to change Turkish politics so that the once-a- 
decade intervention would no longer be necessary. During three years of tight social 
control and radical transformation, the TAP sought to completely transform Turkish 
political life. Education was controlled (through YOK) and society pacified, to the 
extent that the Left wing of the political spectrum, militant or not, was almost totally 
incapacitated. In their attempt to forge social cohesion and wholesome values (respect 
for authority and family-orientation), the TAP promoted what became known as the 
Turkish Islamic Synthesis (Turk-Islam Sentezi, TlS). Although secularism had been 
relaxed since 1946 it was, ironically, the TAP that compromised Atatiirk's legacy.
The TIS was premised on the assumption 'that "Islamic" values would instil respect 
for tradition and society and function as a means of social control' (Tank, 2005:11). 
The TAP chose to weld Islamic ideas to national goals in order to preserve national
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unity and integrity. This was achieved by merging pre-Islamic Turkic symbols and 
history with Islamic ones and forging a new national narrative that retained all the 
Kemalist traits discussed in previous chapters, but afforded Islam a greater role. This 
new narrative stressed a 'Central Asian' regard for family life and military virtue - 
institutions ensuring morality, truth and justice in social relations - love of country, 
fear of God, sanctity of custom and obedience to state authority. The initial TIS, it is 
claimed, was forged when this culture was fused with Islam. It collapsed because of 
an affliction of Turkish intellectuals: Western mimesis. The 1980s TlS sought to re- 
establish a balance between home, mosque and barracks4 and reassert respect, 
discipline and the sacredness of duty in social life.
For Toprak (1990:10-11), the TIS turned religion into a state ideology. Turan 
(1991:41-2) disagrees, noting that 'the Turkish state, while not viewing religion as 
giving direction to its policies and actions, continues to treat it as a resource which 
may be mobilised for "purposes of state" whenever it is found useful or necessary'. 
The TAP had not suddenly become religious. They used religion, thinking they could 
contain it, in an attempt to forge a more socially homogeneous and less politically 
active community (Shankland, 1999:43). The use of Islamic symbols did forge a new 
source of social cohesion. Yet new Islamic communities were far from docile.
The fact that the TIS was introduced without abandoning Kemalism shows that scope 
for negotiation within the Kemalist language has always existed and has been used 
even by those who resist such negotiation, namely the TAP. The TIS itself was the 
product of negotiation between military and intellectual agents, making its paternity 
hard to ascertain. Toprak believes the TIS was the brainchild of the Intellectuals' 
Hearth (Aydinlar Ocagi), Navarro-Yashin (2002:20) attributes it to Islamists, while 
Yavuz (2003:214) sees the TIS as a military-backed intellectual exercise seeking to 
placate and co-opt nationalists and Islamists alike.
In practice, the TIS renewed state legitimacy in the periphery, but it unwittingly re- 
politicised heterodox Kurds and Alevis. Alevis, traditionally supportive of Kemalist 
secularism, felt that the TIS's celebration of Sunni Hanefi Islam disenfranchised
4 Interestingly, Sultan Abdulhamid had premised his legitimation on a mosque-school-barracks trident 
as well, see Deringil (1993).
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them. They, naturally, raised the question of its compatibility with secularism and 
were not alone in deploring a perceived betrayal of Kemalist modernisation. The 
definition of 'modernisation' and 'modernity' was, thus, unwittingly thrown wide 
open. The TAP had only itself to blame for this relativisation of Kemalist legacy.
With the benefit of hindsight, Kemalist apologists, such as Kili (2003:415), criticise 
the TIS as threatening to draw Turkey into the dark ages. The Synthesis, she notes, 
writing after the religious revival of the 1990s, represented a violation of Atattirkist 
thought, a heretical error that gave political voice to religious extremists, enabling 
them to seek the undoing of Atattirk's reforms (ibid, p.420). The TAF's mistake, Kili 
(2003:423) believes, lay in the assumption that Atattirk's ideas can be selectively 
applied and combined with other principles. Atattirk's system of thought, however, is 
'whole'. Ataturkism is not, for Kili, a language for the negotiation of politics, but a 
blueprint for political life, making negotiation redundant.
For Kili (2003:403-4), the coup of 12 September 1980 is an aberration, failing to 
represent the progressive tradition the military stands for - re-embraced, she feels, by 
1997. For Kili, true Kemalists see modernity as consisting of positivist certainties and 
religion as nothing more than unsubstantiated assumptions, prejudice and superstition. 
Yet those Kemalists who supported the TIS did not dismiss religion so readily. Thus 
they blurred the line between acceptable and unacceptable uses of religion in public 
life. This has created a legitimating precedent for Islamists, while also enabling them 
to attempt a redefinition of secularism and its relationship with modernity without 
rejecting Kemalism. For, while the TIS enabled the military to use religion for its own 
purposes, it simultaneously opened opportunity-spaces wherein other actors could use 
religion as well. The TAF's error lay in their dismissal of 'Islamists' as a backward, 
reactionary and unitary 'camp', incapable of utilising such opportunities. Islam, 
however, offered a flexible and multi-faceted language of cultural politics and 
personal morality that soon translated into a new political idiom.
This idiom ensured Ozal's electoral victory in 1983, offering him a new language of 
legitimation - used to justify repealing the law banning the use of religion for political 
purposes. This action was largely symbolic as the constitutional ban on political uses 
of Islam remained in place. Yet it marked the advent of a new era for Turkish politics. 
The Kemalist conviction that personal piety, if publicly expressed, necessarily went
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hand in hand with narrow-minded backwardness was shattered by Ozal, himself a 
perfect embodiment of 'modern' Islam. Ozal embraced market economics and 
Western ways, including the consumption of alcohol. Meanwhile, his association with 
Islamic brotherhoods was no secret; nor was his habit of leaving his desk to pray on 
Fridays. Ozal was an eventuality for which Kemalist westernisation was not prepared.
Atatiirk's relentless secularism was history, yet what would replace it remained 
unclear. For two decades, politicians have been testing the limits of this enlarged 
space of legitimate discourses. Some seek to expand it further. The Turkish Press now 
speaks of 'two camps', the secularist and the Islamist, facing each other; yet things are 
not so simple. Firstly, both sides - to the extent that they exist at all - are heavily 
fragmented and diverse. Secondly, both sides use, to varying degrees, Kemalist 
legitimation narratives in the public arena. Thirdly and most significantly, as 
Shankland (1999:2) remarks, the Islamic revival can only be understood through the 
malleability of hitherto rigid Kemalist institutions, acquired post-TIS. Also post-TIS, 
the electoral success of religious parties has increased which, combined with 
migration from the more religious periphery into Turkey's administrative centres 
(Yavuz, 2003:83), has inadvertently enhanced the state's readiness to embrace Islam. 
As a result, the state can now be used to serve both secular and Islamist aims, often 
simultaneously. This creates potential for confusion and conflict, but more 
importantly, it creates space for the pursuit of many conflicting agendas concurrently.
This is particularly significant as religion has forged several, and often contradictory, 
discursive niches. Islamic idioms and agendas have proliferated forging what many 
call an Islamist public sphere. Religious discourses are not uniformly incompatible 
with the present constitutional order, as feared. In fact, some kinds of Islamism 
offered alternative routes to and definitions of modernity within a republican setting. 
Distinguishing between strands of Islamist thought, however, is not the Kemalists' 
foremost concern. Religion's reappearance in the public sphere alarmed them as they 
believed they were faced with what Weisbrod (2002:499) calls 'political religion', 
namely the translation of religious sensitivities into secular practice.
Although, arguably, this 'translation' marks the end of religious fundamentalism, the 
TAP were taking no chances, especially in the late 90s, when the charismatic, albeit 
incoherent, Necmettin Erbakan became the face of Islamist politics. Erbakan's
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provocative anti-secularism did not partake of the new debate; it simply tested the 
TAF's patience. His failure to castigate deputies making inflammatory statements 
against AtatUrk, foreign affairs blunders and erratic policies soon also catalysed the 
public mood (Toprak, 2005:176). The TAP were not alone in thinking that Erbakan 
was using democratic institutions to undercut the Republic. The belief that the 
democratic process had to be suspended to save secularism was widespread (Torpak, 
2005:177).
The TAP initially simply ignored the people's elected representatives, concluding an 
alliance with Israel despite Erbakan's opposition and staging large-scale military 
operations in northern Iraq without informing the Prime Minister (Yavuz, 2003:243). 
Then came verbal admonitions and a warning in the form of tanks rumbling through 
Sincan after an ill-advised attack on secularism at a rally resulting in the mayor of 
Sincan's arrest and the Iranian ambassador's expulsion. The NSC then issued clear 
demands, regarding the curbing of private schools funded by religious associations 
and the closing of certain imam-hatip schools and Kuranic seminaries. Erbakan 
resisted. On 28 February 1997, the TAP staged Turkey's first 'post-modern' coup, 
presenting Erbakan with a series of demands, also endorsed by bureaucrats and 
politicians.
The honeymoon period was over. Islamism - that is Islam in any form other than 
private faith - was once again regarded with suspicion, as a potential threat to the 
nation and Republic. Many Kemalists now greet Islamism with blanket disapproval, 
convinced that Islamists are hostile towards modernity and republicanism. Statements 
or proof to the contrary and conduct indicating that some Islamists have embraced 
modernity are dismissed as a carefully manufactured smokescreen. Religiosity and 
modernity are, once again, incompatible in Kemalist thought. Kemalists perceive 
Islamic political idioms as the de facto vernacular of 'backwardness'. Having 
retained, until recently, a monopoly over the definition of modernity, Kemalists do 
not perceive Islamism as an alternative perception of modernity but as opposition to 
it. Nevertheless, some Islamist movements use republican language in the articulation 
of their position. Many embrace the nation and modernity, although they seek to 
redefine, although not abandon, secularism. Kemalists resist such attempts, fearing a 
concealed plan to turn Turkey into an Iran-style theocracy. What they fail to
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appreciate is that the Islamist movement is heavily fragmented and, within it, there are 
those who not only honestly embrace the Republic, but could not actually exist 
outside it. Secularism is expedient to keep Islamist radicals from silencing the 
moderates and the moderates know that, though many Kemalists do not.
For those who treat Kemalism as a creed whose legacies cannot be negotiated or 
selectively applied, 'being modern is a deeply cherished ideal that is held very much 
as a religion, with its own shrines, rituals, sacred spaces, and mantras' (£mar, 
2005:4). Kemalism cum religion has a secular temple (Anitkabir), a holy book (Nutuk 
- Turan, 1991:50) and daily civic prayers hi the form of Atattirk's mantras. Atattirk is 
the prophet of this civic creed, his face an icon symbolising national destiny that 
people flaunt - on car rear-view mirrors, lapels and shop windows - in times of 
anxiety. Even Atattirk's commemorations are quasi-religious. 'The secularist founder 
of state [is] not remembered in a secular fashion' (Navarro-Yashin, 2002:191) 
because, although Ozal stopped the obligatory commemoration of 10 November, 
people still stand still at the time of Atattirk's death and engage in mystical practices 
of the kind Ataturk most despised. Turks practising 'domestic magic' call his spirit for 
advice, while semi-scientific treatises analyse the recurrence of 19, a 'magic number' 
for Islam, in Atattirk's life, claiming that he was on a divine mission. Even the Press 
seeks supernatural indications of Atattirk's continued presence (Navaro-Yashin, 
2002:194-196). For those who approach Kemalism as a faith, Atattirk's bequest 
cannot be negotiated. Partly altering it undermines the whole, they believe, and 
secularism, as part of Kemalism, should be neither negotiated nor reinterpreted. But 
Atattirk's legacy is mixed and interpretation is necessary.
2. The AKP: Promoting 'True' KemalistSecularism
Ahmad (1977:362) finds that '[i]t is paradoxical that in Turkey, where there have 
been no organized Islamic pressure groups since the establishment of the Republic, 
religion has played such an influential role in the politics of the country during the last 
quarter century', and was to play an even more significant role in the 20 years after 
this was written. This was the Kemalists' doing. By elevating secularism to a central 
pillar of modernisation, they turned religion into an arena of manipulation and
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confrontation and, by extension, a banner for those seeking to oppose Kemalist real or 
symbolic monopolies. This tradition, exploiting discursive spaces established during 
the TIS, gave rise to Erdogan, who is currently seeking to fuse Ataturk's 'pure Islam', 
EU-sponsored individual freedoms and Islamic spirituality.
Erdogan does not argue against the secular state's legal provisions in the name of 
religion; rather he does so in the name of westernisation and republicanism. Drawing 
on the de facto legitimacy of EU accession - itself pursued in Ataturk's name - 
Erdogan seeks to renegotiate secularism through its practical requirements. He 
appeals to European values and practice, where secularism is not static, but an ever- 
renewed concept (Theology professor Terrence Merrigan, Z, 16 May 2006).
Simultaneously, he stresses that his party not only enjoys a majority of seats in 
Parliament, but was voted for by 'nearly every sector of society... Consequently, our 
party's vote represents a Turkish consensus' (Erdogan, 2002). Then he stresses his 
simultaneous commitment to European and spiritual ideals: pluralism, diversity, 
toleration and piety. Appealing to the great Atatiirk and his legacy, Erdogan speaks of 
universal civilisation and democracy. Turkey is a model, he notes. 'This model is the 
democratic, secular, legal and political order that views the world of faith at the level 
of the individual and treats all faiths equally at the level of the state' (ibid). The AKP, 
Erdogan (2002) continues, is the same model in miniature, as its members are Muslim 
but the party is not Islamic and its agenda is democratic and modernising. Similarly, 
he notes, Turkey is Muslim, but democratic and secular. The EU should embrace 
Turkey because it 'should be based, not on any particular culture identified by the 
faith of individuals, but on commitment to democracy' (ibid). This appeal to the EU is 
actually a simultaneous appeal to secularists within his own country.
Such statements draw on the de facto legitimacy of well-known narratives penned by 
Ziya Gokalp (1959), one of the few identifiable influences on Ataturk's thought. 
Gokalp noted that each nation has its own culture, part of which is religion. The 
essence of progress lies in a nation's ability to move beyond its narrow cultural 
specificities, embracing the non-negotiable traits of universal 'civilisation' without 
abandoning its peculiar culture. Erdogan hardly needs to quote Gokalp when he states 




Erdogan believes in democracy. He often reminds the Muslim world that their 
troubles would be resolved if they put more faith in human rights and reason (TDN, 6 
September 2005; WSJ, 30 August 2005). Moreover, he accepts secularism as 
necessary for modernisation. Nevertheless, secularism for Erdogan, means freedom of 
religion, not freedom from it. 'In a secular society, religion is under the guarantee of 
the secular administration... Secularism is at an equal distance from every kind of 
belief. And for this reason, secularism is a sort of insurance for all of us' (TNA, 9-10 
July 2005). Although this resembles Kemalist secularist narratives, Erdogan is 
adamant that secularism is 'an institutional attitude and method, which ensures the 
State remain[s] impartial and equidistant to all religions' (Erdogan, 2004b). The 
purpose of secularism is to limit the state, not the individual.
Simultaneously, religion is to be kept out of politics. 'While attaching importance to 
religion as a societal value', Erdogan (2004a) stated, 'we do not think it right to 
conduct politics through religion, to attempt to transform government ideologically by 
using religion, or to resort to organisational activities based on religious symbols.' 
Having thus ensured compliance with the constitution, Erdogan outlines his party's 
democratic conservatism: '[A] political approach which accords importance to 
history, social culture and, in this context, religion [and] re-establishes itself on a 
democratic format.' Not even Gokalp could disagree with this. Religion belongs to the 
individual, Erdogan (2004a) stresses, '[i]t should be left to the individual'.
Drawing heavily from aspects of Kemalist legacies that die-hard secularists would 
rather forget, Erdogan claims that the time has come to reinterpret Ataturk's legacy, 
secularism included, 'according to the norms of modern democracy' (Z, 16 May 
2006). In 1924, Ataturk's secularism was justified iti terms of cleansing Islam and 
rescuing it from political manipulation. Ataturk's (2003:612) support for a pure, 
universal religion, moving men away from the prejudices and false notions that 
'poison their bodies and intellects', explains his aggressive secularism as the Republic 
was making the transition away from the political and social structures of empire. In 
fact, Davison (1998:151-2) believes Atatiirk was in favour of Islam 'in its plain 
trueness', as it did not hinder modernisation and Berkes (1998:484) believes '[t]he 
crux of all Mustafa Kemal's experiments was not to Turkify Islam for the sake of 
Turkish nationalism, but to Turkify Islam for the sake of religious enlightenment'.
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Erdogan capitalises on this narrative, hinting that secularism was necessary for 
modernisation, but should not be perceived as hostility towards religion per se.
Stringent secularism - distilling, controlling and protecting religion from re- 
contamination and mediating personal access to the sacred in terms of the state's own 
modernising exigencies - could have been an interim policy. Atatiirk's biographers 
believe that, had he lived, he would have relaxed his relentless secularism after the 
transition to the new polity, for which secularism was a necessary stepping-stone. 
Actually, this relaxation occurred only after his death and invariably for the wrong 
reasons. Today, Kemalists treat secularism as an essential part of republican legacies. 
So Erdogan celebrates secularism 'as the fundamental and uniting feature of the 
republic and a guarantee for the freedom of religions and religious beliefs' (Z, 16 May 
2006) and Ann9 stresses the AKP's commitment to both democracy and secularism, 
noting that problems only arise because of different interpretations (Z, 24 April 2006).
Erdogan pays lip-service to secularism while castigating secular practice in Turkey 
where, even when secular policies were relaxed, the individual was never trusted to 
make choices regarding religious practice without compromising the Republic or 
modernisation. Erdogan's focus on the individual represents a dramatic revision of 
secularist perceptions and policies. Marrying secularism with individualism, he is 
pleasing the EU and, while not retracting Kemalist principles, he is vesting them with 
new meaning. Secularism suddenly is not shorthand for the state's right to control 
expressions of faith, but a description of individual rights vis-a-vis the state. Erdogan 
is using the Kemalist signifier, but changes its meaning according to a European, 
modern and, hence, legitimate model. Some external observers are convinced by 
Erdogan's mix of personal piety and political secularism. US-based Christian Science 
Monitor describes the AKP as the Turkish equivalent of European Christian 
Democratic Parties and no more subversive than them (M, 10 June 2005).
In order to convince domestic audiences, Gtil (2005c) speaks of Islam using Ataturk's 
descriptions of enlightened religion, presenting its values as universal and hence an 
asset, not an impediment, for modernisation. 'The perception on the part of certain 
policy-makers and public opinion in the West, of Islam, as a source of intolerance and 
extremism is totally unfounded... Islam is a profound source of wisdom, ethics, 
knowledge and values that complements and enriches the common heritage of human
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civilisation... an asset and not a disadvantage' (Gul, 2005i). A country such as 
Turkey, notes Gill (2004c), 'with a predominantly Muslim population' can retain its 
'spiritual-cultural identity' while 'achiev[ing] contemporary democratic standards. 
Justice, equality, consultation, law and respect for the individual are in fact inherent in 
our spiritual and cultural heritage'. Erdogan (2005c) also uses the theme of a 
democratic state with predominantly Muslim citizens, describing himself as the 
'Muslim Prime Minister of a democratic country'. Erdogan notes that democracy is a 
system of universal values and hence accessible to Muslims, and stresses that '[t]he 
mam philosophy of Islam... favours participation, freedom and pluralism'.
Erdogan is seeking to simultaneously appease US allies, EU assessors and secularists 
at home: still he goes on the offensive. In the same speech he castigates those who 
'carry out restrictive policies in the name of religion', either by politicising faith or 
otherwise limiting pluralism - a covert but clear reference to Turkey's secularists - 
for they harm both democracy and religion.
Gul (2005d) stresses Turkey's ability to demonstrate, in an unstable world, that a 
Muslim society can sustain institutions of democratic participation and political 
pluralism. Ataturk could not object to this. And yet the persistent focus on political 
pluralism worries secularists. The AKP may be more Kemalist than most Islamists, 
but it remains more Islamic than secularists are comfortable with. The AKP's 
redefinition of secularism, empowering the individual, and their description of Turkey 
as a Muslim society - demographically accurate, yet diverging from Kemalist identity 
prescriptions - cause fears regarding Erdogan's 'true' intentions to resurface. These 
fears are rarely fully articulated. Nevertheless, Kaylan (2005:412) speaks for many 
when he writes: 'On November 3, 2002... Kemalisrn and the secular reforms of my 
childhood years suffered a humiliating defeat in Turkey's 172,143 polling stations. 
The winners, despite their denials of having an Islamist agenda, were aiming to 
undermine Kemal Atatiirk's secular reforms.' Kaylan does not explain how he knows 
that, yet he feels the need to expose Erdogan, because 'I was a child of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatiirk's revolution... We called ourselves Kemalists then and took solemn 
oaths to protect his secular legacy.' (p.25). This feeling is strong for many.
The result is suspicion and conflict that finds no institutionalised arena in which to 
resolve itself or play itself out. As former Chief Justice Sel9iik put it: 'In a country
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that lacks freedom of expression, there can be no tradition of debates. In a country 
that does not accept the fact that the number of opinions... is equal to the number of 
people who live in it, it is impossible to introduce a culture of debate' (TDN, 14 June 
2006). As the TAP and courts remain vigilant, ready to detect signs of 'heresy', they 
force Erdogan to tread carefully and refrain from articulating the full extent of his 
reform vision - even if unrelated to religion. Although the AKP has not used its 
parliamentary majority to affect radical constitutional reform, Baykal accuses them of 
trying to 'restructure the state based on religion' (TDN, 10 July 2005). But is it what 
Erdogan does or who he is that inspires such fears? Erdogan and Gul may have 
thrown the EU's gates open for Turkey, but they constantly refer to Turkey's Muslim 
identity (GUI, 2004a & b; Erdogan, 2004b); their wives are covered; they were both 
Erbakan's associates; Erdogan even attended an imam-hatip school5 .
Erdogan represents both the contradictions currently facing Turkey and potential 
solutions to them. Having dissociated himself from Erbakan (M, 10 October 2004), 
Erdogan remains pious and proud of his humble roots - and for that, electorally 
popular. His government champions democracy, justice, human rights and economic 
growth. Undoubtedly, it is more than fear of the generals that binds Erdogan to the 
Republic. His EU commitment appears genuine, not least to the EU, and political 
change is real and sweeping. Even some businessmen appreciate a party they once 
rejected as Islamic and hence backward, as Turkey is enjoying single-digit inflation 
for the first time since 1970. This may have happened during the AKP's watch rather 
than thanks to them and economic indices have deteriorated in 2006, but is that reason 
enough to mistrust Erdogan's democratic credentials?
Secularists may actually mistrust the people's secularist credentials and their choice 
of Erdogan as their leader. In Selcuk's words, '[o]ne of the biggest problems Turkey 
faces is the distrust felt by those who govern the country towards the people and vice 
versa' (TDN, 14 June 2006). Often this mistrust is expressed publicly. On one such 
occasion, when academics denounced a perceived AKP onslaught on secular 
education and Erdogan dismissed their intervention as political (H, 25 September 
2003), their reply was dramatic and unequivocal: defending Ataturk's reforms and 




'personally partaking of the battle'. If defending the reforms and pitting themselves 
against 'darkness', they stated, is to do politics, then politics they shall do.
Secularists remember Ataturk's (2003:610) warning: Islamists 'wanted to sacrifice the 
Turkish people in the name of a simple caprice'. With that in mind, CHP leader Deniz 
Baykal urges the people to remain vigilant as the AKP's real 'intention [is] to subvert 
the main principles of the state' (TDN, 3 November 2004). Erdogan, understandably, 
deplores this attitude: 'Some talk like they are reading my mind. No other 
administration faced such treatment' (TDN, 6 June 2005). Although this is not 
actually true - both Erbakan's and his successor Recai Kutan's intentions were 
constantly questioned - it is unclear whether this treatment is deserved.
AKP policies have, on occasion, cast doubt on the sincerity of the party's secularism. 
The proposal to criminalise adultery (see TP, 14, 16 & 17 September 2004) was 
quickly dropped under EU pressure and domestic outrage, but not all controversial 
bills have shared its fate. Attempts to limit alcohol consumption are a case in point. 
When AKP-ran municipalities seek to move businesses that serve alcohol into red 
zones outside city centres and Erdogan blames drunk driving for 80 percent of 
Turkey's traffic accidents when police statistics set the figure at below 1 percent, 
secularists worry. Taxes on alcohol are steadily climbing. Although Erdogan denies 
plans for an outright ban, observers wonder whether he is, once again, mixing religion 
with politics at secularism's expense (//, 24 November 2005; LAT, 10 December 
2005).
Similarly worrying is the AKP's position on women's rights. Although the champion 
of the covered girls' right to education, Erdogan (2005b) believes that rights are 
acquired, not granted: women have to work for their rights just as men did. No quotas 
or special dispensations will be offered to Turkish women and their entry into public 
life will be permitted but not facilitated (ibid). True democracy should need no 
quotas. But is Erdogan hiding his disdain for women behind carefully selected 
'European' vocabulary? There is no real evidence of that. Dagi (2003; 2005:30) notes 
that the AKP's position on all social matters remains conservative, but neither radical 
nor Islamic, despite its leaders' piety. In fact, Dagi believes, the fact that the AKP see 
Turkey's EU membership as the natural outcome of modernisation marks the end of 
political Islam as it was in the 90s.
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Although the AKP draws considerable electoral support from religious quarters, its 
electoral majority cannot possibly rely solely on Islamists. In fact, an intense pro- 
Islamic discourse could alienate many AKP supporters (Dagi, 2003). Conservative 
social and economic policies, internal democracy and a good record in office, 
combined with the presence of many Eastern Turks on AKP ballots, make the party 
popular, often despite its religiosity. This is a huge change from the 1980s and 1990s, 
when Erbakan's faction ensured popular support through voter radicalisation (Toprak, 
2005:173). The AKP is careful not to antagonise the courts (too much) and is 
conscious that the credit its popularity lends it should not be spent on fighting 
religious issues alone. This, for Torpak (2005:183), entails little effort as the AKP is 
genuinely committed to the EU process and aware of the fact that accession and, 
eventually, membership will foster conditions favourable to the implementation of the 
party's social, political and economic agenda without the AKP needing to fight for 
them now. This is exactly what the secularists fear. Turkey, however, does not exist in 
a vacuum. Any move away from secularism would result in pressures, penalties and 
isolation. Besides, resistance would begin at home as, partly thanks to EU accession, 
Turkey now sports a thriving civil society that cherishes pluralism.
Debate is ongoing on whether the time has come for the Turkish state to become a 
value-free administrative apparatus that follows no blueprint for the good life, but 
allows and enables the community and individuals within it to follow their own. Many 
question the AKP's ability and, indeed, intention to carry out such a transformation. 
Some question the desirability of fixing what is not broken. What cannot be 
questioned is the AKP's contribution to exposing the flexibility of Kemalism as a 
language of legitimation. Without rejecting Kemalist principles, the AKP has widened 
the scope of legitimate political activity. Undeniably, Erdogan's ability to do so is 
partly attributable to a breakthrough in Turkish-EU relations, which in turn is, to a 
considerable extent, his doing. As EU-stipulated reforms are changing the state 
dramatically, a simultaneous change to the language of legitimation is effectively 
altering the political model Turkey has long followed.
Erdogan has fused his political future with the country's European vocation and has 
shown both willingness to cooperate with the establishment and amazing resilience in 
the face of opposition. During the tense few weeks before the Cyprus referendum,
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Erdogan's sangfroid and ability to hold his ground led to Birand's exclamation that 
Turkey had, for the first time in its history, a true elected government (M, 24 February 
2004). This is assisted by Ozkok's conciliatory attitude and preference for persuading 
rather than forcing the government's hand (Heper, 2005:217-220). Yet the AKP's 
reformism has won it the respect of even those who do not approve of Erdogan's 
religiosity or the party's take on alcohol or adultery. Although secularists often try to 
present tensions with the AKP as an argument over secularism, it is evident by now 
that it is about more than that. It is about Turkey as a project, it is about republican 
legitimacy, it is about a model of politics that has worked well for decades.
Religion, especially its visible manifestations, such as the Islamic head-covering, 
challenges this project on many levels. In Turkey the headscarf is banned from public 
places in the name of modernisation. Yet when two girls take their country to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) defending the right to cover, the notion of 
modernity becomes elusive. Erdogan could hardly conceal his support for Leyla Sahin 
and Zeynep Tekin, who claimed that the headscarf ban impinged on their human 
rights. In June 2004, much to the secularists' joy and the government's chagrin, the 
ECHR upheld the ban because of Turkey's 'special condition' (Z, 17 May 2005). The 
special condition had constituted the crux of the Turkish state's defence, claiming that 
the ban represented a necessary precaution. Far from limiting human rights, the 
lawyers noted, the ban actually protected them by shielding the public - particularly 
the uncovered girls - from a potentially repressive religious revival.
Gul confirmed that the state's defence lawyers represented the Republic's opinions, 
but not his government's. Although ministers rarely draw such a stark distinction 
between their government and the state, the AKP often feels it needs to. The AKP, 
seeking to placate its traditional voters while retaining its legitimacy with the 
Republican mainstream, nodded in agreement when Sahin's lawyers - during their 
appeal - accused the ECHR of supporting 'limited' democracy for Turkey because it 
is a Muslim society (Z, 19 May 2005). Erdogan (2005b) took this even further, noting 
that banning the headscarf makes a mockery of democracy as 80 percent of society 
support it - a method of supporting the headscarf utilised since the 1980s (Sezer, 
1992:22). Further, it makes a mockery of Atattirk's modernisation drive, Erdogan
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continued, noting that the right to cover will be granted when Turkey reaches the level 
of human rights that Western civilisation entails.
Although, given France's policy on headscarves, the ECHR's ruling was hardly 
surprising, some EU commentators criticised it heavily, dismissing post-9/11 fears 
that full democracy is unattainable in Muslim societies. Seeking to debunk this myth, 
Sahin's lawyers used the language of Western democracy, basing their case on 
freedom of religion and conscience in 2002, and a girl's right to education during the 
18 May 2005 appeal. When, in autumn 2005, the ECHR announced its final decision, 
Turkey's secular establishment was jubilant and the AKP outraged. The ECHR found 
that turban laws in Turkey upheld both secularism and equality. In a democratic, 
secular constitution, notes secularist daily Milliyet (10 November 2005), equality is as 
important as freedom of religion, if not more so. For Milliyet, the ECHR's ruling was 
a triumph for women's rights. For secularists, the ruling was a triumph for Ataturk's 
definition of modernity and all corresponding policies: a validation and formal 
European acknowledgment. This recognition, valued in its own right in light of 
Turkey's westernising drive, is doubly significant as it boosted both the existence and 
exact nature of Kemalist secularism, making it harder for the AKP to verbalise its 
opposition to the headscarf ban in a (domestically) legitimate fashion.
Although the government had asked the ECHR to approve the headscarf ban in 
accordance with Turkish law and the opinions of the country's judicial, military and 
academic establishments, simultaneously AKP members had castigated the ban on 
several occasions. The government's ambivalent position meant that Munci Ozmen, 
Turkey's lawyer, was expected to both defend the ban and concede the need to review 
it in view of protecting rights and freedoms (Z, 19 May 2005). This approach is based 
on Erdogan's position that law should protect, not legislate human rights, of which 
wearing a headscarf is one. 'Rights are not given by law', notes Erdogan (Z, 26 April 
2005), rather 'laws are created to protect rights' that are, it is implied, natural.
This discourse of human rights and democracy allows the AKP to oppose the ban 
without abandoning its Kemalist legitimation. AKP members may stretch and, 
occasionally, stray from Kemalist language, but they always frame arguments in its 
terms. Hence, Erdogan (2005b) stresses that Atatiirk gave Turkish women rights their 
European counterparts could not even dream of. Now, it is every Turk's duty to
189
Chapter 6
ensure all women can make full use of their rights by ensuring that legislation reflects 
changing social trends. By introducing the Ataturkist angle of universal standards of 
civilisation, Erdogan speaks of the headscarf in terms of freedom of religion and 
expression. In Ataturk's time the headscarf may have represented backwardness but, 
after 80 years of Ataturkist modernisation, Turkey has changed and what the ban 
represents today is simply a failure to deliver the level of democracy and human rights 
that Western countries enjoy (ibid). Erdogan seeks to turn the headscarf - for 
Kemalists, a symbol of superstition and oppression to be stamped out - into a 
challenge for the secularist establishment; he seeks to make the headscarf a symbol of 
true secularism as, he notes, accepting a woman's right to cover would further 
equality between the sexes and institute true freedom of religion.
This argument, part of the AKP's careful redefinition of secularism, draws heavily on 
Kemalism, although it strays from standard interpretations. This legitimation 
narrative, however, could not stand alone. It is backed by constant references to the 
AKP's westernising credentials, a Kemalist trait, and their popular legitimacy, a 
democratic trait (e.g. see M, 30 November 2004). Presenting the right to cover as a 
popular demand, Erdogan (2005b) castigates the secularist establishment for granting 
rights selectively. Aqik (uncovered) and covered girls have an equal right to choose 
and they can only be protected concurrently, concluded the premier. In order to lift the 
headscarf ban and enable Turkey to further pursue its alignment with the West, 
Erdogan notes, unanimity and democracy are essential (Z, 5 November 2005).
Sezer (1992:43) notes that 'competitive politics has made it almost a foregone 
conclusion that the philosophical-ideological bases on which the state was originally 
erected yield in varying degrees to demands and inputs from civil society'. That is 
what Erdogan is banking on, possibly hoping that this yielding could be transformed 
into a fully fledged renegotiation of the state's philosophical bases, which, although 
not fully articulated as such, represent a momentous opportunity for change in 




3. a. The Courts
Early republican reformers believed that secularism, although introduced from above, 
would become self-sustainable. They never intended for a tolerant social pluralism to 
become the norm in Turkey, yet it has. Secularism's new, enlarged, boundaries are 
now zealously guarded by more than the TAF's guns. The judiciary is just as eager to 
protect the secular establishment from further erosion. The sheer number of Islamist 
agents, parties and organisations means that the courts are kept very busy.
Erbakan alone kept the courts working overtime for over 20 years (e.g. see NYT, 18 
January & 30 April 1998; 11 March & 11 July 2000; H, 1 June 2006). Although a 
string of his parties6 were banned, Erbakan was back in the game within days, months 
or years. Yet the courts kept fighting him. By the 1990s, his entourage had become so 
accustomed to the process, that, in anticipation of a ban, Refah's successor party 
Fazilet was ready pre-emptively. Eventually, the courts won. Erbakan never led 
Fazilet. In 1998 the Constitutional Court under Chief Justice Sezer banned Erbakan 
from politics for five years on the grounds of anti-secularism. The ruling, White 
(2002:136) notes, was not based on specific unconstitutional activity, but on 
Erbakan's opposition to constitutional essence, that is how much Erbakan's vocal and 
unpredictable Islamism had worried the secularists.
In a world where the Communist threat subsided only to be replaced by an Islamic 
global challenge, the TIS legacy was heavy. The courts needed to remain vigilant 
against Islamism as it represented both a threat to national unity and territorial 
integrity and an obstacle to Kemalist modernisation and westernisation. Vigilance 
gave rise to hyper-sensitivity. In 1998 Erdogan was tried over a 1997 campaign 
speech in which he recited a nationalistic poem of questionable artistic merit but 
undeniable religious overtones: 'Turkey's mosques will be our barracks, the minarets 
our bayonets, the domes our helmets, and the faithful our soldiers'. Although the
6 Banned in 1971, Erbakan was back in parliament within a year and Biilent Ecevit's deputy Prime 
Minister by 1974. Although he was successfully kept out of politics for most of the 1980s, he was back 
in parliament in 1990s, thanks to an electoral law amendment, and back in government after his 
unlikely alliance with Tansu
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religious element is undeniable, this is a militant nationalist poem, penned by Ziya 
Gokalp - a respected figure in Republican mythology. In the context of the TlS, these 
verses could have been a state-sponsored slogan. However, coming from a known 
Islamist, they sounded like a militant appeal to religious universalism.
Erdogan received a 10-month prison sentence in accordance with Article 312 of the 
Turkish Penal Code. He lost his mayoral seat and was banned from politics. When the 
AKP was created, this conviction and its founders' religiosity was not forgotten. The 
state prosecutor warned the AKP, whose founding members included covered women, 
that they were in violation of the law; so the AKP changed its constitution. On 19 
April 2002 Turkey's constitutional court barred Erdogan from leading his party and 
from standing in the impending national election because of his previous conviction, 
passed by a, now-defunct, SSC. Erdogan stepped aside and GUI lead the party.
His conviction was meant to carry a lifelong political ban with no right of appeal. 
Elected with an adequate majority to make the necessary constitutional amendments 
in 2002, however, the AKP ensured that, before the year was out, Erdogan ascended 
to power after a by-election, thus becoming Turkey's first Prime Minister to have 
served a prison sentence for inciting religious violence. Before this, however, he stood 
trial again in 2002, this time on charges of insulting the military and praising Islamic 
groups in Afghanistan 10 years previously (TDN, 25 April 2002). The trial, following 
a TAF petition to the Justice Ministry, was referring to a 1992 speech made in Rize, 
during which Erdogan congratulated Afghanistan on forming an Islamic Republic and 
accused the TAF of sending inexperienced conscripts to fight Kurdish rebels. Erdogan 
later admitted that these remarks were harsh and stressed he had no quarrel with the 
TAF. Nevertheless he rejected the charges, noting that 'the right to criticise is 
important in a democracy' (TDN, 25 April 2002).
Clearly the courts were more interested in containing Erdogan than punishing a 
specific trespass and that is why many worry he is now seeking to avenge himself (see 
Chapter 5). Although Erdogan emerged victorious on this occasion, the courts are 
watching closely. The courts' fear of Erdogan's religiosity is no secret and, since his 
election, the government and courts have engaged in a constant low-intensity bras-de­ 
fer over visible Islam, in other words, the question of the headscarf.
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For Atatiirk the veil was a metaphor of both male and societal oppression ( 
2005:62, 71). When the Kemalist state 'freed' women, the veil 'marked' those not yet 
reached by reforms, or those who resisted them out of ignorance. Thus the veil 
became a sign of backwardness (Ozdalga, 1998:35). By default, this made veiling a 
'class thing'. The veil, more prevalent among the poor or in the socially conservative 
periphery, became a symbol of their poverty and isolation in secular eyes. For them, 
however, veiling is not a political act but a constituent element of social identity and 
personal morality (Gulalp, 2003:386). Still, the headscarf remains a symbol of 
backwardness even when the individual wearing it is actively embracing modernity 
by, for instance, entering public life and becoming an MP.
In 1999, Fazilet MP Merve Kavak9i tried to take her oath in parliament wearing a 
headscarf (Yavuz, 2003:99, 249; White, 2002:145; Shankland, 1999:9, 129, 183). The 
resulting political mayhem and the subsequent, although partly unrelated, loss of her 
citizenship7 mark the significance the issue holds for Kemalist elites, expressed 
succinctly by Kazancigil & Ozbudun (1997:viii):
'Turkish Islamism remains an extremist minority movement. The favourite 
strategy of Islamist parties and groups seems to be increasing infiltration of 
governmental machinery with the aim of strengthening the hold of Islam in the 
country's social and political life, but without openly and directly challenging 
the secular state, at least for the time being.'
The fear surrounds the intentions of all Islamist politicians, Erdogan included - 
although, according to Heper (2005:221, 228), as a Sufi, Erdogan is by definition 
opposed to the political uses of religion - and all appearances of religious symbols in 
public life. Although it has been argued that taking the headscarf issue into parliament 
in the most dramatic fashion, namely by wearing it, is an appropriate course of action 
for a matter that has become essentially political, the headscarf saga is mostly played 
out in courtrooms and university campuses across the country.
The official line is that, in a secular state, religious symbols have no place in the 
public domain, hence headscarves are not allowed in universities, schools,
7 Kavak9i had failed to notify the authorities of her dual citizenship (Turkish and American).
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courthouses and other public buildings. The state does not care why women veil, 
although arguably it should. The veil is seen as a throwback and even DtB director, 
Professor Bardakoglu, a state employee, stressed that the headscarf is not a religious 
stipulation (M, 18 October 2003). In a muddled and contradictory statement claiming 
both that religion demands modesty in the form of a simple headscarf and that 
modesty does not mean wearing a headscarf, Bardakoglu seeks to toe the official line: 
the advent of modernity has made such practices redundant as religious habits respond 
to the mores of the era one lives in, making the headscarf irrelevant in Turkey.
To mark this, the headscarf is often banned, as graduants' relatives discovered when 
they were denied entry into the Ataturk University campus in the eastern city of 
Erzurum. Although graduating girls had complied with regulations and were about to 
receive their diplomas uncovered, their female relatives had not anticipated that police 
would deny them entry for wearing headscarves (WT, 2 October 2005). Although this 
may be an isolated incident, it stresses both the significance the issue holds for secular 
authorities and the haphazard nature of attire regulations.
There is no actual law prohibiting certain garments. That, for Ozdalga (1998:39), is 
part of the problem. Attire regulations are only applicable to certain groups, in some 
settings; they are often vague and complicated, as different types of headscarf are 
banned, discouraged or tacitly tolerated; and their implementation leaves a lot to
o
individual judgment. In 1982, for instance, the ba^ortu was banned in schools and 
universities. The ban proved difficult to implement as girls resisted in various ways - 
wearing wigs or hats over their headscarves - while overzealous interpreters sought to 
ban hair-ribbons (ibid, p.59). In 1984, while the ba$ortu remained banned, the turban 
was allowed as a head-covering in line with modern living. A debate ensued about 
whether the scarf was most 'modern' - i.e. secular - tied under the chin or at the nape 
of the neck and the regulation was withdrawn two years later. By 1989, universities 
and faculties were largely left to their own devices. It was clear by then, however, that 
the issue at stake was modernity's semiotic prevalence.
Meanwhile, politicians remained divided on the issue, although it was generally 




legislate accordingly, reinstating expelled 'covered' girls, President Evren blocked 
such efforts, referring legislation to the constitutional court. Now, according to Article 
17 of Higher Education Law 2547 (in effect since 1990), any item of clothing can be 
worn in universities (Z, 27 April 2005). Attempts to get a universal ban on the 
headscarf failed at court level, with President Sezer, then a judge, voting in favour of 
a ban. Universities, however, regulate internally whether covered students are allowed 
to attend classes and graduation ceremonies or sit exams.
Most universities tend to uphold an unconditional ban on members of staff, while 
regulations on students vary between universities and faculties. Although covered 
girls can now attend most universities, they often endure pressure and intimidation in 
doing so. Reaching graduation covered necessitates a thorough knowledge of 
university regulations - calculating the number of 'warnings' and 'cautionary notes' a 
student is allowed before expulsion - that many girls find unbearable and quit. Others 
persist. After graduation, however, they find that civil servants, lawyers, MPs and 
other state employees are expected to keep their head bare. The rationale is simple: 
the secular state's representatives should look secular (Ozdalga, 1998:51, 52).
Moreover, teaching women to embrace modernity was part of the state's modernising 
project. When educated and articulate - i.e. modern - women take on the headscarf, 
they represent a failure in terms of society's modernisation and an aberration from 
Kemalist modernity narratives, wherein the headscarf was a trait of backwardness and 
oppression that should naturally disappear. That women should willingly cover is 
unthinkable, yet it happens. As shown above, Erdogan celebrates this choice as a 
triumph for Kemalist secularism and modernisation.
This re-appropriation of Kemalist language does not, however, convince everyone. 
Former Chief Justice Mustafa Bumin, by-passing Erdogan's elaborate re- 
conceptualisations, issued an unequivocal proclamation in favour of the ban, resulting 
in Erdogan's abstention from the celebrations of the anniversary of the constitutional 
court's foundation. YOK spokesmen, criticising the AKP's treatment of the headscarf 
issue, incurred Bulent Arum's wrath. Ann? accused unaccountable institutions of 
creating political tension and 'some political parties' of joining them as their 
instruments (TDN, 8 July 2005). Ann? defiantly asserted Parliament's authority to 
deal with the headscarf issue in accordance with the people's wishes (TNA, 8 July
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2005), positioning himself opposite the secular establishment. Erdogan, conversely, 
preferring reconciliation to confrontation, suggested that the ban should be lifted from 
private universities, leading to Ko9's9 exclamation that 'the Prime Minister is 
seriously in need of legal counsel' if he thinks that Turkish law can be selectively 
applied (TNA, 9-10 July 2005).
Tensions are high, but debate is occurring over an issue that had hitherto remained 
'above discussion' in the secularists' minds. Many have tried to benefit from this 
change. Even ANAP 10, then outside Parliament, sought to champion the issue, 
demanding a constitutional amendment (TDN, 8 July 2005). Building on the party's 
traditional links to Islam, ANAP leader Erkan Mumcu went as far as accusing 
Erdogan of ignoring the problem (Z, 19 July 2005).
The courts, university rectors, TAP and President watch these attempts to score points 
with the electorate with contempt and trepidation. While their commitment to 
Kemalism is unwavering, the constant widening of political debate and the 
corresponding proliferation of visions regarding modernity and secularism worries 
them. The government is the prime agent seeking to widen the scope for debate while 
the state - 'a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent 
to, or fused with the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of 
member groups in the polity' (Skocpol, 1993:27) - seeks to retain its monopoly over 
definitions of key terms such as nationality, modernity and secularism.
The struggle is largely symbolic, yet its effects (trials, imprisonment, party bans) are 
real for the people involved especially as, recently, the struggle ended in murder, 
making secularists feel their mistrust of Islamists was sadly vindicated. Following a 
February ruling against schoolteacher Ayta? Kill's right to wear a headscarf outside 
school, a lawyer, Alparslan Arslan, shouting 'I am a soldier of Allah', opened fire 
inside the Council of State, killing one and injuring four of the judges involved in the 
ruling. Kilin?, who was about to start work in a TAF-affiliated school, was covered in 
her private life, not at work. Nevertheless, this was considered 'a violation of the
9 CHP's parliamentary group deputy leader.
10 Anavatan Partisi, the Motherland Party.
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principles of the legal order' and she was demoted and transferred to a village 
school 11 .
The shooting occurred in a period of heightened insecurity, with attacks on secular 
newspapers 12 and AKP headquarters, as well as Kurdish-related violence both in 
major cities and in the Southeast increasing concerns about the Republic's security 
(G, 18 May 2006; TDN, 26 July 2006; Z, 10 August 2006; TDN, 14 August 2006). 
President Sezer described this as an attack on the secular Republic 13 . The judicial 
establishment accused the state, on the one hand, of failing to protect justice and the 
Press, on the other hand - in particular the daily Vakit - of radicalising public opinion 
and publishing the judges' pictures thus exposing them to danger (E, 18 May 2006). 
Adding insult to injury, Erdogan failed to attend the murdered judge's funeral and, 
although he condemned the attack, he also condemned attempts to link it to his 
activities. Yet, in light of such events, the distinction between republican Islamists 
and fanatics becomes academic for the secular establishment, which is part of the 
problem in the first place.
3.b. The President
President Sezer (2004a, b) is proud of Turkey's Islamic past, which he sees as a 
fraction of a long history, surpassing Ottoman times in both duration and significance. 
The Republic respects Islam, he notes, but awards it no role in the public realm, hence 
he opposes all public expressions of religion, headscarves included. Consequently, 
when the President celebrated his son's wedding at the Cankaya presidential complex, 
Erdogan, Gul and Ann? were invited without their wives. This was neither the first 
nor the last time AKP members were invited to presidential functions without their 
covered spouses (M, 28 October 2003; TP, 12 September 2004; M, 8 January 2004).
11 See 17 May 2005. Human Rights Watch (vvwvv hrw org) and 26 May 2006 
http.//service.spiegel,de''cache/international/spiegel/0.1518.417900.00 htm
12 Arslan and eight other suspects are accused of being involved in both the Council of State shooting 




Sezer is a staunch secularist. His record as both judge and President testifies to this. 
Erdogan is suspected as an Islamist and as such is watched closely. This means that 
the President is not only watching out for religious trespasses, as the courts are, but 
monitors the government's every act. These suspicions compromise the government's 
ability to carry out the difficult reforms necessary for EU accession. In the midst of 
strenuous and momentous transformations, the country's top leaders are not talking to 
each other. Public opinion finds this ludicrous and counter-productive (Z, 31 October 
2005), yet it does not stop.
The AKP's reaction to this disparaging attitude is to remind the President, the citizens 
and the TAP, whose interventions invariably rest on the existence of an effective 
power vacuum, that Sezer is neither directly elected by, nor answerable to the people. 
Bearing in mind that the AKP's is the first single-party government since 1987, 
Erdogan often juxtaposes his government's popular legitimacy to the President's 
power without responsibility, advising Sezer not to raise his voice above that of the 
people's democratically elected, accountable representatives. The same accusation is 
levelled against YOK functionaries or the CHP leadership who, in the AKP's mind, 
do the President's bidding (e.g. see TDN, 6 June 2005; TNA & TDN, 8 July 2005; 
TNA, 14 October 2005). This appeal to a public mandate enhances, as mentioned 
before, the AKP's often-shaky Kemalist legitimation narrative. The AKP's electoral 
mandate is their only trump card against opponents inside and outside parliament.
Although secularists enjoy pointing out that the AKP's parliamentary majority does 
not correspond to a true mandate, as turnout was low and the electoral system favours 
the front-runner (e.g. Kili, 2003:408), the AKP enjoys the ability to claim superior 
democratic authority to any agency levelling anti-secular accusations against them. 
This authority is also practically expedient. The AKP emerged from the 2002 election 
with a strong and stable government and an adequate majority to shape the 2007 
presidential election. The question of whether Turkey is about to have its first Islamist 
president is on everyone's mind. Erdogan's responses are evasive, neither confirming 
nor denying speculation. So secularist circles worry.
Although the AKP constantly stresses it is not an Islamist party and does not have an 
Islamist programme, for many academics, observers and journalists the personal piety 
of AKP members and their past association with Erbakan are proof to the contrary
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(TNA, 14 October 2004). The fact that this party can effectively appoint Turkey's next 
President causes intense trepidation: will Turkey find itself with an Islamist President, 
bent on compromising secularism? 'This election might result in the regime's secular 
nature being seriously challenged and fragmented' (TNA, 7 July 2005) as the 
President has traditionally applied secularist pressures on politicians.
Past experience is reassuring. Ozal, pious and charitably inclined towards Islam, 
indulged in no anti-secularist hysterics when President. There is no reason to believe 
that the AKP will exact revenge on secularists through the next presidential 
appointment, yet many fear it. For now, speculation is rife. Unless Erdogan calls early 
elections, he has the prerogative, as leader of the party with a majority in parliament, 
to nominate his presidential candidate. Who that candidate might be is the subject of 
heated debate. Meanwhile, Sezer's confrontation with Erdogan over secularism rages 
on, focusing, in 2005, on the perennial question of religious education.
Imam-hatip schools have been the subject of a tug-of-war between secularism's 
guardians and populist governments since 1946. The opening of such schools 
represents one of the main demands voiced by Muslim groups and of the main 
concessions granted by centre-Right parties for electoral support (Yavuz, 2003:127). 
Secularists seek to 'contain' them, especially as, in the 1960s, they expanded beyond 
training imam-hatips. Graduates enjoyed free access to post-graduation options, thus 
imam-hatip schools became an alternative to the (secular) education system (Aksit, 
1991:147). The 1971 military intervention ended this, making them a less attractive 
option - offering shorter tuition and limited post-graduation choices. In 1983, Ozal 
allowed imam-hatip graduates to take university exams for any discipline, while in 
1997 the velvet coup limited the schools' scope once again (Sezer, 1992:24).
The TAP oppose offering imam-hatip graduates non-religious career options; so does 
President Sezer. Erdogan, an imam-hatip graduate himself, disagrees. While Professor 
Zeki Aslanturk 14 accuses the secularists of politicising religious education, they, in 
turn, accuse the government of seeking to give such schools equal status with modern, 
non-vocational, secular schools in order to sabotage modernisation (A/, 18 October 
2003).
14 Divinity Faculty, Maramara University.
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Similar tensions surround Kuranic courses and seminaries, as secularists deplore their 
continued existence, even though they are under state supervision. As early as 2003, 
the AKP legislated in favour of state control over religious education and Article 263 
of the new penal code bans all unauthorised teaching of the Kuran in informal settings 
(Z, 17 May & 5 June 2005). Religious groups, especially Islamic orders and 
brotherhoods, running unofficial courses were furious. The resulting clash with the 
AKP highlights that there is no 'Islamic camp' in Turkey - opinions differ, beliefs 
vary and 'Islamist' responses do not exist. For secularists, that hardly matters, as two 
years previously the AKP confirmed their suspicions by establishing extensive 
optional night and summer Kuran classes (TDN, 8 December 2003).
This could be indicative of the AKP's willingness to placate competing concerns 
while pursuing its own agenda. The AKP stayed loyal to the Kemalist script when 
noting that religious education should be carried out under state supervision. It even 
limited the scope of religious education, making it impossible for children to attend 
Kuran schools before completing eight years of formal education. Yet, 
simultaneously, the extension of state control was presented as a salvage operation, 
preventing religious education, in Education Minister Huseyin £elik's words, from 
being 'pushed underground as a nefarious activity' (TDN, ibid) and thus vesting it 
with new significance. The Kemalist state provides religious and moral education in 
order to exert control; the AKP uses this power to protect, not isolate religious 
education.
In a rare moment of agreement with AKP policy, Sezer declared illegal Kuran courses 
to be in violation of Turkey's constitutionally protected secularism (M, 17 May 2005) 
and asked for severe punishments to prevent terrorist, sectarian and missionary 
organisations from opening such schools (Z, 4 June 2005). The state, noted Sezer, 
cannot allow for youth to be educated in ways that are separatist, outdated or contrary 
to the Republic's founding principles. Erdogan was unhappy with Sezer's reading of 
his policies. It is a natural right, he stated, for every Turk to learn the Holy Book. 'It is 
a disrespect against Muslims to misinterpret studying the Kuran as an instrument of 
[terror]' and the nation will not forgive attempts to exploit this politically (Z, 29 May 
2005). Although the AKP and Sezer actually agree on this particular law, they do so 
for different reasons and Erdogan wants that stressed. Discussing religious rights as
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part of a citizen's human rights is central to Erdogan's redefinition of secularism. 
Erdogan rejects the Kemalist equation of religion with backwardness and terror while 
not rejecting state control over religion. Thus he broadens the debate without openly 
undermining the secular state. President Sezer is waiting, ready to intervene as 
necessary, and the TAP are observing closely.
3.c. The TAP
For the TAF, protecting secularism begins at home. Between January 1995 and 
August 2000, Tank (2005:8) notes, the TAF expelled 745 serving officers for 
ideological reasons - in other words, excess religiosity. Turkey's military routinely 
dismisses officers suspected of sympathizing with Islamic groups or Kurdish 
terrorists' (TDN, 1 December 2003), as they fail to conform with the TAF's corporate 
identity and the Kemalist plan (Altmay, 2004:72). Although the military's ability to 
purge itself is currently under AKP scrutiny, its willingness to dismiss officers over 
'disciplinary infractions' (TDN, 9 August 2005) is indicative of the TAF's esprit de 
corps. As General Evren noted during the 1980s coup:
'[Tjhose who attempt to challenge the secular tradition of our republic by 
hiding behind the free democratic system are bound to be crushed. The [TAF] 
which, from the raw recruit to the senior commander, constitute the most 
resolute defenders of the reforms and principles of the Sublime Ataturk will 
tear out any tongue sullying his name and break any hand touching him in 
malice' (quoted in Birand, 1987:139).
Secularism is defended as a precondition for progress, a universal civilisational trait 
and part of Ataturk's legacy. As Deputy Chief of Staff General Ba§bug (2005) 
stressed, although ' 98 percent of [Turkey's] population is Muslim... [the] Republic is 
a democratic and secular state'. Secularism, inherited from Ataturk, is a "basic and 
indispensable principle' for the fulfilment of Ataturk's project as it is a constituent 
element of modernity. 'Ataturk's thought-system is mainly based on secularism. 
Secularism... is based on reason and positive science [and] presents an ideal lifestyle 
for all societies' (ibid). For Ba§bug, secularism is objectively beneficial, hence its 
opponents are not only sullying Ataturk's legacy, but are also objectively misguided.
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The TAP see secularism both as a precondition for westernisation and as one of 
Ataturk's legacies in its own right - on an equal footing with modernisation and 
republicanism and worthy of the same protection. Hence, although secularism and 
westernisation are distinct notions, they are not separable and the TAP are unwilling 
to compromise one for the other. Consequently, post-9/11 US references to Turkey as 
a friendly Muslim democracy and an example for the Muslim world, enraged the 
generals. Ataturk's westernisation entailed being accepted by the West as an equal 
(see Chapter 7) not as a useful oddity. Moreover, Turkey has spent eight decades 
dissociating itself from the Islamic world through secularism and modernisation. 
Hence, when Colin Powell described Turkey as an Islamic state, General Tolon 
frostily reminded him that Turkey has been a secular republic for eight decades (TP, 3 
April 2004). Similarly, General Ozkok stated that 'Turkey is neither an Islamic state, 
nor an Islamic country' (TDN, 28 April 2005), but a secular country wherein religion 
is respected but reactionary movements are not tolerated. 'Bear in mind that our great 
leader Ataturk placed secularism in the centre of [the] six principles he established 
while founding the Republic. He recognised... that all modem and civilised nations 
were strongly tied to secularism' (Ozkok, 2005a).
The Republic 'has no official religion. All laws and regulations... are made... 
according to the scientific principles and forms provided by modern civilisation' 
(ibid). Turkey's population may be 99 percent Muslim, Ozkok concedes, but that does 
not give 'some circles' the right to redefine Turkey's polity as an Islamic one. Turkey 
cannot be a model for Islamic countries. 'What is forgotten or neglected here is the 
fact that secularism is the main driving force in the development of Turkish 
democracy' (Ozkok, ibid). Turkey should not be judged on the basis of its geographic 
position but in terms of its civilisational choices. Turkey chose secularism the day it 
chose westernisation. Secularism is not an 'aside' in Turkey's political development 
but 'the keystone of all values that constitute the Republic' (ibid). Secularism is 
central to Turkey's national existence, hence discussing republicanism or nationality 
as distinct from secularism is, for the TAP, misguided, if not openly provocative. For 
Basbug (2005a), 'secularism is the mam driving force behind the development of 
democracy' and the TAF's duty is to protect them both. This commitment to 
secularism is both a well-known fact and, for many, a welcome security.
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Protesting a draft law perceived as a threat to secularism and YOK's independence, a 
group of senior academics marched to Amtkabir, on Republic Day 2003 (M, 28 
October 2003). Rather than protesting against the specifics of the proposal, however, 
the rectors' placards read 'ordu goreve' 15, urging the military to intervene with a coup 
against the AKP. Their entry in their visitors' book was 'Atam, vatan elden gidiyor' 16 . 
Ataturk's Republic is upheld as a coherent whole and the TAP are called upon to 
defend it. By urging the TAP to ensure that secularism was not compromised, 
however, the academics were claiming part of the guardian's mantle for themselves, 
while also choosing Kemalist republicanism over popular democracy - by dismissing 
both the people's elected representatives and the citizens' ability to resist the erosion 
of secularism. Many within Turkish society share this unease. Some turn to the 
military; others, such as the President and judges, shoulder the responsibility to 
defend secularism against the AKP's perceived encroachments themselves.
'[E]xactly because the patriotism of the TAP cannot be doubted... Turkey is in 
constant danger of military intervention' (E, 9 December 2003). The era of armed 
interventions may be over, especially as technological innovation makes the control of 
public opinion virtually impossible. Yet the TAP can, and do, intervene without 
getting the armoured vehicles outside their depot. The debate over the boundaries and 
provisions of Turkey's secularism is unfolding under the shadow of this knowledge.
4. The Boundaries of Modernity
For Kemalists, modernity is good and secularism is part of both modernity and the 
path to it. Secularism is therefore good and aberrations are bad. Although simplistic, 
this stipulation captures many Kemalists' feelings, echoed in Mango's (1999a:8) 
words: '[D]etractors [from Ataturk's legacy]... are afraid of the modern world and 
want to retreat into a past that never was.' Positions denying, questioning or diverging 
from Ataturk are seen as reactionary, destructive and, by extension, inherently 
illegitimate.
15 Army, to your duty.
16 'Father, the fatherland is leaving your hands'.
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Although resistance to Atatiirk's secularism was intense and bitter during the early 
Republic 17, swift justice was delivered through the Independence Tribunals, sending 
people to the gallows after summary proceedings. What today seems like a prickly, 
but symbiotic, relationship between the secular state and controlled Islam, was not 
always so. Atatiirk's secularising policies relied on the force of arms. This, strangely, 
enhances his supporters' passionate enthusiasm for Atatiirk's achievements. The fact 
that the Turks - illiterate and superstitious (ilkin, 2003) - had to be forced to 
modernise makes Atatiirk's achievement seem even more admirable. 'Perhaps his 
most outstanding quality was his ability to develop an ambitious yet achievable vision 
for the future of his country... Of all the revolutions of the past century, only the one 
in Turkey achieved its goals, and still maintains its dynamism and vigour... The 
reason for this longevity is simple: Atatiirk's ideology... of humanity and civilization' 
(ibid). This, in turn, makes Atatiirk appear more glorious, 'a man of unusual foresight, 
intellect, wisdom and charisma... enormous courage and stamina' (ibid).
Given this adulation, it is hardly surprising that Kemalists resist the use of Kemalism 
as a language and rather see it as a specific (and restrictive) ideology. Perceiving 
Kemalism as an organic whole makes selective interpretations unacceptable - besides, 
most Kemalists would trust no one's ability to 'interpret'. Kemalists enjoy repeating 
that without Ataturk neither the Turkish nation nor its modernisation would exist, 
which means that the Turks would never have realised their own ability to 'learn to 
use the tools of modern civilisation and live up to the exigencies of each new age' 
(Kili, 1969:49). As modernisation is unthinkable without secularism (Kili, 1969:221) 
and progress, survival and national dignity are unthinkable without modernisation, 
Islamists are national dangers and possibly deranged individuals to boot.
•
As Kili (ND) explains hi the Voice of Atatiirk, Islam is 'not interested in a 
reconciliation with the forces of modernity' and 'Islamic groups (have) an aversion to 
Kemal Atatiirk'. Islam is an obstacle on the road towards completing Turkey's 
transformation. As Atatiirk's plan represents 'the very essence of Turkish 
enlightenment' (ibid), Islam stands outside Turkey's national existence and in the way 
of progress. Even academics, who do not accept Kemalism uncritically, often accept
17 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion; 1930 Menemen rebellion; 1930-1 Agn Dag uprising (leading to the 1934 
Resettlement Law); 1937-8 Dersim rebellion.
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secularisation as a prerequisite for modernisation, thus dismissing Islamism as 
reactionary (e.g. see Giilalp, 1997:57-8).
It sometimes seems that self-proclaimed Kemalists inherit a mistrust of Islamists that 
is neither necessarily coherent nor always rational. Kaylan is a case in point. His 
book, an incoherent jumble of memories and personal opinions, lacks both academic 
and literary merit. Yet it remains significant as Kaylan - having served as Reuters 
correspondent, political news editor ofAk$am and Yeni Sabah and editor-in-chief of 
Hurriyet - enjoyed access to respectable public platforms for decades and his views 
are loosely representative of one group of journalists and newspaper men. Finally, this 
book, dedicated to Atatiirk's memory and loyally reproducing official narratives, is an 
interesting specimen of unsolicited Kemalist propaganda.
His stated aim is to expose and castigate 'Islamist bigots' (p.23, 83, 369) and 
fundamentalists18 (p. 133), because of whom 'the secularity of the state is under an 
obsessive and hostile encroachment' (p.430). Kaylan perceives Kemalism as both 
indivisible and natural, hence a denial of part - staunch secularism - equals a denial 
of the whole, which is, in itself, an unnatural frame of mind: bigoted, reactionary and 
dangerous. This makes it impossible for Kaylan to perceive the rise of Islamism as a 
social phenomenon. Rather, he attributes it to peasant ignorance, incomplete 
modernisation, Islamist financing from abroad or to the failure of Atatiirk's successors 
to follow the plan, rather than to a flaw in the plan itself. Had the Turks been vigilant 
against external interference, as Ataturk instructed them, all this could have been 
avoided (p.305-6). Islamism only exists today because Turkey strayed from Atatiirk's 
path. Its existence poses a clear danger to Turkey's continued survival in its present 
form as, Kaylan (2005:323-4) notes, '[t]he harem is the ultimate objective of 
tesettiir19'... I believe that the election victory... of the [AKP] with its Islamic roots, 
finally caused tesettur to take over the Turkish secular state.'
18 For Kaylan, the act of building thousands of new mosques when secular schools are needed is 
fundamentalist.
19 Tesettiir is a way of covering that differs from the traditional headscarf both stylistically (the scarf 
tightly covers the head, neck and shoulders but not the face. It is usually matched with a pastel- 
coloured floor-length coat, which hides the contours of the body without being bulky and billowing) 
and symbolically. Tesettur is invariably considered 'political'.
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Kaylan is representative of a group of secularists who are unable - or unwilling - to 
concede that there is no such thing as an Islamist movement. 'Islamism' is fragmented 
and plural, hence generalisations are misleading. Moreover, Turkish Islamism as a 
phenomenon grew within the republican tradition and does not automatically reject 
the Kemalist Republic. Yet accepting the reality of these statements presupposes a 
conceptualisation of both republicanism as separable from Kemalism and Islamism as 
compatible with republicanism; neither is easy. Ataturk's nation-building project was 
focused and specific. Islamism, in most its manifestations, accepts the nation and 
embraces the republic, yet it re-conceptualises modernisation - if not its desirability, 
then its essence and the paths towards it. In principle, certain forms of Islamism are 
fully compatible with Kemalism, yet Kemalists are not willing to entertain that 
thought.
Kemalism's ambiguous relationship with religion, rejecting it as a sign of 
backwardness but simultaneously harnessing it for nation-building purposes, is 
captured in Pamuk's (2005:162) aphorism: '[W]e equated piety with poverty but 
never in too loud a voice.' Although even secular Turks rarely fully reject religion, its 
public expression is generally equated with material and spiritual poverty, a feeling 
that, in recent years, has been combined with fear inspired by the violence that 
Islamist fundamentalists have shown themselves capable of elsewhere. Could that 
happen in Turkey? For Shankland (2004), there are enough aggressively religious 
people in Turkey to constitute a real danger for both secularism and aqik girls, if the 
neutrality of public space is compromised. This view, echoed by Sezer and TAP 
commanders, rests on the assumption that Islamism represents both a challenge to 
modernity and a physical threat for secular individuals. Toprak (1981:122), however, 
notes that it is naive to assume that religion's interaction with modernisation has been 
static and consistently obstructive over eight decades of Republican history.
In fact, for Toprak, today's religiosity is a measure of the ever-increasing cultural gap 
between ruling elites and the 'masses': not a threat, but a warning protesting the 
Republic's treatment of its citizens. Birand (M, 12 January 2004) agrees. Islamism 
hardly constitutes an anti-modern social movement, he notes. Rather, it represents the 
articulation of frustrations that intellectual and political elites choose to interpret as 
potentially dangerous because they harbour a profound mistrust for the people, a la
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Ataturk. Thus, Republican elites support continuous military involvement in politics 
because they fear that traitors within and enemies without seek to divide the country. 
Those who believe that the military should partake of the country's governance to 
prevent it from straying off the correct path, Birand continues, do not realise that the 
people will permit neither division nor a revision of the secular republic. Nor will the 
AKP. For Birand the secular republic is safer than ever (M, 8 January 2004).
White (2002) agrees. Her study shows that, although some Islamists contemplate the 
advantages of a §eriat order, Islamist political idioms are mostly couched in 
republican terms and Islamist politicians seem committed to Turkey's democratic 
parameters (Yavuz, 2003:4). Erbakan, pnar (2005:118) believes, is a dated 
phenomenon. Refah's successors (Fazilet and the AKP) vocally endorse Kemalist 
republicanism. Moreover, Islamist politicians, Erbakan included, are intensely 
nationalistic (White, 2002:53; £mar, 2005:8). Although their Turkishness often 
contains a greater dose of Ottomanism than official historiography prescribes, they 
never place the ummet above the nation. Political Islam, in all its manifestations, 
accepts the Republic's rules of engagement and constitutes a functional part of a 
plural democracy (Ozdalga, 1998:3, 93; ^inar, 2005:83). Fanaticism is introduced 
into the equation more frequently by state anxiety than Islamist activities.
That said, the relationship between Islam and modernity is far from simple. Although 
'[t]he history of modern Turkey... is a complex, many-tiered encounter between 
"traditional" forces and modernity' (Mardin, 2005:160), Islam now straddles this 
divide, accommodating, challenging and reconceptualising modernity in ways to 
which state agencies seem oblivious. Thus the state lags behind (civil) society, failing 
to distinguish between Islamic movements seeking to dissolve Ataturk's modernity 
and those seeking to re-appropriate it. Fethullah Giilen is a case in point. His neo-Nur 
movement combines modernist and Islamist idioms; it is intensely nationalistic, pro- 
Atatiirk and pro-Ottoman; it is Islamist yet highly individualistic20 and forward- 
looking. Gulen subverts standard analytical categories and challenges the Kemalist 
discursive monopoly against which Erdogan is also fighting.
20 http://en.fgulen.eom/a.page/life/gulens thoughts/individual.and.individual.human.rights/c244 html
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Imprisoned after 1971, Giilen was brought before the now-abolished SSCs under the 
Counter-Terrorism Act (Z, 27 April 2005) in 2000. He re-appeared in court in 2003 
and 2006 under accusations of trying to Islamicise public life. Gttlen embraces the 
secular republic vocally,21 yet he faces the secularist fear that Islamists' true 
intentions remain unfathomable. Moreover, in opposing Giilen, secularists defend 
Kemalism's monopolies over definitions of identity and modernity. Although 
nationalistic, Gulen introduces an element of spirituality in identity narratives that 
makes Kemalists uncomfortable. For Turan (1991:40), 'early Republican leadership, 
in their effort to build a nation, may have produced a national timmet ' that Gulen is 
now educating in order to enable it to externalise Islamic consciousness in a modern 
world (Yavuz, 2003:185, 187, 193). Yet this Kemalist thread is lost on Kemalists, as 
Gulen recasts core Kemalist terms, such as secularism22, republicanism23 and the 
nation , infusing their discussion - much as Erdogan does - with piety and a 
religious subtext not originally there. Therein lies the tension with Kemalist 
modernity.
Giilen stages a sustained discursive assault on Kemalist modernity through a huge 
network of teachers, bursaries, dormitories and schools. He focuses on spirituality25 
and hardly considers the headscarf integral to faith. This is a linguistic struggle, as 
Giilen is introducing Turkish youth to a modernist political idiom other than that of 
secular Kemalism, breaking the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by Kemalist national 
discourses. Giilen's suggestion that the wholesale rejection of Turkey's Ottoman 
legacies in favour of Hittite symbols offers the Turks an irrelevant past may be 
accurate, but it challenges the entire national edifice. Similarly, his moralistic reading 
of national bonds and republicanism as well as his definition of secularism as freedom 
of religion rather than freedom from it mean that, although Giilen does not reject 
Ataturk, his narratives are incompatible with Kemalist orthodoxy.
Giilen re-appropriates the Turks' Ottoman past and readmits Islam into national 
narratives. In doing so, without rejecting existing narratives, he enriches the core of
21 http //en feulen com/a page/lit'e/gulens thouahls/republn: politics democracy and secularism'al270 html
22 http'//en feulen com/a page/life/gulcns thoughts/republic politics democracy and scculansm'al274 html
23 http //en fgulen com/a page/life/gulens thoughts/republic politics democracy and seculansm/al3b8 html
24 http.//en.fgulen com/a page/life/as a teacher/a816 html
25 http.//en fgulen com/a page/lit'e/gulens thoughts/religion.islam and relevant matteiVc242 html
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nationhood. This alternative focus remains illegitimate in Kemalist eyes, as national 
identity is first and foremost secular; Islam was never meant to penetrate to its core. 
Using the opportunities that the TAP created, Islamists started an unsolicited and 
unauthorised renegotiation of collective memory, challenging the state's discursive 
monopoly. If nationality can be redefined, however, so can modernity and secularism.
Islamists use the language of human rights, democracy and globalisation in order to 
counter-balance their poor secular credentials with public appeals to a recognisable 
modern idiom, further legitimised through Turkey's EU drive. Yet this renegotiation 
of prevailing political values is not the powerhouse behind the ever-increasing 
popularity of Islamist movements. Individuals, notes White (2002:5-6, 28, 79), are 
attracted to the movement's use of a socio-cultural idiom, religious in origin, 
accessible to people lacking sophisticated cultural capital; the state's refusal to 
acknowledge this turns Islamist activity into politics.
Although subversive political Islam exists, many Islamists embrace the Republic and 
remain national(istic), albeit in unconventional ways. Islamists are not uniformly 
'backward'; in fact, Dagi (2005:21, 23) notes, they never were. Islamist antagonism 
towards the West was never essential; rather it was fuelled by Kemalist oppression of 
Islamist expressions in the name of westernisation and modernisation. This 
antagonism was never translated into an Islamist rejection of modernisation (Dagi, 
2005:25) and anti-Western Islamist feeling has been declining since the 1970s 
(Toprak, 2005:171). Even Erbakan - whose infamous Milli Goru§ (National Outlook) 
was suspicious of the West - embraced modernisation and Western capitalism, only 
advocating Turkey's withdrawal from the Customs Union when not in office (Yavuz, 
2003:45; Navaro-Yashin, 2003:55-56). Now Turkish Islamists, including Kutan, often 
use the West as a reference point while employing the language of rights and 
democracy. Islamism's antagonism with the West is over, yet Islamists have not 
embraced existing modernist narratives. Rather they have re-conceptualised 
modernity through a discourse of democracy and human rights, enabling them to 
articulate their spiritual needs as such rights and to renegotiate secularism within a 




A 2005 European Stability Initiative Report shows that the Anatolian Tigers, a group 
of socially conservative and commercially thriving Anatolian entrepreneurs, 
successfully embrace market capitalism while abandoning neither their piety nor 
public acts of Islamic charity. Their willingness to accept modernity readily and 
effectively - assisted by access to capital, skill, luck and the reforms that 'profoundly 
changed the nature of the state and its relationship to society' (p.22) - enabled some 
Anatolians to prosper more than others. In Kayiseri, the report notes, Islam has made 
its peace with modernity: there is a large mosque in the university campus and 
companies have prayer rooms on site. Conservative social habits do not preclude 
market orientations, pro-EU attitudes or mixed lifestyles. In Ankara's Begendik 
Kocatepe shopping centre, covered women buy foreign products while the ezcm is 
heard overhead. Covered girls use mobile phones, smoke in public and walk hand-in- 
hand with their boyfriends, wearing modest yet fitted outfits. Although traditional 
lifestyles survive in Turkey, 'reformed Islam' is also a sociological reality - both the 
product of modernisation and a factor assisting its growth.
Among the Anatolian Tigers, education, healthcare and social activities are promoted 
through Islamic charity. The picture would be perfect, the report notes, but for the 
question of women, who remain marginally employed or kept at home. Employers 
admitted preferring to hire men (p.30) because they are the family breadwinners and 
women only work until they marry. The report remains hopeful that the Tigers' 
entrepreneurial pragmatism - and the labour shortages this strategy is bound to cause 
in the long run - will change these attitudes. For secularists, however, modernisation 
is as much about economics as it is about lifestyles, hence the Tigers' attitude towards 
women makes their modern aspirations seem like a sham.
Fears that Islamists will not only oppose but, given the chance, undermine the 
'Western way of life' are never far from the secularists' mind. In the run-up to the 27 
March 1994 municipal elections, the Islamists were heading the polls and media 
anxiety over women's mobility, Western entertainment and freedom to choose one's 
preferred way of life reached a feverish peak (Navaro-Yashin, 2002:29). Although 
sensationalist reporting invariably boosts sales and ratings, the concern is genuine and 
reappeared during the 2004 municipal elections (A/, 2 February 2004).
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In 1994, the fears proved well-founded as certain Refah-run municipal restaurants and 
coffee houses stopped serving alcohol (Cmar, 2005:128-9). But women's attire was 
not regulated and gender-segregation not promoted. The Islamists have not forsaken 
their conservatism. However, having accepted its instrumental benefits, they have re- 
conceptualised their relationship with modernity. For Kemalists, the simple act of re- 
conceptualisation is an affront. So is the Islamist advocacy of mixed lifestyles within 
a democratic setting - especially as, for Kemalists, the path from accepting religious 
lifestyles as legitimate to finding oneself under Islamist rule is short and slippery. 
Naturally, Turkey should not have to choose between secularist or Islamist 
authoritarianism, but secularist fears and reactions make that difficult to realise.
Islamists have failed to convince the secularists that this new-found appreciation for 
modernity is sincere and their proposed alternative routes are valid. Yet they persist 
and their resilience astounds Kemalists, who have inherited the view that religion as a 
viable political idiom would never survive modernisation. Islamist idioms grew 
gradually - first filling the vacuum created by the relentless anti-Leftist witch-hunt of 
the 1970s, leaving economic and social reform without a champion. Generating a 
discourse based on justice and rule-governed conduct for all facets of life in a secular 
state, Islamist actors capitalised on the relaxed intellectual climate of the 1980s. The 
attempt in the 1990s to retract that relaxation cannot undo its effects. Islamist idioms 
carry weight and command an audience. They generate their own legitimacy that, 
often, appeals to Kemalism and modernisation as much as it does to faith. In fact, 
many Islamists wish for more secularism and more republicanism, and their main 
criticism of Kemalism is that it has not gone far enough.
Standard secularisation theses predicting that religion naturally withdraws into the 
private sphere in a modernising society were proven wrong in Turkey, as was the fear 
that Islamists would battle modernity to the bitter end. Islamists approach modernity 
differently from Kemalists; they appreciate it for different reasons and lifestyle 
options vary wildly. Yet, in economic, industrial and technological terms, they are in 
complete concert. This, however, does not resolve the tension. Even if Islamist 
versions of modernity were accepted as legitimate, their determination to recalibrate 
national identity and re-embrace its rejected past by definition antagonises Republican 
narratives and, by extension, the Republican project. Finally, although Islamists
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accept economic and industrial modernisation, the question of lifestyle remains 
pertinent. Would they, given the chance, restrict options, force women to cover, 
censor art or ban alcohol? Or would a 'multicultural' era dawn?
The secularists are taking no chances. While seeking to protect their lifestyle choices 
from Islamic encroachment, they limit the Islamists' choices. Rival visions of 
modernity can only coexist when they do not threaten or oppress each other. In 
Turkey they do both, as the secularists have the power to oppress Islamism and the 
Islamists have the ability to make Kemalists feel cornered: the appearance of a 
headscarf in public usually suffices, even though for many women - especially those 
from traditional backgrounds - veiling is the only ticket to personal mobility and 
autonomy permitting them to join modernity (White, 2002:52, 219-220, 238).
The Islamist movement is fragmented, yet it is largely moderate and almost uniformly 
conservative. Many Islamist men believe women should stay at home, some even 
support polygyny. It is clear then that female Islamists need the secular Republican 
framework more than any other group. Yet the state refuses to differentiate between 
different kinds of Islamism, treating them all with the same unconcealed alarm. As a 
result, Islamists group together against the state's refusal to grant veiled girls access to 
education. Yet they are not united; for some, believing that women need no more 
education than suffices to make them better mothers, this is simply a banner. For 
others, it is a substantive issue of freedom of choice and religion that actually curries 
favour with many secularists, but not all. And while Kemalists resent the 'covered' 
girls as hitches to the modernisation project, these girls are modern enough to know 
their rights and take the state to court in their defence.
'In a democracy' notes Kaylan (2005:331), 'wearing a turban is... a matter of 
personal choice. In Turkey the turban is used as a form of protest by a reactionary 
movement, supported for years by Saudi Arabia and Iran.' For Kaylan, the headscarf 
is not simply a symbolic violation of secular public space, but an open expression of 
political support for theocracy. Yet religion, although feared, remains central to the 
Turks' national self-definition, even if it denotes shared cultural capital rather than 
piety (Turan, 1991:37-8). Even the Republic tacitly admits this, favouring Muslim 
asylum applicants over others in the name of cultural compatibility (Kiri^i, ND).
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Religion remains relevant as Turkey remains conservative. A 2005 survey shows that 
30.5 percent of Turks attribute the country's problems to lack of morality, while 40.3 
percent are proud of Turkey 'because it is an Islamic country'. Only 12.3 percent were 
proud of Turkey's modernisation (TDN, 19 September 2005). Piety and conservatism 
do not necessarily imply support for Islamic politics or opposition to economic and 
technical modernisation; in fact, they rarely translate into religious politics26. 
Nevertheless, religiosity affects the way people think about politics. Hence the 
secularist national self, with its disdain for piety, excludes many Turks. Similarly, 
Erbakan's attempt to turn the headscarf into an Islamic political banner alienated 
many girls who cover because of personal piety, paternal oppression, social timidity 
or personal politics, but still seek a slice of modern living despite their headscarf, not 
because of it.
Although veiling can be political, it is not ipso facto political27 . By assuming that it is, 
however, secularists alienate the veiled university student - a Republican citizen 
embracing modern living. A secular republic is the ideal structural habitat for a veiled 
student to practice her faith without forsaking her right to education or a job outside 
the home. And yet the secular Republic does not celebrate or even accept its veiled 
students, as modernising expectations prescribe that women raised and educated 
within it should not wish to veil. A veiled student, doctor or lawyer is a contradiction 
in terms. The headscarf ban, as all attire regulations, was meant to ensure Turkey's 
Western aspect while modernisation was taking root. The ban itself does not seek to 
cultivate modernity, it simply ensures its semiotic prevalence. A headscarf is 
assertively visible in a secular landscape. As the state forces its female students and 
professionals to 'embrace' modernity by looking the part, the question of what 'being 
modern' means begs an answer. Is a woman who seeks an education and career not 
modern? If this is not proof enough, the covered girls' readiness to fight for their right 
to cover proves they are hardly the docile Muslim women that modernisers fear.
26 46 percent of Turkey's population pray five times a day; 84 percent of men attend Mosque on Friday; 
91 percent of Turks observe the ramazan fast. Yet three-fifths of those questioned, and despite their 
religiosity, believed that a religion-based party had no place in Turkish politics (White, 2002:56-7). 
27 Women in (ar$afare a rare sight in Turkey. Loose headscarves are most common. The assertively 
self-conscious tesettiir is also modern and chic.
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Ozdalga (1998:60) finds 'covered' lawyers, PhD students and divorcees. Covered 
women are not subsisting in modernity's margins. Although many are forced to cover 
by spouses or fathers, for most veiling constitutes a 'sensible' compromise between 
personal choices and her family's conservative sensibilities. Some perceive the veil as 
an opportunity to re-appropriate Islam in a public and political fashion (Gole, 1996:1, 
5), but for the vast majority of women, veiling is a matter of moral dignity, not a 
rallying cry for systemic change, (Ozdalga, 1998:89).
Motivations vary and, if anything, the veil is neither a sign of backwardness nor an 
obstacle to progress. Regardless of her motivations, however, a veiled woman 
engaged in modern activities challenges Republican definitions of modernity by 
embodying an unthinkable combination: religiosity and modernity. Simultaneously, 
she challenges Islamic traditions wherein women occupy the role of invisible 
domestic carers. The covered/modern woman phenomenon makes conflict with 
traditional Islamic males inevitable (Gole, 1996:117) as the 'veiled student' is a 
secular product, not an Islamic one. She needs the secular setting more than the 
secularists themselves. 'Paradoxically', notes Gole (1996:139), 'the more Islamic 
women enter the public sphere via political movements, the more influential they 
become in initiating an irreversible process within the Islamic movement, when they 
"question" the private sphere.' Their demands vis-a-vis the secular state may be 
religious in content, but their methods and language would have done Ataturk proud.
Covered girls speak of liberal values and individual freedom, a language enjoying 
currency abroad and resonating with Turkey's EU ambitions. Although the 
constitutional court deems using democratic principles in order to impose segregation 
(through the veil) and challenge secularism unacceptable, the covered girls have 
widened the secularism debate. Firstly, by actively claiming that it is not the veil that 
segregates them but the state, they undermine the authority of the courts' protection 
rhetoric. Secondly, and most significantly, the covered girls, alongside the AKP, 
combine the European language of human rights with a redefinition of Kemalist 
secularism to forge a new legitimation narrative.
The debate over whether men and women can be equal partners in a modernising 
society is not unique to Turkey and is not limited to the Islamists. Even Kemalist 
modernisers retained conservative gender notions for many decades. Eventually
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women became a Kemalist symbol. £mar (2005:65) actually accuses Kemalism of 
granting women political rights as a tactical move for European consumption. Gole 
(1996:73, 79) accuses Kemalism of granting women social visibility in order to 
facilitate the desired 'civilization shift' while actually retaining Islamist/conservative 
perceptions about what a woman 'ought to be like'. As women became a symbol for 
modernisation, the veil became the symbol of all that could hamper this effort. The 
covered student debunks this myth while also rejecting Kemalist monopolies over the 
definition of modernity. Defying Kemalist predictions, she embraces modernisation, 
but does so in her own terms, abandoning Kemalist universalism and Western 
mimesis for an assertively personalised road to modernity.
While Islamists are trying to assert legitimate lifestyle alternatives, they remain united 
vis-a-vis a hostile state, although, in an open environment, fragmentation would be 
inescapable. Meanwhile secularists claim the unique protection of Turkey's secular 
principles and fear the Islamic onslaught. The question is whether the 'Islamic 
revival' is embedded in the Republican nexus or seeking to transform it. Does praying 
during one's lunch-break on Friday cement secularism or subvert it?
The question is hardly asked yet, but the time when it will be is not far off. 
Meanwhile, Islamists feel obliged to address secular concerns regarding their 
presumed backwardness and irrationality as their self-image absorbs and responds to 
secularist fears and misapprehensions (Navaro-Yashin, 2002:42-3, 71; White, 
2002:8). The debate is widening and, gradually, caricatures and stereotypes are being 
abandoned. The AKP is both the product and powerhouse of this transformation, 
having won precious breathing space by embracing a Kemalist westernising rhetoric 
and delivering results on the EU front. Yet, as not all modernisers favour EU 
accession, the AKP cannot escape suspicions of being not only a threat to secularism, 




The EU: Westernising Opportunity or National Threat?
Atatiirk's legacy regarding the West is mixed and ambivalent. The West represented 
the source of Ottoman problems and anxieties. It was threatening, duplicitous, 
treacherous. Simultaneously, Western science, art and technology inspired intense 
admiration. For Kemal, who fiercely rejected the Communist alternative, national 
survival depended on becoming as strong as the West in order to resist it. To move 
Turkey out of its precarious post-War position, progress was needed. This required 
modernisation, for which the West was a good model. With time, this urgency waned 
and Turkey was left with a national narrative that both admired the West, seeking to 
resemble it, and hated it, seeking to resist potential encroachment.
L Threat and Admiration: Kemalist Visions of the West
The West is both a model and a predator in Turkish national narratives. As the place 
where civilisation and modernity flourished, it offers an excellent model for Turkey's 
modernisation. In its desire to share the West's scientific, artistic and technological 
accomplishments, however, Turkey looks up to an abstract, static and a-historical 
'West' (Ahiska, 2003:352, 354), distinct from the Western countries Turkey never 
trusted. It was Turkey's mistrust of this real West that created the urgent need to 
modernise and 'catch up' in the first place, in order to avoid being at the westerners' 
mercy again. Westernisation, promised Ataturk (1929:723), would 'raise the nation 
onto its rightful place in the civilised world'. This was an invaluable tool for early 
Kemalists, as the strong republican state was legitimised as the only structural vehicle 
capable of pursuing progress and modernisation (Gokalp, 1959:81).
As modernisation held the key to national survival, everything done in its name was 
deemed expedient - including the creation of a brand new polity. Once on the road to 
modernisation, early Kemalists forged an elaborate rhetoric seeking to represent
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westernisation as a return to the Turks' original roots - in order to make the task seem 
both manageable and legitimate to an exhausted, war-weary population. Historical 
appeals to the Turks' 'Europeanness' sought to represent the initial westernisation 
drive as a modernisation drive for a European country whose development had lapsed. 
The urgency of sustaining this message at home and disseminating it abroad - proving 
Turkey's Europeanness to Europeans - survives today.
An Ankara Business Centre (2005) publication, designed as a resource for foreign 
businessmen, spends several pages 'proving' Turkey is European by claiming three 
traits associated with Europe: a long and illustrious (national) history, binding Turkey 
to Europe's own Hellenic and Roman ancestors (p.44); a solid republican pedigree, 
the gift of 'Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, one of the greatest leaders in modern times, who 
catapulted Turkey into the 20th century' (p.l); and secularism (p.23,49).
Similarly, a 2003 TRT (Ttirkiye Radyo Televizyon) leaflet advertising the radio 
service La Voix de la Turquie delves into a similar set of claims regarding Turkey's 
Europeanness. Firstly, Turkey is a European-style national republic, thanks to 
Atatiirk. Secondly, it consciously pursues a policy of secularism, scientific inquiry 
and modernisation, which is rational and European. The leaflet notes that the 'eternal 
Republic... a source of pride and happiness' has enabled the Turks to achieve success 
in many fields while competing against other Europeans: awards at Cannes; literary 
prizes for Pamuk; Erener Sertab's 2003 Eurovision song contest victory; a third place 
in the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Stressing the mortal peril the nation faced because of 
the Europeans during the Independence War, the leaflet underlines that such 
accomplishments are only possible thanks to the Republic, which ought to be 
protected at all cost.
This is indicative of Turkey's current position. Its 80-year westernisation drive has 
created an intense desire for recognition and vindication. It is felt that, unless the 
Europeans accept Turkey's westernisation as successful and Turkey as one of them, 
the effort will have come to nought. Westernisation has long been pursued despite the 
West - a la Atatiirk - and Europe's unwillingness to accept Turkey's Europeanness 
was attributed to ill-will, jealousy and small-mindedness. Yet acceptance remains 
highly desirable. In fact, some favour EU membership mainly because it would 
convey this recognition in a most final and formal way. Simultaneously, EU
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membership would offer Turkey the means and support to complete its modernisation 
project and reach the level of contemporary civilisation. To do so, however, Turkey 
has to cede to the westerners' demands - 80,000 pages of legislative reform; submit to 
their scrutiny and, potentially humiliating, assessments; and compromise national 
pride and sovereignty while putting the country's unity and integrity at risk. And then, 
even after having complied with all the demands and having ignored Atatiirk's 
warnings against European duplicity, Turkey may still be rejected, facing the 
humiliation that Westernisation was meant to shield it from.
The EU is both a threat and an opportunity, the object of both admiration and 
profound mistrust. Does it represent the West that Ataturk warned his children 
against? Or does it represent progress; a force Ataturk believed could be neither 
resisted nor negotiated? Everything Turkey is, from the nation-state to the secular 
Republic, was embraced as part of a conscious effort to bring it in line with 
contemporary civilisation. Membership of international bodies, such as NATO and 
the Council of Europe, was sought in the name of westernisation; industrialisation 
was pursued and gender equality legislated in the name of progress. As progress and 
'being European' became fused, Turkish foreign policy's 'primary aim was to see 
their country recognised as a respected European power' (Hale, 2002:57). 
Recognition was of the essence.
'Not long ago, a prominent Belgian politician argued that Turkey could not 
become a member of the European Union because Europe was a 
"civilisational project". But Ataturk's project, launched at a time when 
civilisation was coming under a threat in its European core territory, was a 
"civilisation project" above all else' (Mangt>, 1999a:9).
Turkey is the outcome of this project and seeks EU membership in its name. How 
Ataturk would feel about the EU is a complicated issue. Those who argue in favour of 
the EU do so in Atatiirk's name: but so do those who oppose it. Atatiirk's legacies are 
pitted against each other when trying to weigh nationalism versus westernisation. 
Some seek to revisit, update and redefine these legacies in light of a changing world. 
Others uphold certain arrangements as not only good, but also necessary. In Atatiirk's 
time there were no formal channels for the conveyance of Western recognition. 
Recognition did not entail compromises on sovereignty or an extensive legal
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harmonisation plan. Westernisation for the Kemalist regime, notes Hale (2002:71), 
entailed pro-Western republican, secular structures and policies, but did not involve 
any further contact or entanglement with the West unless national security required it. 
So is the EU an opportunity for recognition or a danger to national independence and 
integrity? The issue remains unresolved. Debate over whether EU accession would 
pursue Ataturk's dream to its logical conclusion or compromise his principles is now 
raging. When, however, Turkey applied to join the (much smaller and less 
demanding) EEC in July 1959, there were no doubts that membership was in line with 
progress and modernisation.
Turkey was deemed unfit to join, but in 1963 it was offered an association through the 
Ankara Agreement, securing financial assistance and a gradual customs union, 
completed in 1996. The customs union brought about 'the biggest budget deficits ever 
witnessed in world economic history' (Z, 27 July 2005), but was hailed as a political 
success, promoting modernisation. Additional protocols were signed and legal 
harmonisation started remarkably early, yet Turkey remains in the EU ante-chamber.
Decades of political instability and economic crises hampered Turkish-EU relations 
(Glyptis, 2005a:403-407). When Turkey reapplied for membership in 1987, the 
application was forwarded to the European Commission and not rejected outright. 
This meant that - unlike Morocco whose application was turned down by the Council 
of Europe because it is not European - Turkish membership was a matter of readiness 
not suitability. And although Turkey was not deemed ready, the Council and 
Commission did not question its suitability. Meanwhile, the EU changed dramatically 
and membership became a much more complicated affair. When Turkey's EU saga 
began there was no reason to believe that it might backfire and result in humiliation 
rather than recognition. Even if Turkey failed the formal criteria, its Europeanness 
should not be an issue as it was confirmed when the Association Council, 
Commission and Council of Europe discussed Turkish membership between 1997 and
2000. recognising Turkey as a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki summit. This 
should have sealed the process. It definitely increased Turkey's commitment as, in
2001. EU accession became Turkey's overriding political priority.
EU acceptance is now more pertinent than ever, yet it seems that some academics, 
politicians and political advisers never stopped questioning Turkey's 'Europeanness'.
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Sanguineti is a case in point. For Sanguineti (1999:18), Turkey is not European on 
any level; its geography, race, culture, religion, civilisation and politics prove Turkey 
is alien to Europe. Sanguineti dwells on politics in particular as, he believes, Turkey 
disregards core European values and norms of conduct. Yet, implicit in his argument, 
there seems to be a feeling that, as Kubicek (2004:25) aptly put it, 'even if Turkey 
meets the political criteria, it will still be big and Muslim'.
Corrado Pirzio-Biroli (2005), Head of Cabinet for former EU Commissioner Franz 
Fischler, finds such witticisms unhelpful. 'Accusing all those who object to the 
accession of Turkey of Islamophobia... is a very cheap shot', he argued. Turkey is 
simply not European. The 1999 candidacy decision, he notes, took 60 seconds to 
make. Now EU leaders do not back down for fear of humiliating Erdogan's 
government, which has done an exceptional job. But granting candidacy was an 
irresponsible action. Defining Europe is hard, Pirzio-Biroli admits, but defining what 
Europe is not is easy. For Olli Rehn, the EU is defined by values not borders. Turkey, 
for Pirzio-Biroli fails to respect those values. Besides, he concludes, Rehn's statement 
is irrelevant to strategy, as it gives no indication of where the EU could end. For 
Pirzio-Biroli, the answer is simple: west of the Bosphorus.
Such statements hurt national pride by dismissing both Turkey and its national 
aspirations. Since the EU started stalling, devising membership criteria for Turkey 
that other candidates did not face and prolonging the process, Turkish diplomatic 
circles started feeling that the quest for acceptance was gradually eroding its own 
premises. The pursuit of moral satisfaction was beginning to hurt national pride. Was 
the EU being malicious, inconsistent or irresponsible?
The EU has changed dramatically since Turkey's Association Agreement. This 
change has not been fully thought-out and Turkey accentuates many unresolved issues 
regarding Europe's future - identity matters; structural issues; boundary problems; 
and the dilemma of whether the EU should be a security area or a security actor (see 
Glyptis, 2005b). As Grillo, Milio and Talani (2005:3) note: '[t]he two referend[ums] 
that killed the constitutional treaty at the end of May represent the most dramatic 
crisis in the history of the European project. In fact, the Council of the 16th and 17th 
June shows that what makes the crisis even more acute is that nobody seems to be in 
charge or to have a plan.' It is no wonder, then, that the EU is sending Turkey mixed
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modernisation was to protect independence; without it, the entity that is to modernise 
exists no more. Mango (2000) agrees. Atattirk was inspired by Western civilisation's 
achievements, but knew that the fact that contemporary civilisation was achieved in 
the West did not make it Western. Ataturk's vision embraced some Western traits, but 
did not seek to emulate the West. For Mango, comparisons and external benchmarks 
are misguided and detrimental. Echoing Ataturk's famous aphorism 'biz bize 
benzeriz' 1 , Mango re-asserts the grounds for Turkish pride vis-a-vis Europe. Ataturk's 
Republic was unique in its time, even if it did not satisfy a stringent definition of 
democracy. Besides, '[i]f Italy, the home of the Renaissance, could not maintain 
democratic rule, how could one expect it of Turkey, which the Renaissance had by- 
passed?' (ibid).
Aggravation aside, withdrawal from the accession process is not a serious proposal 
yet. The AKP continues to champion EU membership, capitalising on both the 
westernising project's de facto legitimacy and the (waning) popularity the prospect of 
EU membership enjoys. Thus, under the mantle of EU-stipulated reform, the AKP has 
managed to effect sweeping reforms that no other government - especially if 
suspected of harbouring an Islamist agenda - could have passed. This, however, 
further complicates the EU supporters' already fragmented front.
The EU is an unyielding and meddlesome partner, often acting with complete 
disregard for both national sovereignty and pride. Before accession, Turkey needs to 
satisfy the EU on 35 key issues or 'chapters', ranging from science and education to 
politics and the Cyprus question. Some issues are already on the road to being 
satisfied, such as dismantling the SSCs, reforming the NSC, legalising Kurdish 
broadcasting and banning the death penalty, as well as reforming the constitution, 
penal code and anti-terror legislation. Others, such as minority rights, the Cyprus 
issue and relations with Greece, are harder to resolve, yet the AKP persists.
Even those who perceive membership as the apex of Atatiirk's westernising dream 
often wonder whether the accession process actually undermines Kemalist 
nationalism by assaulting national sovereignty and integrity. Is the pursuit of EU 
membership forwarding westernisation at the expense of Kemalist nationalism? The
1 'We resemble ourselves'.
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debate is intense. For Ahiska (2003:355), the entire Kemalist project was 'a 
performance geared for the gaze of the West', hence Turkey will not abandon its EU 
ambitions, whatever the sacrifices entailed. Yet AtatUrk's legacy of 'westernisation 
despite the West' meant that Turkey should ensure that while Western eyes were 
turned towards it in admiration, Western hands were kept off it at all cost.
The AKP's presence at the helm of an already problematic reform effort, mistrusted 
as an instance of potential foreign meddling, complicates matters further. Is Erdogan 
using EU accession and the language of democracy and westernisation to undermine 
secularism and emasculate Kemalism?
'[Some] are not reassured by the argument that, just as approaching EU 
membership protects civilian rule against military interference, so it defends it 
against religious takeover. Ah yes, they say, but EU membership will never 
actually come about. Somewhere along the way it will be vetoed. And then 
Turkey will be left in the hands of the AK Party, and all the good works of 
Atatiirk and his republican successors will be undone' (TE, 17 March 2005).
Reform has been extensive; not enough to disestablish the existing state model, but 
far-reaching nonetheless, unsettling unitary national narratives by giving voice to 
minorities and weakening military involvement in civilian affairs. The AKP, fearing a 
disruption on the road to Europe, seeks to inspire public ownership of the reform 
effort - presenting it as popular, necessary and fully compatible with Kemalist 
principles (Glyptis, 2005c:105-106). Nevertheless, even those in favour of both 
reform and EU membership are not unanimously convinced of the AKP's ability to 
pursue these goals (TNA, 1 July 2005). Meanwhile, Kemalists remain divided on 
whether the EU is a threat or an opportunity in Kemalist terms.
EU accession is not a negotiable process. The EU makes demands and expects 
candidate countries to change, adapt and comply. Legislation needs to be passed 
regulating everything from data collection to water purification, health and safety at 
work to the establishment of family businesses. Unsurprisingly, the more contentious 
part of the reform package involves the political provisions demanding, among other 
things, the complete withdrawal of the TAP from civilian affairs, legislative reform 
protecting the individual above the community, provisions for minority rights and
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human rights and freedoms, as well as the resolution of the Cyprus question. All in 
all, satisfying the EU's political demands entails a radical rethink of Turkey's unitary, 
nationalist, defensive and collect!vist state model.
Such a rethink, however, is not easy, as the issue of minority provisions proves. As 
unity presupposes 'one-ness', the Turkish state adopted a Jacobin approach to 
minorities - with the exception of Istanbul's etablis, 'foreigners' protected by the 
Lausanne Treaty. The Kemalist state did not embrace ethnic diversity. Population 
movements, exchanges and an inclusive civic discourse enabled the Turkish Republic 
to move away from Ottoman ethnic diversity, although Mango (2000) is keen to stress 
that Atatiirk 'cannot be blamed for the disappearance of the ethnic diversity of the 
Ottoman state... non-Turkish communities had become determined to lead separate 
lives in their own national states'. Hence the presence of the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate in Istanbul (E, 11 November 2005; 31 October 2005; 7 September 2005; 
H, 7 June 2006) or the Armenian Hospital Foundation's right to own property in 
Turkey (M, 22 July 2005) are unwelcome reminders of past Ottoman mistakes and 
thorns in the side of national unity. Yet these populations present no real threat to the 
state-territory-nation trident as they are foreign, with national homelands elsewhere. 
Although actually indigenous, these populations represent Ottoman residue, staking 
no real claim on Anatolia. Conversely, populations with no alternative homeland are 
problematic and their potential claims on Anatolia need to be nipped in the bud. 
Anatolia belongs to the Turkish nation and all its residents are Turks; if they think 
otherwise, it is simply a case of false consciousness to be remedied through education.
As former Prime Minister Biilent Ecevit put it: 'There is no Kurdish problem in 
Turkey, there is a feudalism problem' in the Southeast (Z, 7 September 2005). hi 
other words, the problem is not one of unitary nationhood or territorial integrity, 
rather, it is one of insufficient modernisation. Violence in the Southeast is caused by 
tribal chiefs refusing to let go of power that has become irrelevant in a modern world. 
Such attitudes, naturally, de-legitimise the Kurdish struggle on several levels. 
Perceiving the 'Kurdish problem' not in ethnic, but in civilisational terms, makes it 
easier to 'handle' under the Kemalist modernisation scheme. Or, rather, it did until 
recently. Turkey's EU ambitions make such narratives untenable as the EU demands 
minority provisions to be integrated into law, irrespective of Turkey's unity concerns.
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In line with these demands, Turkey established a committee to investigate Turkish 
citizenship provisions. Its report, published in November 2004, was damning. 
Criticising the state's approach to citizenship since its founding moment, the report 
suggested replacing the ethnonym 'Turk' with the more inclusive toponym 
'Tiirkiyeli'. Outrage ensued. The state prosecutor investigated allegations of treason 
and an enraged committee member theatrically tore up the report before television 
cameras (TE, 11 November 2004). Although condemnation for the shredding was 
immediate and vocal, even human rights activists criticised the report for insulting the 
state (TDN, 3 November 2004). The report challenged unity: since safeguarding unity 
and territorial integrity is the state's duty, the report effectively threatened integrity by 
denying the one-ness of the Turkish nation with its Anatolian motherland.
This incident is representative of the tension between making concessions on the road 
to EU accession and actually compromising the Kemalist national, secular Republic. 
Ranking Ataturk's priorities in descending order is a difficult task that Kemalists did 
not expect to have to perform. While the decision on whether modernisation as 
westernisation is worth pursuing through EU membership is pending, the AKP is 
championing the cause of membership andeffecting reform in Kemalism's name.
2. Kemalist Concerns and EU Ambitions: the AKP's Accession Effort
The sweeping 2002 electoral victory allowed the AKP to claim it represents the 
wishes of the Turkish public. This claim was simply strengthened with time. A 2003 
poll showed support for the AKP increasing from 34.2 percent to 44.4 percent (TDN, 
6 November 2003). By 2004, and with AKP's success at the impending local 
elections almost certain, secular journalists rightly anticipated a strengthening of the 
AKP's rhetoric of popular legitimation (M, 2 February 2004; TDN, 22 March 2004).
In order to retain this popularity, however, the AKP cannot afford to lose touch with 
the people. It needs to voice popular frustrations at a perceived Western lack of 
respect for Turkey. In the wake of the 2003 murderous attacks on Istanbul, when 
European countries issued travel warnings and UEFA moved two football matches 
away from Turkey, Gill told Europe it had failed Turkey, showing no solidarity and
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isolating it in its time of need (TDN, 7 December 2003). For all its commitment to the 
accession process, the AKP is no stranger to Kemalist frustrations and fears.
Following a Turkish-Swiss showdown on and off the football pitch during a 2006 
World Cup play-off, Fatih Terim, the national coach, accused the West of a 
conspiracy to keep Turkey out of the competition and praised his team for doing 
'what was necessary for the Star and Crescent'. The matter was referred to FIFA and 
could have ended there had deputy premier and sports minister Mehmet Ali Sahin not 
jumped on the conspiracy bandwagon. Sahin spoke of injustice and accused FIFA 
president Sepp Blatter of acting 'as a Swiss fan instead of a president' (World Soccer, 
January 2006). Although marginal, this example is indicative of a national reflex at a 
time when national pride is bruised by a barrage of European slights against Turkey's 
Europeanness that the opening of accession negotiations failed to stem.
Similarly, the AKP needs to articulate the socially conservative voters' 
preoccupations with the EU's perceived Islamophobia. It is worth noting here that 
'[w]hile many AKP members are Islamist, most Turks are not' (AEI, 2 August 2005) 
and overt religiosity would undermine both Erdogan's popularity and his credibility 
vis-a-vis the EU project. The AKP cannot afford that, as support for the EU and the 
reform effort is vital for the party's survival. Hence, although Erdogan never bypasses 
an opportunity to deplore the West's propensity to equate Islam with terrorism, he 
does so within the context of the concert of civilisations of which Ataturk spoke. On 
rare occasions, he even accuses the West of a bigoted and racist attitude towards 
Islam that worries Turkey, a country with a Muslim population and a democratic 
regime (M, 17 May 2005). But Turkey can help. 'With is stability, success in 
development, status within the West, rich historical heritage and identity, Turkey will 
be a symbol of [the] harmony of civilizations for the 21 st century... the EU should not 
and cannot be a Christian club' (Erdogan in TDN, 9 July 2005).
In keeping with public opinion, AKP politicians occasionally condemn EU 
intervention in domestic affairs as an assault on sovereignty and independence, in true 
Kemalist style. Ironically, on one such occasion the 'meddling' was welcome to 
secularists, as it concerned the AKP's abortive attempt to criminalise adultery (TP, 10 
September 2004). For journalist Ulkii Giiney, the AKP's willingness to fall into line 
with public moods and its readiness to withdraw unpopular legislation is a sign of
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weakness (TDN, 13 December 2003). However, the AKP's reluctance to press the 
system to breaking point and its eagerness to remain in tune with popular moods is a 
sign of wisdom, not cowardice. Public endorsement is vital both for the AKP's 
legitimation and the reform effort's sustenance, as there is a growing feeling in 
Turkey that the Europeans are backing out of the European project.
Could Turkey's continued loyalty to this project be misplaced (see SFC, 17 June 
2005)? While the Europeans try to disentangle their priorities and agree on their 
common direction, Turkey is striving to meet criteria and stay positive. Yet this is 
hardly satisfying the nation's need for recognition. Growing frustrations could derail 
the reform effort. Erdogan cannot afford this, so he tries to give his people a sense of 
ownership of the reform effort. Even if EU membership fails to materialise, Turkey, 
he notes, will 'go it alone', turning the Copenhagen criteria into the Ankara criteria 
(TNA, 6 September 2005). This was an AKP slogan even before the party's election 
(Erdogan 2002, Giil 2002). The phrase was later used by Enlargement Commissioner 
Olli Rehn (2005a), who also claimed that Turkey's accession journey will be as 
rewarding as the final destination. A year previously, Erdogan (2004a) had said the 
same thing: the road to membership is as significant as the destination because it 
enables Turkey to pursue much-needed reform and Ataturk's westernising dream 
concurrently.
Reform is not simply a means to an end (Gul, 2005e). Turkey's transformation goes 
beyond introducing and implementing new laws. The reform is aimed at changing 
habits and modes of thinking and acting that are incompatible with democracy and 
modernity (ibid). The AKP never concealed its support for reform in itself. Now 
Erdogan's position is unequivocal: Turkey's * demoralisation' path will continue 
irrespective of the fate of its EU aspirations (Z, 3 October 2005). The path in question, 
however, remains easier to travel down as part of the EU accession effort.
The AKP's discursive position relies heavily on the combination of their popularity 
with the (waning, but still considerable) support for EU accession and the ability to 
attribute controversial legislation to EU accession demands. This means that the AKP 
seeks to retain the loyalty of conservative voters while gaining support elsewhere 
because of their reform agenda and EU aspirations. Those who favour reform would, 
potentially, still support the AKP even if the EU process foundered. For others,
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however, reform was a necessary evil and the AKP an undesirable champion of a 
coveted goal. If that goal remains stubbornly out of reach or becomes undesirable, 
then Erdogan's reform effort will lose several of its reluctant supporters.
Erdogan's electoral success, combined with the popularity of his westernising 
reforms, has enabled him to stretch the definitions of nationhood and secularism while 
still legitimising his actions in the name of Kemalist goals. As Dagi (2005:31) put it: 
'[T]he AKP realized that they needed the West and modern/western values of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in order to build a broader front against 
the Kemalist centre, and to acquire legitimacy through this new discourse in their 
confrontation with the secularist establishment.' This, however, means that if 
Turkey's EU membership was rejected - by either the Turks or the EU - Erdogan's 
powerhouse of legitimation would fail, the reform effort would falter and so could his 
party. So Erdogan is seeking to instil support for reform in itself by constantly 
stressing the need for and popularity of reform, regardless of EU demands.
This legitimising narrative was easy to construct, as the previous government handed 
the AKP a declaration of intent in the form of the National Programme (2001) 
making the pursuit of EU membership a national duty. The programme hailed EU 
accession as the culmination of Ataturk's dream and pledged to pursue it with respect 
for national unity and integrity. Had Erdogan tried to initiate this process, discussions 
regarding 'hidden intentions' would have probably hampered him. In 2002, however, 
the AKP hardly needed to legitimise its agenda; the process was under way and 
legitimised before them, enabling the AKP to legitimise itself through it.
The AKP sought to legitimise its idiosyncratic version of secularism in terms of the 
EU project, making it a question of national pride 'to prove and confirm that a 
Muslim society can... be democratic, open, transparent, accountable, pluralistic and 
contemporary, that is "European", while preserving its identity'(Gtil, 2004d). The 
AKP thus challenged both the EU and Turkey's secularists to prove themselves 
against Ataturk's universal standards. Turkey, Gtil (2005a & e) noted, proves the 
universality of certain values and the feasibility of managing democratic politics in a 
Muslim society. Can secularists at home accept that Turkey's Muslim population does 
not challenge its democracy? Can the EU admit this Muslim population into its 
civilisational enclave? If Europe opens its doors to Turkey, continues Gul (2005a), it
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will show the world that 'Europe is defined not by a narrow understanding [of] 
geography or religion, but by common values': democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law. These values, concurs Erdogan (2004a), are 'European' in civilisational, not 
geographical terms. Although European hi origin, they have transcended their place of 
birth, becoming the common property of the civilised world. 'No single culture can 
claim that universal values belong to it alone' (Gill, 2004e).
The reassertion of Turkey's Muslim identity as a dare to Europe - to show itself 
worthy of the civilisation it gave birth to - turns EU membership into the acceptance 
of Muslim Turkey. Islam thus becomes a constituent element of an exercise in 
national pride. Staying loyal to Ataturk's belief that civilisational standards are 
universal, Giil (2004c) exclaims that 'democracy is a way of thinking' untainted by 
cultural specificities. In fact, freedom of thought and expression - necessary for 
democracy - are evidently in action when democracy flourishes in new cultural 
environments, such as a Muslim setting. As always, the message is directed both at 
EU and domestic audiences. But domestic audiences are fragmented.
Trying to placate secularists, traditionalists, reformists and conservatives at home, 
Erdogan (2004a) defines Europeanness as 'politics commanded by values'. 
Secularists approve of politics adhering to a set of values - Kemalist in nature and 
European in origin - transcending social divisions. Meanwhile, socially conservative 
Anatolians receive such statements as declarations of the AKP's intent to end a bias 
towards westernised Turks at the centres of power and possibly even end clientelism 
and patrimonialism. Obviously, Erdogan's popularity, as well as his practical 
capability to deliver reforms, rests on his continued ability to retain the support, 
however grudging, of both these groups. Given that both groups are heavily 
fragmented internally, the task is as sensitive as it is momentous. The fact that EU 
demands are non-negotiable makes uniting disparate agendas easier for now. 'Europe 
is not only the engine of reform but the glue of political cohesion in Turkey. EU 
membership is a national project shared by the people, business and the army, and 
embraced by the AKP as a shield against the generals' (FT, 22 May 2006).
People desire EU membership for different reasons, so some embrace reform while 
others merely tolerate it. The fact that the EU simply dictates its demands means that 
disparate forces can - and have been - harnessed towards the same goal. This is why
229
Chapter 7
the AKP has managed to sail around debates over its 'true intentions' and doubts 
voiced by secular officers and academics; the Copenhagen Criteria became an 
unexpected ally in the pursuit of domestic reform. As a result, the AKP's EU 
commitment has been dismissed by some as 'more necessary than genuine' (E, 8 
October 2005). Kaylan (2005:449) even argues that the AKP only seeks EU 
membership in order to pursue its fundamentalist agenda unchecked by domestic 
agents. Such accusations are extreme. In fact, even suggesting that the AKP needs the
westernisation, rather it has incorporated the drive into its internal legitimating logic.
For Dagi (2005:32), the AKP's pro-EU stance is 'based on an observation that, the 
more Turkey was distanced from the West and the EU in particular, the stronger 
would be the tutelage of the army that treated the Islamic groups as an anomaly and 
threat... the Western demand for democratization and human rights overlapped with 
their search for protection against the Kemalist establishment, including the military 
and the judiciary'. The AKP is genuinely concerned for human and religious rights - 
'in particular its own' (P, issue 105, December 2004, p. 49), as protecting human 
rights and democracy will ensure its own survival. Undoubtedly, this constitutes a 
parallel agenda, but it is neither concealed nor subversive. The AKP needs the reform 
effort for its political survival both at the polls and vis-a-vis the secular establishment.
In order to sustain this effort, the AKP has to counter Kemalist fears that the West is 
constantly 'plotting against Turkey' (ibid), as well as suspicions regarding its 'hidden 
agenda' (Tank, 2005:12). Although the former is hard to achieve, the AKP has 
followed the EU democratisation roadmap closely, not giving secularists cause for 
real concern too frequently. Meanwhile, however* the AKP is effectively testing the 
boundaries of Kemalist discourse. Can republicanism come to mean Western liberal 
democracy? Can secularism come to mean freedom of religious belief?
Despite momentous reform, the core of the Turkish state remains the same. 
Constitutional and legal concerns, as well as the corporate identity of judges, officers, 
academics and the President, all point towards the fact that Erdogan has walked the 
tightrope well so far, but is not yet on solid ground. The reform effort needs to 
continue and, for that, either the accession process needs to carry on or the Turkish 
people need to feel complete ownership of reform, valuing it independently and
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regardless of EU accession. Erdogan, trying to forge this feeling, often stresses that 
the AKP's popular mandate is a mandate for radical reform; this is a 'reformist 
government' enjoying 'the strong support of all segments of Turkish society' (article 
by GUI, TDN, 13 December 2003). In order to retain this support and sustain the 
reform effort, Erdogan seeks to present the accession process as very near completion, 
while simultaneously making textbook Kemalist legitimation appeals
Erdogan (2004a) believes Turkey has 'reached the required threshold in both 
legislative terms and effective implementation', but many disagree. Hansjoerg 
Kretschmer, head of European Commission's Delegation to Turkey, (TP, 1 May 2005; 
TNA, 9 July 2005) stresses that 'the beginning of accession talks does not necessarily 
imply that Turkey will enter the EU'. Olli Rehn (2005a & b), on the other hand, 
possibly seeking to help stabilise the reform effort, often stresses that reforms in 
Turkey have reached an irreversible point; the debate now is not about whether 
Turkey will join, but about when. In fact, Rehn (2005b:54) spoke of Turkey's rightful 
place in the European project, practically quoting Atatiirk.
Rehn is aware that Kemalist concerns are the main reason EU aspirations are deemed 
legitimate in Turkey and so is the AKP, wasting no opportunity to pay tribute to 
Atatiirk and his legacy. Gul (2005b) proudly advertises his ministry's dedication to 
Atatiirk and determination to 'function with a high level of patriotism'. Patriotism 
drives state business, loyal to Atatiirk's (2003:9) legacy: 'The essential thing is that 
the Turkish nation can lead an existence of dignity and glory'. The AKP does not lose 
sight of this and seeks to present the tortuous path to EU accession as the road 
towards national glory that will take Turkey, in the words of chief EU negotiator Ali 
Babacan, into 'the contemporary world' (H, 4 October 2005), marking the final stage 
of Atatiirk's modernisation effort with an endeavour that is comparable in magnitude 
and significance to Atatiirk's accomplishments. 'Turkey is now experiencing the 
second largest wave of modernization after the reforms carried out by the founding 
father of the Republic' (Babacan, 2004:12).
Atatiirk famously stated that Turkey should resemble no one but herself. Gul (2004f) 
repeats this theme: Turkey stands apart from the rest of its neighbourhood thanks to 
the Republic. Atatiirk set Turkey on the path to a destiny the AKP is about to fulfil, 
true to his spirit. 'We dared to implement this reform programme in a very peculiar
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atmosphere: a war was going on in our neighbourhood, international terrorism was on 
the rise, most liberal countries had to take some restrictive measure effecting certain 
freedoms', but Turkey, once again, proved stronger and more determined than others 
(Gul, 2004f). For GUI (2004d), AKP reforms hardly differ from Atattirk's mission as 
they share the goal to improve political, economic, cultural and social standards for 
the country and the people in an uncertain world. Moreover, AKP reforms are 
genuinely popular. 'We responded to the call from our grass roots asking for better 
governance, higher standard[s] of democracy and respect for rights of every sort' 
(Gill, 2004g).
National pride, republican structures and modernisation are immediately recognisable 
as Kemalist references, hi a tight-knit nexus of meaning, Kemalism conveys 
legitimacy on undertakings ex hypothesi. Describing democracy as a 'process of 
perfection', Gul (2005e) effectively claims that he is elaborating on Atarurk's plan. A 
static democracy is no democracy at all, he notes, hi order to retain Atarurk's legacy, 
the nation has to keep working, changing and evolving with the times.
The AKP presents EU accession as the vindication of Ataturk's vision, but with a 
twist. Accession will confirm Turkey's modern credentials and prove Ziya Gokalp 
right: attaining contemporary civilisation does not require abandoning specific 
cultural identities. 'Turkey is coming ever closer to its historical integration with the 
West while preserving its uniqueness' (Gul, 2005f). The 'uniqueness' in question may 
be more Islamist than Atatiirk would have appreciated, but the marriage of culture and 
civilisation is fully in tune with his legacy. The question is how creatively can one 
adapt this legacy. For Kili, change is heresy: for others change is long overdue (Z, 25 
May 2005), as eight decades is long enough to render the wisest legacy redundant. On 
that note, some even advocate a complete departure from Kemalism. Legitimation 
works in concentric circles of acceptable, negotiable, deviant and inconceivable ideas. 
The wholesale abandonment of Kemalism is currently in the outer circles, but its 
negotiation is legitimate and acceptable, although its boundaries remain fuzzy.
'Some see European culture and values as museum pieces restricted to certain 
geography', but for Gul (2004g), Atatiirk was right; European civilisation defies 
spatial boundaries. Atatiirk could not have foreseen, however, today's global world. 
He could not have known that joining Western civilisation was not merely a matter of
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choice, but one of legal and institutional harmonisation and formal acceptance. 
Turkey remains loyal to Atattirk's path of integration with the West, namely alliances 
and treaties (Giil, 2004h). Turkey, however, keeps up with the times. Engagement 
with modernity now also entails membership of international organisations such as 
NATO and, of course, the EU. Drawing from the argument that EU membership is the 
logical culmination of Kemalist westernisation, the AKP managed to widen the 
meaning of 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'secularism' - by making their EU- 
endorsed meaning common currency in Turkey. Linguistic options proliferated and, 
as a result, political debate widened. Simultaneously, however, tensions emerge as 
newly embraced European definitions are not always compatible with accepted 
Kemalist definitions. Often terms such as secularism mean different things, have 
different aims and legitimise different sets of actions. Through this disparity, the 
dilemma faced by the Ottoman Empire during its decline re-emerges: can Western 
modernity be selectively embraced? Or do Western values need to be given 
precedence over local ones? As Turkey is neither crumbling nor ailing, the question it 
needs to answer is whether value-coexistence is possible and, if not, whether the 
alternative is desirable.
3. The Kemalists' Qualified Europhilia
3. a. The TAP
The TAP, as Kemalism's guardians, are committed to all facets of Atatttrk's project, 
including modernisation. In this spirit, and true to Atatttrk's 'peace at home, peace in 
the world' motto, General Ozkok (2005a) stresses, Turkey joined NATO and always 
contributes to regional and global peace. In this spirit, Turkey also wishes to join the 
EU, as an equal partner. The wish to join, however, rests on the condition of equality. 
Nobody, not the US nor the EU, should hint that association with Turkey constitutes a 
favour. America's relationship with Turkey is based on a mutual-need/mutual-benefit 
assessment, and so will Turkey's association with the EU (Basbug, 2005a). Ozkok 
(2005a) agrees: 'It is really inappropriate to consider [EU] membership as a favour.'
Despite this tone of defiance, however, Dagi (1996) found that the TAF's 
longstanding identificational engagement with the West makes military leaders highly
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responsive to Western influence and pressures. As Republican national imperatives 
are essentially linked to westernisation/modernisation, TAP personnel never willingly 
disassociate themselves from Europe. Even during the 1980s military administration, 
Dagi continues, Turkey's EEC vocation was never abandoned. Turkey did not even 
withdraw from the Council of Europe - despite threats to do so - because such a 
withdrawal would be 'a denial... of Turkish commitment, in symbolic terms, to 
Westernization that was the cornerstone of Kemalist state ideology' (ibid).
For the TAP, pursuing EU membership is part of a sustained Western-oriented policy 
that has sought membership of international organisations when opportunities arose 
and allowed security doctrines to change with time. EU membership itself is neither 
an overriding nor distinct goal; rather, it remains important as part of this ideological 
positioning and rapprochement with the West. In this spirit, Hilmi Ozkok noted that 
the time has come for Turkey to assume a more cooperative perception of security, 
focusing not on its neighbours any more, but on international terrorism. In order to do 
that, Ozkok stressed, Turkey needs to be admitted into the EU. Then, and not before, 
it will be truly able to adapt its security doctrines to the needs of new security 
situations facing the world (M, 18 October 2003; TDN, 23 November 2004).
Responding to EU demands for the resolution of Turkey's longstanding disputes with 
Greece (the continental shelf, FIR and Aegean grey zones), the TAP, understandably, 
wish to be on an equal footing with their counterparts before relaxing policies. 
Consequently, the TAP are unwilling to grant the EU's request for signs of goodwill 
before parity is established as, they feel, this may jeopardise national security. This is 
further complicated by the fact that the TAP often perceive threats to national unity as 
security threats. Hence TAP suspicions are extended to several EU demands, 
including granting cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurds. As such demands 
proliferate, the TAP are hinting a policy re-orientation away from the EU and, 
strategically speaking, away from an exclusive focus on the West since relations with 
the US are as strained as those with the EU (TDN , 28 April 2005).
EU membership is sought in Ataturk's name, but there is more to his legacy than 
westernisation. And the EU's ever-increasing demands, articulated in terms of human 
rights concessions and increased democracy, create an unprecedented problem for 
Turkey, namely the need to rank Ataturk's priorities in descending order of
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significance. EU-stipulated reforms are bound to change Turkey's existing state 
model and affect its collectivism nationalist and secularist priorities. Is westernisation 
more important than unitary nationalism and the protection of national sovereignty 
against foreign meddling? For General Basbug (2005b), the nation-state is the 
ultimate repository of loyalty for citizens and officers alike. In fact, citizen attachment 
to it 'remains one of the reasons for [the] rejection of [the] EU constitution in... 
France' (ibid). But if the nation-state retains such overriding importance for EU 
member-states, why would an aspirant member be expected to compromise national 
pride in the name of accession? For Basbug, the nation-state is more important than 
EU membership. Although he clearly hopes one would not preclude the other, the 
preservation of unitary nationalism and corresponding state structures is the TAF's 
primary concern. EU membership should not require sacrifices in that respect.
This does not mean that the TAF do not desire EU accession. On the contrary, Ozkok 
(2005a) exclaims: 'EU membership is the first topic on our national agenda.' 
However, negotiations are ongoing and it is not simply up to the EU to decide; 
'Turkey can also say "yes" or "no" in the end' (ibid). The problem, notes Basbug 
(TDN, 3 November 2004), is that the EU makes demands and puts pressure on Turkey 
without taking its realities, needs and interests into account, thus jeopardising its 
unitary structure and territorial integrity. The EU, like other European powers before 
it, joins forces with Turkey's minorities seeking to divide and weaken the country. 
But the TAF, Basbug concludes, will protect the unitary Republic at all cost. Turkey 
should remember negotiations are open-ended and the option to refuse membership 
remains open. As Ozkok (2005a) put it: 'If no agreement is reached and Turkey does 
not enter the EU, it would, of course, not be the end of the world.'
Yet there is little to agree on. As the EU's conditions are non-negotiable, Turkey has 
to decide how much it actually desires membership. Then the question is not whether 
Turkey can become what the EU wants it to be, but whether it wants to (Glyptis, 
2005d). Does Turkey want to dilute Kemalist unitary nationalism; de-securitise public 
discourses; and abandon collectivist national narratives? So far, when necessary, 
'[individual rights and the autonomy of public institutions were restricted... for the 
sake of national unity' (Mango, 2005:31). This constitutional and military 
preoccupation with unity and integrity forges a collectivist framework in which EU-
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style individual liberties cannot fully function. For those who believe time for change 
is upon us, the EU provides an excellent framework within which to do so. The TAP 
disagree, believing that the political model followed thus far works and does not need 
changing. Kemalism, together with all its priorities, the TAP note, survived intact into 
the 21 st century because it is both popular and successful. Although true, Turkey's 
evolution has also been shaped by the fact that the West needed it to remain secular 
(after the Iranian revolution), stable and Western-oriented (during the Cold War), and 
did not much care if it was the TAP rather than civilian authorities ensuring that 
Turkey stayed on their side at those difficult times.
Now, however, the pressure is on. The EU demands the TAF's withdrawal from 
politics and the creation of new laws placing the individual above the community. 
Moreover, the EU demands that this new spirit be reflected in institutional practice, 
public culture and political priorities. It also demands that EU observers, analysts and 
assessors be allowed access to institutions and public documents. Unsurprisingly, the 
Sevres Syndrome rears its head: is the EU trying to undo the Lausanne Treaty? Could 
EU accession, rather than being the vindication of Ataturk's modernisation, actually 
be its undoing? Could complying with EU demands open Turkey to Kurdish, Islamist 
and other threats that the emasculated TAP will no longer be able to control?
'Sufferers of the Sevres Syndrome cling to a rigidly authoritarian system that uses 
Kemalism as the proverbial hammer that pounds flat any raised nails, be they ethnic 
or religious' (White, 2002:57). The Sevres Syndrome is not limited to the TAP, but is 
shared by politicians, journalists and civilians. Although 'in the abstract, Turks 
approved of a number of basic democratic rights... [they] exhibited more lukewarm 
feelings on many of the specific political reforms that have actually been adopted' and 
many 'would refuse to endorse reforms, even if it would cost Turkey its EU 
membership' because they are 'reluctant to "follow orders" from Brussels', often 
equating EU demands with Kurdish separatism (Kubicek, 2005:371-2). Although 
Kubicek is quoting from a 2002 survey and things may differ following the AKP 
experience, the concert between public opinion and military concerns is important. 
Given the respect surrounding the TAP, when the military identifies an event as a 
threat, challenge or slight, the population and Press take notice.
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The TAF's scepticism towards the EU (NYT, 25 September 2005; TT, 10 June 2005; 
CSM, 14 June 2004), combined with reform fatigue and the practical side-effects of 
convergence efforts hitting society, means that the question of whether pursuing EU 
membership costs more than it is worth is being raised. As the referendums in France 
and Holland were experienced as direct affronts in Turkey (M, TDN & TP, 2 June 
2005), the popularity of accession started to wane. Nevertheless public opinion has 
not yet turned against the project, the AKP remains committed and even the TAF, 
reservations notwithstanding, have not withdrawn their support. In an unprecedented 
move, Hilmi Ozkok even permitted the investigation of retired officers (including 
retired Admiral ilhami Erdil) for financial irregularities and abuse of power (H, 25 
May 2005). The move was so unexpected that some wondered whether it had more to 
do with personal animosities rather than a willingness to comply with the 
government's reform effort (TDN, 28 December 2004). Stating that 'patriotism cannot 
be monopolized by men in uniforms' (ibid), Ozkok, bowing to civilian authority, 
allowed the investigation of 39 officers, in line with EU demands. The TAF is no 
longer untouchable, yet the debate over the desirability of EU membership is not over.
'Many Turks believe the Kurds are using the country's EU bid to advance separatist 
ambitions under the cover of human rights reforms. Moreover, public support for EU 
membership, the driving force behind Turkey's democratic reform effort, has declined 
amid increasing European hostility to this Muslim nation's accession to the bloc' 
(TDN, 10 July 2005). The TAF's concerns with unity and their opposition to 
perceived concessions to a foreign power obviously linger in the Turks' minds. This 
unease is exacerbated by the insecurity caused by the new wave of attacks in the 
Southeast (TDN, 31 March 2006; TP, 29 March & 6 June 2006; Z, 21 April 2006).
Concerns, however, have been voiced that the TAF, rather than seeking to appease 
this insecurity, may have created it. In September 2005, a Zaman editorial lamented 
that 'whenever Turkey starts democratic reformations, turns its face to the Western 
world, and gets rid of its [political] problems', rogue security elements and ultra- 
nationalists seek to frustrate its ambitions for a better future (Z, 6 September 2005). A 
few months later, these concerns seemed potentially founded in fact. Land forces 
commander Yasar Buyiikanit and two senior officers were investigated for attempts to 
thwart Turkey's EU bid through the artificial manipulation of the Kurdish conflict (TT
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& LAT, 1 March 2006). Buyiikanit was earmarked as Ozkok's successor (and indeed 
became TAP Commander-in-Chief on 30 August 2006) and expected to be less 
accommodating than the current Chief of Staff. Van prosecutor Ferhat Sankaya 
accused Buyiikanit of having assembled a rogue force to stoke unrest among the 
Kurds in hope of forcing the government's hand into restricting Kurdish freedoms and 
thus undermining Turkey's EU bid.
On 9 November 2005, a bomb exploded in a bookshop in Semdinli, killing one and 
injuring five. Although the PKK was initially suspected, it transpired that two non- 
commissioned officers were implicated. When 'General Biiyiikamt described one of 
them as "a good soldier" suspicions deepened' (TDN, 14 June 2006). The request to 
investigate Buyukamt came after a parliamentary investigative committee had been 
set up and after several local officials had been transferred to other regions. The 
accusation was shaky, based on a single testimony, and the Supreme Board of 
Prosecutors and Judges disbarred Sarikaya (TDN, ibid). Some perceived this action as 
a Kemalist 'closing of ranks', while others spoke of a government plot to ensure a 
more pliable successor to Ozkok than Buyiikanit.
Either way, although Biiyiikamt remained unaffected, the TAF's authority was 
undermined by the speculation and the subsequent arrest of military personnel on 
charges of setting up organisations to destroy the unity of the country (TP, 5 June 
2006). The General Staff's attitude - accusing the civilian prosecutor of overstepping 
the boundaries of his authority - and Sankaya's subsequent fate revived discussions 
regarding the 'deep state' - namely that real power lies with the military, police, 
gendarmerie and secret services. Meanwhile, the AKP sought to grant Sankaya an 
amnesty to work in the private sector, but the CHP opposed the move (TDN, 14 June 
2006), describing Sankaya's indictment as an attempted coup against the TAP. ANAP 
sided with the CHP in its defence of the Kemalist establishment.
Exactly one year before these events, GUI declared EU accession 'the most important 
project in the history of the Republic', noting that it enjoyed the complete support of 
civilian and military forces (TDN, 27 April 2004). These events may well prove him 
wrong. Nevertheless, it is clear that the TAP support EU membership as the 
culmination of Ataturk's westernising plan only as long as its pursuit does not require 




Not all Turkish politicians think EU membership is a good idea. Opposition is voiced 
from all sides of the political spectrum in startlingly similar language. Workers' Party 
leader Dogu Perincek and ultra-nationalist Devlet Bahfeli, surprisingly in agreement, 
note that they respect Europe and Western civilisation, yet oppose EU membership as 
it threatens national autonomy and sovereignty (TP, 14 February 2004). Prerincek 
refers to Atatiirk's warnings against external interference and, describing European 
capitalism as 'latter-day colonialism', he denounces straying from the Kemalist path. 
Bah9eli makes a similar appeal, noting that Turkey's EU entry ought to be dignified, 
entailing no concessions on religious and ancestral values that would jeopardise unity. 
In the name of this unity, he opposed abolishing the death penalty (for separatists) and 
accused the AKP of betraying the nation and laying siege to its pride.
Erdogan's reply was equally Kemalist: 'Those who cannot digest Turkey's 
membership are opposed to an alliance of civilizations' and the people's will. 
'Nobody can divert the path of the public by filling public squares. The Turkish 
public can't be deceived like that. The day is the hour of truth' (TNA, 4 October 
2005). Erdogan is referring to a rally where Bah?eli (2005) urged the great Turkish 
nation to resist the compromises asked for by the AKP and the EU. Implicit was a 
reminder of the First World War, when the Europeans opposed Turkey's very 
existence. Turkey's contradictory feelings towards Europe complicate matters. 
Former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, while warning that if Turkey is not offered 
membership, it will either slip into Islamic fanaticism or suffer another coup, also 
accused Europeans of having a crusader's mentality and called the EU a Christian 
club (E, 1 September 2004).
For many, each difficulty on Turkey's EU path is both a slight to national pride and a 
warning sign against European aggression. This complicates Turkey's desire to 
belong. Every EU directive or communication is received in an environment of 
mistrust towards both the Europeans' intentions vis-a-vis Turkey and their a priori 
unwillingness to accept her as an equal. These fears underlay Baykal's exclamation 
that Turkey should not be happy with whatever the EU offers, but hold its head high, 
negotiate as an equal (TDN, 26 May 2005) and under no circumstances accept a 
privileged partnership or other second-tier tie, which is what, Baykal claims, the AKP
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is ready to do (H, 25 May 2005). Although Baykal does not advocate withdrawal from 
negotiations, he did request that the accession process be debated in parliament (Z, 3 
October 2005). Although Erdogan reacted to this proposal as he does to most anti-EU 
remarks, that is by treating them as personal political attacks (Z, 12 October 2005), it 
is important to ask what re-opening a parliamentary debate on the desirability of 
accession would achieve at this stage of the process. The only real purpose would be 
reaffirming Turkey's sense of agency and reminding everyone that Turkey can 
withdraw if it so wishes.
President Sezer agrees that Turkey should retain its sense of agency in the process. As 
head of state, however, Sezer approaches the issue with caution. He is in favour of 
westernisation and believes that, in ideological terms, there is no a priori discord 
between Turkey and the West (Tank, 2005:4). For Sezer, the EU is a civilisational 
project, pursued in the name of universal values. Countries sharing those values share 
a bond despite their historical and cultural differences (Sezer, 2000a & 2004b). This 
bond, stressed Sezer's Chief Foreign Affairs advisor, Sennet Atacanli, was the reason 
why the President would not allow the French and Dutch 'No' votes to affect his 
European commitment (TDN, 6 June 2005). Nevertheless, his commitment is not 
unqualified and Sezer remains vigilant against challenges to national unity, integrity 
and pride. He knows that Ataturk's westernisation was not meant to entail the 
wholesale acceptance of European values.
Sezer uses a specific, often defensive, national narrative that embraces EU accession, 
but makes it abundantly clear that certain issues are non-negotiable. The first is 
national interest. Sezer often speaks of 'realities' that the EU has to take into account 
- such as the existence of 'equal and democratically separate states' in Cyprus (TNA, 
1 July 2005). Secondly, the President is unwilling to sacrifice Turkey's national unity 
and territorial integrity and has often used his veto in order to block AKP legislation - 
justified in terms of EU demands - that he felt violated the constitution and put the 
country's unity and integrity in danger (Z, 6 November 2005). Thirdly, Sezer is 
suspicious of what he, too, perceives as unwarranted foreign meddling in Turkey's 
affairs. When the ECHR called for the re-trial of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, 
the President advised that the request be rejected (M, 17 May 2005). Although the EU
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retains the right to monitor candidate countries' legal proceedings, Sezer perceived 
this as a contrived excuse to stall Turkey's EU accession.
In the end, the ECHR decided a re-trial was unnecessary (Z, 16 May 2006), but 
Sezer's initial stance remains significant. Some felt this interjection actually 
compromised the impartiality of his office. Others, particularly those sharing his 
indignation at a perceived sustained EU campaign to injure Turkish pride, felt that, as 
President and a former judge, Sezer was well within his rights to express an opinion. 
Evidently, defending national pride has created unlikely bed-fellows; Perincek agreed 
with Bah9eli, and Sezer agreed with Ann? when the latter stated that Turkey wants 
EU membership but accession should 'be completed without giving up national 
interest and self-esteem'. Sezer concurred, noting that the Turks' biggest 
responsibility is not EU accession, but the Republic's preservation and protection (Z, 
2 October 2005).
4. The Future of Turkey's European Vocation: The Advent of Relativity or the 
Dawn of the Second Republic?
Having identified the EEC as 'the political expression of "contemporary civilization" 
that Ataturk had set them the task of reaching', the Turks hailed accession talks as 'a 
decisive victory for the republic's ideals' (IHT, 16 December 2004). But if accession 
is 'the most important project in the history of the Republic' (TDN, 27 April 2004), is 
it worth reforming the Republic for? With SSCs abolished, the NSC limited, pluralism 
embraced (TDN, 12 August 2005) and the Prime Ministry publishing monthly human 
rights reports (TDN, 27 January 2004), is Erdogan's reform effort slowly but surely 
paving the road towards the Second Republic?
Erdogan proudly stated that 'no person has entered jail for expressing their thoughts 
during my term. Turkey is a country of freedoms'' (WSJ, 18 March 2006), a statement 
that captures the reformists' jubilant mood, but is not fully accurate. Firstly, reform 
has slowed down noticeably in the past year. Secondly, Turkish prosecutors are 
currently investigating English artist Michael Dickinson for depicting Erdogan as a 
dog in a collage. The accusation is 'insulting the dignity of the Prime Minister' and, if 
found guilty, Dickinson could spend up to three years in jail (TDN, 14 June 2006).
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This is not the first time Erdogan has been depicted as an animal nor, indeed, the first 
time he is taking legal action against his critics, as a cartoonist depicting him as a cat 
discovered last year (BBC, 3 March 2005). When, following this incident, a magazine 
depicted Erdogan's head attached to a variety of animals, the premier sued again and 
- when the court ruled against him - appealed, noting that '[fjreedom of thought, 
freedom of the press never amount to freedom of insult; they should not. If you 
caricature the prime minister of this country, or anyone else, as an animal, this 
can never be called freedom' (TDN, 3 April 2006). Yet in the EU it can and it does, 
and Erdogan's intolerant attitude caused raised eyebrows in Brussels.
The AKP's record is no longer unblemished. Although there is evidence that the AKP 
purges itself occasionally (H, 1 June 2006), the party's impeccable credentials while 
ruling the municipalities have been compromised while in government and 
accusations of tolerating corruption and appointing cronies to top jobs are rife (TE, 4 
May 2006). Similarly, although the AKP initially followed the IMF financial plan to 
the letter, earning Western praise (see Glyptis 2006) and CHP accusations of taking 
orders from abroad (Z, 29 May 2006), things no longer look as rosy (E, 27 May 
2006). With the 2007 parliamentary elections in mind, Erdogan lowered taxes and 
raised spending (TE, 30 March 2006). ANAP leader Erkan Mumcu actually accused 
him of trying to influence the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey to conceal a 
financial crisis (TDN, 15 June 2006).
This situation is compounded by increasing violence in the Southeast. 'Kurdish 
politicians have blamed the riots on Ankara's failure to meet their demands for greater 
freedoms' (TDN, 31 March 2006), while Bah9eli described the violent riots as 'the 
price for Erdogan's Diyarbakir adventure' (i.e. the 'meeting with intellectuals', ibid). 
In this context, popular anti-PKK sentiment grows and soldiers' funerals are 
inundated with placards demanding action in the form of tougher anti-terror laws 
(TDN, 11 April 2006) that could limit freedoms anew. Meanwhile, Ozkok issued a 
statement confirming the TAFs guardianship role, even though it did not reveal 
specific intentions: 'We love the people of the region. We are the commanders of all 
regions. We serve the whole nation.' Yet how is the nation best served? By navigating 
through the difficulties of EU demands and arriving, finally, at the Second Republic, 
that may or may not include EU membership? Or by protecting national unity,
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integrity and pride? The inherent contradictions in Atattirk's legacy are difficult to 
resolve, but Erdogan's democratising westernisation seeks to sail around them.
Democratisation, however, is a tricky concept. For some in Turkey, 'more democracy 
generally means more Islam' (NYT, 25 September 2005), yet for others, more Islam 
automatically means less democracy. Hence the question of whether the Kemalist 
Republic can harmonise with the acquis communautaire and still be the same state is 
charged and pertinent. If the only vehicle that can take Turkey into the EU is the 
Second Republic, membership loses its appeal for many. Many agree with Mango's 
(2000) belief that the purpose of each state is good governance and EU demands may 
be compromising the Turkish state's ability to fulfil this purpose. '[HJuman rights 
lobbyists must ask themselves... whether the reforms they urge will enhance or 
diminish good governance, and law and order, without which freedom cannot 
flourish.' Here Mango raises the question of whether those demanding sacrifices from 
Turkey have the foresight and ability to navigate through difficult and unpredictable 
situations that Ataturk had. The conviction that Ataturk's genius cannot be replicated, 
therefore his legacy should not be interfered with, is common. The position is 
anachronistic, as the options and international realities facing Atatiirk were hardly 
comparable with the ones facing Turkey today. Therefore, many believe that reform is 
long overdue. For them, the EU is a useful anchor and trigger for much-needed 
reform: for them, the advent of the Second Republic is good news.
For Kubicek (2005:366), Turkey's elites have long favoured drastic reform, even if 
they rarely choose the 'Second Republic' phraseology in its support. Hence reform 
occurs even though the people remain indifferent or hostile to it. Elites, however, are 
not uniformly in favour of reform. Turkey now resembles, according to Barlas (S, 18 
October 2003), a car with two drivers - the elected and the appointed - each with 
their own agenda and steering wheel. Accidents are bound to occur. Although both 
drivers are headed for 'democracy', the term, as we have seen, means different things 
to different groups. Erdogan seeks to amalgamate these trends by marrying eight 
decades' worth of Republican legacies. Erdogan's (2004b) 'conservative democracy' 
borrows from traditional Kemalism, rejecting 'interest' politics and claiming to 
represent the whole nation; it emulates ANAP-style inclusiveness and avoids 
Erbakan's mistakes. Conservative democracy is not an ideology, it is a survival guide,
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as the AKP is determined to carry out 'reforms of a revolutionary nature' (Gill, 
2005b) and preserve the peace between the civilian and military establishments. 
Opting for the thoroughly Kemalist path of a 'revolution from above', while stressing 
its electoral mandate and continued popular support (GUI, 2005e), the AKP has 
limited the TAF's political leverage, enhanced rights and freedoms and declared zero 
tolerance to torture (H, 17 March 2004).
Yet during GUI's (2005e) London School of Economics speech, a small but vocal 
demonstration by the Haklar ve Ozgurltiler Cephesi protesting police brutality and 
torture was raging outside the lecture hall. GUI's assurances notwithstanding, the AKP 
revolution still has some way to go. The AKP's balancing act does not always work. 
The AKP is in tune with the population's socially conservative elements, such as the 
potentially pious urban poor, rural masses and new capitalists. In fact, the European 
Stability Initiative Report (2005:6) finds that the AKP 'is in many respects a political 
reflection of the values and ambitions that have shaped the Anatolian Tigers'. Yet the 
party does not always retain the confidence of 'coastal' elites, secularists and 
Kemalists. But their confidence remains necessary as reform has not gone far enough 
to hail the advent of a Second Republic.
While the AKP is eager to stress that everything is under control and the EU path 
remains undisturbed, the only problems faced being difficulties inherent in the process 
(TP, 6 May & 5 June 2006; Z, 12 June 2006), the eventual extent of reform is still a 
moot point. Radical as change may have been, the existing system is so far being 
'updated', not replaced. The advent of the Second Republic requires individualism - 
and corresponding rights and freedoms - to replace collectivism and EU-style liberal 
democracy to replace the secular Republic. Until then, structural reform will affect but 
not alter the normative core of political legitimacy. The Republic's agenda and 
priorities remain the same. Erdogan is currently negotiating the meaning and practical 
translation of certain items on this agenda, but his position is yet to win the day.
As legitimacy is a language of constraints and opportunities for the articulation of 
power arrangements and political choices, the normative framework of legitimacy can 
change. In Turkey such change would entail radical legal reform, the re-training of 
judges and educators and the gradual replacement of spatial symbolic narratives and
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socialisation discourses. In short, such change would require more reform and more 
time than it has been given thus far. But is there support for such change?
Elites and citizens remain divided. The actual aim of reform, EU accession aside, 
remains frustratingly unstated. Because reform was legitimised in terms of EU 
accession, no alternative justification for its desirability has been articulated. 
Although support for the reform process irrespective of the EU exists, it springs from 
a multitude of often-contradictory rationales. If EU hopes are frustrated, the reform 
effort will have to be assessed on its own merits, and discussing the Second Republic 
may become appropriate. Yet Turkey's ability to do this will depend on what brought 
its EU ambitions to an end: a conscious decision at home, EU rejection or a coup?
Following the Semdinli case, speculation regarding civilian-military relations reached 
fever pitch. Following the 17 May 2006 attack on the State Council and a judge's 
death, tensions between the Islamists and secularists are rising. Erdogan criticised 
those who linked this attack to the headscarf question. Phrasing his statement 
carefully, the premier spoke of organised crime and likened this attack to the Susurluk 
affair, unmistakably referring to the 'deep state' (Z, 24 & 31 May 2006). Deputy 
Prime Minister Sahin spoke of illegal individuals and organisations thinking they are 
protecting the state while actually harming it. Erdogan concurred, claiming that these 
attacks were targeted at his government (Z, 24 May 2006; E, 25 & 27 May 2006).
Two issues are at hand here. Firstly, the TAF are complaining that after the attack, the 
government seemed more concerned to inform the media of developments than the 
TAF (TP & E, 5 June 2006). Given the security implications of this attack, this is 
more than a violation of protocol, but Sahin denies the accusations, stressing the 
government's commitment to helping security personnel at this juncture (Z, ibid). 
Secondly, speculation regarding an attempted or potential coup against the AKP is 
gaining momentum. As serving officers are currently under investigation by the TAF, 
as well as civilian authorities, conspiracy theories are rife. Istanbul-based Greek 
journalist Aris Abatzis is convinced that the AKP has won the animosity of both the 
TUSIAD, over 'disrupted' channels of state patronage, and the TAF, mainly over the 
question of secularism, and current events are part of a concerted, albeit hitherto 
unsuccessful, effort to destabilise Erdogan's government (E, 3 & 5 June 2006).
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The secularists' lack of faith in the AKP's suitability to lead the accession process is 
no secret. The possibility that they may withdraw their support for the unqualified 
pursuit of EU membership cannot be ruled out. Events such as the 17 May or the 
§emdinli attacks, regardless of who perpetrated them, prove one thing: that Turkey's 
EU harmonisation is far from over and that it is increasingly undesirable to more and 
more people. Abdullah Cevdet2 famously stated in 1913: 'There is no second 
civilisation, civilisation means European civilisation, and it must be imported with 
both its roses and its thorns' (quoted in Rustow, 1997:59). Having followed this 
legacy to the letter, Turkey is actually wondering whether one universal civilisation 
actually exists. The answer to this puzzle could potentially derail both accession and 
the reform effort.
Turkey felt discriminated against from the outset as EU decision-makers made its 
accession conditional not only on normal criteria, but on a series of extra issues such 
as improving relations with Greece and resolving the Cyprus issue. The AKP 
government accepted the challenge of trying to deliver results on both these issues 
without compromising national pride. Having scored a moral victory with the Cyprus 
referendum, Erdogan's government stumbled on the question of recognising the 
Republic of Cyprus, now an EU member state, and extending the Customs Union to 
include a country that hitherto did not exist for Ankara. Which he grudgingly did3 .
Relations with Greece are equally sensitive, especially as a recent accident over the 
Aegean (inside FIR Athens but outside Greek national airspace) caused the ill feeling 
of previous decades to resurface. A mock battle between Greek and Turkish fighters 
in May 2006, a sad but frequent occurrence, resulted in the death of one pilot. 
Although Greece has not threatened to veto Turkey's EU ambitions as a result, the 
atmosphere is tense. Greek President Karolos Papoulias accused Turkey of 
disrespecting international legislation (ibid), while Greek politicians brought the 
recognition of Cyprus to bear on the resolution of this incident (E, I June 2006). 
Meanwhile, Turkey stressed that the aircraft were on a training mission that NATO 
was informed of. Turkey also made demands, later retracted, for concessions on 
Cyprus (E, 18, 24 May & 1 June 2006). Complicating matters further, Greece is




adamant the Turkish side is to blame (E, 24 May 2006), while the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry launched an inquiry warning it will eventually demand compensation from 
Greece (TDN, 15 June 2006), exacerbating an already tense atmosphere. It is exactly 
these tensions that the EU wants resolved before accession. Yet, ironically, it seems 
such problems can only be resolved after accession, when border control no longer is 
as overriding a national priority. That was Ozkok's message after a similar incident in 
2003 (M, 18 October 2003) and Greek Air Force pilots agree, embracing Turkey's EU 
membership as the only solution to this ongoing low-intensity war (E, 25 May 2006).
This aside, objective criteria seem to be applied more rigorously to Turkey. Nothing 
else can explain why former Communist states, with weaker governance structures 
and rickety economies, overtook Turkey on the accession ladder. Adding insult to 
injury, these countries were former foes, against whom Turkey stood shoulder-to- 
shoulder with the forever-ungrateful West4 . As Turkey keeps urging the EU to be true 
to its signature and promise (TNA, 4 August 2005; Z, 8 August 2005; S, 27 August 
2005; H, 13 June 2006), the fear of not being accepted is intense. This plays on 
anxieties regarding the projection of Turkey's European image abroad (TDN, 13 
December 2003; Z, 14 June 2005), and also fuels intense introspection regarding 
Turkey's identity, the relative significance of Islam and the West in it and the 
possibility that the EU might simply be biased. In a post-9/11 world, this question is 
not easy to answer. Turkey has nationalised Islam and embraced the West, being 
neither Islamic nor Western, yet retaining characteristics from and partly identifying 
with both civilisational paradigms. Erdogan, however, fears that the Europeans may 
subscribe to Huntington's clash of civilisations, making this position untenable.
Erdogan increasingly speaks of 'civilisations' seeking to live in harmony rather than 
cultures co-existing within one civilisation (WSJ, 18 March 2006). This is not a 
simple semantic difference; it constitutes a potentially huge revision of Atarurk's 
legacy. When asking the EU to be a place where different civilisations meet and not 
an exclusive Western club; when he urges, after the cartoons of the Prophet incident 
early in 2006, an alliance of civilisations (IHT, 5 February 2006; TP, 26 September 
2005; TDN, 22 June 2004), he is departing from Kemalist universalism. Erdogan is 
implying that if the West denies the existence of universality a la Atatiirk then, to all
4 Turkish Foreign Office, htip: /'/ www. m fa. go v. tr/grupa/ad/adab/re I at i PITS . htrn
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intents and purposes, it does not exist. Hence it is not the AKP rejecting Ataturk's 
belief in civilisation as an umbrella covering all cultures, but rather the West itself.
What does national pride dictate in this case? Atatiirk's westernisation was 
courageous in a country ravaged by war and bitter at the West's imperialist incursions 
on Ottoman soil. But Atatiirk preached westernisation despite the West and, in a way, 
against it. Although recognition of Turkey's equal status would be the ultimate proof 
of success, modernisation's true aim was survival and national greatness. The West 
was a model. But if a model becomes irrelevant, then it simply gets replaced. 
Westernisation in the abstract can be pursued outside and irrespective of the EU. 
Ataturk's legacy, preaching pride in Turkey's uniqueness, may inspire an 
unwillingness to become what the EU demands. If the Republican 'hard-drive' is 
incompatible with EU-sponsored software, why was the assumption that the Republic 
should change so easily made - especially when Europe itself seems to be abandoning 
the European enlightenment project for a guarded, insular identity?
Turkey has westernised; it is secular, but culturally Muslim and is currently 
undergoing momentous reform that could stop at any point or continue until the 
Republic is fundamentally transformed and modernisation meets secularism once 
again, when neither is necessary as policy any longer as their aims have been 
achieved. For that to happen, the debate over whether the EU represents the logical 
conclusion of Ataturk's legacy needs to be resolved and reform needs to be decoupled 
from membership and discussed in its own right. With ever-decreasing support for 
Turkey's EU membership in Europe (TNA, October 4 & 19 July 2005; CSM, 14 June 
2004), the best time to do that is now - before a potential EU rejection makes reforms 
seem like a concession to external intervention and before fears regarding US policies 
and the instability of Iraq inspire a more inward-looking stance in Turkey. Increasing 
national(ist) frustrations within Turkey with EU indecision and US estrangement 
could lead to reorientation away from the West.
The AKP's motto, that nobody is free unless everybody is free, exposes standard 
categories for analysing Turkish social and political development (modernisers vs 
traditionalists; elites vs the people) as redundant. It also exposes the over-reliance of 
Kemalist westernisation narratives on symbols - sometimes over substance (Cizre &
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Cinar, 2003:310). In doing so, the question of whether the EU is resisting Turkey's 
accession not because it is Muslim, but because it is Kemalist, is raised.
Constant EU requests for human and minority rights protection5 are a case in point. 
Turkey is a democracy where the rule of law prevails. What to EU observers looks 
like a poor human rights' record may actually be the legal protection of collectivism 
at the expense of individualism. Although many EU demands, such as prison reform 
and the prevention of torture, have no bearing on Kemalist principles, the 
individualism and multiculturalism underlying EU legislation comes into conflict, not 
with Turkey's Muslim identity, but with its Kemalist legacies. Recent research by the 
Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (2005:63, 65) shows that 
incompatibility with the EU arises not because of Turkey's Muslims, but because of 
the nature of its state's secularism, which is also blamed for the existence of political 
Islam in Turkey in the first place. For the EU, the report concludes, the problem is not 
one of religion's influence on the state but 'the influence of the state on religion'. 
Once again, the problem seems to be Kemalism. In other words, EU accession ipso 
facto necessitates the advent of the Second Republic.
Turkey did not sign up for regime change, even though many Western observers keep 
losing sight of that fact, thinking that the Turkish state is as malleable as collapsed 
post-Soviet states. This discourse, even when employed in Turkey's favour, often 
smacks of latter-day colonialism (e.g. see G, 26 September 2005). The issue at hand is 
that if Kemalism is the reason why the EU does not want Turkey, Kemalism may well 
be the reason why Turkey will reject the EU in turn. While membership retains 
friends at home and supporters abroad (e.g. Jack Straw's article, IHT, 9 September 
2005), Kemalism is being renegotiated - and alongside it, so is normative purpose of 
politics. This does not mark the advent of the Second Republic, yet it represents 
Turkey's 'third way'.
' European Commission Information Database, \v\vw.fifoost org.en/'mdex.php
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Conclusions, Turkey's Third Way'?
The first half of this thesis shows that nationality, history and political experience in 
Turkey are mediated through the language of Kemalism. I analyse the narratives, 
anxieties and priorities of this language, used extensively for socialisation and state- 
sponsored national narratives, and demonstrate that this language is embedded in and 
protected by constitutional and legal provisions and used, alongside its corresponding 
values, by judges, generals and the President when performing their duties. The 
distinction between Kemalism as a language and Kemalism as a set of values is vital 
because, although the language is accessible, extensively used and negotiated, not 
everyone subscribes to Kemalist values.
The second half of my thesis demonstrates, firstly, how those who subscribe to these 
values seek to uphold them and, secondly, how those who espouse the language but 
seek to revisit the values go about instigating debate. Meanwhile, I demonstrate that 
the 'debate' is not entirely verbal, as policies, court orders and violent incidents make 
powerful 'statements' that influence the direction of this negotiation.
This analysis begs the question of whether it is actually useful to describe the Turkish 
state as 'Kemalist'. According to Tostendahl (1992:12), a state is a network structure, 
changing according to circumstances and with 'no lasting content of [its] own'; it is a 
social reality shaped by contingency. Erdogan disagrees: states should be value-free 
structures, yet often they are not, failing to realise that ideological states are a thing of 
the past (Erdogan in TP, 3 April 2005). Although speaking about Communism in the 
Ukraine, Erdogan's reference to Kemalism at home was thinly disguised.
Yet Kemalism, even for those who embrace it as a doctrine, remains imprecise and 
incoherent; a language for politics rather than a blueprint for action. Turkey is not an 
ideological state, even though Kemalist concerns are written into the Turkey's 
Constitution and reflected in the recruitment practices and code of conduct of most of 
the state's core bodies. However, Kemalism as a language is the medium through 
which Turkish politics is conducted. Even Ocalan expressed loyalty to Atatiirk during 
his trial and Erbakan claimed that, were Atatiirk alive, he would be a member of the 




Kemalist signifiers and nationalist narratives are unquestionably dominant in Turkey. 
But what are they? Kemalism is contradictory and can fuel conflicting policies as it 
blends civic and primordial appeals to nationality; it simultaneously urges Turks to 
resist the West and join it; and it is willing to marginalise religiosity while using 
religion. Nevertheless, until recently this potential for conflict did not complicate 
everyday political exchanges, as military officers, law-makers, educators and jurists 
all interpret Atatiirk's legacy in a standard and coherent fashion. Increasingly, 
however, the language is being used creatively rather than deferentially. National 
symbols are popular currency, used independently of specific political meaning and, 
as a result, potentially used for different purposes and incompatible causes. The AKP 
is currently exploring its boundaries and applications and, in doing so, revisits 
Republican political imperatives and assumptions via legitimate channels. This 
depends on making sure that that the AKP's legitimation rests on Kemalism but does 
not fully rely on it.
Hence the AKP constantly stresses its democratic legitimacy and popular mandate 
acquired in 2002 and enhanced after the 2004 local elections (E, 29 & 30 March 
2004) as a reminder for officers, judges and political opponents 1 . Secondly, the AKP 
utilises the de facto legitimacy of westernisation to pursue, more successfully than 
any previous government, Turkish-EU rapprochement earning them the admiration of 
foreign governments and businessmen (Z, 9 June 2005) as well as the EU2 . At home, 
Erdogan's westernisation drive may be under fire for being too yielding (M & TDN, 
19 June 2005; TDN, 6 June 2005), but the legitimacy of its final objective is not yet 
questioned. This gives Erdogan some leeway to use Kemalist republican nationalism 
as a third strand of legitimation in ways that diverge from the language's established 
uses and, slowly but surely, open the debate over the meaning of nationalism, 
secularism, westernisation and republicanism. Erdogan's reforms have changed 
Turkish politics. His linguistic acrobatics have initiated a process of negotiation over 
normative issues. The question now is how far-reaching and long-lasting this will be.
1 Apart from constant verbal reminders, AKP opponents have occasionally felt the sting of its power. 
For instance, the AKP removed procedural concerns that had previously halted proceedings so that 
Yilmaz and Taner could face trial (see TDN, 9 July 2005).
2 See bibliography for Commission Reports.
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For Turkish Daily News (28 April 2004) reporters, the change is already revolutionary 
as public service veterans openly criticise Turkey's rigid state model. This openness, 
however, is not fully attributable to the AKP and is heavily conditioned by EU- 
membership ambitions. Hence, if Turkey fails to join the EU, the future of this reform 
effort is not assured; although the reasons behind such a failure will be of vital 
significance. If Turkey 'fails' the European test, as Wolf suggests it might3 (FT, 19 
October 2004), then the AKP will be discredited and westernisation might be recast in 
a different mould, but Kemalism, as a set of priorities, will not have suffered too 
serious a blow. If, however, Turkey abandons the EU process because of a perceived 
European 'exclusionism' or if the EU terminates it because of exclusionism, then 
three scenarios emerge: the Kemalists may offer a re-vamped 'modern despite the 
West' narrative; Kemalism's universalist appeals may appear relativised, thus 
bringing the broadening of the linguistic terrain pioneered by the AKP to the fore, 
enabling alternative conceptualisations of the future and modernity to be explored; or 
a conservative backlash may turn Turkey away from the West and modernity.
It is too soon to speak of the AKP's triumph: the party has been flamboyant, but has it 
been successful? For Ercan Citlioglu (TNA, 1 July 2005), the AKP's legitimation is 
precarious and bound to falter. Its Kemalism has convinced no one, while 'borrowing' 
legitimacy from the EU drive has meant that policy success is often measured abroad, 
ignoring frustrations at home. In fact, Citlioglu believes, in order to deal with such 
frustrations, the AKP lied to the people regarding the success of the EU drive - lies 
that have propelled the AKP forward, but that are bound to be exposed sooner or later.
Meanwhile, reform proceeds slowly but surely, introducing legislation based on 
individualism and human rights under a constitutional umbrella premised on 
collectivism and national expediency. The tension between these principles, implicit 
in the way Erdogan chooses to employ Kemalist terminology, cannot be ignored for 
much longer. Courts will need to implement legislation and instances comparable to 
the Pamuk trial, minus the publicity that saved the day on that particular occasion, are 
bound to occur. Yet the issue at hand is not new. The tension between Westernising
3 Wolf notes that although inflation has fallen, the country's growth performance does not allow for 
convergence with the EU average. If Turkey joins pre-convergence, its size and poverty will cause 
'unmanageable stress' for the Union.
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Republican traditions and Kemalism's dismissive populism, strict secularism and 
modernisation from above was present since the Republic's proclamation and is 
reflected in the constitution, national narratives and the TAF's agenda. The question is 
whether the time has come to resolve it.
Kemalist military and civilian elites have long harboured a distinct lack of trust 
towards the people's understanding, ability and readiness to defend the secular 
Republic and have taken it upon themselves to ensure the Republic's continued 
survival. The Kemalists underestimate their people. Yet they also underestimate the 
ability of their own socialising mechanisms to ensure the internalisation of national 
republican narratives - especially as some interpreted the failure of strict secularism 
to take root as a wholesale failure of the Kemalist project. Kemalism may be an 
indivisible whole for Kemalists, but for the Turkish people 'Kemalism' is a social 
reality and, as such, multi-faceted and flexible. This effectively means that the best 
defence against any threat is the republic; not the Republic as an abstraction distilled 
from Atatiirk's legacy, but the citizens in their rich variety.
Many find this confidence difficult to sustain due to renewed violence in the 
Southeast, fears regarding the Islamists and a precarious international situation: the 
EU remains non-committal, relations with the US have not improved and a war has 
been simmering on Turkey's borders for three years. In theory, flexible Kemalist 
language in its current 'widened' status could be the best vehicle for restoring a 
balanced set of priorities. If, however, the current negotiation process is interrupted by 
violent incidents at home or a rejection abroad, this may not be an option.
So where does all this leave Turkey? While some Kemalists deny the existence of a 
Kemalist language in favour of an imagined infallible doctrine, they simultaneously 
fuel the language's continued utilisation in public life by accepting its currency 
regardless of who uses it. The resulting negotiation of terms, priorities and 
assumptions is the fate of any living language. This negotiation is slowly extending to 
issues of great normative importance, proving that the Kemalist language is flexible 
and popular, regardless of what the TAP think or fear. Public actors ensure 
Kemalism's reproduction and reafflrmation through constant use. Academics, jurists, 
judges and journalists ensure the reproduction of a perceived national truth by 
remaining loyal to it. As long as such narratives are open to renegotiation and re-
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appropriation, Turkey's normative debates can proceed gradually and peacefully. This 
will necessitate two things: that laws, educational provisions, artistic output and 
political discourse are allowed to respond to social change; and that Kemalism's 
guardians accept that those who do not accept Kemalism wholesale do not necessarily 
reject it. Turkey's 'third way' starts with the acceptance that the republican 
experiment has worked. The revolution from above can now cease, regardless of the 
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